(Re)Making and Undoing of PEACE/CONFLICT

This book presents the selected proceedings of the "Third International Conference on Communication and Media Studies: (Re)Making and Undoing of Peace/Conflict" hosted in 11-12 April 2012 by the Faculty of Communication and Media Studies at Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagusta, North Cyprus. The conference was organized by the Center of Research and Communication for Peace, located and working in the said Faculty of Communication and Media Studies.

The theme of our conference was "(Re)Making and Undoing of Peace/Conflict." With our conference theme we wanted to highlight how both conflict and peace are actively and performatively made and undone. Conflict and peace don't just happen by themselves, as themselves. They are not static givens as polar opposites. They are always in process, in becoming, yet to come. What this also means is that, in their becoming, they can uncannily evolve and change into their opposite as well. An intervention for a peaceful resolution, for instance, can turn out to cultivate another conflict. Neither peace nor conflict are guaranteed to stay as they are. This gives those of us who live in conflict situations hope for a peaceful future, but also calls for ongoing vigilance. Peace work is like housework in that it never ends.

(Re)Making and Undoing of PEACE/CONFLICT

emupress

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(Re)Making and Undoing of Peace/Conflict

3th International Conference in Communication and Media Studies, April 11-13, 2012

Faculty of Communication & Media Studies

Eastern Mediterranean University

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Introduction

Tuğrul İlter

This book presents the selected proceedings of the **Third International Conference on Communication and Media Studies: (Re)Making and Undoing of Peace/Conflict** hosted in 11-12 April 2012 by the Faculty of Communication and Media Studies at Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagusta, North Cyprus. The conference was organized by the *Center of Research and Communication for Peace*, located and working in the said Faculty of Communication and Media Studies.

The theme of our conference was "(Re)Making and Undoing of Peace/Conflict." The theme of our previous conference was "Communication in Peace/Conflict in Communication." In between the two, we also organized a "Peace Journalism Conference." As you can easily tell, issues related to peace and conflict are pressing concerns for us in the Faculty of Communication and Media Studies. This is certainly related to the fact that we, the organizers, live in Cyprus, marked by a history of conflict and prolonged attempts at a peaceful resolution of conflict, and where reflection on peace and conflict are pressing concerns. At the same time, Cyprus is not singularly unique in providing a reason(s) for these concerns, as peace and conflict are pressing concerns for peoples of our wider region, the Middle East, and our contemporary world as well, with its rapidly globalizing economic, political and international crises and measures to resolve such crises. Our increased interconnectedness, indicated by the term globalization, means that the effects of a crisis somewhere are less able to be confined to that locality, but have far reaching consequences for others living elsewhere.

With our conference theme we also wanted to highlight how both conflict and peace are actively and performatively made and undone. Conflict and peace don't just happen by themselves, as themselves. They are not static givens as polar opposites. They are always in process, in becoming, yet to come. What this also means is that, in their becoming, they can uncannily evolve and change into their opposite as well. An intervention for a peaceful resolution, for instance, can turn out to cultivate another conflict. Neither peace nor conflict are guaranteed to stay as they are. This gives those of us who live in conflict situations hope for a peaceful future, but also calls for ongoing vigilance. Peace work is like housework in that it never ends.

We invited Gary Hall, professor of media and performing arts at Coventry University in Britain, as keynote speaker of the conference. We are continually impressed with the crucial work that Professor Hall is doing in the fields of digital media, cultural studies, deconstruction, and open access publishing, addressing the procrustean recasting of the university as an institution that is going on around us. I will introduce Gary Hall separately, but let me just mention that his stimulating keynote speech was titled "An Academic Spring: Putting the Neoliberal University to the Test."

An international gathering of academics from twelve different countries responded to our call and presented thought provoking papers discussing various aspects of the issues posed by our call for papers. The conference continued what is becoming a tradition of providing an opportunity for both regional and global exchange of ideas, to establish new academic relations, and to make new friends. I would like to take this opportunity to thank them all for contributing to the success of our conference.

In addition to our participants and keynote speaker, many people worked hard to make our conference

Call for papers

Call for paper for the Third International Conference in Communication and Media Studies

Theme   : (Re)Making and Undoing of Peace/Conflict

Keynote Speaker   : Professor Gary Hall, Coventry University, UK

Dates of the Conference   : 11-13 April 2012

Organizer   : Center of Research and Communication for Peace

Venue   : Faculty of Communication and Media Studies

                                    Eastern Mediterranean University
                                    Famagusta, North Cyprus

The *Center of Research and Communication for Peace* in the Faculty of Communication and Media Studies at Eastern Mediterranean University invites paper, panel, and event proposals addressing the general theme of "(Re)Making and Undoing of Peace/Conflict." The Third International Conference in Communication and Media Studies, which will be held at the EMU facilities in Famagusta, North Cyprus between 11-13 April 2012, aims at bringing together scholars to present their research and exchange ideas in a wide range of topics under the general theme including but not limited to:

- Peace is love/Love and peace/loving peace
- Peace as a process, not a fixed state
- Maintenance of peace/conflict: Regulating conflict/Policing peace
- Media/Communication pedagogies for peace
- The mediatized life of peace/conflict
- Mapping media: Ownership and editorial control in conflict zones
- Throwing stones at glass ceilings: Naming and shaming gender inequalities in the media
- Usage of the new media in peace/conflict activities
- Technologies for/of peace
- Methods and methodologies in peace-making
- Methods and methodologies of peace journalism
- Remembering or forgetting for peace
- Forgiveness, justice and peace
- Cosmopolitanism and forgiveness
- Documentary: Film as remembering?
- Filming/forgetting the scene
- The past remains, mourn for today
- Truth and reconciliation
- Dialogue and the dialogic of self-other relations
- Politics of difference, politics of identity, politics of friendship
- Identity politics versus politics of affinity
- Ethical responsibility: Responding to the otherness of the other as well as to the otherness-within
- Ethnocentrism and its different forms like racism, sexism, nationalism, orientalism, agism.
- Epistemic violence and its role in the perpetration of physical violence.
- Excommunicating the other-within, xenophobia
- Hospitality: Conditional and unconditional
- Hosting immigrants
- Hostility toward different others, xenophobia
- Hospitality and hostility of citizenship

- Media representations of the consumer-citizen

- Globalization, peace, and cosmopolitanism

- The "New International"

- Dissociation of identity: The originality of representation and mediation

- Step-Mothertongue

- Human-animal dissociation

- Youth in cultures-in-conflict

The language of our international conference will be both English and Turkish.

The deadline for submitting proposals is 21 June 2011. Please send your abstracts (not more than 300 words) to: http://fcms.emu.edu.tr/mupc2012

Do not hesitate to contact us if you have any question: mupc2012@emu.edu.tr

Introducing the Keynote Speaker Professor Gary Hall

Tuğrul İlter

Now, I would like to introduce our keynote speaker, Professor Gary Hall.

I think it is fair to say that we are all affected by the transformation of the university as a result of the neoliberal drive to privatize what is ours in common, and to impose a business model to align its operations with private interests and their profit motive. Increasingly, our work is judged in terms of whether or not it is functional for the realization of profit. This is an example of what Jean-Francois Lyotard had called the "terror of the operativity criterion". Often these policies are rammed down our throats against popular protest, without due process, without transparency, without accountability, and without the consent of the very people who are affected by these decisions.

Gary Hall has been thinking, writing, and offering viable alternatives to the transformation of the university long before it became an emergency for many of us. His response is not a traditionalist one, relying on a fall-from-grace story, positing an idyllic "before" of the present university-in-crisis. The university has always been in deconstruction, as, perhaps, the title of Kant's book, "The Conflict of the Faculties," also suggests. So, Gary Hall has come up with practical and inventive re-uses of contemporary digital communication technologies which re-transforms the very institution of the university, subverts the stranglehold of corporate operationalization, and opens it up to the (always different) future, to the university-to-come.

Responding to how academic publishing has become subservient to the private quest for profit, which limits access to research and knowledge produced by us only to those who can pay, turning us into accessories to somebody's profit maximization scheme, he was instrumental in the founding of the open-access online journal *Culture Machine*.

Together with an international group of academics he also founded *The Open Humanities Press*, which is largely online, and open-access, and being online, is open to experimental, inventive texts. As part of *The Open Humanities Press*, he is an editor of the *Liquid Book* series, which is open-access, open-ended, collaborative and democratic.

He also founded *CSeARCH*, the cultural studies e-archive which allows open access to the archived work there.

He discusses these and related issues in a number of books such as *Culture in Bits*, *Digitize This Book!: The Politics of New Media, or Why We Need Open Access Now*, *New Cultural Studies* (edited with Claire Birchall), and *Experimenting: Essays with Samuel Weber* (edited with Simon Morgan Wortham) and many articles published in journals. As expected, his work is available open-access in the cultural studies archive and can also be reached through his web site at <garyhall.info>.

We learn from his website that he is developing a series of "politico-institutional interventions—dubbed activist scholarship or 'deconstructions in the public sphere'—which draw on digital media

to actualize or creatively perform critical and cultural theory, and that he is writing two monographs: *Media Gifts*, designed as a follow-up to *Digitize This Book!*, and *Pirate Philosophy*."

We have known Gary Hall as a keynote speaker in a previous conference a few years back. We have been collectively impressed by his generosity. He is attentive and caring to his listeners, hoping to engage them on their terms and in terms of their concerns. During that conference, our doctoral students were especially impressed by such considerate engagement and generosity.

And for all of this, I have the great pleasure of introducing to you, Professor Gary Hall.

An Academic Spring: Putting the Neoliberal University to the Test

Gary Hall

Coventry University
gary@garyhall.info

Much has been written about the 'crisis of capitalism' and associated events known, for short, as the student protests, August riots, and global Occupy movement. [1] But although they form a starting point for what I have to say today, I do not want to talk about these events themselves too much. Not because I do not think they are interesting: they are, very. It is just that:

1) If it is an articulation of the immediate political situation you want there is a lot of work already available on this – including of course contributions from Alain Badiou, Judith Butler, Jean-Luc Nancy and Slavoj Žižek.

2) I am concerned about using these events as intellectual capital: as an opportunity to establish and reinforce my own position and credentials as some kind of publically or politically engaged figure. Is there not a risk of attempts by academics such as myself to represent, or speak to, these protests - even when we do so in an approving fashion that is critical of other intellectual, societal and governmental responses [2] - flying in the face of a lot of what these events are actually about? Do slogans such as 'They don't represent us', not point toward a non-representational political practice, one that goes beyond the idea that the politicians of representative democracy support the corporate interests of the 1% rather than those of the people, the 99%? [3]

3) I am also wary of being complacent about immediate political needs and what it is most urgent and important to write and speak about. This is not an easy thing to say at a time when the pendulum of intellectual fashion in the West has swung back to such a degree that the radical theory that is most acceptable and feted today - from Žižek and Hardt and Negri, to Galloway and Toscano - seems almost invariably materialist and/or Marxist in inspiration. Yet it seems to me the existing political discourses of urgency and crisis around these events risks closing off access to the 'political', and the decision as to what it is most necessary and urgent to write about and take a position on, as much as it opens it up. [4]

So, instead, I want to ask, to what extent do these events pose a challenge to those of us who work 'in' the university – a challenge that encourages us to go further than merely endeavouring to 'just say "no"' to the idea of universities operating as for-profit business in order to serve the economy, and demanding a return to the kind of publicly financed mass education policy that prevailed in the West in the Keynesian era? What if we, too, in our capacity as academics, authors, writers, thinkers and scholars want to resist the

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1 A version of this keynote lecture was published as 'Pirate Radical Philosophy', *Radical Philosophy: A Journal of Socialist and Feminist Philosophy*, 173, May/June, 2012: http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/pirate-radical-philosophy-2.

2 See, among many possible examples, Alain Badiou writing on the events in Tunisia and Egypt:

> Is it not laughable to see well-paid and well-fed intellectuals, retreating soldiers of the capital-parliamentarism that serves us as a moth-eaten Paradise, offering their services to the awe-inspiring Tunisian and Egyptian people, in order to teach these savages the ABC of 'democracy?' What pathetic persistence of colonial arrogance! In the situation of political misery that we've been living in for the last three decades, is it not evident to surmise that it is us who have everything to learn from the popular uprisings of the moment? Don't we sense the urgency of giving a close look at everything, that, over there, made possible, by collective action the overthrow of oligarchic and corrupt governments, who — or maybe especially — stood in a humiliating position of servitude to the Western world? Yes, we should be the students of these movements, and not their stupid professors. For they give life, with the genius of their own inventions, to those same political principles that for some time now the dominant powers tried to convince us were obsolete. And in particular the principle that Marat never stopped recalling: when it is a matter of liberty, equality, emancipation, we all have to join the popular upheavals.

> (Alain Badiou, 'The Universal Reach of Popular Uprisings': http://www.lacan.com/thesymptom/?page_id=1031; my emphasis)

3 See, for example, the poster at: http://www.flickr.com/photos/34098908@N00/5816327472/

4 As has been pointed out: 'This in no sense implies that complacency rather than urgency is the appropriate pathos for writing about these matters, but that the urging of urgency maintains a relation to complacency that is not here thought through, just because of the urgency of the argument' (Geoffrey Bennington, 'Emergencies', The Oxford Literary Review, Volume 18, 1996, p.201)

continued imposition of a neoliberal political rationality that may appear dead on its feet but, zombie-like, is still managing to blunder on? How can we think and act, not so much for or with the anti-austerity protesters, 'graduates without a future', 'digital natives' and 'remainder of capital' in places such as Spain, Italy, California, Buenos Aires and Chile - protesting alongside them, accepting invitations to speak to and write about them - but in terms of them, thus refusing to simply submit critical thought to 'existing political discourses and the formulation of political needs those discourses articulate', and so 'defusing' what Merleau-Ponty called 'the trap of the event'? [5] What if we desire a very different university to the one we have, but have no wish to retain or restore the paternalistic, class-bound model associated with the writings of Arnold, Leavis and Newman? While appreciating the idea that there is an outside to the university is itself a university idea, and that attempts to move beyond the institution too often leave it in place and uncontested, is it nonetheless possible to take impetus from the emergence of autonomous, self-organised learning communities such as The Public School, and free text-sharing networks such as AAAAARG.ORG? Does the struggle against the 'becoming business' of the university not require us, too, to have the courage to try out new economic, legal and political systems and models for the production, publication, sharing and discussion of knowledge and ideas; and thus to open ourselves to transforming radically the material practices and social relations of our academic labour?

To date, such questions have proven surprisingly difficult to bring into focus, no doubt in part because they do indeed contain the potential to change and renew, radically, our professional practices and identities. In the March following the student protests of November 2010, the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London hosted an afternoon of talks under the title 'Radical Publishing: What Are We Struggling For?' At first sight this event looked like it might explore some of these issues. As it turned out, the afternoon featured extensive discussion from speakers including Franco 'Bifo' Berardi, David Graeber, Peter Hallward and Mark Fisher of K-Punk blog fame about politics, understood according to the most easy-to-identify signs and labels, the majority of which concerned political transformation elsewhere: in the past, the future, Egypt and what has come to be known as the Arab Spring. Somewhat surprisingly, given its title, there was very little discussion of anything that would actually affect the work, business, role and practices of the speakers themselves: radical ideas of publishing with transformed modes of production, say.

But perhaps we should not be surprised. After all, blindspots of this nature are widespread throughout the humanities. Take the very idea on which the humanities, and with it the concept of the university, are based: that of the human itself. [6] The humanities have critically interrogated the concept of the human for the last hundred years and more, not least in the guise of critical theory and continental philosophy. Yet the dominant mode of production of knowledge and research in the humanities continues to be tied to the idea of the indivisible, individual, liberal human(ist) author. It is a description of how theories and concepts are created, developed, published and disseminated that is as applicable to the latest generation of theorists to emerge as it is to the 'golden generation' of Barthes, Foucault, Lyotard and Lacan – not just radical philosophers such as Agamben, Badiou, Latour and Stiegler, but many of the so-called 'children of the 68ers', like Meillassoux, too. For all that theorists nowadays may be more inclined to write using a computer keyboard and screen than a fountain pen or typewriter, their way of creating, developing and disseminating theory and theoretical concepts remains much the same. This is the case with respect to the initial production of their texts and their materiality – the focus on print-on-paper codex books and articles, or at the very least paper-centric texts, written by lone scholars usually in a study or office, and designed to make a forceful, authoritative, masterly contribution to knowledge. But it is also the case with regard to the attribution of their texts to individualised human beings whose identities – regardless of any associations they may have with anti- or post-humanist philosophy – are unified and self-present enough for them to be able to claim them as their original work or property.

Admittedly, these traditional methods for the creation, composition, publication and circulation of knowledge and research are being brought into question by the emergent field of the digital humanities. Witness literary theorist Stanley Fish's recent characterisation of those forms of communication associated with the digital humanities, blogs especially, as 'provisional, ephemeral, interactive, communal, available to challenge, interruption and interpolation'. Fish consequently positions such uses of networked digital media technologies as standing directly against the traditional ambition of the scholarly critic, an ambition he admits to sharing. This entails being able 'to write about a topic with such force and completeness that no other critic will be able to say a word about it'. It is an aim he ascribes to a 'desire for pre-eminence, authority and disciplinary power'. Accordingly, Fish contrasts both blogs and the digital humanities to the kind of 'long-form scholarship – books and articles submitted to learned journals and university presses' – he has devoted his professional life to, and which he describes in terms of the building of 'arguments that are intended to be decisive,

5   Michel Foucault, 'The Concern for Truth', *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984*, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, Routledge, New York, 1988, p.263. For a discussion of the importance of the distinction between 'for' and 'in terms of', see Wendy Brown, *Politics Out of History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2001, p.42-43, from where these quotations are taken.

6   As Samuel Weber has argued: To speak of the Humanities, then, is to imply a model of unity based on a certain idea of the human, whether as opposed to the divine (medieval, scholastic humanism) or to the non-human animal world.... The unity of the university remains profoundly bound up with the notion of a universally valid essence of the 'human', which is the anthropological correlative of the epistemological universalism that resides at the core of the university as an institution....

(Samuel Weber, 'The Future of the Humanities: Experimenting', *Culture Machine* 2, 2000, http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/311/296)

comprehensive, monumental, definitive and, most important, all mine'. [7]

Yet the digital humanist Fish concentrates on in most detail, Kathleen Fitzpatrick, does not offer a profound challenge to ideas of the human, subjectivity, or the associated concept of the author at all. Nor, to be fair, is she interested in doing so. In fact, far from questioning radically the notion of the human that underpins 'the "myth" of the stand-alone, masterful author', [8] Fitzpatrick's view of the digital humanities sees it as being more concerned to bring the humanities as they are traditionally known and understood to bear on computing technologies. [9]

Take her recent book *Planned Obsolescence*, which, as an experiment with open peer review, was itself first published on a blog others could contribute to. Fish portrays Fitzpatrick as contending in this volume:

> first, that authorship has never been thus isolated – one always writes against the background of, and in conversation with, innumerable predecessors and contemporaries who are in effect one's collaborators – and, second, that the 'myth' of the stand-alone, masterful author is exposed for the fiction it is by the new forms of communication – blogs, links, hypertext, re-mixes, mash-ups, multi-modalities… – that have emerged with the development of digital technology. [10]

Yet, as Fitzpatrick makes clear in a section of her book expressly concerned with the change in authorship 'From Individual to Collaborative':

> the kinds of collaboration I'm interested in need not necessarily result in literal co-authorship... The shift that I'm calling for may therefore be less … for writing in groups than for a shift in our focus from the individualistic parts of our work to those that are more collective, more socially situated … One need not literally share authorship of one's texts in order to share the process of writing those texts themselves; the collaboration that digital publishing networks may inspire might parallel, for instance, the writing groups in which many scholars already share their work, seeking feedback while the work is in process. [11]

Fish reads this as suggesting that, 'if the individual is defined and constituted by relationships, the individual is not really an entity that can be said to have ownership of either its intentions or their effects; the individual is (as poststructuralist theory used to tell us) just a relay through which messages circulating in the network pass and are sent along.' [12] As Fitzpatrick emphasizes, however, the shift she is calling for is 'less radical than it initially sounds'. Far from being based on a rigorous decentring of the subject, her approach often seems closer to the liberal-democratic humanist stance she is endeavouring to question; albeit one in which 'unique', stable, centered authors are now involved in a 'social' conversation 'composed of individuals' that is somewhat akin to Habermas's ideal speech situation – at least to the extent this 'conversation' appears to contain relatively little conflict, antagonism or incommensurability between the participants. [13] There is no differend, as Lyotard would put it. Responding to Fish on his own blog, Fitzpatrick is at pains to point out she is not maintaining notions of the author, text and originality 'are going away in the digital age, only that they are changing, as the interpretive community of scholars changes'. [14]

It is significant in this respect that Fitzpatrick chose to employ a blogging tool for her experiment with open peer review: namely, WordPress, albeit it with the CommentPress plugin, which enables comments to appear alongside the main body of the text on a paragraph-by-paragraph, whole-page or entire-document basis. For most blogs (in contrast to wikis, say) do not actually allow for collaborative writing, let alone 'elimination of the individual'. The work of a blog's author tends to be kept quite separate from that of others who use the same blog to review or respond to that work. Although 'responses to the text' may indeed 'appear in the same form, and the same frame, as the text itself', [15] these two distinct identities and roles –original author and secondary reviewer, respondent or commentator – are maintained and reinforced by the blogging medium. So not only does Fitzpatrick not actually put ideas of the human, subjectivity or the associated concept of the author to the test, neither do blogs, for all that Fish portrays both otherwise. Instead, the maintenance of authorship and originality on Fitzpatrick's part is achieved with the assistance of the very medium (blogging) Fish positions as creating problems for it.

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7 Stanley Fish, 'The Digital Humanities and the Transcending of Mortality', *New York Times: Opinionator*, 9 January, 2012, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/the-digital-humanities-and-the-transcending-of-mortality/; emphasis added.

8 Ibid.

9 The '"big tent" that the digital humanities can be', she writes, is 'a nexus of fields within which scholars use computing technologies to investigate the kinds of questions that are traditional to the humanities, or, as is more true of my own work, who ask traditional kinds of humanities-oriented questions about computing technologies'. Kathleen Fitzpatrick, 'Reporting from the Digital Humanities 2010 Conference', Chronicle of Higher Education, 13 July, 2010, http://chronicle.com/blogPost/Reporting-from-the-Digital/25473/.

10 Stanley Fish, 'The Digital Humanities and the Transcending of Mortality'.

11 Kathleen Fitzpatrick, Planned Obsolescence: Publishing, Technology, and the Future of the Academy, New York University Press, New York, 2009 (published in print in 2011), http://mediacommons.futureofthebook.org/mcpress/plannedobsolescence.

12 Stanley Fish, 'The Digital Humanities and the Transcending of Mortality'.

13 Kathleen Fitzpatrick, Planned Obsolescence.

14 Kathleen Fitzpatrick, 10 January 2012; response to Stanley Fish, 'The Digital Humanities and the Transcending of Mortality'.

15 Kathleen Fitzpatrick, Planned Obsolescence.

While they are different to traditional forms of long-form scholarship, the way the majority of academics interact with blogs and social networks such as Facebook and Google+ actually functions to promote and sustain notions of the author and originality far more than they undermine them. This is in no small part due to the fact that, as Felix Stalder points out, '[y]ou have to present yourself in public as an individual in order to be able to join digital social networks, which, increasingly, becomes a precondition [to] join other forms of social networking.' [16] (Hence you can't use a pseudonym on Google+ unless you are a celebrity already known by an established pseudonym - which is also why Salman Rushdie was eventually allowed to use his pseudonym on Facebook). Such personal social networks may thus be seen to offer a variation on the theme of what Beverley Skeggs calls 'compulsory individuality' – with a lot of academics using them as a means of promoting and marketing themselves, their work and ideas, not least by gathering 'friends' and 'circles' to network with and presenting themselves as accessible, engaged, charismatic personalities who are 'always on'. [17]

So where does that leave us, if even the digital humanities do not represent too much of a test of the orthodox modes of creation, composition, legitimisation, accreditation, publication and dissemination in the humanities? Interestingly, in a book from 2009, one of the participants in the ICA's Radical Publishing event, Franco 'Bifo' Berardi, raised the question as to whether we should not 'free ourselves from the thirst' for the kind of 'activism' he sees as having become influential as a result of the anti-capitalist globalisation movement, and which we can see in the student protests and Occupy: 'Isn't the path towards autonomy of the social from economic and military mobilization only possible through a withdrawal into inactivity, silence, and passive sabotage?', he asks. Should we then consider embracing our own variation on the theme of refusal that has been so important to autonomous politics in Italy: namely, a strategic withdrawal of our academic labour – and not just from blogs and corporate social networks such as Facebook and Google+? [18]

Peter Suber, a leading voice in the open access movement, has recently provided an instance of just such a withdrawal. In January, Suber announced on Google+ that he would 'not referee for a publisher belonging to the Association of American Publishers unless it has publicly disavowed the AAP's position on the Research Works Act'. The latter, which was introduced in the US Congress on December 16, 2011, was designed to prohibit open access mandates for federally funded research in the USA. The Research Works Act would thus in effect countermand the National Institutes of Health's Public Access Policy along with other similar open access policies in the USA. To show my support for both open access and Suber's initiative, I publicly stated in January 2012 that I would act similarly. [19]

Having met with staunch opposition from within both the academic and publishing communities in what some have dubbed an 'Academic Spring', the Research Works Act has been dropped as of February 27. [20] But, rather than taking this as a cue to abandon the strategy of refusal, should we not adopt it all the more? Should we not withdraw our academic labour from all those presses and journals that do not allow authors, as a bare minimum, to self-archive the refereed and accepted final drafts of their publications in institutional open access repositories? [21]

As a supporter of long-standing, I feel it is important to acknowledge that the open access movement—which is concerned with making peer reviewed research literature freely available online to all those able to access the Internet—is neither unified nor self-identical. Some do indeed regard it as a movement, [22] while for others it represents merely a variety of economic models or even just another means of marketing and promoting academic work. It should also be born in mind that there is nothing inherently radical, emancipatory, oppositional, or even politically or culturally progressive about open access in itself. The politics of open access depend on the decisions that are made in relation to it, the specific tactics and strategies that are adopted, the particular conjunctions of time, situation and context in which such practices and activities take place, and the networks, relationships and flows of culture, community, society and economics they encourage, make possible and mobilize. Open access is thus not necessarily a mode of left

16 Felix Stalder, 'Autonomy and Control in the Era of Post-Privacy', posting to the nettime mailing list, 4 July, 2010, http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.culture.internet.nettime/4848.

17 Beverley Skeggs, 'The Making of Class and Gender Through Visualizing Moral Subject Formations', *Sociology*, Vol. 39(5), 2005, p.968, http://cms.gold.ac.uk/media/skeggs1.pdf.

18 Franco 'Bifo' Berardi, *Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the Pathologies of the Post-Alpha Generation*, Minor Compositions, London, 2009, p.127; Mario Tronti, 'The Strategy of Refusal', Libcom.org, http://libcom.org/library/strategy-refusal-mario-tronti. Elsewhere, Bifo states that the 'refusal of work… is better defined as a refusal of the alienation and exploitation of living time' (Franco 'Bifo' Berardi, 'Cognitarian Subjectivication', in Julieta Aranda, Brian Kuan-Wood and Anton Vidokle eds, *Are You Working Too Much? Post-Fordism, Precarity, and the Labor of Art* (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2011), p.138)

19 Peter Suber, 'Watch Where You Donate Your Time', Peter Suber, 7 January, 2012, https://plus.google.com/u/0/109377556796183035206/posts/QYAH1jS-JG6L#109377556796183035206/posts; Gary Hall, 'Withdrawal of Labour From Publishers in favour of the US Research Works Act, Media Gifts, 16 January, 2012, http://garyhall.squarespace.com/journal/2012/1/16/withdrawal-of-labour-from-publishers-in-favour-of-the-us-res.html. At the time, this meant not writing, publishing, editing or peer reviewing for, among others, Sage (who publish numerous journals in the critical theory area including *Theory, Culture and Society* and *New Media and Society*), Palgrave Macmillan (publisher of *Feminist Review*), Stanford University Press, Fordham University Press, Harvard University Press and NYU Press.

20 http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn21467-web-freedoms-fuel-academic-spring-journal-protest.html

21 As long ago as 2007, Nick Montfort, an associate professor of digital media at MIT, stated that he was no longer prepared to review articles for non-open access, for-profit, non-public journals (Nick Montfort, 'Digital Media, Games, and Open Access', Grand Text Auto, 21 December, 2007, http://grandtextauto.org/2007/12/21/digital-media-games-and-open-access/). In 2008 he was joined by Danah Boyd, who was at the time a Visiting Researcher at Harvard Law School among other things. Dana Boyd, 'Open-access is the Future: Boycott Locked-down Academic Journals', *Apophenia*, 6 February, 2008, http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2008/02/06/openaccess_is_t.html#comment-322195.

22 See Peter Suber's Open Access Overview, http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/overview.htm and 'Timeline of the Open Access Movement', http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/timeline.htm.

resistance. Nevertheless, what is interesting about the current transition to the open access publication and archiving of research is the way it is creating at least some 'openings' that allow academics to destabilize and rethink scholarly publishing, and with it the university, beyond the model espoused by free-market capitalism.

That said, open access continues to operate within particular limits. While John Willinsky has presented it as 'both a critical and practical step toward the unconditional university' imagined by Jacques Derrida in 'The Future of the Profession or the University Without Condition', the open access movement is actually (currently at least) quite conditional. It may promote the 'right to speak and to resist unconditionally everything' that concerns the restriction of access to knowledge, research and thought, as Willinsky says. However, the open access movement does so, for the most part, only on condition that the 'right to say everything' about a whole host of other questions is not exercised. [23] Included in this are questions not just about the use of blogs, Facebook, Google+ and so on by open access advocates such as Peter Suber and myself, but also about the author, the text, and originality.

But what if, taking our lead from Derrida, we were to view the open access movement as merely a strategic starting point for thinking about such issues? What if we were to regard the above conditionality of open access not as a prompt to move beyond open access, or to leave it behind and replace it with something else, but rather as directing us to follow the logic of the open access movement through 'to the end, without reserve', to the point of agreeing with it against itself? [24] What if we were to begin to speak about, and to resist unconditionally, some of the other orthodoxies that concern the restriction of access to knowledge, research and thought: precisely ideas of authorship and originality, and the copyright system that sustains them? I single out copyright because, if we wish to struggle against the 'becoming business' of the university, then we have to accept this may involve a struggle against the copyright system too, since the latter is one of the main ways in which knowledge, research and thought is being commodified, privatised and corporatized.

Drastically simplifying the situation for the sake of brevity, there are two key justifications for copyright: that associated with economic rights; and that connected with what is known as author's or moral rights. [25] In the former, which dominates the Anglo-American copyright tradition, the emphasis is placed on the protection of the commercial interests of the author, producer or distributor of a work and their right to benefit from it financially by making and selling copies. This is how the majority of conventional academic publishing firms regard the books they bring out: as commodities the rights to the commercial exploitation of which have been transferred to them. Consequently, it is publishers who are perceived as being most at risk financially from the infringement of copyright in this economic sense. Witness, with regard to AAAAARG's 'pirating' of texts drawn from philosophy, politics, theory, avant-garde fiction and related areas, the fact that it was the self-professed 'radical publishing house' Verso – and not the authors – who posted the December 2009 'cease and desist' letter asking the knowledge-sharing platform to take down copies of those titles by Zizek, Rancière, Badiou, et al for which Verso reserves the rights.

Of course, some academic authors may wish to support independent publishers of radical political content. Many such presses are in a precarious financial situation, especially in comparison to their multinational conglomerate-owned rivals. They are therefore heavily reliant on the income generated from the sale of books to which they own the rights to be able to stay in business and so bring out more such titles in the future. However, because the copyright system is one of the main ways in which knowledge, research and thought is being commodified and privatised, it is perhaps more difficult for those committed to the struggle against the commercialisation of culture and society to wholeheartedly support defences against infringement on the basis of the protection of economic rights. After all, if we are interested in trying out new or different economic, legal and political systems to that of capitalism (and not just neoliberalism), it can hardly come as a surprise if that should have implications for those publishing firms whose business models continue to depend on turning even such obviously political phenomenon as ideas of communism, Occupy, and the Arab Spring into marketable commodities that can be privately owned and bought and sold for the profit of owners and shareholders (rather than their workers, say). [26]

When it comes to moral rights, the justification for copyright has its basis in the protection of what is held to be an inalienable right of the author in their work. This right—often positioned as originating in the culture of Western Europe and as operating in a supplementary, secondary, even marginal relation to economic rights—applies to the work considered as an expression of the unique mind or personality of the author. Consequently, in contrast to economic rights, the moral rights of the author cannot simply be waived, sold or transferred to another individual or corporate entity such as a publisher.

23   John Willinsky, 'Altering the Material Conditions of Access to the Humanities', in Peter Pericles Trifonas and Michael A. Peters, eds, *Deconstructing Derrida*, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2005, p.121; Jacques Derrida, 'The Future of the Profession or the University Without Condition (thanks to the "Humanities", what could take place tomorrow)', in Tom Cohen, ed., *Jacques Derrida: A Critical Reader*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p.26.

24   This is Derrida's procedure for reading Hegel's dialectic according to a non-oppositional difference. Jacques Derrida, 'From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve', *Writing and Difference*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978, p. 260.

25   The reading of copyright that follows is greatly indebted to my discussions with Cornelia Sollfrank, and to the more detailed and subtle account of the relation between economic and moral rights she provides in an artworld context in her *Performing the Paradoxes of Intellectual Property: An Artistic Investigation Of The Increasingly Conflicting Relationship Between Copyright And Art,* PhD thesis, University of Dundee, Duncan of Jordanstone College of Art and Design, 2012.

26 For another example of such marketing, see Pluto's www.getpoliticalnow.com.

Now, some might argue that philosophy's decentring of ideas of the subject and the human, and associated declaration of the 'death of the author', has contributed to the expansion of the neoliberal globalized copyright industry, and its shifting of the emphasis even further away from safeguarding the rights of the individual author as original creator, and onto safeguarding the rights to a commodity which can be bought and sold for profit regardless of who created it. By the same token, however, if we are inclined to be generous, the tendency on the part of many theorists to assert vigorously their authorship of particular works, ideas and concepts (e.g. object-oriented philosophy, media archaeology, software studies, critical code studies), thus both enclosing and branding them by association with a proper name on the basis they are 'all mine' (an original expression of their own unique selves) can be positioned as one attempt to make this shift in emphasis from culture and human authorship to economics and property ownership a little less smooth. From this perspective, the risk copyright infringement poses to authors is more to their moral rights, and in particular:

1. the right of attribution—which, to return to the example above, AAAAARG does not tend to threaten, as the authors of most of the texts on this knowledge—sharing platform are clearly named and identified as such (you can browse its library by author surname);

2. the right of integrity, which enables authors to refuse to allow the original, fixed and final form of a work to be modified or distorted by others;

3. the right of disclosure, which covers the right to determine who publishes the work, how, where and in which contexts. AAAAARG may thus represent for some academics a loss of reputation, honour and esteem, to the degree that their work is being republished outside the conventional institutional frameworks and in places and ways other than those of their own choosing.

The question we need to ask, though, is to what extent operating according to the moral rights of attribution, integrity and disclosure leads radical thinkers to act to all intents and purposes as if they continue to subscribe to the idea of the author as individual creative genius that emerged from within the cultural tradition of European Romanticism—a notion that the humanities' critical interrogation of the concepts of the subject, the human, and indeed the author was in many respects an attempt to challenge. For it is precisely this romantic belief that underpins the idea of the work as the original expression of the unique personality or consciousness of the human author, and on which such moral rights are in turn based.

This is not to imply we should necessarily do away with the concept of the author. What it does suggest, at the very least, is that we need to explore further how radical thought can enact ideas of authorship in ways that do not either slip back into compulsively repeating a version of romantic individualism and its ideas of originality, or empty this out so that texts merely become exchangeable commodities. To provide one example of how we might begin to do so—and to main the theme generated by my discussion of AAAAARG—could we perhaps try acting something like pirate philosophers?

Of course, as Adrian Johns has shown, despite its romantic, counter-cultural image, much of the philosophy associated with online piracy today is itself a 'moral philosophy through and through'. It is concerned 'centrally with convictions about freedom, rights, duties, obligations, and the like'. What is more, it is a philosophy that has its historical roots in a 'marked libertarian ideology': one of the UK's pirate radio ships of the 1960s was even called the Laissez Faire. [27] Such pirate philosophers as we might envisage here, then, would have to try acting like pirates in the classical sense of the term. Interestingly, when the word pirate begin to appear in the texts of the ancient Greeks, it was 'closely related to the noun peira, "trial" or "attempt", and so to the verb peiraō: the "pirate" would then be the one who "tests", "puts to proof", "contends with", and "makes an attempt"'. [28] These are the etymological origins of the modern term 'pirate'.

In this respect, what is most interesting about certain phenomenon associated with networked digital culture such as Napster, the Pirate Bay or indeed AAAAARG is that we cannot tell at the time of their initial emergence whether they are legitimate or not. This is because the new conditions created by networked digital culture—such as the ability to digitize and make freely available whole libraries worth of books (as is the case with both Google Books and AAAAARG)—at times require the creation of equally new intellectual property laws and copyright policies. The UK's Digital Economies Act 2010 is one example; the Google Book settlement, SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act) and PIPA (Protect IP Act) in the US are others. It follows that we can never be sure whether these so-called pirates, in the 'attempts' they're making to 'contend with' the new conditions and possibilities created by networked digital culture, to 'trial' them and put them to the 'proof', are not involved in the creation of the very new laws, policies, clauses, settlements, licensing agreements and acts of Congress and Parliament by which they could be judged.

Take the case of William Fox, a filmmaker who relocated from America's East Coast to California in the early twentieth century in part 'to escape controls that patents granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison'. As Lawrence Lessig recounts in his

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27 Adrian Johns, 'Piracy as a Business Force, *Culture Machine* 10, 2009, http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/345/348.

28 Daniel Heller-Roazen, *The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations*, Zone books, New York, 2009, p.35.

chapter on 'pirates' in Free Culture, Fox founded the film studio 20th Century Fox precisely by pirating Edison's creative property. [29] (Ironically, the chairman and CEO of 20th Century Fox is now that scourge of internet piracy Rupert Murdoch, who attacked the Obama administration on Twitter after the White House indicated it would not be supporting some of the harsher measures proposed in the SOPA bill.) [30] As the example of Fox shows, we can never tell the founder of a new institution or culture in advance. We can only finally judge whether the activities of such supposed pirates are legal or not, legitimate or not, just or not, from some point 'projected into an indefinite future'. [31]

Another way to think about the issue of piracy is in relation to the legislator in Rousseau's The Social Contract. Here, too, we can never know whether the legislator—the founder of a new law or institution, such as a university—is legitimate or a charlatan. The reason is the aporia that lies at the heart of authority, whereby the legislator already has to posses the authority the founding of the new institution is supposed to provide him or her with in order to be able to found it. Certain so-called Internet pirates are in a similar situation to Rousseau's legislator. They, too, may be involved in performatively inventing, trialling and testing the very new laws and institutions by which their activities may then be judged and justified. As such, they can claim legitimacy only from themselves. This is a state of affairs that, as well as marking their impossibility, also constitutes their founding power, their instituting force. It is here, between the possible and the impossible, legality and illegality, that we must begin any assessment or judgement of them. And it is not just the potential pirates who may be legislators or charlatans. The current laws and institutions by which we might condemn internet piracy as illegal are based on the same aporetic structure of authority. Such lawmakers are always also undecidably charlatans or pirates too - or hackers, in the case of Murdoch's News International.

Consequently, we cannot tell what is going to happen with 'pirate' philosophy. It may lead to new forms of culture, economy and education: where people work and create for reasons other than to get paid; where the protection of copyright is no longer possible; where the institutions of the culture industry—book publishers, newspapers, and so forth—are radically reconfigured; music is available to freely download and share (which it already is); communities disseminate academic monographs via peer-to-peer networks and text sharing platforms (which they already do); and where even ideas of the individualistic, humanist, proprietorial author are dramatically transformed. In this respect, pirate philosophy may play a part in the development of not just a new kind of university, but a new economy and new way of organizing post-industrial society too. In the process it may have as profound an effect 'as the establishment of copyright... in the eighteenth century', to borrow Johns' words. [32] But it may not. And that is the point. As with the famous remark about the significance of the French Revolution—let alone the 'crisis of capitalism' and the Arab Spring—it is still too early to tell. [33]

Nevertheless, what is interesting is the potential pirate philosophy contains for the development of a new kind of economy and society: one based far less on individualism, possession, acquisition, accumulation, competition, celebrity, and ideas of knowledge, research and thought as something to be owned, commodified, communicated, disseminated and exchanged as the property of single, indivisible authors. [34]

Without a doubt, many currently at work in the university are going to experience any such 'trialling', 'testing' or 'putting to the proof' of the idea of acting something like pirate philosophers as an attack, not just on copyright and the corporatization of the university, but on their professional identities too: as a challenge to the secure ground on which they have operated for so long, based as it is on quite orthodox ideas of authorship, originality and so forth. And their fears will be justified. Yet in order to respond to the forces of late capitalism, might we not have to take the risk of leaving the safe harbour of our profession as it currently stands? After all, it is not as if we're going to be secure if we do nothing; our professional identities are already under threat. Might embarking on such an endeavour offer us a means of contending with some of the forces behind this threat, without simply succumbing to them, reacting with nostalgia or romanticism to them, or naively celebrating and assisting them?

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29 Lawrence Lessig, *Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity*, Penguin, New York, 2004, p.53, 55, http://www.free-culture.cc/.

30 So Obama has thrown in his lot with Silicon Valley paymasters who threaten all software creators with piracy, plain thievery. Piracy leader is Google who streams movies free, sells advts around them. No wonder pouring millions into lobbying.

(Rupert Murdoch, Twitter; cited in 'Rupert Murdoch in Twitter attack on Google over 'piracy', *Telegraph*, January 16, 2012: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/9016762/Rupert-Murdoch-in-Twitter-attack-on-Google-over-piracy.html)

31 See Geoffrey Bennington, 'Postal Politics', in Homi K. Bhabha ed., *Nation and Narration*, Routledge, London and New York, 1990, p.131-132, on which the reading of the legislator in Rousseau that follows is based.

32 Adrian Johns, 'Piracy', *Inside Higher Ed*, 3 February, 2010, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/02/03/johns.

33 Attributed to the Chinese communist leader Zhou Enlai, some say mistakenly, others that he misheard, and that he thought the question was actually referring to the Chinese revolution, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Zhou_Enlai.

34 Andrew Ross, *Nice Work If You Can Get It: Life and Labor In Precarious Times,* New York University Press, New York and London, 2009, p. 167.

Varolma Kaygısı İçindeki Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu Üzerine Bir Araştırma

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Bu çalışmanın amacı modernizasyonu belirleyen temel kodlar olan; ulus devlet, kimlik, millet – cemaat – milliyetçilik, etnosentrizm gibi politik kavramların Kuzey Kıbrıs ve Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu olgularına izdüşümünü "toplumsal kimlik", "toplumsal varoluş" ve "göç ve asimilasyon", gibi meseleler üzerinden yeniden okumaktır.

Bir başka deyişle bu çalışma,

a) kimlik üzerinden geliştirilen toplumsal söylemlerin Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk toplumunda artan "Var Olma - Yok Olma Kaygısı" üzerinde ne kadar etkili olduğunu;

b) ortaya çıkan bu kaygının yarattığı etnosentrik yargının hangi yöne doğru evrimleştiğini anlamaya çalışmaktadır.

Çalışma temel olarak bir grup katılımcı ile yapılan mülakatlara verilen cevapların karşılaştırılmalı olarak sunulmasına dayanmaktadır. Burada amaç, çalışmaya herhangi bir ideolojik yorum katmadan, tartışılan meseleleri günlük hayatlarında fiilen yaşayan insanların, tartışılan meselelere bakış açılarını bir arada toplamaktır. Bunun yanı sıra çalışmada, Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu'nun toplumsal varlığını etkileyen kritik tartışmaların, toplum üzerlerindeki meselelerin, Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu içindeki kanaat belirleyici kişiler tarafından, nasıl eleştirildiği aktarılmaya çalışılmıştır. Çalışmanın omurgasını oluşturan mülakatlar için belirlenen hedef kitle, metnin tartıştığı konular hakkında aktif olarak yazan ve bu konuları farklı yönleriyle tartışan aydın kişilerden seçilmiştir.[1] Mülakat yapılan entellektüellerin

profillerini belirlemek için esas alınan kriterler ise aşağıdaki gibidir; (a) Katılımcının en az lisans mezunu olması ve aktif entellektüel faaliyetlerde bulunması; (b) Katılımcının aile kökeninin 1974 öncesinden de Kıbrıs'ta yaşıyor olması ve 1974 göçmeni olmaması; (c) Katılımcının Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nde ikamet ediyor ve çalışıyor olması; (d) Katılımcının 30 yaşını doldurmuş olması.

Çalışma, mülakat sorularına verilen cevaplara dayanarak; "Kimlik Tanımlamaları", "Göç, Asimilasyon ve Varolma Kaygısı" ve "Toplumsal Varoluş Mitingleri" olarak üç temel bölüme ayrılmaktadır.

Beytambal kalsın" en büyük lanet hala... Ve kelime kapanmamışlığına rağmen o kadar "açık" ve "canlı"

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1 **Katılımcı Profilleri:**

Katılımcı 1- Erkek, Doçent Doktor (Siyaset Bilimi & Kamu Yönetimi). Çalışma Boyunca "İlhan Bey" olarak anılacaktır.

Katılımcı 2- Erkek, Doçent Doktor (Uluslararası İlişkiler). Çalışma Boyunca "Turgut Bey" olarak anılacaktır.

Katılımcı 3- Erkek, Yardımcı Doçent (Ekonomi). Çalışma Boyunca "Cemal Bey" olarak anılacaktır.

Katılımcı 4- Erkek, Yardımcı Doçent (Hukuk). Çalışma Boyunca "Edip Bey" olarak anılacaktır.

Katılımcı 5- Erkek, Gazeteci, Araştırmacı Yazar (Doktora Adayı). Çalışma Boyunca "Ece Bey" olarak anılacaktır.

Katılımcı 6- Kadın, Fransızca Öğretmeni. Çalışma Boyunca "Tezer Hanım" olarak anılacaktır.

Katılımcı 7- Kadın, Gazeteci, Haber Editörü. Çalışma Boyunca "Nilgün Hanım" olarak anılacaktır.

Katılımcı 8- Erkek, Aktif Politikacı, Psikiyatr. Çalışma Boyunca "Enis Bey" olarak anılacaktır.

Katılımcı 9-Erkek, KKTC Eski Başbakanı & Meclis Başkanı, Yüksek Mühendis, Mimar. Çalışma Boyunca "Fazıl Bey" olarak anılacaktır.

ki, Kıbrıs'ta boşa gidene, heba edilen her şeye "Beytambal'a kaldı" diyorlar hala... Beytambal kalmak, Beytambala kalmak, bütün bu sözcükler biliniz ki son otuz yıllık hayatları içinde bütün Kıbrıslı Türklerin hayatını örüp duruyorlar...Ya da kazıp duruyorlar, ağ örüyorlar, ve her türlü börtü böcek gibi işliyorlar... Kıbrıs romantizmi yapmama neden yok... Ama hissediyorum ki böyle bir "açık kelimeye" duyulan ihtiyaç şu anda muazzam: "Beytambal galsın" biraz ressentiment de içererek "tamam alın gidin, lanet olsun" demekten başka bir şey değil... Ulus Baker [2]

Kimlik Tanımları

Kimlik tanımlamasını yönlendiren farklı faktörler vardır. Bunların bazıları siyaset bazıları eğitim bazıları yaşanmışlıklar ve tecrübe olabilir ama herkesin kendi kimliğini tanımlaması aynı sebeplerle aynı isim tamlamalarıyla oluşmaz. Bazı alışkanlıklar ve çevresel etkenler bireylerin kendini sınıflandırmasını etkileyebilir. Yapılan röportajlarda özellikle bireylerin bulundukları mekanın bile , kendilerini kime karşı tanımlıyor olduklarının bile cevaplarını etkilediği gözlemlenmiştir. Örneğin kendini Kıbrıs'ta bir Rum ile etkileşim içindeyken Türk veya Kıbrıslı Türk diye tanımlayan birey, Türkiye'de bir Türkiye kökenli ile etkileşim içindeyken Kıbrıslı olarak tanımlayabiliyor.

Kıbrıs Türklerinin kendi kimliklerini tanımaları hususunda, yapılan mülakatlardan alınabilecek ilk okuma, tek bir kimlik tanımı üzerine ortak bir aklın olmadığıdır. Kimlik tanımlamaları ve bu kimlik tanımlamalarının arka planları çeşitlilik gösteriyor. Tarihsel olarak bakıldığında Kıbrıs'ta "millet" kavramından önce "cemaat" kavramı ve cemaat üzerinden sosyolojik durumun tanımlanması daha eskidir (Nevzat & Hatay, 2009, s.1). Osmanlı ve İngiliz idaresi dönemlerinde adada yaşayan Rumlar ve Türkler kendilerini dini kimlikleri üzerinden tanımlıyorlardı. Burada her iki büyük cemaatin de öncül kimliği "Hıristiyanlık" ve "Müslümanlık" diye ayrılıyordu, kısacası kimlik ile din içiçe geçmiş durumdaydı.

Ulusal bir benliğin her iki cemaat için de ortaya çıkması 1960 yıllarına dayanmaktadır. 1960 yıllarında Ada'da başlayan olaylar sırasında kimlik jargonu, "Hıristiyan" ve "Müslüman" gibi dini olgular yerine kendini "Rum" ve "Türk" gibi etnik olgulara bıraktı. 1960 öncesi varolan dini cemaat, siyasallaşıp, toplumsallaşma süreci içine ilk defa bu dönemde girdi. Ancak, bu çalışma, temel olarak, Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu üzerine yapıldığından, meselenin günümüz yansımaları üzerine Kıbrıs Rum Toplumu ile karşılaştırmalı bir analizi içermiyor, kimlik tanımlamasının sadece Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu üzerindeki yansımalarına bakıyor.

Mülakat sonuçları gösteriyor ki; Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunda "Kıbrıslı Türk" tanımı, üzerinde en çok uzlaşmış kimlik olarak kullanılıyor. "Türk", "Kıbrıslı", "Kıbrıs Türkü" gibi tanımlar da Kıbrıslı Türk tanımının yanında kullanılan kimlik betimlemeleri ama bu betimlemeler "Kıbrıslı Türk" kullanımına göre daha politikleşmiş tanılar ve genel de marjinal sağ ya da sol söylemler

2 Baker, Ulus (2009). *Yüzeybilim Fragmanları*. (s. 50). İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları

tarafından kullanılıyor. Kişiler kendi politik durumlarına göre Kıbrıslı veya Türk olarak kendilerini tanımlayabiliyorlar. Tabi ki burada "Türk", "Kıbrıslı", "Kıbrıs Türkü" gibi tanıların bir politik bilinç içermeksizin gündelik hayatta, halk ağzında kullanılan ve sıklıkla karşılaşılabilen tanımlamalar olduğunu da, marjinal politik söylemlerden ayrıştırarak belirtmek gerekir.

Mülakat sonuçlarında ortaya çıkan "Kıbrıslı Türk" tanımı her ne kadar üzerinde uzlaşılmış bir tanım olarak görünse de, bu tanımın ortaya çıkış neden ve koşulları üzerine görüş farklılıkları mevcut. Görüş farklılıklarını belirten birkaç örnek aşağıdaki gibidir;

> "Kıbrıslı Türküm. Ama zaman zaman bu değişiyor. Evet, Kıbrıslıyım, burada doğdum, burada yaşadım, dönem dönem Kıbrıslı olarak tanımladığım oldu. Ama Kıbrıslı Türk tanımının en doğrusu olduğuna inanıyorum. Toplumsal konjektüre göre bu konuda dönem dönem farklı tanımlamalar oldu. Kıbrıs'ta kimlik tanımlaması güney ve Türkiye ile olan ilişkilere göre kimlik tanımlaması değişkenlik gösterebiliyor. Bazen daha Türk, bazen daha Kıbrıslı oluyoruz ama Kıbrıslı Türklerin Kıbrıslı Türk tanımlamasının Annan planı ile ilgili olan süreçten sonra belirginlik kazandığına inanıyorum. Annan planı sürecinde Rum halkının hayır oyuyla halk gerçeklikle yüz yüze geldiğine ve kimlik tanımlamasının daha da belirginleştiğine geliştiğini düşünüyorum." (Nilgün Hanım)

"Kıbrıslı Türk" tanımını belirleyen iki temel faktör var; Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Türkiye. İlk olarak, 1960 sonrası yaşanan olaylardan sonra; İngiliz İdaresi döneminde ortak olan kamusallık, fiili olarak ikiye ayrıldı. Bu durum iki ayrı toplumsal bilincin de temelini attı ki bu ayrılıkla birbirlerinin ötekisine dönüşen Rumlar ve Türkler, birbirlerine karşı kendilerini mevcut koşul ve durumlara karşı tanılama zorunluluğuna giriştiler. 1974 sonrası Türkiye'den başlayan göç süreci ve yerleşiklerin adaya gelip, vatandaşlık almaları ve toplumsal sürece dışarıdan dahil olmaları ise Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu için yeni bir "öteki"ni gündeme getirdi ve dolayısıyla yeniden kendilerini, yeni "öteki" karşısında yeniden kimlik olarak tanımlama zorunluğu ortaya çıktı.

"Kıbrıslı Türk" tanısının nasıl ve neden ortaya çıktığı üzerine iki katılımcının görüşlerine bakalım;

> "Kıbrıslı Türk olarak tanımlıyorum. Salt kimlik düzeyinde baktığınızda kimlik denilen şey, politik düşüncelerden soyutlanamaz. Dolayısıyla Kıbrıslılar 60'lardan önce kendilerini Türk diye tanımlıyorlardı. Çünkü kendilerini Rumlara karşı konumlandırıyorlardı. 1974'den sonra Türkiye'den gelenlerle yüzleşince ya biz bu insanlardan biraz farklıyız aynı şey değiliz diye düşününce Kıbrıslı Türk kavramı öne çıktı. Daha sonra bu Kıbrıslı Türk kelimesi bazı kesimlerde bitişik yazılmaya başlandı bunun kaynağı da Türk'den kendini iyice ayırmaktı. Bir de son dönemlerde Türkiye yetkililerine duyulan tepkilerden dolayı ve maalesef burada bazı kesimlerde oluşmaya başlayan o ırkçı havadan dolayı Türklükle iyice ilişkisini kesmek için Kıbrıslı diye tanımlamaya

başladı insanlar kendilerini." (Edip Bey)

"Ben kendi kimliğimi Kıbrıslı Türk olarak görüyorum. Bana göre Kıbrıs'ta bir kimlik kargaşası var zaten bunun sebebi de Türkiye ile Kıbrıs Rumları arasında kalmamızdan dolayıdır. Türkiye'ye baktığımızda, onlardan farklılığımızı ortaya koymak için Kıbrıslı diyoruz, Kıbrıslı Rumlara baktığımızda da kendimizi Kıbrıs Türkü, Kıbrıslı Türk veya Türk olarak söylüyoruz. Aslında burada her ikisinden de farklı bir toplum olduğumuzu, var oluşumuzu anlatmaya çalışıyoruz, tek başına Türk dediğimizde, Türkiye'deki devletten farklı bir devlette farklı bir toplumda ve kültürde yaşamadığımızı, nasıl ki bir Azerbaycan, bir Türkmenistan Türkü farklıdır, ayrı devlet ayrı bayrakları var, bizim de aynı şekilde, Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyetimiz var, ayrı bayrağımız var, ayrı bir meclisimiz var, tanınmasa bile. Bu yüzden biz de kendimizi tanımlarken, Türkiye'ye yönelik baktığımız zaman Kıbrıslılık'a vurgu yapıyoruz. Ama Kıbrıslı dediğimizde o zaman zaten bütün dünyanın aklına Rum geliyor, dolayısıyla tek başına Kıbrıslılık, Kıbrıslı Rumlara karşı kendimizi ifade etme bakımından yeterli olmuyor. (Enis Bey)

Burada "Kıbrıslı Türk" tanımı "Türk" ve "Kıbrıslı" tanımları arasında ara bir tanım olarak okunabilir. "Türk" kimliği 1960 öncesi "Rum" kimliğine karşı kullanılan olağan bir tanım (ki cemiyet dönemindeki normatif dini kimlik tanımlarına -Hıristiyan ve Müslüman- yakın ve tam anlamıyla Kıbrıslı Türkler için etnik bir bilinci olmayan doğal bir kullanım). Ancak yukarıda da aktarıldığı gibi; 1974 sonrası Türkiye'den göç hareketleri sonucunda "Türk" kimliği göçmenlere karşı Kıbrıslı Türkler'in kendilerini tanımlamaları için yeterli bir tanım değil. Bu noktada "Kıbrıslı Türk" – Türk kökenli iki sosyal yapıyı, ayrı ayrı tanımlamak için ortaya çıkan ayırıcı bir sıfat oluyor. Bununla paralel olarak adaya göçen yerleşikler için de "Türkiyeli" ayırt edici bir sıfat olarak kullanılmaya başlanıyor. Kimlik tanımlamasında "Türkiye" son dönemde yeniden belirleyici bir faktör. Son dönemde K.K.T.C ve Türkiye arasında yaşanan politik krizler; bu defa bütün olarak Kıbrıslı Türkler'in Türkiye'ye karşı kendi kimliklerini yeniden tanımlamalarına neden oldu. Bunun neticesinde ortaya çıkan "Kıbrıslı" söylemi, Kıbrıslı Türkler için yeni bir ayırt edici kimlik olarak kullanılmaya başlanıyor.

Bir başka katılımcı ise "Kıbrıslı Türk" tanımının 1960 sonrası ortaya çıkan idare ayrılığıyla bağıntılı bir kimlik tanımı olduğunu belirtiyor;

Bana bu sorulduğu zaman ben süreci yaşayan biri olarak Kıbrıslı Türküm derim. Çünkü hasbelkader ben verdiğim örneklerden de yola çıkarak o kimliğe inanarak ona sarılmış biriyim. Rumun hakimiyetine girmemek için benim kişiliğim ancak beni Kıbrıslı Türk olarak kurtarırdı. Ben bu Kıbrıslı Türk kişiliğimi önce Ruma karşı ortaya koydum ve aradan geçen elli yılda Kıbrıslı Türk ve Kıbrıslı Rum, tamamıyla siyaset, literatüre girmiş iki ayrı kavramdır. Türkiye'den gelip burada vatandaş olanların ben Kıbrıslı Türküm demesini bekliyorum artık. (Fazıl Bey)

Kıbrıs yakın tarihinin en çok tartışılan metni, "Annan Planı" buna en yakın örnek olarak verilebilir;

Birleşik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti, hukuk devleti, demokrasi, temsili cumhuriyet hükümeti, Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Kıbrıslı Türklerin siyasi eşitliği iki bölgelilik ve kurucu devletlerin eşit statüsü temel ilkelerine bağlı olarak bu Anayasa ile yapılandırılır. (Annan Planı. Kısım 1: Temel Maddeler, Madde 1.4.)

Fazıl Bey'e göre bu siyasi tanım ayrılığı 1960 olaylarından sonra fiili olarak gündemde ve taraflarca kullanılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla "Kıbrıslı Türk" tanımı, toplumlar arası ilk ayrımda ortaya çıkan aynı zamanda da siyasi olan bir kimlik tanımıdır. Burada "Rumlar" ve "Kıbrıslı Türk" tanımı için belirleyici faktör olarak görünüyor. Bu tanım, göçmenler adaya göç ettiğinde zaten mevcut olan, kabul görmüş ve benimsenmiş bir kimlik tanımıydı. Bir başka katılımcı da "Kıbrıslı Türk" kimliğinin 1960 sonrası ortaya çıkan siyasal bir kimlik olduğunu ve bunun iki taraf için de milliyetçi bilinci ortaya çıkarttığını söylüyor:

Kıbrıs Türkü benim için çok acayip bir tanımlama olmaz, Kıbrıslı Türk de bana abes gelmez. Kıbrıslılık; hayır adada iki tane toplum var, yani bu çok gün gibi açık. Sadece bir Kıbrıs milleti oluşabilseydi, bu günkü 1950'lerden itibaren yaşadığımız problemleri yaşamayacaktık. Bütün mesele zaten 1960 yılında sömürge idaresinden çıkıldığı zaman Kıbrıs'ta İngilizlerin bıraktığı boşluğu hangi yönetim yapısıyla doldurulacağı sorunu vardı ve adanın iki tane esas unsuru olan Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Kıbrıslı Türkler bir şekilde bu boşluğu dolduracaklardı. Bu boşluk için, eğer uluslararası ilişkilerdeki esas paradigmayı alırsanız, 'ulus=devlet paradigması' ve bu da üniter devlet, bir taraf Enosis ile doldurulmaya çalışıldı, diğeri ise Taksim dedi. Ama kendilerine istenmeyen bir çocuk verildi 1960'ta Kıbrıs devleti. (Turgut Bey)

İngiliz idaresi sonrası Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Kıbrıslı Türkler idareyi ele geçirince, anlaşmazlıklar karşısında, siyasi kimliklerinden hareketle "milliyetçi" çözümler ortaya koyuyorlar; Rumlar'ın Enosis'i, buna karşı Türklerin, Taksim'i bir çözüm olarak ortaya koymaları, ilk ayrışmadan itibaren üstlendikleri kimliklerinin bir dışavurumu olarak görülebilir.

Mülakatlar karşılıklı incelenip, marjinal politik söylemlerden ayrıştırıldığında "Kıbrıslı Türk" Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu'nun kollektif bilinçdışına yerleşmiş, kanıksanmış ve kendi kimliğinin ifadesi olarak somutlaşmış bir betimleme olarak okunabilir. Buna karşın şu sorulabilir; "Uzlaşılmış bir kimlik kabulü varsa – neden hala kimlik tanımlamaları üzerinden belirsizlikler ve tartışmalar gündeme geliyor?" Zaman içinde kimlik konusunda yaşanan bu belirsizlik ve tartışma durumu, mevcut kimlik oluşumunun değişen siyasi sürece bağlı olarak bazen farklı yönlere evrilebilmesine bağlanabilir. Neticede "Kıbrıslı Türk" betimlemesi, siyasileşmiş bir kimlik tanımı ve oluşumu konusundaki görüş farklılıkları da yine tanımın doğmasında etkili olan siyasi belirsizliklere bağlıdır. "Kıbrıslı Türk" tanımını belirleyen iki temel faktör olarak, Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Türkiye gösterilebilir. Bu unsurlar halen Kıbrıs Türk

Toplumu'nun siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyolojik yapısını etkileyen en baskın faktörlerdir. Dolayısıyla bu faktörlerin siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyolojik başkalaşımları, bazen dolaylı olarak bazen de kısmen Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu'nu etkiliyor. Uzlaşılmış bir "Kıbrıslı Türk" tanımına rağmen, kimlik konusunda zaman zaman toplumsal tartışmaların gündeme gelmesi bu faktörlerin değişkenlikleriyle ilişkilendirilebilir.

Göç, Asimilasyon ve Varolma Kaygısı

Kıbrıs Adası yakın tarihe kadar, daima iki politik etkiyi bünyesinde barındırdı. Bu etkiler; adada farklı dönemlerde sömürge yönetimlerinin var olması ve adanın daima dış göçe maruz kalmasıdır. Ada tarihinde bu iki politik olgunun varlığını, geç bronz çağdan (Fenikeli ve Hitit istilaları) 1960'lara kadar gözlemlemek mümkün. Göç olgusu daha sonra da devinimini sürdürdü ve halen de sürdürmeye devam ediyor. Osmanlı İdaresi döneminden beri ada toplumunu incelersek, adadaki mevcut tüm sosyal topluluklar için (cemaatler, azınlıklar, etnik gruplar) varolma kaygısı, toplumsal bilinç dışına kodlanmış tipik bir azınlık mefhumu. Sosyal topluluk bir cemaat olarak, bir toplum olarak ya da bir ulus devlet olarak nasıl evrimleşirse evrimleşsin "kendi içine kapanma" ve "ötekiyi, sosyal çözülmeyi etkileyecek bir unsur olarak görme" durumunu daima bilinçdışında barındırır ve bu sürekli canlı tuttuğu kollektif bir tehdit algısıdır.

Bu tespitlerden hareketle, Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu özelinde sağlamlaşmış ve gündelik söylemde rahatlıkla karşılaşılan bir varolma kaygısından bahsetmek mümkün. Bu kaygıyı en çok besleyen kuşkusuz göç unsurudur. 1974'den sonra Kıbrıslı Türkler'in yaşadığı bölgelere Türkiye'den 1980 başlarına kadar süren bir nüfus aktarımı yapıldı. Bu nüfus aktarımı halen dalgalar halinde devam ediyor. 1974 sonrası adaya nüfus aktarımıyla gelen ve vatandaşlık hakkı alan yerleşmeciler, Kıbrıslı Türk'lerde bir asimilasyon tartışmasını gündeme getirdi ki ilk nüfus aktarımından beri sürekli sorulan soru bu göçlerin planlı bir asimilasyon denemesi olup olmadığıydı.

Kimlik tanımlamasının aksine, mülakat sonuçları; göç ve asimilasyon meselelerinde keskin görüş ayrılıkları olduğunu ortaya çıkartıyor. Türkiye'nin adaya nüfus aktarımı, göç eden yeni yerleşmecilerin profili ve göçmenlerin sosyal hayata dahil olmaları gibi bir çok mesele Kıbrıslı Türkler için ciddi bir problem olan asimilasyon tartışmalarına neden oldu. Bugün hala hatırı sayılır boyutta toplumun bir çok kesimi tarafından tartışılan asimilasyon meselesi, eğer varsa Kıbrıslı Türkler'in varolma kaygısının en büyük sebebi olarak yorumlanabilir.

1974 sonrası adaya Türkiye'den gelen nüfusun bugün K.K.T.C'de üçüncü hatta dördüncü kuşak çocukları yaşıyor. Bu yeni kuşak çocuklar başka bir kimlik tartışmasının da tarafları oldular. Öyle ki bu yeni kuşaklar için gündeme gelen kimlik sorusu bu kuşakların hala "Türkiye Göçmeni" olarak mı tanımlanacağı yoksa artık onların "Kıbrıslı Türk" mü oldukları yönünde? Bu kimlik sorusu göçmenlerin çocukları için başka bir tanımı da beraberinde getiriyor "adaptasyon" meselesi. Asimilasyon problemin hemen karşısında bir adaptasyon meselesi de hala göçmenlerin yeni kuşak çocukları üzerinden tartışılan ama çok fazla gün ışığına çıkartılmamış bir mesele.

Türkiye'den yapılan göçlerin planlı bir asimilasyon denemesi olup olmadığı tartışılırken, bu göçmenlerin varlıkları üzerinden başka bir mesele de tartışılıyor, bu göçmenlerin K.K.T.C'de siyasi iktidarlar için potansiyel oy kaynağı olarak kullanılmasıdır. Bir Katılımcı durumu şöyle yorumluyor;

> "1974'ten sonra buraya gelenler sosyo-ekonomik düzeyi düşük insanlardır,bir takım sorunlar yaşadılar ilk başlarda ancak aradan 40 yıl geçti ve bu sürede bu insanların üçüncü, dördüncü kuşağı dünyaya geldi ve artık onlar arasında ayrım yapamıyoruz bunlar Türkiye göçmenleri midir yoksa Kıbrıslı Türkler midir. Burada yaşadılar, doğdular, o konuşmayı öğrendiler buralı oldular. Adapte oldular. Sorun son dönemde göç dalgasıyla gelenlerde oldu özellikle bu inşaat patlaması onların arkasına gelen çalışanlar işçiler yeni kişiler aslında buraya adaptasyon sorunu yaşadılar. Bir de seçim yatırımı olarak sağ partiler tarafından getirilenler var. Seçimi sol partilere karşı kazanabilmek için Türkiye'den böyle aşırı milliyetçi tipleri buraya getirerek onlara bir takım iş imkanı, ev arazi (Rumlardan kalanları söylüyorum) karşılığı olmayacak bir şekilde dağıtarak bu insanların buraya şuursuzca, bilinçsizce gelmesi sağlandı. Buradaki iradeyi ve gücü yenmek için yapıldı. Şimdi buradaki iradeyi gücü yendiğinde de yerli halk tepki gösterir tabi ki buna çünkü burda ayrı bir demokrasi var. (Enis Bey)

Bu yorum; göçmenlerin K.K.T.C içerisinde siyasi iktidarlar için ne kadar ciddi bir kitle olduğunu gösteriyor. Göçmenlerin siyasi bir araç olarak kullanılması, ilk bakışta asimilasyon problemine karşı başka bir problemi tartışmaya açıyor ancak adadaki yerel nüfusun, göçmen nüfusa karşı oranı göz önüne alındığında, göçmenlerin siyasal bir araç olarak kullanımı, nüfus oranı üzerinden asimilasyon sorununun başka bir boyutuna da işaret ediyor. Türkiye'den göç aktarımı nasıl bir problemse, Kıbrıslı Türkler'in de adadan başta İngiltere, Avusturalya ve diğer Avrupa ülkelerine göç etmeleri ve bu göç eden nüfusun adadaki yerli nüfustan çok daha yüksek oranlarda olması da ayrı bir sıkıntıdır.

Göçmenler üzerine yapılan ekonomik tespitler ise en sık tartışılan durumlardan biri. Öncelikle göçmen problemini "ekonomik sınıf" olarak gören bir bakış açısı Kıbrıslı Türkler'de hala mevcut. Bu bakışa göre; nüfus aktarımıyla gelen göçmenler düşük ekonomik sınıftandı ve adanın mevcut durumuyla kültürel bir bağ kurmakta zorlandılar. Bundan dolayı göçmenlerin yeni yerleşiklik alanlarına ve bu alandaki mevcut sosyal sürece adapte olmaları çok zordu. Bu durumda göçmenler ve yerleşikler arasında ciddi bir uzlaşı sorunu oluştu.

Diğer bir ekonomik gerekçe ise ; 1974 ve 1980 arası Türkiye'nin nüfus aktarımı uluslararası sözleşmelere aykırı olsa bileKıbrıslı Türkler'in yaşadığı bir çok bölgede tarım, hayvancılık ve balıkçılık alanlarında sürdürülebilirliği sağlama sorunu vardı. Ayrıca

mevcut yerleşik nufüs savaştan dolayı Rumlar'dan boşalan tarım, hayvancılık ve balıkçılık alanlarına yerleşmek istemiyorlardı. Bu sıkıntıyı devlet yetkilileri Türkiye'den gelen göçmenlerle çözmeye çalıştılar.

Bir katılımcı durumu şöyle yorumluyor;

> Ben kendi adıma bu göçü planlı bir asimilasyon projesi olarak görmüyorum. Bilimsel olarak da olgularla bilinen bir şey vardır ki 1974-1980 arası, tabi bunu hukukçu olarak söylemiyorum, Türkiye devleti buraya nüfus aktardı 1974'le 1980 arasında biliyorsunuz bu Cenevre savaş sözleşmesine göre suçtur. Aktarım şekli şöyledir: hiç gittiniz mi bilmiyorum Kaplıca köyü vardır, Dağros, oraya toplu aktarım yapıldı dolayısıyla bu bilinmeyen bir şey değil. Buradaki amaç bence hem oradaki insanlara olumlu hayat şartları tanımak, hem de Kıbrıs'ın ekonomisiyle ilgili bir sorun vardı.Rumların boşalttığı birçok köye Kıbrıslı Türkler gitmedi. Kaplıca aslında o dönemde ulaşımı çok zor bir köydü şimdi tabii orası turistik bir köy oldu. Ama o dönemde Kıbrıslı Türkler gitmeyecekti. O köyde de balıkçılık yapılabilirdi, bunu yapabilecekleri getirdiler. Benim eleştirim 1980'lerden sonra Kıbrıslı Türk iş insanlarınadır. Çünkü 80'den sonra buraya getirilen insanların çoğu Kıbrıslı Türk iş insanlarının ucuz işçi talebi üzerine geldi hala bugün zaten gelenler de öyle geliyorlar. Kıbrıs Türk sanayi odasının talebi var; çifte asgari ücret uygulama talebi var. Yani yabancı uyruklulara daha düşük asgari ücret verelim isteniyor. abi bunun sonucu nedir, daha çok yabancı uyruklu getirelim çünkü onlar daha ucuza çalışacak buradakileri çalıştırmayalım. (Edip Bey)

Bu yorumda asimilasyon ve göç meseleleri ile ilgili iki saptama daha ortaya çıkıyor; ilki dışarıdan ucuz iş gücü getirilmesinin adadaki iş adamlarının bir talebi olması ve dolayısıyla Türkiye'den nüfus aktarımında, Kıbrıslı Türklerin'de bazı alanlardaki taleplerinin payı olması. Bir başka saptama da göçmenler ve yerleşikler arasındaki kültürel uzlaşmazlığa açıkça işaret ediyor.

Bir çok katılımcı bugün K.K.T.C'nin de facto nüfusunda rahatlıkla gözlenebilir bir artışın olduğunda hem fikir. İşsizliğin yüksek oranlarda olması, okul ve hastane gibi kamusal alanlarda hizmetin mevcut nüfusa göre yetersiz kalması, bu artışın ilk emareleri olarak gösteriliyor. Buna rağmen K.K.T.C'de son dönemlerde hızla büyüyen inşaat sektörü hala Türkiye'den ucuz işçi talebinde bulunuyor ve bu sektördeki iş gücü büyük oranda Türkiye'den getiriliyor. Yeni dalga göçlerin bir başka toplumsal yansıması da K.K.T.C'de suç olaylarının artışı ancak tutuk evlerinde hüküm giymiş suçluların uyrukları ve Kıbrıslı Türk suçluların, Türkiye göçmeni suçluların ve diğer uyruklu suçluların birbirine oranlarıyla ilgili gazete haberleri ve bazı yayınlarda verilen bilgiler dışında resmi bir istatistik verisi edinilemiyor, o nedenle bu durumla ilgili resmi istatistiklere dayalı bir analiz yapmak mümkün değil.

K.K.T.C'de göçmenlere vatandaşlık verilmesi de kimlik tartışmaları gibi belli süreçlerle yeniden gündeme getirilen ve tartışılan en kritik meselelerden biri. Bir katılımcı göçün Kıbrıslı Türkler'de bir varolma kaygısına neden olup olmadığı meselesi, defakto nüfusun artışı ve Türkiye'den iş gücü getirilmesi konusunda şunları söylüyor;

> Kıbrıslı Türklerin bir çoğunda yok olma kaygısı var. "Kıbrıs'ın Hataylaşması" tabirini çıkaran kişiyim. Bu Hataylaşma, buna kaygı olarak bakacaksınız, var. Gerçek bir algı da olabilir, yanlış bir algı da olabilir. Çetele tutmuş birisi değilim kaç kişi Türkiye'den geliyor kaç tanesi "haksız yere vatandaş olmuştur olmamıştır" bunları hakikaten bilmiyorum, ancak de facto nüfusta, sokakta yürüyen nüfusta bir artış olduğunu gözlemliyorum. Okulların yetersiz kaldığı, sağlık hizmetlerinin yetersiz kaldığı, çok bariz şekilde görünüyor. Devlet hastanesine birkaç hafta önce gittiğim zaman bir baktım dopdolu. Biraz orda oturup beklerken kulağımla konuşmaları duyduğum zaman, popülasyonun yarısının veya yarıdan fazlasının Türkiye'den gelen insanlar olduğunu çok bariz görüyorsunuz. Eğer sokakta gördüğünüz nüfus haksız bir sakilde vatandaş olursa bu Kıbrıs Türkünün ürettiğine bir şekilde ortaklık anlamına geliyor. Sağlık için, eğitim için gidip özel sektöre para verip hizmet alıyorum diye düşünüyor. Kaygıları var insanların ve bunu da hoş görüyorum. Hoş görmekten kastım diğer insanların insan haklarının ihlal edilerek burdan sürüklenmesi anlamına gelmiyor, haksız bir şekilde vatandaşlık verirseniz siyasi iradeniz de erozyona uğrar siz kendi Cumhurbaşkanınızı bile seçme konusunda artık bağımsız olamazsınız. (Turgut Bey)

Asimilasyon ve varolma kaygısına geri dönecek olursak, Kıbrıslı Türklerde var olma kaygısının göç ve asimilasyon olgularından evvel de olduğu ve Türkiye'den nüfus aktarımının bu kaygıyı tetikleyen bir faktör olduğunu savunan eleştiriler de mevcut. 1960 sonrası Rumlar ve Türkler arasında yaşanan silahlı çatışmalar ve Kıbrıslı Türkler'e yönelik saldırılar şüphesiz Kıbrıslı Türkler de Rumlar'a karşı bir var olma kaygısını yarattı. Varolma kaygısının temel sebebi yaşanan ölüm ve katliam korkusuydu. Bu süreçte Kıbrıslı Türkler'deki asıl kaygı Rumlar'a karşı asimile olma gibi bir tehdit değil, hayatta kalmayla ilgili bir varolma korkusu olarak görülebilir. 1960'larda Kıbrıslı Türkler'de bazı aydınlar dışında, toplumun asimilasyon kelimesinin anlamını dahi bilmediğini ve bu kavramın bir kaygı unsuru olarak gündelik dile yerleşmesinin Türkiye'den nüfus aktarımıyla birlikte başladığını savunan görüşler de mevcut.

Bir katılımcı meseleyi şöyle yorumluyor;

> Asimilasyon meselesi Kıbrıslı Türklerin ürettiği bir şey değildir. Kıbrıslı Türkler 1974'ten önce bu kavramı bilmiyorlardı, bu kavram pek kullanılmazdı. Yalnızca bir, iki aydın ideolojik olarak olaya baktıkları zaman kullanırlardı bu kavramı ama bu günkü gibi sıradan insanların sokakta konuştukları bir kavram değildi. 1974 öncesinde Kıbrıslı Türkler belirli dönemlerde Rumlarla çatışmışlardır hatta bu çatışmada, öldürmeye kadar gelişen olaylar vardır. Fakat Kıbrıslı Türkler kendi kimliklerinin erozyona uğradıkları hissine

kapılmamışlardır. Sadece güvenliklerini tehlikede görmüşlerdir, ölüm korkusunu yaşamışlardır, toplum olarak saldırı altında hissetmişlerdir. Bu günkü korkunun sebebi Türkiye'den kaynaklanan bu etkinin Kıbrıslı Türklerin bilinen geleneksel moderniteyi birleştirip devam ettikleri yaşam tarzına yönelen bu tehdit nedeniyledir. Kişiler gerçekten kendilerine ait olan her şeyin ortadan kaldırılması suretiyle değiştiğini görmektedirler. Bu nedenle asimilasyon popüler bir kavram olmuştur. (İlhan Bey)

Bu yorumu takip ederek bir başka saptamayı daha irdelemek gerekiyor: Son dönem Türkiye ve K.K.T.C'nin ilişkilerinde kullanılan politik söylemlerin etkisi. Bu bakış açısına göre; Türkiye'de mevcut iktidar üzerinden yürütülen din tartışmalarının, asimilasyon ve varolma kaygısı üzerinde ciddi bir etkisi var. Bazı katılımcılar; din üzerinden geliştirilen bu tartışmaların bir benzerinin, 1960'larda Rumlar ve Yunanistan arasında yaşandığının ancak Kıbrıslı Türkler ve Türkiye arasındaki durum daha farklı bir boyutta olduğunun ve bunun daha kronik meselelerle bağıntılı olduğunun altını çiziyor. Katılımcı'ya göre;

Türkiye'nin son dönemlerde uyguladığı Kıbrıs politikası olayların tuzu biberidir insanların asimilasyon konusunda ne kadar haklı olduklarını bu son gelişmelerle görmüşlerdir. 'Korkularımız boşa değildir, bunlar artık açıkça dile getirilmiştir.' İnsanlar biliyor Erdoğan'ın 'Bırakınız bu Kıbrıslılığı, hepimiz müslümanız' sözündeki müslümanlığın nasıl algılanıp nasıl yorumlandığını. Sıradan vatandaşlar da müslüman olmanın, İslamiyetin Türkiye'deki yorumlanışının kendilerinin yorumlanma tarzına çok uzak, yabancı bir tarz olduğunu da biliyorlar. Aslında Kıbrıslı Rumlar ile Yunanistan arasında böyle bir sıkıntı 1967-74 yılları arasında çok bariz bir şekilde yaşandı, biraz da paralellik kurmak mümkündür. Kıbrıslı Türklerin yaşadıkları sorunlar biraz da geçmişe dayanır, Kıbrıs Rum toplumundaki sorunun sorunun şekillenmesi 1964 ve Kıbrıslı Rumların Yunanistan'a esas tepkisi 67-74 arasında görülebilir. Bu gün çok yaygın bir tepki olacağını sanmıyorum çünkü Kıbrıs'ın güneyindeki Yunanlıların sayısının 1%'i oluşturabileceğini sanmıyorum. Kıbrıs'a olan nüfus aktarımını politik bir programın neticesi olarak görüyorum. İfade edilen gerekçe bana pek inandırıcı gelmiyor [tarımsal alanlar boş kalmıştı vs.] O zaman niye bu alanları kontrol altına aldınız madem ki böyle bir imkanınız yoktu o zaman geri de verilebilirdi. Böyle yapılmadığı için biz de olana bakmak durumundayız. Buraya ilk zamanlarda getirilen insanlar büyük vaatlerle getirildiler, kendileri pek gönüllü değillerdi ama ikna edilmeleri yönünde güçlü yöntemler kullanılmıştır. Arazi, ev vaatlerinde bulunuldu. Bildiğim kadarıyla getirilenler ihtiyaçlı aileler değil gelenlerin Türkiye'de evleri barkları vardı. Bu insanlarla konuşursanız hangi koşullarda buraya geldiklerini söylerler. (İlhan Bey)

Konu asimilasyon riskine gelince farklı ideolojileri benimsemiş olan aydınların farklı yaklaşımları olduğu toplanan verilerde gözlemlenmiştir. Akademisyenlerin bazıları asimilasyonun varlığını iddia ederken bazıları ise asimilasyon diye birşeyin olmadığını iddia ettiler. Öte yandan asimilasyona göreceli olarak bakan aydınlar, asimilasyonun kaçınılmaz olduğunu bunun en büyük etkeninin de Türkiye'nin K.K.T.C politikası olduğunu savunurken, bazıları da bunun doğal bir süreç olduğunu, göç olmadan dünyanın bugünkü haline gelemeyeceğini savundular. Asimilasyon riski ve varoluş kaygılarını bazı akademisyenler 1974 sonrasındaki göçlere bağlarken, bazıları da bunun daha derin bir konu olduğunu Kıbrıslı Türklerin nesiller öncesinden bu tehlikeyi yaşamaya başladığını belirttiler. Bazıları ise son dönem göçlerinin asimilasyona sebep olmayacağını çünkü talep dolayısıyla işçi göçü olduğu fikrindeler.

Mülakat sonuçları; 1974 sonrası Türkiye'den nüfus aktarımının hala problemli bir durum olduğunu açıkça gösteriyor. Bu nüfus hareketinin "planlı bir asimilasyon denemesi" olup olmadığı bir yana – göç faktörünün Kıbrıslı Türkler'de bir asimilasyon fikrini tetiklediği açıkça ortada. Göçle beraber toplumsal bilinçdışına yerleşen asimilasyon algısı ise Kıbrıslı Türkler'in var olma kaygılarını en çok tetikleyen ve bu var olma kaygısını en çok besleyen etmen.

Toplumsal Varoluş Mitingleri

 "Kimlik Tanılaması" ve "Göç - Asimilasyon" başlıkları altında Kıbrıslı Türkler'de toplumsal düzeyde bir varolma kaygısı olup olmadığının temel nedenlerini karşılıklı olarak sunuldu. Çalışmanın bu kısmı ise K.K.T.C'de sosyal bir mefhum olarak belli zamanlarda ortaya çıkmış "Toplumsal Varoluş Mitingleri". Toplumsal varoluş mitinglerinin tamamı bir karşıtlık ve direniş fikri içeriyor ancak Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu'nun tamamının desteklediği ya da toplumun tamamı tarafından üzerinde uzlaşılmış eylemler değil. Buna rağmen bu mitingler, çalışmanın temel amacı için kritik bir önem arz ediyor.

Varoluş Mitingleri, Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta farklı zamanlarda organize edilen, farklı konulara tepki çekmek ve bu konulara karşı toplumsal bir ortak tavır geliştirmeye çalışan bir dizi eylemin ortak adı. Varoluş Mitingleri'nin kronolojisi, gelişme süreçlerine ve ortaya çıkış nedenlerine göre farklılıklar gösteriyor. Toplumsal Varoluş mitingleri; üç dalga olarak irdelenmesi gereken eylemler olarak tanımlanabilir. Aydınların da genel olarak varoluş mitinglerini üç dalga halinde inceledikleri toplanan veriler sonucunda gözlemlenmiştir. Birinci dalgada 2000-2001 yıllarındaki ekonomik kriz dönemi, ikinci dalgada 2002-2005 yıllarında olan ve Annan Planı'nı desteklemeye yönelik mitingler ve son olarak da 2011 yılında yapılan "besleme krizi" mitingleri vardır.

1999 Aralık ayında adada çok ciddi bir bankalar krizi patlak verdi. 2000-2001'lerde yapılan büyük mitinglerin sebebi yaşanan bu ekonomik patlamaya karşı ortak bir sosyal tepki koymaktı. 2002 - 2005 arasında olan mitingler ise öncekiyle bağımlı-bağımsız alakası olan eylemler oldu. Ekonomik krizle, bazı göz ardı edilen sıkıntıların, özellikle ekonomik bağımsızlığı

ellerinde tutamamalarının ne kadar büyük bir tehdit olduğunu farkına varan ada halkı çıkış yolu olarak gördüğü Annan Planı'nı desteklemek amacıyla bir dizi çalışmaya girdi. Bu dönemdeki mitingler tamamen Kıbrıs sorununun çözümüne yönelik yapılan eylemlerdi. Bu dalga; Annan Planı'nı desteklemek ve Kıbrıs'da çözüm bulmayı amaçladı. 2011 yılında şahit olunulan büyük mitingler ise durum diğerlerine göre biraz daha karışık. Daha çok kimliksel tepki olarak baş gösteren mitingler oldu. Bir Katılımcı; bu üç dalganın her ne kadar farklı sebeplerden dolayı hayata geçtiyse de birbirine bağlı ve birbirini destekleyen tepkiler olduğunu ifade ediyor ve farklı zamanlarda, farklı amaçlarla organize edilen Toplumsal Varoluş Mitingleri'nin birbiriyle bağını şöyle yorumluyor;

> Bankalar kriziyle Kıbrıs Türk halkı, bu ülkedeki ekonominin sürdürülebilir olmadığını gördü. Arkasından Kıbrıslı Rumlar'ın AB'ye tek taraflı olarak kabul edilebileceğini farkedince, ülkedeki uluslararası siyasetinde sürdürülebilir olmadığını farketti. Bu ekonominin ve uluslararası siyasetin sürdürülebilir olmadığını farketmiş olmak ve tam da bu süreçte Annan Planı'nın gündeme gelmemiş olması herkesi bir anda çözümcü yaptı. Çünkü ancak çözüm olursa uluslararası alanda tanınabilme ve ekonominin AB ekonomisi olacağı dolayısıyla mevcut siyasi ve ekonomik çıkmazdan kurtulmanın mümkün olacağı düşüncesi peydah oldu. 2011 yılı içerisinde yaşanan üçüncü dalga varoluş mitingleri ise önceki iki dalgadan şüphesiz ki beslendi ama bu defa tepki farklı bir yöne doğruydu ki bu diğer tepki dalgalarına göre temel bir bilinç farkını da yarattı. Kıbrıs sorununun çözümü umutları azaldı. Müzakerelerden insanlar, hemen hemen hiç birşey beklemiyor. Bu arada buraya ciddi anlamda Türkiye kaynaklı bir ekonomik paket dayatması var, paket dayatması özelleştirmeler, maaşlar gibi konuları içeriyor ve bu Kıbrıslı Türklere farkettirdi ki zaten sürdürülemez bir ekonomi vardı, şimdi bu ekonomi olduğu kadarıyla bile artık olmayacak ve bunun Türkiye'den geliyor olması ve Türkiye yetkililerinin de tarihinde ilk defa bu kadar ağıza alınmayacak kelimelerle Kıbrıslı Türkler'e hitap etmeye başlaması aslında varoluş kavramını Türkiye yetkililerine karşı bir kavram olarak ortaya çıkardı. (Edip Bey)

Edip Bey, bu mitinglerin hem ekonomik hem de siyasi anlamda bir direnme olduğunu, besleme krizine yönelik bir onur kırılmasının karşılığı olduğunu savunuyor. Üçüncü dalga mitingleriyle alakalı olarak en büyük farklılık Edip Bey'in, bu dönem mitinglerinin somut bir talepte şekillenmediğini, sadece tepki olarak kaldığını düşündüğü noktada Turgut Bey ve Enis Bey'in tam tersini savunması olmuştur. Edip Bey *"ne istemediğini biliyor ama ne istediğini bilmiyor"* derken Turgut Bey ve Enis Bey *"toplum, bu mitinglerde tespit ettiği sorunların acilen çözümünü istiyor vatandaşlık dağıtılmasın diyor "* diyerek görüşlerini iki zıt şekilde belirtiyor.

Sonuç olarak Kıbrıs Türk'ünün kimliğinin kurgulanışında, toplumun içinde bulunduğu sürecin yarattığı etkilere bağlı olarak, toplumsalın o sürece karşı nasıl tepki verdiği ciddi bir öneme sahip. Yapılan mülakatlar bu saptamayı açıkça destekliyor. Kıbrıs Türk kimliği iki temel faktör karşısında zaman içinde kendini tartışmaya açtı ve hala açmaya devam ediyor; Rumlar ve Türkiye.

Bu kimlik tartışmalarının hala güncel oluşu, Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu'nun bu mevcut iki faktörle sosyal, ekonomik, kültürel ve siyasal iletişiminin hala devam ettirmesine bağlı. Çalışmanın sorduğu ve izini sürdüğü en kritik mesele olan "varolma kaygısı" üzerine şu açıkça söylenebilir ki; Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu için varolma kaygısının kesinliği tartışmasız ortada. Mülakata katılan entellektüellerin neredeyse tamamı bu kaygının varlığının yakın zamanda daha da gözle görülür bir şekilde ortaya çıktığının altını çiziyor fakat bu durumun toplumun varolma kaygısında ciddi bir artış olduğu yönünde değerlendirilmesi yanlış olur. Daha ziyade tespitler; zaten varolan mevcut bir kaygının sadece daha gözle görülür bir hale geldiği ve sosyal söylemlerde artık daha net ifade edildiği yönünde.

Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu'nda bir 'varolma kaygısı'ndan söz edilebilir mi? sorusunun kökeni, Kıbrıs'ın iki toplumlu bir ayrışma sürecine girdiği döneme kadar gidiyor. İlk ayrışma döneminde Rumlar'a karşı gösterilen direnişte kendini gösteren varolma kaygısı, Türkiye'den başlayan göç dalgalarıyla evrimleşip, yön değiştirerek toplumsal bilinçdışındaki varlığını sürdürdü. Çalışmanın üzerinde durduğu bir başka problem olan varolma kaygısının yarattığı etnosentrik tutumun nereye doğru evrildiği kısmı ise; mülakat sonuçlarına dayandırılarak söylenebilir ki net bir sonuca sahip değil. Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu'nda günlük yaşamın bir parçası olarak etnosentrik yargıların anlam farklılıkları yarattığı açık. Gountlett'in (2002, s.45) çalışmasında söylediği gibi: *insanoğlu benzerlikleri ve özellikleriyle toplumun bir parçası olmak ister ancak aynı zamanda özel olup başkalarından farklı olduğunu da vurgulamak ister.* Buradaki durumda ise Kıbrıs Türk halkı kendi içinde toplumunu korumak, birlik ve beraberlik duygusuyla ilişkilerini güçlendirmek kaygısında ve etnosentrik yargıları bu durumunu korumaya odaklı. Bunun için Kıbrıs'ta Rumlara karşı Türk, Türkiye'de Kıbrıslı olmayı vurgulamaktadır. Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu'nun ortaya koyduğu etnosentrik yargılar; zenofobik bir tavırdan ziyade, daha çok kültürel bir milliyetçi bağa işaret ediyor ki buradaki durumu; genç bir toplumun kendi milli bilinçdışını inşa etmeye çabalaması olarak okumak çok da abartılı olmayacaktır. Mülakatların bir çoğu da açıkça ya da üstü kapalı olarak; bu milli inşaya işaret etti. Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu'nu kendi Cumhuriyeti itibariyle ayrı bir sosyal varlık olarak ele aldığımız zaman bu milli inşa olgusunun zaten doğal bir getiri olduğunu söylemek zorundayız. Bu noktada toplumsal varoluş mitinglerini içine karıştırılan kimi politik saplantıdan ayrıştırırsak, şu söylenebilir; bu eylemler: bütün olarak hareket etmeyi ve kültürel milliyetçiliğin kodlarını ortaya çıkartmayı kendiliğinden vareden korumacı eylemler. Toplumsal varoluş mitinglerinin; kimliği ve toplumsal varlığı savunmayı gerektiren durumlar karşısında, sürecin kendiliğinden tetiklediği sosyal getiriler olarak ortaya çıkmaları kaçınılmaz.

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Barış Medyası Olarak Alternatif Medyalar ya da Alternatif Medyanın Barış ile İmtihanı

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Toplumsal gruplar arasındaki çatışmanın sona erdirilmesi ve barış sürecinin yaşama geçirilebilmesi için öncelikle, toplumsal barış temelinde demokratik iletişimin geliştirilmesi ve buna bağlı olarak anaakım medyadaki milliyetçi, ırkçı nefret söyleminin ortadan kaldırılması gereklidir. Günümüzde medya, toplumdaki bireylerin barış ve savaş tahayyüllerini oluşturan en önemli etkenlerden biridir. Tam da bu nedenle yerel ve ulusal medyaların nefret söylemi içeren, şiddeti toplumsal alanda yeniden üreten dili ve görselliği kullanış biçimleri, barışın önündeki en önemli engellerdendir. Toplumsal barışın sağlanmasının önkoşulu, iletişimsel alanın barışçıl hale getirilmesidir. Bu sürecin öncelikli öğesi, sesi duyulmayan, ötekileştirilmiş toplumsal grupların kendilerini ifade edebilecekleri alternatif medyalarını yaratmalarıdır. Sürecin devamında ise tüm grupların kendilerini özgürce ifade edebildiği mecralar olarak alternatif medyalar, kendilerini aynı zamanda barış medyası olarak tanımlamalıdırlar. Alternatif medyalar kendilerini aynı zamanda barış medyaları olarak tanımladıklarında tüm toplumsal grupların katılımını temel alan ve tüm grupların etkileşim içerisinde olabildiği demokratik iletişimi olanaklı kılan demokratik siyasal ortamın yaratılmasına katkıda bulunabilirler. Bu nedenle de alternatif medyaların söylemlerinin de nefret dilinden uzak bir biçimde oluşturulması gerekir.

Barış medyası toplumsal çatışma ve şiddetin sona erebileceği ve toplumların farklılıklarını koruyarak barış içerisinde yaşayabileceği fikrinden hareket eder. Barış medyası, şiddet kültürüne karşı barış kültürünün yaratılması sürecinin önemli bileşenlerindendir. Tüm ezilenlerin, ötekilerin birlikte hareket ettiği toplumsal muhalefet hareketinin geliştirilmesi ve ötekilerin hem iletişimsel hem de siyasal alana aktif katılımının sağlanması

bağlamında önemli olanaklara sahiptir. Türkiye'de alternatif medyaların ve buna bağlı olarak barış medyalarının gelişimi ve yeni iletişimsel olanakları kullanarak giderek etkili olmaya başlaması ile birlikte hem iletişimsel alanda hem de siyasal alanda toplumsal barış konusunda bir kamusal tartışma ortamının açılmasına olanak sağlanmıştır. Bu çalışma, Türkiye'de barış medyasını, iletişimsel ve siyasal alana etkilerini tartışmak için kuramsal bir zemin oluşturmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu noktadan hareketle aynı zamanda yeni medyalar olarak ortaya çıkan ve Internet üzerinden yayınlanan alternatif medyaların metinlerinde kullandıkları yazılı ve görsel dilin barışçıl bir toplumsal ve siyasal ortamın yaratılması doğrultusunda etkinlikleri temel sorular çerçevesinde kuramsal açıdan tartışılacaktır.

Barış Gazeteciliği mi Barış Medyası mı?

Johan Galtung'un *barış gazeteciliği* tanımı özellikle çatışmaların yaşandığı toplumlarda üzerinde çok tartışılmış bir kavramdır. Bu tanıma göre, barış gazeteciliği ikili karşıtlık bağlamında "savaş gazeteciliği"nin karşıtı olarak kurgulanmıştır ve savaşı olumlayan şiddeti meşrulaştıran gazetecilik anlayışına karşı barışın temel alındığı bir yaklaşımın gazeteciliğinin önemini vurgular. Savaş gazeteciliği savaşı, nedenleri ve sonuçları belirsiz, bağlamından kopuk, sırlarla dolu, şiddetin meşru olduğu bir gösteri olarak sunar. Buna karşıt bir biçimde barış gazeteciliği ise savaşı, neden ve sonuçlarını açıkça belirterek, bağlamı içerisinde ve şiddetin yarattığı tüm tahribatları gözler önüne sererek ve sonuç olarak da sorunun çözümü ve barış olanaklarını tartışarak ortaya koymaya çalışır. Ancak Galtung'un (1998, 2000) *barış gazeteciliği* kavramsallaştırmasında ve barışın olanaklarının tartışılması

sürecinde gazeteciler merkezî bir rol oynar. Barışın tesisinin belirleyen aktörleri olarak gazetecilerin rolü aşırı vurgulanmış durumdadır. Bu nedenle de Galtung'un barış gazeteciliği kuramının temel sorunu çatışma ya da savaş meselesini toplumsal bağlamı içerisinde ele alıp oradan çözme yaklaşımına sahip olamamasıdır. David Loyn'un (2007) da belirttiği üzere bir grup gazetecinin çatışan tarafların politik yaklaşımları üzerinde baskı oluşturarak barışı sağlaması olası değildir. Barış gazeteciliği yaklaşımıyla barışın tesisine ilişkin kısa süreli kazanımlar elde edilse de, toplumsal ve siyasal aktörler tarafından içselleştirilmemiş olan bu tür barışçıl kazanımlar kalıcı olmamaktadır.

Barış gazeteciliği yaklaşımı, haber dilinin barışı savunan bir yapıda olmasını, savaşa ilişkin gerçekliğin nesnel bir biçimde yansıtılmasını temel alır. Gerçekliğin görünür kılınması savaş durumlarında muhalif bir çaba haline gelmekte, bu anlamda Galtung'un barış gazeteciliği yaklaşımı anaakım medyada, bireysel duruş bağlamında, alternatif yaklaşıma sahip gazeteciler tarafından savunulsa bile hegemonik ideolojiyi etkisizleştirme ve toplumsal anlamda savaşın tartışmaya açılmasını ve meşruiyetinin sorgulanmasını sağlama konusunda etkisiz kalmaktadır. Barış gazeteciliğinin gerçek anlamda gelişimi muhalif gazeteciliğin içerisinde gelişim gösterebilmekte ve barış gazeteciliği alternatif gazetecilik ile üstüste binmektedir. Bu açıdan, barış gazeteciliğini bir grup gazetecinin denetiminde veya sorumluluğunda olan bir pratik olarak düşünmek yerine, barış için mücadele eden muhalif örgütlenmelerin sesini duyuran bir mecra ve pratik olarak kabul etmek gerekir. Ayrıca barış gazeteciliği, sadece haberlerin yapısına yönelik bir eleştiri ve barış diliyle yeniden-üretilmeleri istemi olarak sınırlandırılmış bir anlama sıkışıp kalmaktadır. Bu nedenle, barış gazeteciliğinden öte "barış medyası" kavramının kullanımının daha uygun olduğu iddia edilebilir.

Barış gazeteciliğini gerçek anlamda yürütebilmek için anaakım medyanın barışçı bir ideolojiyle hareket etmesi gereklidir, var olan medya yapısı içerisinde barışı savunan gazeteciler bulunmaktadır, ancak kendilerini özgürce ifade edebilmeleri olası değildir; gazetelerin bağlı oldukları sermaye grubunun ideolojisine göre kendilerini sınırlandırmak ve yayın politikalarının çizdiği çerçeveler dâhilinde hareket etmek durumundadırlar. Gazetecilik etiği tanımı itibariyle toplumsal barışın savunusunu gerektirmesine karşın, etik yaklaşım sermaye tarafından işlevsiz kılınmaktadır. Kapitalizmin demokrasi ile ilişkisinin sona ermesine bağlı olarak sermaye medyalarının etik ile ilişkisi de sona ermiştir. Bu anlamda anaakım medyanın koşulsuz bir biçimde etiğe uygun davranmayacağı iddia edilebilir. Sevda Alankuş (2011) tarafından belirtildiği gibi "demokrat çizgilerini koruyan bir kaç yazarın köşelerinden söyleyebildikleri dışında, habercilik, editöryel başlık ve fotoğraf seçimleri vb. sözkonusu olduğunda medya her zamanki gibi 'savaş kışkırtıcılığı' yapmayı sürdürüyor, bu nedenle de her zamankinden daha çok eleştirilmesi gerekiyor". Anaakım medyanın eleştirisi belirli ölçülerde anaakım içerisindeki muhalifler tarafından, ancak temelde alternatif medyalar tarafından yapılabilir. Anaakım medya içersinde muhaliflerin durumu siyasal koşullara göre değişebilmektedir. Tam da bu nedenle anaakım medyanın tutarlı ve sürekli bir biçimde etik ilkelere

uyarak yayın yapmasını beklemek her koşulda olası değildir. Bir yandan, yakın tarihte örneklerini gördüğümüz şekilde anaakım medya içerisinde, etik ilkelerde ısrar edenler ve barışçılıkta direnenler medyadan uzaklaştırılmaktadır. Öte yandan alternatif mecralara kayan bu kişilerle ilgili yaygın medyada karalama kampanyaları yapılmaktadır. Sonuçta var olan anaakım medya -birkaç numunelik isim dışında-, sermaye ile uyumlu çalışan ve muhalif düşünüşle hareket etmeyenlerin militarist emir-komuta zincirine ya da efendiye biat etmeyi temel alan bir mekanizmaya dönüşmüştür. Gazetecilik, daha geniş bir bağlamda medya etiği temel sorunlardan bir tanesi haline gelmektedir; bu gerçeklik bağlamında Alankuş medyanın askeri ya da sivil ototenin direktifleriyle değil, kendi geliştireceği yeni bir etik ile davranması gerektiğini savunur. Bunun gerçekleşebilmesi ise, yine Alankuş'a göre, Türkiye için uygulanması her zamankinden daha elzem hale gelen Barış gazeteciliğinin ilkelerine göre davranılması (2011) ile mümkün olabilir. Ancak var olan durum 'barış gazeteciliği' anlayışının anaakım değil alternatif medyalar tarafından ve 'barış medyası' çerçevesinde bütünlüklü bir yapı tarafından geliştirilebileceğine işaret etmektedir. Anaakım medyanın, iktidarı ve iktidarın şiddetini meşru gören ve söylemsel olarak yeniden-üreten anlayışına ve bu medyanın –etik ilkeleri ihlal eden- 'etik' anlayışına karşı alternatif medyalar tarafından 'alternatif medya etiği'nin kuramsal olarak üretimi ve pratikte kullanımı önemli bir sorun haline gelmiştir.

Alternatif Medya Tanımları Nelere Karşılık Gelir?

Alternatif medyalar, muktedirlerin medyalarının hegemonyasının altını oyan karşı-hegemonya yaratma sürecinin aktörleridir. Muhaliflerin ideolojik aygıtları olarak alternatif medyalar, hem ideolojileri hem de söylemleri ile iktidara karşı "başka bir dünya mümkün" anlayışını savunur ve alternatif bir yaşam kurgusunu bugünden yaşama geçirme amacını ifade ederler. Bu amaç, alternatif bir sistem talebini, militarizmin reddini ve barışın savunusunu da içerir. Alternatif medyalar bu anlamda muhalif ideolojiler temelinde hareket eden, toplumsal hareketlerin sesi olarak alternatif kültürel üretimi gerçekleştirmeye çalışırlar; buna bağlı olarak alternatif medyaların toplumun radikal dönüşümünü gerçekleştirme mücadelesinin ürünü oldukları iddia edilebilir.

Alternatif medya, toplumsal sorunların çözümlenmesi sürecinde de etkin bir role sahiptir. Çatışmaların ya da iç savaşların yaşandığı ülkelerde, hem ulusal hem de uluslararası alternatif, radikal medyalar ezilenlerin yanında saf tutarak muktedirlerin ezilenlere karşı uyguladığı şiddete ve yürüttüğü savaşa karşı barışın savunusunu gerçekleştirmeye çalışırlar. Alternatif medyaların savaş-karşıtı, barışı savunan yaklaşımları, medya alanında barış dilinin hâkim kılınması açısından önemlidir ve anaakım medyayı barış yönünde adım atmaya zorlar. Alternatif medya, bir yandan anaakım medyanın şiddet yüklü, militarist dilini eleştirirken diğer yandan toplumun gündelik yaşamındaki ırkçı, ayrımcı, şiddet yüklü söylemlere karşı barış söyleminin yaygınlaşmasını hedefler. Bu süreç içerisinde alternatif medyalar barışı savunan romanları,

öyküleri, filmleri, tiyatro oyunlarını, belgeselleri, performansları, müziği kısacası muhalif ideolojik bir yaklaşıma sahip ve barışı temel alan bir anlayış ile şekillenmiş ve barışı gerçekleştirmeyi amaçlayan kültürel ürünleri kitlelere aktaracak barış medyasının (gazete, dergi, radyo, televizyon, internet ortamı) geliştirilmesini sağlar. Bu nedenle yalnızca haberlerin alternatif bakış açılarıyla ele alınmasını değil, barış dilini yaygınlaştırıcı kültürel üretimleri yayınlarına dâhil etmeleriyle kültür endüstrilerinin dışarıda bıraktığı metinler için de alternatif birer mecra niteliği taşırlar. Anaakım medyayı takip eden gazetecilerden, televizyonclardan, akademisyenlerden, sendikacılardan ve diğer sivil toplum örgütlerinden oluşan ve halen internet üzerinden yayın yapan medya izleme grupları da barışçıl bir dilin oluşumuna dâhil edilerek kamuoyunda tartışma zeminleri yaratırlar. Bu şekilde örgütlenen karşıt-kamusallık, medyanın nefret söylemini, savaşçı dilini eleştirerek ve barış vurgusunu güçlendirerek anaakım medya üzerinde baskı grubu oluşturulmasını sağlamaktadır. Barışın savunusunu yapan bir medyanın yaratılması süreci ancak muhalif örgütlenmelerin -parti, hareket ya da çevrelerin-, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının desteğiyle ve alternatif medyalar üzerinden gerçekleştirilebilir. Barış medyası bu bakımdan alternatif medyanın bir bileşenidir.

Alternatif Medya ve Barış Medyası Nasıl İlişkilendirilebilir?

Barış medyasının, barış mücadelesi ile bağlantılı bir biçimde düşünülmesi gereklidir. Alternatif medyaların toplumsal hareketlilikler bağlamında anlamlandırılması bakımından barış mücadelesinin olmadığı bir süreçte barış medyasının sürdürülebilir olması olası değildir. Barış medyası, barış mücadelesinin kurucu öğesi işlevi görebileceği gibi, barış mücadelesi yürüten aktivistlerin kendilerini ifade ettikleri mecra olarak da tanımlanabilir. Barış mücadelesi barış aktivistlerinin anti-militarist, şiddet içermeyen eylemlerine dayanır. Aktivistlerin sınırlı sayıda eylemci ile gerçekleştirdiği eylemler ya da ağlar üzerinden örgütlenen kitlesel mitingler ile savaşa karşı mücadele yürütülür. Savaş karşıtı yerel ya da küresel aktivist gruplar, yeni medyaları etkin bir şekilde kullanarak eşzamanlı eylemler düzenleyerek küresel güçlerin savaş politikalarına karşı uluslararası barış mücadelesinin geliştirilmesi için çabalarlar. Küresel ve yerel barış aktivistleri ya da savaş karşıtları internet üzerinden kendi alternatif medyalarını, barış medyalarını ve ağlarını oluşturmaktadır. Etkin bir mücadele yürütebilmek için gerekli ağ tipi örgütlenme ve iletişim biçimlerinin yaratılması süreci, varolmayan bir muhalefet hareketi yaratmayı hedeflemez; barış hareketleri genel olarak varolan muhalif toplumsal hareketlerin iletişim ve ağ yapısı üzerinden kurgulanır; ancak bunun dışına da taşan bir yaklaşımla hareket eder. Küresel ya da yerel barış hareketleri tüm dünyayı etkileyen savaşları engellemek ya da süren savaşları durdurmak ve çözüm üretmek için mücadele yürütürler. Savaşı yürüten küresel ve yerel iktidar yapılarına karşı savaşın yürütüldüğü bölgelerdeki barış aktivistlerinin desteklenmesi temelinde, uluslararası dayanışma ağının yaratılması ve küresel gücü oluşturan savaşı destekleyen ülkelerin merkezlerinde yapılan eylemlerle savaşa

ve yarattığı tahribatlara uluslararası kamuoyunun dikkati çekilir ve kamuoyu baskısı ile savaş çıkmasının ya da sürdürülmesinin önüne geçmeye çalışılır. Barış medyası, bu anlamda, toplumsal tartışma, anlayış ve düşüncelerin geliştirilmesi için bir forum görevi görür (de Forsberg, 2006). Bu çerçevede ele alındığında barışın sağlanması ve korunması için demokratik iletişim ortamının yaratılması zorunlu koşullardan bir tanesidir.

Monist yaklaşımla hareket eden otoriteryan ulus-devletler 'öteki' olarak konumlandırılan toplumsal grupları, madunları süreğen biçimde baskı altında tutmaya ve asimile etmeye çalışırlar. Monist ulus-devletin politikalarına karşı madun grupların örgütlenmesi ve karşı çıkması engellenirse, başka bir deyişle ötekilerin, madun grupların demokratik bir siyasal ortamda kendilerini örgütlü bir biçimde var etme ve ifade etmeleri engellenirse çatışma kaçınılmazdır. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, baskıcı bir ulus-devlet bağlamında çatışmasızlık süreci ötekilerin örgütsüzlüğüne, bastırılmışlığına ve sessizliğine gönderme yapar, bu süreç barışçıl bir dönem olarak tanımlansa da gerçekte devletle baskı altındaki gerilim farklı biçimlerde devam etmektedir ve çatışma potansiyeli her zaman için mevcuttur. Ulus-devletin kurucu unsuru olan iç-grup ile dış-gruplar arasındaki etnik, dinsel farklılıklar nedeniyle, dış-gruplar üzerinde sistematik baskı kurulması etnik, dinsel ve kültürel açıdan asimile edilmeye çalışılmaları ya da kendilerini var etmelerinin, ifade etmelerinin engellenmesi, toplumsal yaşamın tüm veçheleriyle anti-demokratikleşmesine neden olur: "etnik ayrımın aşırı vurgulanması ve önyargılı imgelerin sürekli ve yoğun olarak kullanılması sonucunda politik alan iki karşıt güce indirgenir, bize karşı onlar, iyiye karşı kötü. (Sofos ve Tsagarousianou, 1993, s. 60)". Anaakım medya etnik sorunların olduğu ülkelerde, iktidardaki etnik grubun diğer etnik gruplar üzerindeki tahakkümünü meşrulaştırır, milliyetçi söylemiyle "etnik önyargılar üretir (Tersiz, 2008, s. 144)", buna bağlı olarak 'biz' ve 'öteki' arasındaki gerilim tüm toplumsal yaşamın temel belirleyeni haline gelir ve diğer toplumsal çelişkiler bu çelişkinin gölgesinde kalırlar. Böyle bir ortamda, iletişimsel anlamda da anti-demokratik teksesli bir yapı sözkonusudur, 'ötekilerin' seslerinin duymazdan gelindiği, ırkçı önyargılarla aşağılandığı, nefret söyleminin sıradanlaştığı bir medya sistemi; önyargı, çatışma ve toplumsal kopuşun yaşanmasına neden olur. "Dış grup seçilen düşman, ebedi bir meydan okuyuşu temsil eder. Farklı bir şey varlığını koruduğu sürece, bu öbür varlık ne kadar zayıf olursa olsun, faşist karakter tehdit edildiğini duyumsar (Adorno, 2003, s. 69)". İç-grup için tehdit oluşturan, şeytani bir düşman haline getirilen dış-grupların oluşturduğu tehditten kurtulmanın tek yolu ötekileri –asimilasyon ya da soykırımla- ortadan kaldırmaktır, iktidarın sesi olan medya bu karanlık militarist kâbusun üreticisi ve yayıcısına dönüşür. Medyanın militaristleşmesi, savaş dilini aşırı bir biçimde kullanması, tüm toplumsal alanlarda savaş dilinin ve nefret söyleminin yeniden-üretilmesini beraberinde getirir; "[m]edya yoluyla milliyetçi propagandacılar izleyicilere ötekilerin güvenlikleri ve toplumsal birlik için tehdit oluşturduğu ve bu büyük tehlikeden kurtulmanın tek yolunun onu ortadan kaldırmak olduğu söylerler (Hamelink, 1997, s. 32)". Bu anlayış toplumsal çatışmayı yaygınlaştırır ve şiddeti hem gündelik dil ve yaşam pratiklerinde meşrulaştırır hem de savaşı sürekli

olarak yeniden-üretir. Demokratik iletişimsel ortam yaratılana ve şiddet dışında bir dil bulunana kadar toplumsal çatışma tüm grupların yaşamlarını tahrip ederek sürdürülür. Barış medyası savaş sürecinde şiddet dışında başka bir dilin, barışın dilinin hem mümkün hem de zorunlu olduğunu ortaya koyma mücadelesinin örgütleyicisi ve sesidir. Barış medyası, alternatif medya olarak, anaakım medyanın farklılıkları yok sayan, ötekileri inkâr eden yapısına karşı ötekilerin kendilerini ifade etmek için farklı mecralar ya da medyalar yaratmasının sonucu olarak ortaya çıkar. Bunun yanında, tüm toplumsal grupların eşit ve özgürce iletişime geçebileceği bir toplumun mümkün olduğunu tarihsel ve güncel örnekler ve pratikler üzerinden göstermeye çalışır.

Barış medyası şiddet sorunu üzerine düşünen ve tartışan bir platformdur. Muhaliflerin öncülüğünde tüm savaş karşıtlarının toplumsal önyargılarını, nefret söylemini, çatışmalarını kısacası tüm söylemsel ya da eylemsel şiddet biçimlerini ele aldığı, analiz ettiği ve çözümler üzerine tartıştığı bir mecra ve medyadır. Şiddet de bir iletişim biçimidir, yerine sağlıklı bir iletişimsel süreç geçirilmedikçe şiddet tüm diğer iletişim biçimlerini geçersizleştirir; "şiddet sarmalı, başlangıçta sorunlu bir iletişim sarmalıdır, bu sorunlu iletişim sarmalı kontrolsüz bir karşılıklı güvensizlik sarmalı üzerinden iletişimin tümüyle kopmasına kadar ilerler (Habermas, 2008, s. 57)". Toplumsal yapı içersinde farklı gruplar arasında yaşanan çatışmaların şiddet bağlamında çözümlenmesi olası değildir, barış girşimcileri şiddet dışında bir mecra yaratarak gruplar arasında şiddet dışında iletişim biçimlerinin mümkün olduğunu göstermeye çalışırlar ve şiddeti eşitler arasında kurulacak diyalog ile çözümlemeyi hedeflerler. Çünkü tarihsel deneyimlerin açıkça gösterdiği üzere, şiddetin sona erdirilmesi demokratik iletişimin işletilmesi ile mümkündür. Barış medyasının yaratmayı hedeflediği demokratik iletişimsel mecralar, "her gruba sesini duyurabileceği ve kendi istemlerini geliştirebileceği bir alan sağlamayı içerir (Zhao ve Hackett 2005, s. 11)". Bu mecralarda çatışan grupların hem kendilerini ifade edip, gerçekleştirebileceği hem de diyalog içerisinde birbirlerini tanıyabilecekleri bir ortam yaratılmış olur. Bu süreç yaşanmadan çatışmaların çözümlenmesi çok da mümkün görünmemektedir. Toplumlar ya da gruplar arasındaki tarihsel önyargıların aşılması, uzun süren bir bellek muhasebesini, gerçeklerle yüzleşmeyi ve hesap vermeyi içermektedir. Hakikatleri araştırma komisyonları, karşılıklı işlenen suçların belirlenmesi, özür ve tazminat sorunlarının çözümlenmesi, çatışmaların bir daha çıkmaması için gereken temel gerekliliklerdir. Demokratik ortamın yaratılması süreci bu anlamda demokratik bir medyanın yaratılmasını ön-gerektirir; "demokrasi insanlara önemli konularda geniş ölçekli bir bakış açısı, çözümleme ve tartışma sunan, vatandaşların farklılıklarını yansıtan bir medya gerektirir. Demokrasilerde medya müzakereyi, farklı düşünmeyi destekler (McChesney, 1998, s. 10)". Farklılıkların özgürce yaşanması, ulus-devletlerin kurucu öznesi olan iç-gruptan farklı olanların –farklı etnisite, din vb.-, farklı düşünenlerin ve yaşayanların ötekileştirilmeden, marjinalleştirilmeden, şiddet ile sessizleştirilip bastırılmadan çoksesli, demokratik bir yapının olmazsa olmazları olarak kabul edilmeleri gerekir. Demokratik bir siyasal ve iletişimsel ortamın yaratılması süreci ise muhaliflerin, ötekilerin örgütlü mücadelesi

ile olasıdır. Bu mücadele sürecinde ise alternatif, radikal medyalar vazgeçilmez araçlardır. Çünkü "anaakım medyanın azınlıkların, etnik ve dinsel grupların kendi kültürel farklılıklarını yeniden-üretmeleri ve kamusal alanda yer alabilmesi için potansiyel içerdiği görüşüne karşın, gerçekte anaakım medya, özellikle de kamu hizmeti yayıncılığı birçok azınlık grubunun iletişim gereksinimlerini tam olarak karşılamaz (Bailey, Cammaerts ve Carpentier, 2007, s. 84)". Bu süreçte alternatif medyalara gereksinim duyulur. Devletin sınırlayan, kısıtlayan yapısına karşıt bir biçimde alternatif medyalar sınır tanımazlar; toplumsal bağlar kurarak ve katılımcılık yarattıkları pratiklerini sürdürmek için sürekli hareketlilik içerisindedirler, eleştiri, öz-eleştiri ve yeniden-yaratma hedefine sahiptirler. Downing alternatif, radikal medyayı genel olarak hegemonik politikalara, önceliklere ve perspektiflere karşı alternatif bir görüş ifade eden küçük ölçekli, birçok değişik forma sahip medya olarak tanımlar (Downing, 2001, s. v). Bu anlamda alternatif medya, Fuchs'un (2010) vurguladığı gibi, sistemin dışarıda bıraktığı, ezilenlerin, baskı altına alınanların, köleleştirilenlerin, ötekileştirilenlerin, sömürülenlerin karşı-enformasyonlarının ve karşı hegemonyalarının yaratılabileceğini gösterir (s. 179). İktidarın sessizleştirdiği grupların katılımıyla oluşturulan alternatif medyalar çoksesli, diyalojik bir kültürel ortamın yaratılarak toplumsal barışın sürdürülebilirliğini mümkün kılarlar.

Yeni medyalar alternatif medyaların gelişimi bakımından vazgeçilmezdir, çünkü geleneksel medyalara göre oldukça düşük maaliyetlerle, muhaliflerin geniş kitlelere seslenmelerine olanak tanırlar. Yeni medyalar, enformasyon ve iletişim teknolojileri, özellikle de internet günümüzde politik parti, grup ya da hareketler tarafından etkin bir biçimde kullanılmaya başlamıştır (Rucht, 2005, s. 4). Alternatif medyalar yeni medyaları özellikle interneti kullanarak yerel ve küresel alanda etkin eylemler örgütleyebilmektedir. Bunun yanında, muhalif örgütlenmelerin katılımcı bir biçimde yeniden-örgütlenmesinde, kendilerini ifade etmesi ve kitleselleşmesi sürecinde yeni medyaların katkısı sözkonusudur; "Modern iletişim teknolojisi, salt tüketici olarak değil, katılımcı ve yaratıcı olarak da, herkes için erişilebilir kılınmaktadır. İnternet bu tür katılımın güçlü bir aracı haline gelmiştir ve her türden alternatif hareketin –antiküreselleşmeci, çevreci, yerli, anti-kapitalist vb.- bu aracı nasıl büyük bir etkiyle kullandıkları hususu son derece öğreticidir (Raby, 2007, s. 59-60)". Barış medyası da interneti etkin bir biçimde kullanarak yerellerden başlayarak küresel anlamda da etkin bir hareketin yaratılmasını sağlamıştır. Bu açıdan geleneksel medyaların muhaliflere tanımadığı olanakları sunan "[i]nternet potansiyel olarak bizim ilk küresel toplum alanımızdır, politikanın hem yerel hem uluslar arası düzeyde gerçekten katılımcı olarak kullanılabildiği bir medyadır. İnternet bireylerin ve bağımsız kolektiflerin tüm dünyada milyonların takip edebildiği kendi sesleriyle iletişim kurabildikleri ilk medyadır (Ford ve Gil, 2001, s. 202)". Internetin katılımcılığı, çoksesliliği alternatif medyaların gelişimini hızlandırmış, buna bağlı olarak da sessiz kılınmış, açık ya da gizli şiddet biçimleri ile bastırılmış toplumsal grupların kendilerini ifade etmelerini olanaklı hale getirmiş, yerellerde sürdürülen özgürlük mücadelelerinin,

barış çabalarının küresel anlamda tanınmasını ve uluslararası dayanışma ağlarının yaratılmasını sağlamıştır. Alternatif küresel ağlar, toplumsal hareketlerin yerellerde devletler tarafından bastırılmasına ve sessizleştirilmesine karşı, militan seferberliklerin gerçekleştirilmesini mümkün kılmıştır. Örneğin Meksika'da Zapatistlerin ezilen yerli halkların hakları için verdikleri mücadele uluslararası destek ile savunulmuş ve devlet şiddetine karşı korunarak, barışçı mücadele yöntemlerinin gelişimine destek olunmuştur (Russell, 2001, s. 358). Sözcüklerin ve imgelerin internet aracılığıyla hızlı bir biçimde yayılması silahlardan daha güçlü bir etkiye sahip mücadele biçimini beraberinde getirmiştir. Savaşa karşı barış dilinin geliştirilmesi sürecinde yeni medyalar toplumsal örgütlenmelere ve hareketlere farklı olanaklar sunmuştur. Bu açıdan barış medyalarının gelişimi yerel mücadeleler temelinde ve uluslararası destekle güçlü bir biçimde sürdürülebilmektedir. Yerel mücadelelerin yeni medyalar ile ülke sınırları içerisinde yayılması ve görünür kılınması, buna bağlı olarak da uluslararası dayanışma ağları ile tüm dünyada görünürlüğünün sağlanması iktidarların rahatça hareket etmesini engelleyebilmektedir. Ancak, farklı bir bağlamda, Sri Lanka'da Tamil Elam Kurtuluş Kaplanları (LTTE) adlı örgütün yönetici ve militanlarının topluca öldürüldüğü, tüm Tamil halkının toplama kamplarına toplandığı gerçeği uluslararası alternatif medya ve ağlarda duyurulmasına rağmen hiçbir insani müdahale olanağına sahip olunamamıştır. Tamil halkı için söylemsel talepler dışında etkin bir aktivist destek yaratılamamıştır ve Sri Lanka devletinin şiddet ve öldürme temelli siyaseti teşhir edilerek durdurulamamıştır. Ya da benzer biçimde Avrupa'nın orta yerinde Kosova'da yaşanılanlar ile ilgili olarak yapılan yayınlara ve yaşanılanların ağırlığının belgelenmesine kulak tıkayan muktedirleri hareket geçirmek mümkün olmamıştır. Benzer birçok vakada, ezilen toplumsal grupların yaşadıkları devletlerin "içişlerine müdahale" olarak tanımlandığı ve kabul edildiği için uluslararası güçler tarafından görmezden gelinmiş ve devletlerin şiddet aygıtları yaşanılanların dış dünyaya aktarımını ve muhaliflerin müdahalelerini engellemiştir. Bu açıdan, internet üzerinden kurulu dayanışma ağlarının söylemselliğinin unutulmaması, gerçekten eylemde bulunabilen ve güçlü toplumsal hareketlerin iktidarlar üzerinde baskı kurabileceği ve yerellerde güçlü toplumsal hareketlerin, barışı savunan örgütlenme ve medyaların yaratılması gerekliliğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bağlamda, militarist baskılara, savaşa ve şiddete karşı muhalifler, birbirini tamamlayan ve yeniden-üreten süreçler olan "yeni barış medyaları"nın yaratılması ve barış hareketlerinin örgütlenmesi yönünde çaba göstermektedir. Uluslararası ve yerel barış hareketlerinin internet temelli barış medyaları oldukça etkili olmuş ve barış mücadelesinin hareketliliğinin ve kitleselliğinin gelişmesine katkı sağlamıştır.

Türkiye'de Barış Medyası

Türkiye'de alternatif medya kanalları toplumsal hareketlerin uzantısı olarak ortaya çıktıkları için başlangıçlarından itibaren bir karşıt-kamu tarafı olarak hizalanmış ve saf tutmuş durumdadırlar. Türkiye'deki toplumsal hareketler ve medyaları arasındaki ilişkiye bakıldığında, belirli bir ideolojik görüşe sahip çekirdek bir

kadronun bir araya gelmesi, bu kadronun etrafında kümelenen bir grup ve hareketi kitleselleştirme amacıyla kendi medyasını oluşturması olarak özetlenebilecek bir süreçten bahsedilebilir. Bu yapıda, fikirlerin merkezde bulunan çekirdek kadrodan çeperlere doğru giden bir anlayışla yayıldığını ve yayılmaya başlamadan önce fikri sürecin tamamlanmış olduğunu, daha sonra da aktarıldığını söylemek mümkündür. Fikirlerini yayma ve aktarma aşamasında seslerini duyuracakları mecraları nasıl yaratacaklarını -teknik bilgileri edinme ve içerik oluşturma pratiğini geliştirme gibi süreçleri- öğrenmeleri gerekmektedir. Geleneksel medyaların oluşturulması (gazete, dergi gibi) süreciyle kitleselleşme amaçlı olan hareketler, hem kendilerini isimlendirmiş olmakta hem ideolojilerinin yayılmasını ve kendilerini toplumsal hareket olarak var etmelerini hem de sonuçta ortaya çıkan radikal medyası ile toplumsal hareketin üst üste binmesini sağlamış olmaktadır.

Türkiye'de toplumsal hareketler ile ilişki içinde etkinliklerini sürdüren alternatif medyalara bakıldığında Haber Fabrikası, Jiyan, Atılım, Muhalefet, Sol Haber, Sol Alternatif [1] gibi medya örgütlenmelerinin, buraya kadar bahsedildiği şekilde bir barış dilini oluşturan ve yayan barış medyaları şeklinde yayın yaptıklarını söylemek zordur [2]. Bu medyalarda karşıt-kamusallığın dili de hem görsel hem de yazılı haliyle anaakımın karşıt kutbu bir taraf tutma ilişkisi içinde kendisini var etmektedir. Çatışma dilinin dışına kendisini taşıyabilen ve kendilerini farklı toplumsal cinsiyet, etnik, mezhep, sınıf ilişkileri üzerinden tanımlayan bütün gruplara eşit mesafede durabilen bir alternatif medya örneği olarak BİANET projesi görülebilir [3]. Şiddetin dilini yeniden üretmeyen, barışın dilini hem muktedirler hem de madunlar için mümkün kılan bir anlayışla toplumsal eşitsizliklere, hak ihlallerine, yanlış uygulamalara dikkat çeken; bunu yaparken de etik ve politik olarak sorumlu habercilik anlayışını takip eden BİANET, hem ulusal hem de yerel medyalardan akan enformasyon ağının birleştirici ve dağıtıcı noktası işlevi görmeye çalışmaktadır [4].

Sonuç olarak, barış medyasının alternatif medya yapılanmaları içinden çıkacağı açıktır. Ancak her alternatif medyanın barış medyası olarak işlev göreceğini söylemek mümkün değildir. Anaakım medyanın içinde barış dilini kullanmaya ve yaymaya özen gösteren yazarlar olduğu gibi, alternatif medyaların yazar kadrolarının da barış medyası olarak konumlanmalarını ve hareket etmelerini mümkün kılacak bir dili üreten homojen bir yazarlar grubuna sahip olmadıklarını söylemek gerekir.

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1 Sırasıyla bu alternatif medyalara http://www.haberfabrikasi.org/, http://www.herdildeherrenkteisyan.org/, http://www.atilimhaber.org/, http://muhalefet.org/, http://haber.sol.org.tr/,http://www.solalternatif.com/ adreslerinden ulaşılabilir.

2 Bu çalışma, kuramsal bir tartışma zemini yaratmak amacında olması nedeniyle, adı geçen alternatif medya örneklerinin içeriklerinin sözel ve imgesel söylemlerine ilişkin bir çözümleme yapılmamıştır. Ancak alternatif/radikal medya, barış medyası ve etik tartışmalar bağlamında bu açıdan çözümlemelerin yakın gelecekte gerçekleştirilmesi muhalif mecraların da barış dilini kullanmalarını destekleyecek yönde bir eleştirel bir adım olacaktır.

3 BİANET, alternatif medya ve katılımcılık ile ilgili olarak yapılmış bir çalışma için kaynakçada bakınız: Kejanlıoğlu, Çoban, Yanıkkaya ve Köksalan (2012).

4 Bu çalışmada adı geçen diğer alternatif medyaların görsel ve yazılı içeriklerine bakıldığında ise benzer türden bir mesafenin tutulmadığı görülmüştür. Bu nedenle de alternatif medyanın barış medyası olarak barışın dilini üretme ve yayma konusunda daha çok mesafe kat etmesi gerekmektedir.

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Living with a Difference: Immigration and Racism in The Republic of Cyprus

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While studying chosen social phenomenon such as migration in Cyprus, one must bear in mind, that 'there may also be no better comparison for a mainland than an island, since the processes and dynamics that occur habitually on a mainland may been enhanced and exacerbated in an island setting' (Baldacchino 2004:278). Hence, insular context of Cyprus appears as an asset for studying immigrants' situation. Nevertheless, this is not the only factor that shapes the current social situation there. Peripherality of the place influences this as well, especially because it shapes the production of special kind of locality which carves policies and drives peoples' island–shaped identity. Cyprus amongst other islands is in a never ending period of transition where the reality changes rapidly and constantly. Hence the transition alongside insularity and peripherality are the key concepts shaping people's life there.

Insularity and migration

The role of islands in the era of escalated mobility has changed and while witnessing the mobility turn in migration studies, one cannot not see the important role of island in the immigration processes today. Baldacchino (2004) goes further by paraphrasing Meads's (1928) 'Coming of Age in Samoa' and describes what we are witnessing now as 'Coming Age of Island Studies'.

In simple terms, from the geographical point of view, island is the piece of land that is surrounded by water. Hence, it could be a potential laboratory for the researchers which was indicated already in the sixties (Suggs 1961, Sahlins 1963) followed later by Connell and King (1999). This way of thinking was criticised and accused of being taken too far (Baldacchino, 2004) which may lead to 'unwarranted assumption' (Kirch 1986, 2). Therefore, although the space is limited by clearly defined borders in case of islands, it is not closed and does not exist by its own. Hence while studying islands, one must relate the findings with the broader context. In other words, although insularity shapes specific context, the changes happening in the islands are similar to those in other places but in an accelerated way. Hence, islands cannot to be studied in separation from other places as the findings are universal. If there is an island, there must be a mainland as well. The connections between them are shaped by today's globalisation but the word glocality (Robertson, 1992) has different meaning in the island context. In this case, locality and externality are the key aspects of the place's existence. That is not to say that external (mainland) is not what influence or shape island but is merely a perspective which one could apply while looking at it. In the view of this, islanders look at themselves through a prism of mainland till some extent but on the other hand, they construct the self-island-driven-identity in opposition to the mainland. This identity is shaped mainly by geographical position of islands which is often referred to as islandness. This insularity is composed with strong sense of island identity, limited resources surrounded by water and the culture of the place which is located in the periphery. Baldacchino (2004: 273) emphasizes that island-based identity fortify national identity which 'finds expression in xenophobia' because of strong sense of belonging which reflects on constant melting between geographical and political aspects of insularity. It is also supported by the strong culture of sameness (Baldacchino et al. 2009), namely same language, religion, skin colour etc.

Nissology, an academic name for island study created by McCall in 1994 emphasizes the role of economy in this area which is tailored by island governance profile and development options that the place has got. Warrington and Milne (2007) marks out 7 types of governance profiles. First are islands with civilization profile (i.e. Venice, Britain, Japan), second are those with

plantation profile (i.e. St. Lucia, Mauritius), third with settlement profile (i.e. New Zealand), fourth with fiefs profile (i.e. Haiti, Sicily), fifth with fortress profile (i.e. Cyprus, Malta), sixth with refuge profile (Cuba and Taiwan) and last with seventh profile entrepôts (i.e. Hong-Kong, Manhattan, Singapore). This division is based on the role of islands which they have played (or they are still paying) in the international level. This also indicates what kinds of the island are potential attractions for immigrants which will be discussed at the later stage.

In terms of development options island can be divided into three profiles; MIRAB - Migration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy (Bertram and Watters 1986), SITE - Small Island Tourism Economy (McElroy 2006) and PROFIT - People, Resource Management, Overseas Engagement and Para-Diplomacy, Finance and Transportation (Baldacchino 2006) where each names describes their nature.

Both governance profile and development options in the islands are fairly well studied (Connell, 1994, Baldacchino and Greenwood 1998, Baldacchino & Milne, 2000; Bertram & Poirine, 2007) but as stated above, we are currently witnessing the migration turn in island studies. Hence, one must stress the issue of migration in relation with both economy and development in the insular states.

Islands and immigration

For the purpose of this study, immigration to the island is going to be discussed and not the migration from them. Nevertheless, the latest has received considerable attention (Lowenthal 1992, Lockhart et al. 1993, King and Connell 1999) and it occupies strong position in nissology.

Zammit in 1964 called Malta a 'Migration's Microcosm' which indicates that the phenomenon of the immigration in the islands holds specific attributes because of their geographical location. Vast majority of small islands retain its homogeneity and possess strong self identity which was mentioned above. Societies are small and people seem to know each other very well. Consequentially, 'others' are recognised immediately by the islanders. This alongside the fact that islands have clearly defined recourses mean the inflow of immigrants may cause social tensions. From the island point of view, the most important are consequences of immigration rather than causes (King 2009). Furthermore, the impact on the place of immigration is far more important than others, with economic impact and influence on social identity being the most critical.

Immigration to the island states has different consequences for different types of island classified above. In brief, immigration to Britain and Japan (island as civilization), New Zealand (island as settlement) or Malta (island as fortress) influences these islands in different ways.

For the purpose of this research, influences on the island as

fortress are going to be shortly described. These types of islands' role is to protect the project power. They are positioned in strategic geopolitical places and because of this reason they had always attracted global powers. Controlling them meant often controlling the whole region. Cyprus and Malta played such role for a long period of time. Controlling these islands meant not only controlling the Mediterranean but Middle East and Far East as well. Because different powers have been interested and present in these places for ages, one could imagine that it has created specific 'melting pot' where the multiculturalism is openly acceptable. However, this is not the case. Being conquered and colonised several times has reinforced sense of pride and identity which shapes people and their social perceptions until today.

In King's (1999, 66) opinion, there is few scenarios of the immigration to the islands these days. The first scenario sees the islands as 'strategic locations in the geopolitics of irregular migration', such as the islands in the Mediterranean. Immigrants reach these islands with the thought of moving forward to the mainland Europe. Often they are 'stuck' there for several years. On the one hand, these islands had been and are still referred to as stepping stone or in another words waiting rooms with the transit migrants (King 1999) but Werth and Körner (1992) had predicted that this will change for what they have called 'terminus' were immigrants looking forward to move elsewhere won't be able to do so. This is because of specific immigration law which is influenced by the idea of Fortress Europe. Regardless of the difficulties o reaching them, the islands in the Mediterranean are still considered to be the best entry points for immigrants mainly from North Africa and Middle East. Particularly the ones that are part of the EU attract immigrants among these strategically-located fortress islands. This phenomenon is referred by King (1999: 66) as 'launching pads' of immigration and although the European islands in the western part of Mediterranean and the Atlantic receives the highest amount of immigrants (so called boat people), Cyprus being placed in the east attracts people as well especially since 2004 when it joined the EU.

In opposition to first scenario which considers forced migration the second one revolves around voluntary, where although people are often moving because of economical reasons in fact they are looking for what one could call 'island way of living'. An example can be taken as mainland Europeans moving to Cyprus or Baleares. The islands are then becoming their sunny southern destination. Some people are moving the because of reasons such as retirement (these immigrants are in vast majority of cases from wealthy countries) or seeking work (these are mainly from poorer countries).

For a researcher, this situation allows study of immigration as multilevel process with its interactions in the 'insular microcosm' (King, 1999:68) which is 'invariably characterised by migration' (Connell, 2007:1). Moreover, they can observe the local societies with their sense of island based pride and of national uniqueness and their reactions to the new social reality which is the increased immigration. Additionally and most essentially for this research,

they can observe the immigrants lives experiences in the new and often hostile society unprepared for demographic changes driven by immigration. A number of researchers highlight the fact that majority of the islands, because of its specifics described above, are unwelcoming to the outsiders who are seen as potential threats to the nation, particularly to their economy and the culture (Baldacchino 2008, Baldacchino 2009, Connell and King 1999).

The case of Cyprus

Cyprus is an example of small insular country which experiences both type of the immigration patterns described above. It is a country with a long history of out-migration which has recently experienced a considerable inflow of new migrants. In a way it occupies a unique position in the EU as "stepping stone" (the concept described above) for immigrants looking to move to the mainland Europe.

Relatively high population density, its' unique geo-political position and developed economy makes it attractive for the immigrants on the one hand and important to the EU for its idea of fortress Europe on the other hand. Among the profiles of islands mentioned above, Cyprus is of the fortress type. This has its roots in geography of the place and historical importance of the Mediterranean Region. From that point of view the island was a part of British defence line alongside Gibraltar and Malta.

The contemporary situation in Cyprus is a result of its rich and ancient history as well as the newest situation which has shaped it all together. Because of its unique geographical position mentioned above, it was subject to number of invasions which has influenced its culture. The ancient period through middle ages until Ottoman and British Empire, independence up to Turkish invasion in 1974 has formed its situation today. Nevertheless it is certainly its modern history which influences the contemporary situation the most. It is the conflict and foreign forces that has assembled today's Cypriot shape (Ker-Lindsay and Faustmann 2009).

It was after the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) and the Congress of Berlin, that Cyprus became part of the British Empire in 1878 when it took over its administration (Mirbagheri, 1998). Overlooking the Suez Canal was the most important factor in explaining why Cyprus was attractive to others. Hence mainly geopolitical reasons made the British interested in the country. Additionally, protection of Ottoman Empire against feasible Russian aggression as well as being placed in the main colonial route decided about the fact that Cyprus was strategically the most important British colony of those times. Officially Cyprus was attached to the British Crown in 5 November 1914 but it was few years later when it became its colony (Mallinson, 2005). This converged with the First World War during which Great Britain offered Cyprus to Greece in return for fighting in the war on British side. After Greece turned down this proposal, Cyprus was officially declared as British crown colony. This was in 1925.

Despite the offer being turned down, numbers of Cypriots fought in both the I and the II World Wars on the British side seeing it as a hope for future to be united with Greece. Having passed tempestuous times of Second World War, the Cypriot Church organised referendum on enosis (Greek: Ένωσις, meaning "union") in 1959. It was Greek-Cypriot population movement proclaiming incorporation of the island of Cyprus into Greece which was inspired by similar movements created in Ionian Islands, Crete and the Dodecanese. In opposition to Cyprus these areas were eventually attached to Greece. This movement had its roots in anti-colonial ethos in Cyprus in the early years of the twentieth century. Greek Cypriots which symphaties with enosis have seen the only solution for future of the island in joining it to the Greece. In 1959 Cypriot Orthodox Church without British permission organised referendum in which 95.7% of participants voted for annexing. Enosis movement gives bases for Cypriots Greek nationalist military resistance organisation EOKA which is explained below (Papadakis, 1998) The Turkish Cypriot community refused to take part in the referendum mentioned above. Over 90% of the voters voted for unification with Greece (Emilianides, 2011). This referendum's result exposed and reinforced existing ethnic issues which lead to creation of EOKA (Thackrah, 2009; Mallinson, 2005; Grivas, 1964), (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών, Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston - Greek for National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters). It was Greek Cypriot nationalist military resistance organisation which was fighting against British colonisation of Cyprus, capitalism, Turkish Cypriots and for island unification to Greece. EOKA has risen from enosis movement. By carrying out spectacular armed actions and campaigns it was trying to gather international attention to gain its support in the fight with British and reinforcement of Greek Cypriot identity (Atkins, 2004).

Fighting the colony and seeking unification with Greece were the flag aims of that organisation (Stephanides, 2007). This led to reinforcement of tensions and animosities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Like the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots also started to organise themselves and created Turkish Resistance Organisation (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı) TMT. In brief it was a Turkish Cypriots' paramilitary organisation created 1958 as a response to EOKA's activities. Its aim was to unable enosis and protect Turkish Cypriots identity and existence in the island of Cyprus which was threatened by majority of Greek Cypriots. TMT in opposition to EOKA exhorted to Taksim (from Turkish 'division') which was the movement proclaiming division of Cyprus into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot parts. It was in opposition to enosis movement. The idea of taksim of the island was introduced by Fazıl Küçük who was the first Turkish Cypriot Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus. In the views of the taksim supporters the division of island was the only assertion for Turkish Cypriots minority to remain present in the island dominated by Greek Cypriots. Takism sympathizer shaped Turkish Resistance Organisation TMT (Hitchens, 2002). To put it more simply, TMT aspired to division of the island between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This cross-

purpose had been stimulated by the British. The above facts plus the shift in politics of colonisation around the globe brought Cyprus' independence on 16 August 1960 which was guaranteed after both Zürich and London Agreement (Metin Hakki, 2007). Until today Great Britain has kept two Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia which were used recently in Operation Ellamy (2011 military intervention in Libya). While withdrawing from Cyprus, Great Britain divided the public sphere between the two main ethnic groups using ethnic quotas. As a result Turkish as ethnic minority received rights to permanent veto with 30% in parliament and administration (Salih, 2004). In other words the inception of the new country and division of the public sphere between two main ethnic groups led to psychological, ethnical and psychological divergence of the Cyprus (Anastasiou 2008).

This fact alongside with growing tensions between the groups led to explosion of violence and reinforcement of social segregation. As a reaction to this situation, Turkey was ready to intervene and fight for Turkish Cypriot minority rights. However, at that point it didn't happen mainly because of diplomacy of United States that had warned Turkey not to do so because they are going to be left alone in case Russia will try and attack them again. Although at that time, international diplomacy was capable to prevent the war, the case looked different in 1974. Yet a number of important accidents occurred which lead to 1974 war. Particularly, escalated violence from both sides based on ethnical belonging, creation of Turkish ethnic minorities enclaves, politics of archbishop Makarios III towards changes in constitution favoring Greek Cypriots, politics and action by both Turkish and Cypriot juntas etc (Asmussen, 2008). All of these erupted and the Turkish forces invaded Cyprus in 1974. As a result of that war 37% of Cypriot lands were occupied by Turkey (Panteli, 2000). Around 180,000 of Greek Cypriot and 50,000 Turkish Cypriot hasd been internally displaced (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). In 1983 as a consequence, Turkish Cypriots with the help of Turkey proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). None of the countries recognise it apart from Turkey and Cyprus continues to be divided and the border itself is secured by UN buffer zone which cuts the island across (Aksu, 2003). The border exists till present times even though one has to admit that both sides seems to be involved and has worked on a durable solution. For example, the so called Anan Plan for unification of Cyprus had been rejected by Greek Cypriots in referendum that took place in 2004 (Ker-Lindsay, 2005). One of the improvements in the Cypriots relationships was opening of the cross border points that was one step forward to the possible future solution (Tocci, 2007).

It is important to emphasise that since the seventies ethnic conflict and division of island dominates the politics and relationship between both groups. Moreover it shapes everybody's lives there regardless of nationality. In the meantime, social reality is changing and Cyprus is witnessing influx of immigration but because of all attention being focused on the Cyprus dispute, this new reality with its own issues and problems remain under researched.

How the recent history of Cyprus and the division of the island in particular influence contemporary situation then? It is mainly because it shapes phenomenology of the place which as Hay (2006, 33) says 'makes common cause with the central concerns of island'.

Immigration to the Republic of Cyprus Cyprus island is divided into two parts: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in the south. This study is based in Republic of Cyprus (RoC). Hence, in this paper 'Cyprus' will be understood as the whole island and Republic of Cyprus or RoC as its southern part which is the adequate subject of the research.

Since the contemporary situation in Cyprus is mainly shaped by intra-ethnic tensions, majority of public attention as well as academic interest is centred on it leaving little space for other issues surrounding the new social reality in the island, one which is shaped mainly by immigration.

As described above, after the independence in the 1960s, the politics and policies were focused on ethnic issues which lead to war in 1974 and division of the island separating North from the South. In April 2003, the borders between them became open again. This fact plus the joining of Republic of Cyprus into the EU in 2004 has influenced contemporary immigration situation the most. Nevertheless, to capture the reality of it, one must keep track of Cypriot modern immigration history which dates back to 1980s when Beirut collapsed. This led to the flow of Lebanese and Palestinians among others, to Cyprus. As the majority of them were well off, they went back after the situation in the Middle East calmed.

Before this period, Cyprus was country of emigration rather than immigration. This situation was a result of country's economy and ethnic conflict by all means. In 1980s and 1990s, the economy in Republic of Cyprus suddenly boomed which was mainly a consequence of mass tourism as well as use of Cypriot refugees from the North as cheap labours (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2005). This new economic situation brought the need for more labour power in early 1990s which pushed the government to make changes in their policies and its liberalisation regarding immigration. Suddenly for the first time in the history, borders became open for immigrants willing to work in certain limited sectors. Domestic workers, the service industry (mainly tourism), manufacturing industry, agriculture and construction were in need of labour. It is important to stress that immigrants were let into the country on special conditions. Permissions which were issued these days were short-term, temporary and restricted to specific sectors by which Cypriot government wanted to 'control' the immigration process.

This situation led to two ways immigrants entering to the country. In the first case, immigrant had to be attached to just one and only employer without possibilities of changing job

without current employers' permission. In second case, work permits were issued for one year with no longer than five years stay. Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (2005:8) argue that this lead to 'reproducing a framework of precariousness and exclusion' which is the consequences for the present-day situation of immigrants. Economy and the tourist boom are just the two from the long list of regional and international factors in bringing immigration into Cyprus. The others are in one way or another connected to those two. For example, Cyprus being the so called European tax haven with a high amount of offshore companies registered from early 1990s until the present is also one of the factors shaping immigration. Offshore companies used the opportunity given by new polices and started bringing workers from the countries of its origins or from countries with which they were doing business. This created a particular group of immigrants which were significantly enlarged after Cyprus' accession to the EU in 2004. The collapse of the Soviet Union is next the factor which had influenced high numbers of Eastern European (Bulgarians and Romanians) and Ex-Yugoslavians (mainly Serbs) present in the island from early 1990s. In case of Serbs, the second flux took place in 1999 as a consequence of war in Balkans. It is essential to stress that Cyprus was the only country EU country that let Russians to enter their country without visa requirements before 2004. This was facilitated by the idea of making Republic of Cyprus more attractive for Russian businesses who were already interested by tax haven (Trimikliniotis and Pantelides 2003).

Immigrants who came to Cyprus in 1990s settled there on a temporary residence visa which could be renewed annually. Interestingly however, there is a group of immigrants who obtained Cypriot passport. It is the Greek-Pontiacs who first got the Greek passport by coming from the Black Sea via Greece. They are considered as an ethnic minority who are attracted to the island because of common religion and culture with the Cypriots.

The relatively stable immigration situation in Cyprus changed rapidly as a result of the EU accession and being a part of its free movement zone. Significant numbers of Eastern Europeans had been attracted by possibilities of work mainly in hospitality sector as well as in construction. Cyprus was among the only few EU members who agreed to open its borders for workers from new Eastern EU members straight in 2004 (Reitz, 2007). On the contrary countries like Germany, France or Austria, being geographically closer to new Eastern EU members than Cyprus decided not to do so, hence Cyprus became even more popular among people willing to work abroad.

The fact of allowing people from the EU not only to travel but work as well straight after joining EU make the please highly attractive for the immigrants.

Official statistics and the reports based on them are continuously highlighting the fact that the numbers are just an estimation of the actual situation of immigration in Cyprus mainly because of undocumented migrant workers. Nevertheless the overview on

the demographic and social features helps to capture a holistic picture of the immigration situation in the Republic of Cyprus.

Prior to analysing statistical information about immigrants in Cyprus one has to agree that international migration flows tend to be unstable and lacks clear patterns. Analysing the figures collected and presented by the statistical offices omits facts that immigrants' population vary across the months due to reasons such as seasonal work etc.

All numeric data used in this section are drawn from Demographic Report 2009 by Statistical Service of Cyprus. In the Republic of Cyprus out of a total of 892,400 inhabitants, 672,800 which is 75.4% of the population are Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot community accounts for 89,200 or 10.0% of the population. So called foreign residents makes up 130,400 (14.6% of the population).

In case of Cyprus, net migration has been positive since the early 1980s which has its roots in the economic boom and liberalisation of immigration policies described earlier. But yet in 2009, net migration decreased to 1,846 compared to 3,595 in 2008. Nevertheless it still had positive value hence more people are entering the country than leaving it. This shows that Republic of Cyprus still attracts immigrants.

Table 1 presents the total immigration movement in Cyprus from 2000 till 2009.

In 2000 there were total of 12764 long-term immigrants (by long-term immigrants, Statistical Service of Cyprus understands as 'foreigners arriving for settlement or for temporary employment for 1 year or more' (Cyprus Demographic Report 2009, 2011:18)) which gradually grew over years until its peak in 2005 with 24419 immigrants. This was due to 2004 EU accession and escalation of immigration mainly from new EU member states like Poland, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovakia. In 2006, the immigration rate decreased to 15545 to be followed by an increase in 2007 (19142). This was mainly shaped by Romania and Bulgaria becoming the EU's newest members in 1 January 2007. Cyprus immediately allowed Romanians and Bulgarians not only to be able to travel but also to work. This attracted numbers of immigrants coming to the island. After 2007, the amount of immigrants has continuously decreased.

Table 1. Migration movements 2000-2009

Year	Total Immigrants	Net Migration
2000	12764	+3960
2001	17485	+4650
2002	14370	+6885
2003	16779	+12342
2004	22003	+15724
2005	24419	+14416
2006	15545	+8671
2007	19142	+7390
2008	14095	+3595
2009	11675	+1-846

Source: Statistical Service of Cyprus, Demographic Report 2009

Table number two presents long-term immigration to Cyprus by country of residence.

Table 2. Long-term immigration to Cyprus by country of residence 2000-2009

2000		2003		2005		2009	
Country	Immigrants	Country	Immigrants	Country	Immigrants	Country	Immigrants
Greece	3130	Greece	4971	UK	5235	Greece	1596
UK	2070	UK	2870	Greece	5015	Romania	1.397
Russia	913	Russia	1908	Poland	1625	UK	1.056
Sri Lanka	713	Sri Lanka	654	Sri Lanka	1278	Philippines	774
USA	434	Philippines	515	Russia	1257	Sri Lankan	677
Bulgaria	418	Bulgaria	436	Slovak Re.	1124	Bulgaria	642
Ukraine	354	S. Africa	426	Philippines	918	Russia	238
China	306	Syria	366	Romania	614	USA	226
Philippines	289	China	359	Germany	525	Lithuania	166
India	272	USA	292	USA	474	Ukraine	156

Source: Statistical Service of Cyprus, Demographic Report 2009

As one can observe, sending countries are located all over the world. The highest numbers of immigrants in Cyprus are Greeks (in this case, mainly Pontic Greeks who are holders of Greek passports). Nevertheless the number has decreased from 3,130 in 2000 to 1,596 in 2009. Greece, the United Kingdom, Sri Lanka and Russia always seem to be holding high position in case of numbers in Cyprus. In 2005, new country of origin appears namely Poland which is due to Cyprus and Poland accession to the EU which guaranteed freedom of movement. In 2009 Romania occupied the second position which is mainly due to its EU accession in 2007. Similarly the number of Bulgarians rose for the same reasons. In 2000 there were 913 Russian long term residents in Cyprus but the number decreased to 238 in 2009 which can be explained by the economic crisis and some restrictions in offshore companies law introduced in the island.

In sum there seems to be four main groups of immigrants being present in Cyprus from 2000 towards this days. First are Greeks mainly because of historical reasons. Second are British, which is correlated with colonial history of the island. Third are Eastern European. As it was described before it is due to collapse of the Soviet Union followed by EU accession by some Eastern European countries. Last but by no means least, are Asians mainly from Sri Lanka, Philippines and India. This is in response to labour market demand open especially for female domestic workers.

We have to note that table number 2 particularly shows long-term immigration to Cyprus by country of residence, some smaller groups were omitted but they are present in the island. In total in 2009 there were 11,675 legal immigrants from all over the world.

The Statistical Service of Cyprus has announced the launch of the website of the Census of Population 2011 at http://www.census2011.gov.cy. The Census is scheduled to start on 1st October 2011

The rapid changes in Cyprus demography are the subject of the public debate which often evolves around xenophobia and racism.

> 'Questions of racism in Cyprus are inevitably bound up with questions of migration. Although there are now a number of naturalised citizens, they are still perceived by the general populace as foreigners rather than as fully Cypriot.' (Mackay, J. et al, 2009)

As a new EU country, Cyprus became part of its southern border and South-North migration routes to Europe. Its immigration trends and their effects resemble those in Malta (Thomson, 2006), Spain (Desiree, 2009) and Sicily (Cole, 1997), where immigration is a relatively new phenomenon and reactions to immigrants are still evolving. However, the existing research on immigration in Cyprus tends to study issues related to the economic motilities of migrants and population trends they create, while overlooking the relations developing between the migrants and the host communities. Racism and violence develop as a result of cultural preconceptions, economic behaviour strategies and social antagonisms. The phenomenon of Cyprus as the "in-between" country in South-North migration routes and the rising anti-immigrant racism has become a social reality despite the growing problems of discrimination, racism and violence highlighted as key policy issues by the ECRI (Council of Europe), Cyprus Labor Institute (PEO-INEK) and RAXEN (EU Monitoring Centre on Racism & Xenophobia).

Many cases of racism and xenophobia in Cyprus have been receiving considerable attention at international, EU level for quite a while now. Hence, there are various types of literatures which can be found that talks about racism and rights abuses of foreigners in Cyprus. Trimikliniotis (1999) says that Cypriots citizens as well as governmental bodies are racists against migrants because they don't understand changes in their country's demography. Nevertheless this explanation is not sufficient. As stated earlier, since the early nineties, migrants started coming there to work and Cypriots were not prepared for such rapid changes. He also says that the people in Cyprus should bear global factors in their mind, as they underpin the migration changes taking place there. According to Castles (1993:17), this new phase of population movement is taking place in whole world and that 'situation of ethnic minorities in Europe should be and can be fully understood in a global context. If not migrants still are going to face racism and human rights abuses'.

Trimikliniotis (1999:162) also highlights that 'to understand better the migration processes in Cyprus, a fuller picture of the processes of migration of labour must be provided.' At the moment, there are limited studies concentrating on violence abuses and racism there. In the same page, he also says that 'in Cyprus the policies governing the rights of migrant workers are not properly thought through, nor are they well implemented and administered.' Trimikliniotis has also said that 'the sources (for this article) it analyses are official statistics and publications,

other statistics such as those provided by trade unions and the media, and newspaper reports and articles.' He highlights that he is not using qualitative data for his research and that 'numbers are a key method of racialisation groups' (1999:3). This is to highlight that there are limited qualitative research on migration in Cyprus and that till now this part of research is omitted in publications.

Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (2005) as well as other researchers were collecting different type of quantitative data and then analysing it using descriptive statistics and inferential statistics methods to describe migration. Since 1989, Cyprus, a country divided by ethnic conflict, has moved from being a country of emigration, to one of immigration. It remains a largely racist and xenophobic society and at a structural, institutional, and political level, vital changes are required to address this problem' and that 'at policy level, the whole approach to immigration policy must break away from the ideology of 'control' and, in particular, border control and move towards a more proactive and positive approach towards immigrants and immigration'. (Trimikliniotis, 2006:57)

Racism specifically against female migrants in Cyprus is common as well and seems to be socially accepted as Panayiotopoulos (2005:124) describes how the domestic workers are not given days off and are not allowed to have boyfriends by their employers. Also, Lenz (2001:87) points out that state is not doing anything to control bad situation of these women which is going be discussed at later stage. In another article, Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla (2006) puts their attention on women migrants' rights abuses highlighting need of anti-racism, anti-discrimination, equal opportunities and affirmative action policies. In the same paper, it has been emphasised on the 'need for developing welfare and migrant settlement services, and the government should design welfare services programmes with the purpose to ameliorate class inequality' (2006:35) in Cyprus.

The need to respond to the situation of migrants in Cyprus is well presented in 'Responding to Racism in Cyprus' prepared by European Network Against Racism. ENAR (n.d) describes legal situation of migrants there, pointing out that they are always under the law and nobody is respecting their rights guaranteed by EU. It seeks that 'developing an understanding of racism in Europe is essential for two key reasons. Firstly, to promote learning and knowledge about what racism is and how to combat it. Secondly, to generate common tools across the European Union to combat racism.' (ENAR, n.d.: 2 &9) This is to highlight that, on example of migrants situation in Cyprus, one could prosecute changes in peoples' behaviour towards migrants. This report also focuses that it is difficult for migrants to organise themselves politically and fight for their entitlements because they are not welcomed to do so from the state side.

Mackay et.al. (2009:3) point out that 'questions of racism in Cyprus are inevitably bound up with questions of migration' but he is not describing specific case of racism or migrants human rights abuses. Similarly, in another report, ENAR (n.d)

says 'although migrants have contributed enormously to the economic development of Cyprus, they are the main victims of discrimination and racism'.

Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (2008:79) highlights need 'to critically evaluate the situation as regards the current state of affairs on combating discrimination in Cyprus.' In their opinion lack of legal anti-discrimination tradition is responsible for current situation of migrants. They also notice that 'unless anti-discrimination enters the school curriculum, the process of developing a culture and tradition without prejudice will be inept and slow'. In Cyprus, racists' acts and abuses against migrants are often provoked by youths. There is no adequate education addressed to them to make them understand social and cultural changes which are taking place in their country. Moreover there is also legal problem concerning racism.

Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (2008:107-108) are trying to highlight legal problems with respecting migrants' laws by saying that 'the recent emergence of anti-immigrant and ultra-nationalist far right groups has not been addressed by the government. There are no convictions against perpetrators in cases of racist attacks'.

Seeing immigrants' situation in Cyprus in above light while bearing in mind its insular context may seem to be far too simplistic. However, the problem with hostility everywhere regardless geographical context has to be more complex. This refers back to the smallness and islandness hence to the resources scarcity which makes people behave in certain way in relation to 'others' who are considered to be 'foreign'. Putting population density, countries' area alongside with the 'flow' or 'invasion' of immigrants in one line reinforces the tensions which in the islands are naturally present due to the insular context as it has been described above. Specifically in Cypriot case (division of the island), things as nation and race (although important in any debate on immigration in insular context) become the key concept utilised by nationalists. Therefore, there is the presence of the discussion on who is more welcome than the other (i.e. Eastern European rather than Asians, Bulgarians rather than Polish, etc.). Baldacchino (2008) describes these concerns with regard to flux of immigrants in the insular context as the threat of invasion to island societies. King (2009) talks about similar situation in Malta adding threat to the national identity as an important factor leading people towards being xenophobic and acting in a xenophobic way, rightly noticing the fact that the concept of the identity itself is complicated as well. If someone like immigrants are threat to the Cypriot identity, one has to define what the Cypriot identity means but this leads to another paper.

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Barış Gazeteciliği, Hemen Şimdi! Barış Gazeteciliği Üzerine

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Uzun yıllardan beri, Türkiye'nin özgül tarihi, kültürel, siyasal, toplumsal yapısının da etkisiyle, toplum içinde, ırk, dil, din, mezhep, etnisite ve farklı cinsiyet kimliklerinden kaynaklı anlaşmazlık, uzlaşmazlık ve çatışmalar başgöstermektedir. Bu çatışma ve uzlaşmazlıkların önemli gösterenleri arasında, farklılıklara karşı tahammülsüzlük, egemen kültürel ve siyasal değer yargılarının ve iktidar pratiklerinin, azınlık gruplar üzerindeki baskısı, güç ve iktidar ilişkileridir. Toplum içindeki farklılıklar arasında uzlaşmazlığın, anlaşmazlığın, çatışmanın önemli nedenlerinden biri de medya, özellikle anaakım/merkez medya olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Zira merkez medya, toplumda başat kültürel, siyasal söylemleri meşrulaştırmakta, yeniden üretmekte, bu haliyle çoğulculuktan çok "çoğunlukçu" bir yapı arz etmektedir. Durum böyle olduğunda, toplumda farklı dil, din, ırk, etnisite, mezhep, cinsiyet kimlikleri gibi azınlıkta olan gruplar/oluşumlar, medyanın "ötekileştirme" pratiği içinde yabancılaştırılmakta, bastırılmakta ve bu kimliklere, grup ve oluşumlara karşı kışkırtıcı, tahrik edici bir tür "nefret söylemi" üretilmektedir. [1] Bu, toplum içinde tüm farklılıklarımızla neden bir türlü barışamadığımızın da önemli gösterenidir. Zira, medya, toplumsal barış ve uzlaşmanın tesisinde, farklılıklarla empati kurmada, tahammül ve saygı dilinin geliştirilmesinde ve bunların toplumda hâkim değerler olarak yayılmasında önemli bir araçtır. O halde, siyasal dinamiklerin yanında, toplum içinde ve uluslararası alanda barış dilini kuracak, yeşertecek ve kalıcı kılacak en önemli araçlardan biri de medya olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

Mevcut çalışmanın amacı, içinde bulunduğumuz süreçte, medyanın, farklılıklarla birarada yaşamanın dinamiklerini ortaya koyacak, farklılıklara karşı saygı, tahammül, anlayış, hoşgörü yaklaşımını yeşertecek, başta toplumun Kürt sorunu gibi hassas dengeleri üzerinde seyreden bir kriz veya çatışma durumunda, mağduriyet ve haksızlığı dile getiren eleştirel haberleri/yayınlarıyla barışı özendirecek yayınlar yapması gerektiğine dikkat çekmek, uzlaşmanın temel olduğu, toplumda çatışmadan kaynaklı şiddet, kriz ve gerilimin yatıştırıldığı bir tür barış gazeteciliğini acilen uygulamaya koyması gerektiğine vurgu yapmaktır. Bu bağlamda, çalışmada, merkez medyada mevcut çatışma-şiddet dilinin şifrelerini çözümleyerek, barış gazeteciliğinin önemi, barış gazeteciliğinin etik kodlarını mevcut anaakım medyanın haber pratiklerinden yola çıkarak örneklerle ele almaya ve irdelemeye çalıştım.

Herşeyden önce şunu belirtmek gerekir ki, toplumlar yekpare, bir homojenlik içinde değil, parçalı, heterojen bir yapıdadır. Bu Türkiye toplumunu düşündüğümüzde daha çok böyledir. Çünkü Türkiye coğrafyası, farklı medeniyetlerin, farklı kültürlerin üzerinde yeşerdiği çok katmanlı, zengin kültürel dokusu olan bir coğrafyadır. Bunca dil, din, etnik, milliyet, sınıf farklılıklarının olduğu bir coğrafyada, siyasi ve felsefi inanç farklılıkları da doğal olarak zengindir. Farlılıklarla yaşamanın ve bu zenginlik içinde kalabilmenin olanağı ise, uzlaşma, hoşgörüye dayalı "barışçıl" bir toplumdur. Barışçıl bir toplumun tesisinde ise, açıktır ki, medyanın rolü büyüktür. Zira içinde bulunduğumuz toplumda, Aleviler, Kürtler, Çerkezler, Araplar, Süryaniler, Ermeniler, Rumlar, Sünniler, başörtülüler, kadınlar, emekçiler, çevreciler/yeşiller, vicdani retçiler, farklı cinsel kimlikler, ve daha mağdur

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1 Medyada ırkçı-ayrımcı söylemler ve "nefret söylemi" hakkında şu eserlere bakılabilir: Köker, Eser ve Ülkü Doğanay (2010). *Irkçı Değilim Ama... Yazılı Basında Irkçı-Ayrımcı Söylemler*. Ankara: İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu (İHOP); Alğan, Cengiz T., F. Levent Şensever (Der.) (2010). *Ulusal Basında Nefret Suçları: 10 Yıl, 10 Örnek*. İstanbul: Sosyal Değişim Derneği.

olan, zayıf, azınlıkta olan işsizlerin, hastaların, yoksulların, engellilerin sesini duyuracak, duyurmakla kalmayıp, tüm bu kesimleri dinleme, anlama, anlamaya çalışma konusunda en etkin mecra medyadır. Toplumun tüm kesimleri medyada sesini daha çok duyurdukça, ve tüm bu farklı kesimler birbirlerinin seslerini de duydukça, medyada daha fazla temsil hakkı kazandıkça, toplumsal barışın inşası da sağlanabilecektir, ya da sağlanması yolunda önemli adımlar atılacaktır. Tüm bu kesimlerin seslerine çoğu kere kör, sağır ve dilsiz kalan çoğunluğa sahip siyasal iktidarlar, siyasal seçkinlerin de toplumun bu farklı kesimlerine dikkat kesilmesi, seslerini duyması, sorunlarına eğilmesi için üzerlerinde medya yoluyla denetleyici, gözetleyici, sorgulayıcı bir baskı mekanizması oluşacaktır. Ancak günümüze baktığımızda ne yazık ki, medya ve siyasal süreçler bakımından, Batı artık yönünü ağırlıklı olarak çoğulcu radikal demokrasiye çevirmişken, Türkiye'de hala daha köhne, ilkel, çoğunluğa dayalı bir demokrasi anlayışının işlediğini görüyoruz. Zira Türkiye'de anaakım medyanın, bütün farklı seslere, dokulara yer vermek yerine, çoğunluğa sahip siyasal partiler ve iktidarlara ve yine çoğunluktaki görüş ve düşüncelere ağırlık vererek bu söylemleri güçlü bir biçimde dolaşıma sokmakta olduğunu görüyoruz. Yani "güç", "iktidar" neredeyse medya oraya bükülmekte, azınlıklara, azınlıkta kalan mağdur, güçsüz kesimlere, seslere yer vermekten imtina etmekte, toplumda çoğulcu, çok sesli bir demokrasiyi yeşertmekte yetersiz, aciz kalmaktadır.

Barış gazeteciliğinin etik kodları içinde pek çok öneri sunulmaktadır. [2] Bu öneriler içinde belki de en önemlileri: gazetecilerin barışçı çözümler arayışı içinde olmaları; gazetecilerin sorunun parçası olmaktan kaçınarak, çözümün bir parçası olmak için çaba göstermeleri; gazetecilerin sadece "seçkin" haber kaynaklarıyla yetinmeyip, "seçkin olmayan" kaynaklara ulaşmak için çaba göstermeleri; gazetecilerin barış için çaba gösterenlere daha fazla yer vermeleri ve daha olumlu yaklaşmaları; gazetecilerin haberlerinde barış girişimlerine vurgu yapmalarıdır (Lynch ve McGoldrick, 2005). Bu genel önermelerden de anlaşılacağı gibi, "medya barışı özendirmede merkezi bir rol" oynayabilir (Wolfsfeld, 2004: 1). Wolfsfeld'e göre, medya, barışın getirebileceği yararları vurgulayabilir, barış için çalışan gruplara ve liderlere meşruluk kazandırabilir ve düşmanın imgelerini değiştirmeye yardımcı olabilir. Ne var ki, "medya sıklıkla barış girişimlerini yıkıcı bir rol oynamaktadır" (2004: 15, akt, İrvan, 2008: 270).

Neden Barışamıyoruz? Medyanın Barışla İmtihanı

Medya, ancak, toplumda güçsüzlere, azınlıklara, sesini duyuramayanlara ve toplumda sürekli mağdur ve haksızlığa uğrayanlara gözlerini çevirdiğinde; Kürtlerin, Alevilerin, Rumların, Ermenilerin, Kürtlerin, çevrecilerin, eşcinsellerin, kadınların, dini inancı ya da siyasal, felsefi inancı nedeniyle

dışlananların, toplumda ezilen, mağdur olan tüm kesimlerin sorunlarına, bu çevreleri "kurbanlaştırmadan" dikkat kesilip, yer verdiğinde/eğildiğinde, çoğunluktan değil, toplumsal çoğulculuktan yana olduğunda, toplumsal olarak bütün farklılıklarımızla barışmamız daha mümkün hale gelecektir. Pınar Selek, bir kitabında "barışamadık" derken ne kadar da haklı. [3] Bir türlü barışamıyoruz... Herkes kavgalı; siyasiler birbirleriyle kavgalı, ulusalcılar/Kemalistler İslamilerle, Türkler Kürtlerle, Ermenilerle, Rumlarla, Sünniler Alevilerle, Müslümanlar diğer dini kesimlerle kavgalı... Hatta toplumsal yaşamda bireyler olarak yanıbaşımızdaki komşumuzla, işyerindeki arkadaşımızla kavgalıyız. Sürekli, çoğu kez de şiddet içeren bir çatışma içinde, gündelik yaşamda/ya da tarihsel süreçte/bellekte siyasal ya da toplumsal iktidar savaşları yürütürken, bir türlü barışamıyoruz. Barış orada, sessizce, usulca, gözlerini yummuş, uyuyor. Çatışma, savaş ise, uyanık, her an uyanık, her an menzilde, mevzide, tetikte, gözde, kulakta, dilde. Barışamıyoruz, çünkü nasıl barışacağını bilmiyoruz; barışamıyoruz, çünkü barıştan değil, her daim kavgadan, çatışmadan, şiddetten, savaştan bahsediyor bize siyasiler, eğitimciler, hukukçular, 'devlet-i aliye' ve önemlisi de medya. Barışamıyoruz, çünkü barış değil, her daim savaş öğretiliyor. Diller keskin, sivri, öfke ve kin dolu. Kırmadan, dökmeden, incitmeden 'barışmayı ne zaman öğreneceğiz', soru bu. Çatışma, doğanın elbette diyalektiğinde var, ama bu fikirsel, düşünsel bir çatışmaysa tabii. Fikirler, düşünceler elbette çatışacak. Toplumların gelişmesi, demokratik alanda gelişmesi, ilerlemesi buna bağlı. Ama elbette bu çatışma bir şiddet, kördövüş anlamına gelmiyor, gelmemeli. Toplumsal, fikirsel çatışmalar bir şiddet ve kördövüşe dönüşmemeli. Medya da bu kör dövüşün dili, gözü, sesi, kulağı değil, toplumsal barışın sesi, dili, gözü, kulağı olmalı. Ve yine barışçıl bir toplum için medyanın barış için çaba sarfedenlere daha fazla yer vermesi gerekir. Oysa, siyasi arenada sözde eşit temsil diye, medyanın en savaşçı, şiddet içerikli retorikleri bile dolaşıma soktuğunu görüyoruz. Örneğin, son genel seçim döneminde, çoğunluğa sahip üç büyük siyasal partinin söylemleri derinlikli olarak analiz edildiğinde, bu partilerin gerçekte seçmen kitlesine "savaş" vaat ettiğini gözlemliyoruz. Ve zaten çoğu kez siyasiler, seçim yatırımı olarak seçmene milliyetçi retorik içinden 'şiddet, savaş' vaat ediyorlar. Seçmene savaş vaadeden partilerin söylemleri ise medyada yoğun olarak dolaşıma giriyor. Ve yine partiler, siyasiler de kendi aralarında birbirlerine şiddet içerikli bir söylemle yaklaşıyor. Ve medya, her gün bu söylemleri, ilginçtir, televizyon haberlerinde, üst banttan ya da alt bant başlıklardan, partileri 'cepheleştirerek' sunuyor: Gazeteciler her gün "cephe"lerden bildiriyor. Gazete ya da anahaber bültenlerine de bu manşetleri atıyorlar: "AKP cephesi", "CHP cephesi", "MHP cephesi", "BDP cephesi…" Gazetelerin, TV kanallarının haberlerine/haber dillerine bakılırsa, görünüşe göre, siyaset yapılmıyor, bir tür 'savaş' hüküm sürüyor. Bir siyasetçi sözleriyle "bombalıyor", "kılıçlar çekiliyor", "düelloya davet ediliyor", "sözleriyle vuruyor", "saflar keskinleşiyor". [4] Haber başlıkları hep böyle.

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2 Barış gazeteciliği ve barış gazeteciliğinin etik kodları hakkında geniş bir çerçeve sunan bir makale için bkz. İrvan, Süleyman (2008). "Normatif Kuram Olarak Barış Gazeteciliği: Önermeler ve Engeller". *Uygun Adım Medya-Bir Bilinç Körleşmesi* içinde, I. Cangöz (Der.) Ankara: Ayraç.

3 Pınar Selek'in, barış, savaş karşıtlığı, anti-militarizm gibi kavramları derinlikli bir şekilde analiz ettiği çalışması için bkz. P. Selek (2004). *Barışamadık*. İstanbul: İthaki. Eserle ilgili bir haber için bkz. "Pınar Selek Barışamadık Diyor", İstanbul: BİA Haber Merkezi, 11.05.2006.

4 Bu konuya dikkat çektiğimiz ve medyanın şiddet/savaş içerikli bir "siyasal söy-

Günümüzde, "barış"tan bahsetmek bile neredeyse "tehlikeli" bir hal aldı. Barıştan söz etmek bile, pek çok insanda tehlike ve tehdit altında olduğu hissi uyandırıyor. Vicdani retçilerin, savaşa, silaha karşı olduğu için "askerlikten soğutma" gibi suçlarla, tehlike ve tehdit altında olması gibi. Hani neredeyse gizli gizli barış planları yapacağız. Barıştan bahsetmek günümüzde Türkiye'de tehlikeli ve riskli bir uğraş oldu, zira pek çok kesim, "savaş" yok ki, barıştan bahsedilsin diyor. Oysa yıllardır bu toplumda farklı kesimler arasında ciddi anlamda ve çoğu kere ağır şiddet içerikli bir çatışma yaşandığını görmek istemiyorlar.

Ve yine, yıllardır bu ülkede, herkesin çok yakından bildiği gibi düşük yoğunluklu bir savaş süregidiyor. Ancak, bu konuda da, savaşın iki tarafı olur, oysa karşıda sadece ülkeyi bölmek isteyen, vatan haini, bir grup terörist var, ve sorun, bu "teröristlerin" "imha edilerek yok edilmesi sorunudur" deniyor. Yani, "terörle mücadele" sorunudur deniyor. Yeri gelmişken, şu an toplumda hassas dengeler üzerinde seyreden yine hepimizin bildiği gibi acil çözüm üretilmesi gereken bir Kürt sorunu var. Ancak bu sorun da, Kürt sorunundan ziyade, "terörle mücadele" sorunu gibi algılanıyor. Bu konuda anaakım medyanın dili ise, ciddi anlamda keskin, kışkırtıcı ve şiddet, savaş içerikli. Medya bu konuda bir tür "savaş gazeteciliği" yapıyor. [5]

Günümüzde bir Kürt isyanı olan PKK hakkında, medya, "hain terör örgütü PKK, gözü dönmüş caniler, nankörler, çakallar, çapulcular, kalleşler, hainler, alçaklar, kahpeler" gibi sıfatlarla başlıklar atmakta ve örgütün lideri hakkında da bu sıfatlarla birlikte genellikle "bölücü başı Abdullah Öcalan", "terör örgütü elebaşı" gibi başlıklar kullanılmaktadır. Ve ordunun PKK ile mücadelesinde, "kahraman Mehmetçikler", "işte rambolar", "çelik eğitimli Mehmetçiklerimiz", "aslan parçacıkları", "yiğitlerimiz" gibi ifadeler kullanılarak, PKK'nın bastırılmasıyla ilgili haberlerde de, genellikle "kahraman Mehmetçiklerimiz vatan için görev başında, şu kadar terörist etkisiz hale getirildi/ölü ele geçirildi/öldürüldü"; "Mehmetçiklerimiz bir başarıya daha imza attı"; "Bayramda kahramanlar görev başında, operasyonlar hızla devam ediyor"; "Mehmetçiklerimiz bölücü terör örgütüne göz açtırmıyor"; "şehitlerimizin kanı yerde kalmadı"; "PKK'yı lanetliyoruz"; "PKK'ya büyük darbe"; "PKK'nın kökü kazınacak" gibi başlıklar ve yine ordunun operasyonlarıyla ilgili haberleri "bahar temizliği" gibi başlıklarla yer alıyor. Yazılı ve görsel anaakım medyadaki haberlerde yer alan bütün bu ifadelere, yani kullanılan dil ve üsluba baktığımızda bu ifadelerde ve yapılan haberlerde mesafesiz, duygulara hitap eden, duyguları ajite eden bir yaklaşımın sergilendiğini ve mesafeli, olgun, serinkanlı bir yaklaşımdan uzak, insanların öfke ve kızgınlıklarını körükleyen, kin ve nefret duyguları yayan, kışkırtıcı, tahrik edici, sorunu kan davasına dönüştürmüş, intikamcı, hamasi, savaşçı bir söylemin egemen olduğunu görüyoruz. Ve yine, yenme/yenilme, kazanma/kaybetme savaşçı mantığıyla, ölen ve öldürülenleri adeta bir "maç müsabakasının" skor tablosu içinde, istatistikî bir bilgi gibi sunmayı uzun yıllardır kanıksamıştır medya. Sevda

Alankuş'un da belirttiği gibi (2011), geleneksel gazetecilik, maskülen ve milliyetçi bir savaş gazeteciliği üzerine kurulmuştur.

Yine, medyada, şehit haberlerinin televizyon kanallarında dakikalarca haber yapılarak, gazetelerde ilk sayfadan manşette geniş yer ayırarak, acıları, gözyaşları bolca kullanıp, ezber kalıpları sıklıkla kullanarak, bu yöndeki haberlerin insanların üzüntüsünü, acısını kine, düşmanlığa ve nefrete evrilten/dönüştüren bir yaklaşım içinde olduğunu görüyoruz. Gözyaşları ve acılar, yıllardır medya tarafından sürekli kin, düşmanlık ve savaş için, savaşın sürmesi için malzeme olarak kullanılıyor. "Vatan sana canım feda"; "vatan sağ olsun"; "şehitler ölmez, vatan bölünmez"; "bir oğlum daha olsa onu da vatan uğruna şehit veririm" gibi ezber kalıplar/ifadeler ağızlardan alınarak ve bunlar büyütülerek geniş yığınlara bir nevi, "şiddetseviçilik/savaşseviçilik" aşılanıyor, ölme ve öldürme yüceltiliyor. Medya, PKK ile ilgili yayınlarında, yıllardır, "yendik", "yeneceğiz", "az kaldı", "kökünü kazıdık", "kazımak üzereyiz", "PKK'ya darbe vurduk", vs. vs. derken ve bir iç savaş olanca gücüyle körüklenirken, bu süreçte cenazeler gelmeye devam etti. Ordunun operasyonları sürdü. Bu tür bir haber diliyle/söylemiyle hiçbir yere varılamayacağını (aslına bakılırsa, Cumhuriyetin ilk kuruluş yıllarından beri, daha önceki Kürt isyanları düşünüldüğünde, bu süreçten hiç ders almadığı için) medya ne yazık ki görmedi, göremiyor.

Yine aynı konuda, siyasal partilerin, özellikle milliyetçi kanattaki siyasilerin, hani neredeyse, televizyon ekranları karşısında sadece bebekleri, çocukları değil, yetişkinleri bile ürküten, korkutan şiddetli ses tonlarıyla, el, kol hareketleriyle yaptığı açıklamalar, (daha doğrusu bağırmalar) medyada geniş yer buluyor. Medya Kürt sorunu, Kürt açılımı ve PKK konusunda, genellikle heyecan ve gayretkeşlikle ortamı hepten geren kriz odaklı bir yayın izleyerek ve toplumda böylesi önemli dönemeçlerde sorumluluk anlayışından uzak her daim bu krizden beslenerek (besleniyor; zira, ülkenin krize, kaosa sürüklenmesinde medya bu tür süreçlerden de beslenerek ne yazık ki tiraj ve reyting yapmaya da çalışıyor bir yandan), yıllardır, giderek şiddet söylemini meşrulaştırdı. Kimse siyasal iktidarların ve muhalefetin dilindeki bu şiddeti –bu dilsel şiddeti-, krizin beslendiği en tehlikeli bu şiddeti sorgulamıyor. Sorgulamak bir yana, medyanın bu sesleri sonuna dek açtığını görüyoruz. Daha da önemlisi, siyasilerin bu sesine, (size katılıyoruz mealinden) onaylayıcı, olumlayıcı başlıklar atıldığını ve atılmaya devam edildiğini görüyoruz. Televizyonlara konuk aldıkları iktidar ve muhalefet parti sözcüleriyle, söyleşilerinde, "peki, anlıyoruz, haklısınız efendim"ci bir anlayış sürdürülüyor. Medya bazı konuları görmezden gelerek ve çoğu kez siyasilerin dilinden konuşarak, haberleri, onların söylemini/dilini kendi söylemine/diline dönüştürerek yayınlıyor. Yine, Kürt sorunu konusunda yıllardır "komplo teorileri" ileri sürülerek, medya "dış mihraklar, yabancı parmağı" gibi bir "dış düşman" söylemini sürekli haberlerine taşıyarak canlı tutmakta, bir nevi süreç çarpıtılmaktadır.

Yine, örneğin, özellikle, Güney Doğu illeri başta olmak üzere ülkenin değişik illerindeki Kürtlerin sokak gösterileri için, medya, Kürt eylemciler, göstericiler gibi ifadeler kullanmaktan

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lem'i nasıl dolaşıma soktuğuna ilişkin bir yazımız için bkz. Derya Erdem, "Medya-nın Siyasal Seçkinleri", *Radikal 2*, 05.06.2011.

5 Medyada Kürt Sorununun temsiline ilişkin bir yazımız için bkz. Derya Erdem, "Medyada Kürt Sorunu", *Radikal/Tartışı-Yorum*, 27.04.2010.

sakınıp göstericileri "bölücü terör örgütü yandaşları" diye etiketleyerek ve son yıllardaki gösterilerde ise, artık, göstericilere doğrudan "PKK'lılar" diyerek, sokaktaki genç, çocuk yaşta bütün göstericileri, "terörist" olarak işaretlemekte ve genellikle bu gösterilerden, çatışmalardan Kürt siyasal partileri sorumlu tutulmakta, Kürt siyasiler, eleştirilmekte ve sorgulanmaktadır. Ve yine bu sokak gösterilerinde, taş atan çocuklar, konuyla ilgili bütün haberlerde "terör örgütü tarafından kullanılan/kandırılan/aldatılan" çocuklar olarak işaret edilmektedir. Anaakım medyanın söylemi, daima, PKK'nın bu çocukları kullandığı yönünde oluyor. Ancak bu gösterilerle ilgili haberlerde, çocukların koşulları, çoğunun köylerinin yakılması, boşaltılması nedeniyle, göçle büyük şehirlere geldikleri, buralarda yoksulluk ve sefalet içinde yaşadıkları, daha da önemlisi, bu çocukların çoğunun ya babası, ya ağabeyinin, amcasının, annesinin doğuda faili meçhul cinayetlerde öldürüldüğü, gözleri önünde işkence gördüğü, ya da gözaltına alındığı, tutuklu olduğu ve bu çocukların çoğunun savaş, şiddet ortamında büyüdüğü gibi gerçekler, çocukların içinde bulunduğu bu travmatik sorunlar gözlerden silinmektedir. Ya da çocukların küçük yaşlardan itibaren "politik bir öznellik" kazandığı görmezden gelinmektedir. Medya bu gösterilerde sadece olaylara odaklanıp, çatışma ve şiddet sahnelerini öne çıkarıp, konuya derinlemesine, arka planıyla yaklaşmaktan, sorgulamaktan, ele almaktan uzak bir tutum sergilemekte, bu çocukların aileleriyle birlikte yaşam öyküleri, koşulları neredeyse hiç irdelenmemekte, kurcalanmamakta ve sorgulanmamaktadır. [6]

Anaakım medyanın, Kürtler ve siyasal alandaki temsilcileriyle ilgili yayınları, Kürtleri ve Kürt siyasileri olumsuzlayarak ve bir tehdit kaynağı olarak işaretleyerek, halkları kin ve düşmanlığa sevk eden, kutupsallaşma, kamplaşma ve çatışma ortamı yaratan ve bunu körükleyen yapısıyla, kullandığı dil bakımından da tehlikeli biçimde terörize edicidir. Sürekli "bölücülük" vurgusuyla, özellikle milliyetçi-mahafazakâr-ulusalcı siyasilerin, partilerin çığırtkanlığına çanak tutan medya, kendi ayrıştırıcı, ayrımcı, bölücü dilinin hiçbir zaman farkına varamadı. Medyanın geçmişten bu yana ve içinde bulunduğumuz bu süreçte, Kürtlere yaklaşımında, iyi niyetli, samimi, hoşgörülü, çözüm üretici, empati temelli, mağduriyeti ve haksızlığı dile getiren, barışçıl, olumsal bir dil kurmaktan alabildiğine uzak olduğunu görüyoruz. Bu süreçte anaakım medya, olumlu ve yapıcı olmaktan çok, yıkıcı, tahrik edici bir tür savaş gazeteciliği yaparak, kültürel ve siyasal kimliklerle ilgili sorumluluk temelinde etik bir dil kurmaktan ve toplumda demokratik işlevini yerine getirmekten de uzak bir görünüm sergilemektedir. Medyanın, Kürtlerle ve siyasi alanda Kürt halkının sorunları, istem ve beklentileri yolunda mücadele veren Kürt siyasiler ile uzlaşmazlığın, anlaşmazlığın, kutupsallaşmanın oluşmasında işlevsel olduğunu görüyoruz. [7]

Son söz yerine: Barış için cesur olmak...

Açıktır ki, içinde bulunduğumuz şu süreçte, medya da önemli bir tarihi sınavdan geçiyor. Ve şu ana kadar olan süreçte, aldığı konum, şiddeti içselleştiren, düşmanlık ve ayrımcılık üreten "savaşçı" bir dilin içinden konuştuğu yönündedir. Dildeki şiddetin, bazen en kötü fiziksel şiddetten bile daha ağır, uzun vadede ciddi, tehlikeli sonuçlar doğurabileceği aşikârdır. Medyanın, toplumda ihtilaflı konular, önemli dönemeçler ve kritik süreçlerde, vicdan sahibi, hakkaniyetli, sorumluluk temelinde, mesafeli, serinkanlı, özgürlükçü ve demokratik, bir tür "barış dili" geliştiremediği sürece, tarihi bir vebal altında kalacağı muhakkaktır. Medya, toplumdaki pek çok ihtilaflı sorun hakkında, ya da örneğin, Kürt açılımı, demokratik açılım gibi konular üzerine ahkâm keser ve bu konularda dilediğince sorumsuz, samimiyetsiz, ciddiyetsiz etik dışı bir dil kullanırken, kendi içindeki demokratik yapıdan pek bir emin gibi görünmektedir. Oysa içinde bulunduğumuz süreçte, medyaya ilişkin tüm veriler göstermektedir ki, medyanın da kendi içinde acilen bir demokratik açılıma ihtiyacı vardır. Günümüzde, gerek akademik/kuramsal çalışmalarda, gerek sivil toplum örgütleri bünyesinde ve alternatif basın tartışmaları içinde savaş gazeteciliği yapanlara karşıt/eleştirel bir dil geliştirilmesi ve barış gazeteciliğinin daha sıklıkla tartışılmaya ve konuşulmaya başlanması ise umut verici bir gelişmedir.

Sonuç olarak, şunu söylemek gerekir: Günümüzde artık barış zor bir uğraş haline geldi. Savaş, şiddet o kadar kanıksanmış, ve bu konularda öyle bağışıklık kazanılmış ki, barış toplumda pek çok bünyeye ya da toplumun bünyesine ağır, zor, güç geliyor. [8] Bu şartlarda barış için cesur olmak gerekiyor. Toplumsal barış için nasıl cesur politikacılara ihtiyaç varsa, yine barış için, medyada cesur gazetecilere, cesur kalemlere ihtiyaç var. Farklılıklara tahammül edebilmek, farklılıklarla bir arada yaşayabilmek için barışa çok ihtiyacımız var çünkü.

Ve son olarak belki de bir yazarın, H. Savda'nın sorduğu gibi şu soruyu sormalıyız:

"Halkı barıştan soğutmak, neden suç değil?"

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[6] Bu konulara da dikkat çekilerek medyada Kürtlerin temsiline ilişkin geniş bir çerçeve ve analiz sunduğumuz bir çalışmamız yayın aşamasındadır: "The Representation of the Kurds and the pro-Kurdish Party DTP in Mainstream Turkish Media" *The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Representation, Violence and Reconciliation*, C. Güneş and W. Zeydanlıoğlu (Eds.) (2012). İngiltere: Routledge.

[7] Buradaki bazı tespitlerimizin dile getirildiği bir yazımız için bkz. Derya Erdem, "Kürtlerle ve DTP ile ilgili haberlerde medya terörü", *Radikal/Tartışı-Yorum*, 23.11.2008.

[8] Bu konulara dikkat çektiğimiz ve medyanın "şiddet/savaş" içerikli söylemleri nasıl dolaşıma soktuğuna değinerek, barış gazeteciliğinin önemine vurgu yaptığımız bir yazımız için bkz. Derya Erdem, "Barış gazeteciliği, hemen şimdi!" *Radikal 2*, 08.05.2011.

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Speaking for the Subaltern: Three Films that Portray the Victims of Landmines

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All children of Adam are parts of the same body,

For in their creation they are made of the same substance.

When a human part is sick and afflicted,

The other parts are equally troubled.

 Sa'di 1181-1283/1291 Iran

Watching someone pick up a landmine can be a heart-stopping experience, particularly if that person is a child doing it with his teeth, because he lost his hands in an earlier demining accident. Later in the film, *Turtles Can Fly* (2004), produced and directed by Bahman Ghobadi(1969-),   Hengov, who lost his hands in an earlier demining accident, uses his teeth to pick up and carry his dead sister's shoes to Satellite, the boy who loves her. Hengov is one of some thirty or forty Kurdish children with baskets on their backs or pushed along the ground beside them, who harvest deadly land mines. As they embark upon their deadly task, these children remind us of ants crawling up a small mountain. They will sell the mines, which did not detonate during combat or by the accidental step of a civilian or farm animal, to local arms dealers, who ironically resell the mines to be re-laid for a future cycle of gathering and reselling. Representatives from the United Nations also buy mines, but the price is better if the children sell to the dealers who have set up stalls in the open-air shopping strip. Ghobadi shoots in a documentary style and utilizes the Kurdish language to tell the story of four refugee children, who lack parental guidance and protection and form their own subculture in order to survive economically and psychologically.

 In the film *Kandahar* (2001), directed by Mohsen Makhmalbaf (1957-), also shot in a documentary style, we see what appears to be heaven sent artificial legs falling from the sky into a desert region where dozens of male amputees leave the Red Cross clinic to run as fast as their condition and crutches allow in order to get one or two of those legs. The film does not reveal how they lost their limbs, whether it was during the ten-year war 1978-1988 with the Soviet Union or during the Afghanistan's civil war 1992-1996. From the dialogue, we discover that some of these men plan to sell these artificial limbs rather than use them for themselves or family members. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan estimates that 10 million mines, mostly from the Soviet Union, lie in wait for the unsuspecting footstep of a civilian or a domestic animal. (International Campaign to Ban Landmines). In *Kandahar,* we encounter Nafas, a Canadian journalist, who is on a mission to find and dissuade her sister, a double amputee and land mine victim, from committing suicide.

 The documentary, *Miss Landmine* (2000), filmed by Canadian filmmaker Stan Feingold and directed by Morten Traavik, Norwegian theatre director and activist, shows the process of selection and preparation of young Cambodian women, who have had unfortunate encounters with landmines laid during the Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia during the Viet Nam War (1969-1973 and the consequent lapse of Cambodia into civil war in the 1980's, for participation in a beauty pageant. The issue of whether such a pageant is appropriate for Cambodian women also becomes the focus of the film when the Cambodian government withdraws its support of the contest and the accompanying photo exhibit of land mine victims. The contest does occur, but in virtual reality as opposed to the planned venue in Cambodia's largest city and capital Phnom Penh.

Telling the stories of those stigmatized by landmine injuries

 The purpose of this paper is to explore how Ghobadi, Makhmalbaf, and Traavic, tell the land mine victims' stories. All

three films address the issue of landmines and for Morten Traavik (2010) this is the *raison d' être* for making the film. In an interview with reporters from the *Globe and Mail* in Canada, he states that he wants to "draw attention to the issues at hand in a new way that didn't just confirm already established preconceptions of the land-mine survivors as pitiable abominations." These three directors focus upon young women, who despite their wounds struggle to survive and embrace a situation where their bodies carry a visible sign that sets them apart from their peers. One of the contestants in *Miss Landmine* characterizes her missing leg as "a stigma", a mark that causes those who have two intact legs to shun her.

Chamber's Etymological Dictionary traces the origin of the term stigma back to the ancient Greeks who described it as a tattoo, a mark, or a brand. These signs cut or burned into a person's body made it easy to identify slaves, criminals, and traitors, people whose behavior ran counter to socially accepted mores. These marks of infamy, which Goffman (1963) describes in *Stigma* "advertised …a blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places" (p.1). The able-bodied concludes that because such persons appear to be different from him or her that they are undesirable. He or she may decide that their physical difference results from a weakness of character or that these people will become a burden upon society, because of their inability to perform tasks in the usual way that individuals with two hands or correctable eyesight can perform. Goffman (1963) observes, "we believe the person with the stigma is not quite human. On this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce his life chances" (p. 5). All three of these films are the stories of children and young adults, whose lives have been forever altered by their experiences with deadly landmines.

Landmines are concrete and personal, a microcosm of war. We do not see in these films the traditional macro elements of war, the generals conferring, the big decisive battles, the air sorties, and large troop movements. Landmines are a deadly inheritance, "an insidious and persistent danger," particularly for children in some 80 countries in war torn areas. UNICEF (2010) estimates that over 110 million land mines lay waiting for a footstep or the touch of farm implement that triggers the device, and either kills or seriously cripples the unsuspecting farm animal or the farmer who accidentally detonated it. Hansen (2004) estimates that prior to 1997 about a third of the over 250 thousand landmine victims were women and children (p. 365). Children become particularly vulnerable to these devices because mines are hidden in vegetation, covered with a shallow layer of soil, or have been dropped by aircraft and lie on top of the ground. Children often work as herders of livestock or gatherers of firewood, which brings them into contact with mined areas. Even when the minefield is posted with warnings, children often cannot read these signs. An April 4, 2011 report from the UN found Congolese children taking down the mine warning notices from a forest infested with mines and using the

sign as toys in their play (UN Regional Information Networks). According to The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2010), which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997, there were 3, 956 casualties from mines in 2009 and children were 45 percent of the 3,164 where age could be determined. Despite the work of the United Nations and various NGO's to eradicate these leftover mines millions of mines remain undetected. Worldwide efforts are underway to remove these mines, which can last up to 50 years. The late Princess of Wales, Lady Diana, served as one of the most visible spokespersons for the work of The HALO Trust, a British based NGO and the largest organization that removes mines and other unexploded ordinance from war torn countries such as Cambodia and Afghanistan, the settings for *Miss Landmine* and *Kandahar*, respectively. Ghobadi states, "In Kurdistan there is not one day goes by without somebody being blown up by a landmine, trying to cross somebody or other's border" (Kutschera, 58).

In some respects, the study of the lives and the communication patterns of individuals with disabilities is developing in a pattern similar to the studies on women and minority groups in the United States. Braithwaite and Harter (2000) in their summary of the research on the communication of disabled found much of the scholarship focuses upon the perspective of the able-bodied as opposed to the point of view of the disabled. Much of the research examines the interactions of the disabled with acquaintances and strangers as opposed to the context of relationships within the family, the workplace, and the community (pp.17-18).

One of the early issues for Feminists was to remedy the disconnect of women from the dominant culture and to empower women by telling their stories, particularly to tell about their contributions to history and literature, and to incorporate those stories into the curriculum. In March 1987, the US Congress designated March as National Women's History Month. Many American universities now delegate the month of March as a time to focus upon those forgotten stories. We now know that the patriarchy often silenced women's voices and those women, in order to be heard, had to adopt the language and behavior of males. Social scientists Belenky *et al*, in Ways *of Knowing* (1986) conducted 135 in-depth interviews with women and found five epistemological perspectives that women use to perceive and interpret the world around them. They recognize that men also share these perspectives and that the five "ways of knowing" might not be fixed and exhaustive categories. Indeed, these questions are still being addressed. Some women find silence, the first category of knowing, to be the best option for coping with their lives, because they do not see themselves as capable of articulating an opinion or having the power to alter their situation, which often includes limited educational, economic, and social opportunities. A second epistemological position was "received knowledge" or the situation where women listen and follow those whom they perceive to be authorities. These individuals avoid ambiguity, do not ask questions, and tend to follow prescribed cultural roles

for women. The third category of subjective knowledge finds women looking to their intuition and experiences as a guide for obtaining and applying knowledge. The fourth category of procedural knowledge is a situation where women begin to think more critically and substitute reason and logic for intuition. The final category of constructed knowledge is when women begin to see themselves as creators of knowledge and value both the subjective and objective as ways of knowing (p. 15). Whether the disabled follow a similar trajectory of knowing and how they construct realty and communicate inside and outside the disabled culture needs to be explored by scholars.

Current state of disability studies

Constructing disability as a culture or as a perspective for examining how the disabled see themselves and others is somewhat in an early stage for the communication field. A survey of 202 results for disability studies in the database, Communication and Mass Media Complete, reveals that most studies focus upon language and cognitive development. Only two studies characterize disability as a culture and suggest as does Braithwaite and Thompson (2000) the need for disability studies is akin to our need for gender studies (pp. 509-10). Meekosha (2003) suggests that disability is a "social condition generated by the same types of power relations that give social meaning to color, and gender and sexuality" (p. 61). Wilson (2000) in his classes on medical and scientific writing draws upon feminist theory as well as postmodern and post colonial theory and argues that in our thinking about disability we must consider" the demand of subjects to speak for themselves rather than being spoken for." For Wilson disability studies become a "critical modality" whereby students can examine how scientific language is less than objective, and enters into the realm of the political when it "encodes and transmits a social agenda".

In critical theory, we can turn to postmodern theorists, such as Foucault and Gramsci, who deal with issues of power and knowledge. Gramsci discusses the concept of hegemony or the subtle, or sometimes not so subtle, control that a dominant class can exert over the beliefs and behaviors of those who are oppressed by that class or have come to own the behaviors and belief systems of that class (Bertens, pp. 88-89). Foucault in *Archeology of Knowledge* uses the term discourse as not only utterances and texts, but more often as the institutions and rules that structure how we perceive reality. He is then able to examine prisons as one of the institutions of control to regulate human behavior and trace how a given society's prescriptions of the function and operations of prison systems evolve and change over time. Post colonialists read European texts and examine how these Europeans perceived and defined the "natives" who lived in the countries they encountered through war, trade, and travel. Such definitions were self-reflexive and permitted Europeans to see themselves as superior or as bringing civilization to the uncivilized. Spivak (1988), the postcolonial feminist theorist and member

of the Subaltern Studies Group at Delhi University, critiques how the British constructed reality when they ruled India. She draws upon the writings of Gramsci and other Marxists to question the processes of historiography and ask whether it is possible for scholars investigating the subaltern, the voiceless female or peasant farmer, to overcome " the complicity between subject and object of investigation" (p. 28). In her essay (1987), "Can the Subaltern Speak?", she uses the example of the Indian practice of suttee when widows were burned on the funeral pyre of their deceased spouse. She finds that the British colonizers and colonized Indians possessed differing interpretations of this practice and its legality, but that neither party came to these conclusions by consulting the women who were involved in this practice. In effect, these women were silent and oppressed not only by the colonizers but also by the male hierarchy of their own culture.

This is not to suggest that only women inhabit the realm of the subaltern. The intersections of race, gender, race and ethnicity, religion, class, and sexual orientation are defining factors. More recently, issues of disability and the North/South divide in the access to and use of modern communication technology are factors entered into the discussion of the subaltern. Those who have experienced the domination of Western European culture contest the ethics of speaking for the subaltern and ask whether one can speak for others. The late Edward Said (1979) in his classic book, *Orientalism*, has argued that orientalism is "a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between 'the Orient' and … 'The Occident.' Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, 'mind,' destiny, and so on"(pp. 2-3). Said and Bhabha do not differentiate as does Spivak the cultural differences between men and women as they discuss the interactions of the colonizers and the colonized (Behens, pp. 211-212).

In the process of telling the stories of landmine victims, there is the risk of making the disabled an exotic invention just as the Europeans viewed the inhabitants of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. There is also the risk of speaking for the disabled rather than permitting them to speak, thus casting them into the dilemmas of Indian women, discussed by Spivak. These women are silenced by the rhetoric of the colonial and the colonized who colluded to speak and prescribe feelings and motivations for their subjects without asking how or what they feel and believe. Braithwaite and Braithwaite (2006) in their discussion of communication between disabled persons and non-disabled persons note that the early research did not focus upon the communication of the disabled, but rather "on what people with disabilities should do to make nondisabled others feel more comfortable" or investigated the stereotypes held about the disabled (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2006, p. 191). Even

the experimental studies measured responses to an enabled person who role-played a disabled person using a wheel chair. Starting at the turn of the twenty first century researchers now reexamine the "*ethnocentric bias* [author's emphasis] that ignores the perspective of people from the disabled culture….there are still too few empirical studies, and we are left with a very incomplete picture of the communication of people who are disabled" (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2006, p. 191). Researchers now ask questions about the ways that the disabled think about themselves and how they communicate with each other and with the abled (Braithwaite and Eckstein, 2003).

The media unfortunately often reinforces stereotypes of the disabled. Norden and Wolfson

(2000) find in their survey of 300 films from the late 1890's to 1996 that Hollywood "has perpetuated or initiated a number of exceptionally durable stereotypes that have inspired pity, awe, humor, fear, or some combination thereof and that reflect a theme of isolation" (p. 292). After Heather Mills, activist and ex-wife of Sir Paul McCartney, a well-known performer with the *Beatles*, performed in 2007 on the popular US television reality show, *Dancing with the Stars*, researchers Quinlan and Bates (2008) investigated the discourse that emerged in 260 news stories and 216 blogs about Mills' performances. Mills wears a prosthetic leg as the result of an accident in 1993 and was the first person with a visible disability to perform on the show. Quinland and Bates found that audience comments and news stories reinforce existing stereotypes of the disabled. Viewers saw Ms. Mills as a "supercrip," who capitalizes or is "taking advantage of the sick role "and inhabiting "a sexualized disabled body" (p. 68). They conclude that in order for the viewers to accept Mills as a dancer by the viewers she had to overcome her disability, approximate the able bodied, and be physically attractive. "With her training and expensive legs, Mills is allowed to be normal and is no longer considered disabled. This implication sets up a false hope and provides an unattainable standard for most individuals with disabilities." The message is that "an individual with a disability can be re-abled" or pass as normal provided she works hard and has the financial resources (Quinlan and Bates, 2008, p. 76).

In some respects, our three filmmakers take on aspects of the "outsider and the "insider", terms, which Humphreys and McNicholas (2009) use in their study of Māori women accountants in New Zealand. When these researchers called for change based on their findings, they discovered themselves as marginalized within academe, much like the subjects of their research found themselves excluded from leadership of the firms, which employ them. Many of these women want more than assimilation into corporate life; they seek change and question corporate values and practices, particularly in the area of environmental issues. These women have voices, but find little space to speak, particularly in matters that relate to values of their culture, *Te Ao Māori*, which emphasizes the interconnectedness of people and the natural environment. The implementation of New Zealand's equal opportunity legislation brought minorities into the workplace, but it did not provide women the opportunity to critique or to change what Humphreys and McNicholas describe as the voice of "The Master" (pp. 69-70).

It is not the purpose of this paper to trace the etymology of the term subaltern, but rather to use it as an umbrella term to label the situation of those who for political, social or economic reasons are unable to present their stories, their observations and experiences, to a larger audience outside of the local audience who also share such stories. The term subaltern particularly as used by postmodern and postcolonial theorists such as Gramsci, Spivak, and bell hooks implies a power relationship between those who possess power and those who do not. It also implies that in terms of knowledge production, interpretation, and dissemination of that knowledge, the powerless find that the dominant culture does not listen to their stories.

Turtles Can Fly

Ghobadi is an Iranian Kurd and chooses to assert his identity by making his films in the Kurdish language. In this respect, he limits himself to a language that is not the national language of any country and sets himself against the European powers that squashed the Kurds' hopes for an independent state in the negotiations at Versailles after World War I. Today 25 to 30 million Kurds share a common culture and language, but not the official or dominant language of the countries they inhabit. Continuing in a postcolonial critique Ghobadi states that Kurds did not create these boundaries. "Unseen powers" use the rhetoric of a global village, but continue to create "more and more boundaries, shifting them, changing them so that it benefits their own self-interest" (Kennicott, 2003). Aware that the Kurds are powerless, he hopes to empower them by telling their story. By divorcing themselves from the dominant language of Persian, Turkish, or even English, Kurdish filmmakers can explore their own discourse and decolonize themselves from some of the film conventions of other cultures.

Crossing linguistic and political boundaries, even through fiction is not easy. *Turtles* was withdrawn after it opened in Iran. The head of censorship in the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and Culture demanded that Ghobadi make his film *Half Moon* (2006) in Farsi not in the Kurdish language. Politically the Kurds, the largest ethnic minority in the Middle East, have long been relegated to Other. Aktas and Kücük started the International Film Festival Berlin in 2002, not only to show the world Kurdish films, but to also help these filmmakers find their voices, exchange ideas, and "to find our own cinematic language" (Farzanefar, 2005). Foucault and Said both agree that the dominant discourse of a culture determines the ways of thinking and the behavior of those who live in that culture

Only *Miss Landmine* is a documentary. While *Turtles Can Fly* and *Kandahar* are shot in a documentary style, the directors use an amalgamation of fiction and non-fiction strategies and hire non-

professional actors to portray both fictional and nonfictional characters. Ghobadi and Makhmalbaf continue the tradition of Italian Neorealism in post-World war II by making films that focus upon the *hüzün*, the poverty, and sadness, of everyday life. Italian Neorealist filmmakers used nonprofessional children, filmed on location in areas of urban and rural poverty, and told stories about ordinary people and their daily life, all of which occur in *Turtles Can Fly and Kandahar*.

Ghobadi tells *Reuters* that originally he planned to make an urban film about adult experiences in Tehran. While traveling in Northern Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, he observed that the children in the region were crippled both physically and psychologically by the war. Unable to rid himself of the images of these children, he returned to the border between Iraq and Turkey "because I had to tell their story" (Carne, 2005). He says, "It's about these young people who have become adults prematurely, who have never had a childhood." Starting with a ten-page script, he fleshed it out by living with the children for four months, discussing the plot with them, and hearing their stories about their war experiences. He exclaims, "I am surrounded by stories." Because he dealt with real locations and used local children and adults as actors who have "their own story" of suffering from war, he did not find it difficult to establish the reality needed to tell this story (Hughes, 2004).

Ghobadi disclaims intent to make a political film, but the children's stories make it a political movie (Ghobadi, 125). He now finds himself evolving into "a spokesperson for the Kurdish cause" and observes that while many want to fight for Kurdish independence, he advocates picking up a camera rather than a gun (Sciolino, 2000).

Kandahar

The story in *Kandahar* is based upon the request made to Makhmalbaf by an Afghan expatriate, Nelofer Paizira, who had received a letter from a friend in Afghanistan stating that she could no longer tolerate the situation for women and wanted to commit suicide. To follow up on her request that he tell her story Makhmalbaf visited Afghanistan and states that he was "utterly shocked" by the people dying of hunger and when he visited the refugee camps he saw "many legless people" some of whom had "walked over minefields" to escape to Iran (Dabashi, 2010, pp. 128-129). He felt compelled to tell the story of these forgotten people. He told Dabashi that "it was the first and only project where I didn't feel that I was making a film but that, in fact, I was using the means of cinema in order to inform the world of a tragedy" (Dabashi, p.129).

Makhmalbaf describes his work as the third kind of documentary, where creative liberties are taken by the director. He states, "There is a true story and we are shooting in the *cinema verite* or documentary style, but as the director he involves himself in the story" to convert it to something else, which becomes fiction (Dönmez-Colin, 2006, p. 68). Makhmalbaf

often does it all; he writes, directs, and acts in his films. Both Ghobadi and Makhmalbaf shoot without scripts and let the actors invent the dialogue, which evolves out of the story as it unfolds. Makhmalbaf disdainfully relegates acting with a script to the production of "a television show" (Dönmez –Colin, 2006, p. 68-69). In these two films the story evolves through the process of telling the story as opposed to replicating or performing a story from a prepared script.

All three of the films chosen for analysis in this paper present a message and possess a political intent on the part of the directors to bring to the forefront the stories of those who cannot speak for themselves. In some respects for Ghobadi and Makhmalbaf, the films are also their stories. Zeybodi –Nejad (2010) in *The Politics of Iranian Cinema* suggests when Makhmalbaf deals with social and political issues in his films, he is credible to Iranian audiences because he is viewed as an 'insider', "a working class hero" who comes from the ranks of the subaltern and lives in a poor working class suburb of Tehran. In his youth, Makhmalbaf sided with the Islamists and fought to depose the Shah. During the process of opposition, he shot a police officer and served five years in prison for that crime. Disillusioned with the Revolution, particularly with its response to social justice, he, like many intellectuals in Iran, no longer supports the current government. Zeybodi-Nejad sees Makhmalbaf's contributions in film and literature as particularly important because he is not in Gramscian terms the traditional intellectual who has a stake in maintaining the status quo, but rather is an organic intellectual , who can see other perspectives and " empower them [the subaltern] with a voice in the political movement" in Iran (pp. 64-65; ff9 ,167).

Ghobadi was a child during the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq. His hometown Baneh, an Iranian Kurdish city, is a border city. Halabja, the home of the three of the principal land mine gatherers in *Turtles*, is primarily a Kurdish Iraqi border city with Iran. The shelling from the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the subsequent injuries and deaths of family members forced his immediate family to leave in 1983 and settle in Sanandaj, the Iranian provincial capital (Ghobadi, 124). In interviews Ghobadi admits that the film is partly autobiographical; he tells Hamid (2005) "that the children "are a composite of my own personality" (44). After his police chief father abandoned his family, Ghobadi at the age of fifteen dropped out of school to become the family breadwinner. Ghobadi says that Satellite, one of the leads in *Turtles Can Fly*, represents an aspect of his personality, because he, like Satellite, was energetic and had to assume many adult responsibilities at an early age. He identifies with the powerless Kurds and vows to empower them by telling their story. He points out that during the 2003 Iraq War American media shows Saddam Hussein defiantly firing his rifle into the sky and the superstars George Bush and Tony Blair. The Kurds function only as background "the extras, the anonymous people, the villagers". In an interview with *The Washington Post*, he vows to bring the Kurds to the foreground, to make them the "superstars" (Kennicott, 2003).

Miss Landmine

Little is known about Traavik, because he remains a private person. He can be classified as a performance artist, whose artwork, photographs, and videos are often controversial. His documentary film, *Miss Landmine*, portrays his attempt to hold a beauty pageant in Cambodia, which the Cambodian government ultimately cancelled because they saw the film as insulting the disabled. Canada's CBC television channel aired this film directed by Canadian film director, Stan Feingold, in 2010. Traavik continues to speak for those who have no voice and his most recent activity is the posting on *You Tube* a video of a North Korean group of accordion players performing the 1980's song "Take on Me" (Thai News Service, 2012). Unlike Ghobadi and Makhmalbaf, he is an observer, not a participant. Whether the labels of "white, rich guy, exploitative of [the] poor and post colonial" as he acknowledges have been heaped upon him or whether he is someone "who wishes to do something good for the world" is difficult to determine (Traavik, 2008, *Miss Landmine*). Traavik admits a mixed motive of being altruistic and wanting to change our conceptions of female beauty and desiring to do "a vanity project" (Pablo, 2010). Traavik came up with the idea of a beauty pageant for landmine victims when he visited Luanda, Angola in 2003 with his girlfriend and was asked to judge a local beauty contest. Struck by his frequent encounters with individuals who were missing limbs from the 27 years of civil war in Angola, he decided to challenge the conventions of beauty and conduct a beauty contest for landmine victims. He recounts to MacKinnon from *The Guardian* (2008) that "I'm a great believer in counterpoint—a good old theatre trick" By juxtaposing landmine and young women, he could present the "counterpoint of the serious and tragic reality of landmines and the joyful celebration of life inherent in a beauty contest." Funded by the European Union and one of Norway's arts councils and the Angolan government's Demining Commission, he successfully conducted a televised beauty contest, where the contestants competed in bathing suit and evening gown competitions for a custom- made prosthesis and various cash prizes (Siona, 2008). Traavik is not without his critics, which include his feminist mother who questions whether this activity is sexist and exploitative of disabled as well as abled women (MacKinnon, 2008).

The Children Seen as Other without Voices

When the camera pans across the valley in a long establishing shot in the opening scenes of *Turtles Can Fly* we see a small village that probably never had a glorious or prosperous past, but the brown mud and straw brick and grey limestone one story houses with their traditional pole and thatch flat roofs are permanent homes for families who have inhabited Kanibo for centuries. Interspersed among the houses are groups of beige tents, which provide temporary housing for the influx of war refugees into this village. A make shift fence separates them from the villagers. Our first view of the tents is in the early morning light and we see the grey smoke from the cooking fires drifting up toward the mountains. Later we see these tents dismantled and the refugees either leave by foot or are crowded into the back of trucks to seek a new location. They are migratory birds temporarily blown off course by the winds of war and unlikely to be seen again in this village. They continue to be seen as Other by the residents of Kanibo.

Turtles focuses upon the interactions of the refugee and village children, who unite in the common task of mine clearance. Mine gathering appears to be children's work and to Western eyes, all the children, refugees and villagers alike, appear to be expendable workers. The demining is not gender linked or separated by the traditional division in this region where males do outside activities and women do the domestic inside activities. Young village and refugee girls also clear mines and stack spent shell casings. In the West where we forget that child labor occurs in an economy that requires that everyone works, even grandmothers, because the stages of life all blur together without the defined boundaries of childhood and retirement.

Three of our four principal characters Agrin, Hengov, and Risa, are refugees from Halabja, an Iraqi city close to the Iranian border. The most widely publicized chemical and biological attacks by the Iraqis occurred in 1988 on the cities of Anfal and Halabja, where respectively some 180,000 and 12,000 persons died (O'Leary, 2002). Halabja is synonymous with trouble. and is whispered rather than named out loud by One of the village boys whispers rather than says the city's name out loud when he tells another boy the source of some of the refugee children, who compete with the children of the village for jobs removing mines. The nighttime invasion of Halabja by Iraqi soldiers and the children running through the rain-slicked streets to escape is shown in a flashback when Agrin takes a break from gathering land mines. We see her brother Hengov in her flashback, reaching out with both hands to grab Agrin's legs in a futile effort to protect his sister from rape. In the opening scenes of the film when we first meet Hengov with his work-gang of refugee children who gather and sell landmines, we see his stumpy arms, a reminder of his powerless hands. As such, his situation is not unique or stigmatized, because many of the refugee and village children have lost limbs in landmine accidents, but still labor in the minefields and participate in the local economy.

Only her brother knows Agrin's internal stigma. The visible stigma is the toddler Risa who she carries on her back or tethers to a scrubby tree while she gathers landmines. The villagers, unaware that he is the result of a wartime rape, refer to him as the children's little brother. In this culture, if the villagers knew that Risa is a "bastard" as Agrin refers to him, all three would be stigmatized by the villagers and their fellow refugees. Hengov dishonors his family's reputation, which in this culture is to be protected at all costs. It was Hengov's cultural duty to perform an honor killing and to kill his sister. He did not do so; consequently, they can never return to their hometown. Many viewers in the West would assume that Agrin's sadness is a result

of the rape and knowing that she is "damaged goods."

Agrin's wounds are hidden in her thoughts and disguised by her sullen silence. The film opens by showing her standing alone on the edge of a weathered grey lichen covered cliff. The camera approaches her from behind and we see her gauzy Juliette style sleeves blown to and fro by the wind. The camera cuts to a close-up of her face and shows a young girl contemplating suicide. Later in the film, we see her attempt to immolate herself by pouring the kerosene that earlier she used to calm a bad toothache over her body and unsuccessfully lighting it. Wishing to rid herself of the responsibilities for Risa, she argues with her brother that they should leave him behind when they leave the village. Toward the end of the film, she returns to the cliff and looks out over the mountains and into the snow-covered valley. For her the future is as barren as the mountains. She cannot love or be loved. She removes her blue plastic shoes and jumps. Later that morning while the fog still fills the village, Hengov rushes to the cliff and finds only his sister's worn plastic shoes, which he picks up in his teeth and carries to Satellite, a village boy, whose youthful crush on Agrin had been spurned by her inability to reciprocate his attention.

In the film, Kandahar, the major victim of a landmine accident is never shown. All we know about her is that she lost her legs when she ran to retrieve a doll used as a lure to bring her to trigger the mine, which was laid during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We also know that her father, who is no longer living, stayed behind with her while her sister Nafas and her mother immigrated to Canada. Nafas, who completed a college degree in Canada, is now a working journalist and a woman in a hurry. She received a message from her sister in Kandahar that she planned to commit suicide on the day of the last eclipse of the sun and that event is at hand. The story is told from the perspective of Nafas and we do not know whether her sister's despair is caused by no marriage prospects, poverty, or just the despair of living in a war-torn country where the prospects for women covered by their colorful burkas is limited.

Nafas's journey to Kandahar is a race against time and shows the primitive transport that is available. The quest must be made over land by foot, animal and cart transport, or by three wheeled taxis or tuks. No planes, trains, or busses here. No travel guides or maps exist so Nafas is dependent upon securing a reliable and trustworthy guide as well as transport. Like Ghobadi Makhmalbaf wants to show the tragic stories of the Afghan people. Nafas enters Afghanistan from a refugee camp on the Iranian border, where she is disguised as the fourth wife so she can travel with a family who is returning to Afghanistan. Before the refugees leave the camp, the staff lectures them on the dangers of landmines, particularly the mines disguised as dolls. Their instructors warn the refugees that every five minutes someone dies for the ravages of war or from an encounter with a landmine. Poverty and malnourishment have taken a toll upon these bodies. Cultural taboos such as the removal of a ring from a dead body are broken, because that ring can be sold for food.

Children learn to do what they can to survive. It is not difficult from the images of the refugee children and the young boys at the madrassa to see why they would be attracted to a toy. Yet these are strong children and before Nafas separates from her newly found family after a robbery by highway bandits, one of the little girls warns her not to pick up any dolls on her way to Kandahar.

Ghobadi, Makhmalbaf, and Traavik also deal with a politically sensitive issue of how to portray or whether to portray at all those who are differently able. In all three films, we see and observe the conversations and interactions of landmine victims with each other and with non-victims. In *Kandahar*, we never see or hear the main character's sister, who has lost both of her legs due to a landmine accident and is threatening to commit suicide. In *Miss Landmine*, the issue becomes whether the women who have missing limbs can challenge the usual conventions of what we define as "beauty" and participate in a ritual usually limited to the abled.

Kalami (2009) raises the question as to whether Iranian filmmakers portray the "plight and blight" with the desire to communicate to a "global audience" or do the directors intentionally or unintentionally reinforce the new Occidental vision of the Orient as a place where the inhabitants are victims in need of rescue or in eroticized poverty (p. 44). Dutta –Bergman and Pal (2007) make a case for listening to other voices and renegotiating our ideas about "the dominant constructions of knowledge and the positions of power served by those constructions of knowledge" (p. 22). Communication scholars either drawing upon their own experiences or on the experiences of others have begun to examine the issues of communication between the abled and the disabled in order to better facilitate understanding and communication. In some intercultural textbooks, the disabled are treated as another culture and students are challenged to change their perceptions and strategies for communicating with the disabled. The question of who speaks for the subaltern and whether it is better to empower them to speak for themselves remains.

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The Use and Abuse of Sex Workers in North Cyprus: An Analysis of Mainstream News Media

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Women constitute a growing group composed of certain specific nationalities and ethnicities in specific sectors among migrants in the world. Cyprus has recently become a focal point of this growing regular and irregular migration and has been a destination country for women who are subjected to forced labour and forced prostitution ("Diplomacy in Action"; Göynüklü 2012). The recent flow of migration is described by Castles and Miller (2003) as a "globalised and feminized" one. From the migrant women's point of view, working in other well-off countries means having new occupational alternatives, getting relatively high income for low skill jobs, and most importantly escaping from severe poverty (Pravad 1999; Reynolds 1986 cited in Philaretou et al.2006, p. 106).

The first wave of migrant labourers entered South Cyprus in response to the labour shortage in employment sectors less popular with Cypriots (Matsis and Charalambous, 1993: 38 in Kontos, 2009) [1]. Migrant female workers are coming from Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Belarus and the Czech Republic to work in Holland, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Lebanon (Philaretou et al.2006, p. 126). In Northern Cyprus, this took place after the socio-spatial changes in 1974 through the division of the island.

In the news article titled "First Time in the World" [2] (Boşnak 2010a) in *Kıbrıs* newspaper, it was stated that two young men had stolen two lambs from a neigbour's farm and gave them to the manager of a night club to take two *konsomatrises* [3] out. Four months later, on 20th January 2011, we learn from the same newspaper about the young men found quilty of stealing and soliciting prostitution that "they might have done it before". [4] In the same news article it is stated that the *konsomatrises* were also found guilty (Boşnak 2010b). If *konsomatrises* are taken out for sex with money and if they are caught or reported both sides are taken to the court.

In a news article entitled "Hit the booze" [5] it was claimed that four women in Güzelyurt took two *konsomatrises* from a night club. However, they were interrupted by police officers when one of the *konsomatrises* reported them. In the following days it was revealed—in the light of the interviews with some of the Güzelyurt residents—that people wanted to know the identities of these women for the sake of their town's reputation. The news entitled "Such a relief" [6] uses humor and infers that this news relieved the social tension. Journalist Tilki notes that Güzelyurt people are "corrupted" and ordinarily concerned about other issues, such as citrus and patato prices, debts and unemployment. Consequently, he asserts that some people are suffering from poverty while others are becoming crazy because of too much money.

These are the two news articles among many which are

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1 Cyprus was a country of emigration and Greek (and Turkish) Cypriot women (and men) used to work in the textile industry as cheap labour in London (Phizacklea 1983).

2 "Dünyada bir ilk"

3 Although there are many words referring to this profession such as hostess, bar-maid, escort girl, cabaret dancer etc, the common term in use in North Cyprus is konsomatris. The word is coming from the French word consommatrice.

4 "Daha önce de yapmış olabilirler."

5 "Zevk-i Alem"

6 "İlaç gibi geldi"

enough to indicate that the sex workers and night clubs [7] are a multidimensional issue in North Cyprus. The tone, the language and frequency of the news on the media are worth investigating since they also show the extent of social corruption, blindness and ignorance resulting from the night clubs and sex industry on the island. These news articles are also important to recognise how gender cross-cuts ethnicity, nationality and class (Agathangelou 2006, p. 12); and how sexism and ethnocentrism integrates otherisation and produces and reproduces "us and them" dichotomy.

Cyprus is one of the least migrant labour friendly and most exploitative countries in the world (OSCE 2006; Refworld 2012). According the UNHCR's Refworld report, "…women working in nightclubs and pubs who received 'hostess' or 'barmaid' work permits in 2011 came overwhelmingly from Moldova, followed by Ukraine [8]. Smaller numbers of women came from Morocco, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kenya, and Paraguay. This area continued to be a zone of impunity for trafficking" (Refworld 2012) [9]. Sex work networks easily reached the former socialist countries that have been suffering from social corruption and poverty. Many women found themselves in this sector that expects low skills and high payment (Philaretou et al. 2006). Considering the importance of the issue it should be noted here that human smuggling (and trafficking) is the third largest source of profits after narcotics and arms. On a yearly basis 500.000 women are estimated to enter Europe (Kiatipis 2004 cited in Philaretou et al. 2006, p. 123).

This paper looks at the representations of migrant sex workers who might possibly be the victims of human smuggling and trafficking; and the victims of discriminative journalistic practices and discursive mechanism in mainstream media representations in North Cyprus. The divided status of the island has dominated the media discourse with political and public discussions around the Cyprus issue. Thus, the narratives, stories and thoughts of migrant sex workers are barely brought to the attention of the public, or they remain in the shadow of facts and figures, plans, regulations, policies and measures [10]. On the one hand both communities' media see the issue as a symbolic, ideological and cultural border between them; civil society, by contrast, sees the

issue as an opportunity to collaborate for eliminating the sector from the island.

I have looked at the online version of the highest circulation newspaper, *Kıbrıs* in North Cyprus. I examined news articles and commentaries starting from January 2009 till May 2012. *Kıbrıs'* coverage includes news articles collected from news agencies and commentaries written by journalists. I also cover some news and commentaries from *YeniDüzen*, the newspaper with the second highest circulation, and news taken from South Cyprus online media such as *Cyprus Mail* and *Fileleftteros*. *YeniDüzen* gives more space to commentary as well as news and it puts sex industry related news as a public issue but *Kıbrıs* tends to see them more as individual stories which are not placed/positioned on a frame referring to this social issue.

Night club (or cabaret) as a term connotes a place where male customers drink, dance and have sex with women hired as *konsomatris* in the Cypriot context. This different usage and meaning causes confusion with some visitors to the island which attracts many tourists from many parts of the world. [11] There is a common history of night clubs (or cabarets) in Cypriot culture. They used to be family entertainment venues 40-50 years ago in Cyprus. According to Philaretou (2006) a legislation which reduced the number of female artist visas made it impossible for night clubs owners to hire big groups and variety (p. 116). In the South, the nightclubs employ 1,100-1,300 migrant women on artist's visas. The Cyprus Statistical Service and the Immigration Department, estimates that there are 75-110,000 migrants in the country; 721 of them are refugees and 10-30,000 are undocumented workers in 2005 (Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla 2006, p.: 21). In 2009 there were 58,000 legal and 30,000 unauthorized foreign workers in Cyprus, making up about 27% percent of the island's workers. The European Commissioner for Human Rights stated that the number of women entering Cyprus with "artists" visa is very high considering the island's population (Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla 2006: 13). It is estimated that there are 35,000 unregistered workers in the North (*Havadis*, 2009, p. 7 cited in Güven-Lisaniler, 2010, p. 135).

The recent numbers provided by North Cyprus authorities show that 994 "hostess" and 21 "barmaid" work permits were issues in 2011. These numbers were 977 and 961 "hostess" 16 and 14 "barmaid" work permits in the years of 2010 and 2009 respectively (Refworld 2010, 2012). [12].

In Cyprus' case the demand and supply of women for night clubs (or cabarets) makes one consider the connection between sex work and human trafficking. The Cyprus Ombudswoman's Report on sex-trafficking states that women who work as "artists" are living in desperate conditions and have been suffering human rights violations (Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla, 2006, p. 29). The findings of some researches in the

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7 Although publications and others sources in the South refer to this "business" as cabaret, I prefer to use 'night club' since it is common in the North Cyprus media.

8 Ukraine is not just a sender country but also intermediary country. According to Philaretou et al 500.000 women left Ukraine to work in the sex industry. In some towns it is estimated that 95% of the girls are trafficked to Turkey and Greece." (Hughes 2000; Kiatipis 2004 cited in Philaretou et al 2006, p. 126).

9 Refworld categories assigned to countries according to their conditions available for migrant labour. If the "TRNC" were assigned a formal ranking, it would likely be Tier 3 which is the last (and the worst) category. (Refworld 2012).

10 Although they are not a group included in this study, migrant women in domestic work constitute the second largest group in the island. It is stated that in South Cyprus Eastern-European (white) women are employed in night clubs or cabarets and Asian women are preferred as house-maid (Trimikliniotis, 2003; Panayiotopoulos, 2005; Agathangelou, 2005 cited in Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla, 2006, p. 9 Accordingto KISA (2009) the number of domestic workers in the South reached to 27.000 (28.5 %) (p.4). In Northern Cyprus, in 2003, the largest group of migrant women with work permits was from Eastern European countries, which constitute almost half (50,7%) of the migrant women, and 86% of them were employed in night clubs as sex workers. The second largest group (46%) was from Turkey and worked at the casinos and low paid and low skilled jobs.(Güven-Lisaniler, Uğural and Rodriguez, 2008). Regarding domestic workers also see Aliefendioğlu 2012, pp 495-496).

11 Some tourist guidebooks include a "polite" warning about such a possible misunderstanding.

12 According to Güven-Lisaniler (2005) this number was 778 in July 2001 (p. 83)

North show that women working in the sex industry suffer human rights abuses at the hands of both the state and the employers (Güven-Lisaniler, Uğural and Rodriguez, 2005, 2008 and 2010; Prologue 2006; Göynüklü 2012). Furthermore, Refworld report also remarks that "Turkish Cypriot authorities did not conduct any anti-trafficking awareness campaigns during the reporting period" (Refworld 2010).

Sex workers are not just economically and sexually abused but they are pushed to the margins of the cities and public sphere both physically and symbolically. The location and the housing of the night clubs deliberately keep women outside the public sphere in the North literally in the middle of nowhere. Both in Northern and Southern Cyprus, the workers' passports are kept by the police, the employer or the pimp. Action for Equality, Support, Antiracism (KISA)'s statement summarizes the real dimensions of the working conditions in night clubs: "The dependency that the migration model in Cyprus creates in the case of the 'sex industry', goes beyond slavery and is reminiscent of 'concentration camps'" (KISA, 2009, p. 9) Göynüklü (2012) states that lack of legacies and many unknown and unreported aspect of the issue creates a highly worrisome conditions.

It is a known fact that some employers do not give their workers proper clothing for occasions other than night work (Esembe, 2005, p. 49). Anyone can see these *konsomatrises* with "odd" clothes at the airport, the supermarket and police stations with one or two pimps escorting them. Some people might think that this is the women's choice however most of the time it is the employers' promotion to present to the public the type of girls in service in the night club industry.

Prostitution is legal in South Cyprus; however some prostitution-related activities are defined as crimes [13]. Since it is illegal in North Cyprus, this explains why news reporting about sex workers is always crime related police stories [14]. Although *konsomatrises* are having sex with customers or forced to have sex, it only becomes criminal when it is done outside the night clubs or if someone reports it [15]. A study conducted by Prologue Consulting showed that male customers in the north do not know that prostitution is illegal in this part of the island. Consequently they do not believe sex workers could be victims of trafficking ("It is believed that prostitution is legal in the North" [16]). Although they are not supposed to work in prostitution, *konsomatrises* working in Northern Cyprus are

being routinely taken for compulsory check-ups for sexually transmitted diseases. In the event of a "positive" test result of either HIV positive or Hepatitis B, their employment permits are revoked, and the women are immediately deported (Güven-Lisaniler, Uğural and Rodriguez, 2005, p. 85; Kontos 2003, p. 53). The news article entitled "Blood sample is in Ankara" is about a *konsomatris* who had been hospitalised in North Cyprus on grounds of having tested positive for HIV. If her second (confirmatory) test result came out positive, the case would be sent to the court with a deportation order. It is worth noting that the name and nationality of the *konsomatris* was not revealed which is not always the case in the North Cyprus print media.

Refworld states that deportation is still "the most common form of 'rescue' the authorities use for women who complain about their employment at nightclubs and who ask for help from the local police" (2012) [17]. This application of a double standard, lack of language skills, and inexperience push women to the margins of legality, and prevent them from reporting and make them a dependence on their employers or pimps (Trimikliniotis, 2004; Malinova 1995 cited in Philareto et al 2006, p. 125). Refworld (2011) notes that there is a denial of sex worker's human rights abuse in TRNC and no training provided to the police.

Existing patriarchal, sexist and ethno-centric values legitimize the exploitation of sex workers. These foreign women are seen simply as "prostitutes" and a danger to the moral values and integrity of the community. As Yücel puts it, "The attitude is that: well, they're prostitutes anyway. They come here and break our families" (Trafficked Women Threatened with Torture in N. Cyprus). Ethnic nationalism on the island places unambiguous limits for women; Cypriot ethnic symbolic borders ease prejudices and discrimination against others for both their Turkish and Greek Cypriot ethnic purity. Migrant women are seen as a threat to the ethnic-national culture, family unity and moral values (Anthias 2006, p. 188) as much as women of both ethnic communities are represented as a "biological reproducers and signifiers of symbolic border of their ethnicities" as Yuval-Davis and Anthias asserted (1989, p.7). The simple fact that these women may be the victims of gross global human rights violations is simply ignored (Prologue 2006, p. 7).

Media Coverage

Many studies note that there is a serious lack of gender sensitivity in discourses and practices towards migrant women, particularly among the police and security forces (Badarevski, 2006, p. 19). According to Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla the media generally adopt a rather hostile and sensationalist approach to migrant workers in general and towards women in particular, spreading sexual stereotypes (2006, p. 9). Hadjipavlou (2010) also notes that a discriminative media discourse against Roma, Pontian Greeks, Russians and others is prominent in the

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13 "Such as: (a) keeping, managing or assisting in the management of a brothel, the use of letting premises to be used as a brothel (sect. 156 (1) of the Criminal Code); (b) procuring a woman to be a prostitute or to work in a brothel (Section 157 of the Criminal Code); (c) detaining a woman against her will in a brothel (Sect. 162 (b) of the Criminal Code); (d) living on the earnings of prostitution (Section 164 of the Criminal Code); (e) a woman or man aiding for gain the prostitution of another woman (sect. 165 of the Criminal Code)" Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla 2006, p. 21).

14 TRNC Penal Code Articles 157 and 164 forbid prostitution and sex for money.

15 Pervin Gürler from the North Cyprus Police Department, gave a speech on violence against women. She noted that when police catch anyone having sex, they can only be charged if they are doing it for money. ("Aman Duyulmasın").

16 "Kuzey'de Fuhuş Yasal Sanılıyor" The article also states that this is study has been conducted simultaneously by Prologue consulting and MIGS in both sides of the island.

17 For Dyer, where to send the victims when they are discovered –to prison or to hospital– is a very critical question (Basri-Akter 2011 p. 13). Some women might not necessarily go back their home country, but victimized again in the hand of traffickers.

mainstream media (p. 180). The (mainstream) media practices confirm the same attitude in the north.

The selection and content of the news and news making practices can tell us a lot about the social construction of the sex industry, how it "epitomizes essential gendering and socialization into polarized masculine and feminine behaviours, traits and attitudes" (Philaretou et al. 2006, p. 103). According to a survey conducted by Migration, Identity and Human Rights Center Studies Center, in March 2010, the primary social problems in North Cyprus are listed as lack of transparency in public administration, nepotism and ethnic discrimination. Other issues are a lack of tolerance to people of different sexual orientations and no acceptance of different ethnic people. Participants believe that human smuggling is an important global issue (61.8%) but the majority (89.4%) agree on deportation ("Public distrust is highest to political parties" [18]). I believe the discourse and framing of news about night clubs and *konsomatrises* should be read and investigated in this socio political background.

All the news stories regarding night clubs or cabarets are scandalous crime or deviance stories mostly dealt with by the police and court processes about local men's involvement in sex industry and sex workers and moral decline. The news article title "Raid against prostitution in Nikosia" in *YeniDüzen* announced the irony in the title. The news is about three young women who entered the island with artist visas, and who have been arrested along with three men. The decision of the judge was to deport the women since they violated their job contract. The news discourse does not make any difference between illegality of the perpetrators and the women themselves. One of the men, the owner of a night club said to the judge: "I pay 30 billion in taxes, everyone is doing this."

Bourdieu suggests *habitus* as a system of learnt cultural dispositions of differentiated practices and mindset of people (Bourdieu 1993 cited in Lull 1995, p. 69). I am borrowing this term to apply to the media practices in North Cyprus. One common journalistic *habitus* in *Kıbrıs* newspaper, starting from the title, is that the usually crime-related stories about sex workers are told from the points of view of perpetrators, the men, the locals and the powerful as opposed to the viewpoints of victims, women, foreigners, migrants and powerless. The news article titled "They regret it" refers to a man who placed an order for a *konsomatris* from a night club, and to two others (one working in the night club, the other a taxi driver). All the names are disclosed, including the woman's. "Miscalculation" [19] refers to a *konsomatris* who asked for 300 TL for sex but got caught by the police and was sentenced to a fine of 5000 TL. The news titled "Sex Tourism Boomed" [20] ironically contains the result of a report on human trafficking. It can easily be observed that the night clubs and women employed there are scapegoated and the real anger of people directed towards these women as trouble makers who

are in fact possible victims of human trafficking. By doing so, the media and journalistic practices in North Cyprus encourage the public to put the blame on the minorities. They must, on the contrary, be with the blamed, the powerless and voiceless in this controversy, which is beyond traditional impartiality and objectivity.

Even in the case of death, *konsomatrises* are not in the news titles. A news article states a *konsomatris* was freed on bail. She was travelling with a customer for sex, she lost her friend in a traffic accident, and the news article was ironically titled "Freed on bail". [21] Two news articles by Çağda (2011a, 2011b) about an accident which caused the death of a *konsomatris* and nine people injured were titled "He had no driving license" [22] and "They will be taken to the police" [23]. Although traffic accidents and especially ones with casualties are highly important in North Cyprus, they become ordinary news when casualties are foreign and *konsomatrises*. For instance, there is no word on how many women working in night clubs who get killed in traffic accidents while local men are driving. In this sense news about night clubs and sex workers need a close reading to know these details.

The problem of sex workers and night clubs are referred to as a part of social corruption in many columns, commentaries and interviews as well as the news. It is compared to other social issues such as the lack of municipal services, public health issues [24], citizenship, unemployment [25], personal debt [26] or bad governance. Many journalists discuss this issue to criticize existing government's policies or Turkey's political interference [27]. Night clubs are seen as the face of general corruption in Cyprus. This standpoint is quite common in the left wing and alternative media in the north. Some female journalists share this viewpoint and they deal with the issue with sensationalized discourse, using phrases like: "the cruel world in which they are victimized", "their painful lives" or "their sad end".

North Cyprus print media shows a global sensitivity to the issue in foreign news selection. A caption under a photo entitled

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18 "En fazla güvensizlik siyasi partilere"

19 "Zararlı çıktı"

20 "Seks Turizmi Patladı"

21 "Teminatla serbest"

22 "Ehliyeti de yoktu"

23 "Polise ifade verecekler"

24 Article entitled: "Cesur Milletiz" (We are a Brave Nation) is an interview with Dr. Kezban Akyön from the Ministry of Health for international AIDS day. It notes that condom sales are in decline in North Cyprus. Dr. Akyön states that "Authorities are very sensitive on the issue so that those who are diagnosed with HIV+ or Hepatitis B are immediately being deported". Dr. Akyön also adds that women working in night clubs are tested for sexually transmitted diseases. They are being taken for a health check on a daily basis in small groups.

25 A news article entitled "A desperate situation" (Tablo kötü) includes an interview with a psychologist about recent personal and social trauma in North Cyprus. The psychologist notes that unemployed people may end up with bad habits such as visiting night clubs, gambling and drug abuse.

26 "Case in point" (İbret Verici) is a news article about a man who attempted to commit suicide because of his casino and night club debts. This news title carries a warning for "proper men" to keep themselves away from these kinds of traps.

27 North Cyprus has remained unrecognized since 1974 when Turkey intervened following the conflict between the two major ethnic groups, which placed North Cyprus in a specific relationship with Turkey. The news article titled "They Opened a banner in front of EU Building" refers to this unique tie and states that the platform of trade unions in the North in their visit to the European Parliament put the migrant women issue into a broader picture: For them, Turkey in order to raise new economic sources of income, has encouraged casinos, mafia activities, the drug trade and the trade of women while the EU ignore this ("AB binası önünde pankart açtılar").

"Photo world" [28] reads, "In famous brothels in Bangladesh a real human drama is being experienced. There are 12 years old girls." Although the media claim sensitivity towards the issue there is a contradiction between the text and visual images. Some news articles come with provocative visuals depicting the scenes in night clubs. Visuals either show women and men between police officers or naked women in the gloomy atmosphere in night clubs. As Göynüklü (2012) states "This issue has been covered by journalists, however, majority of these news stories covered in the media encourages the public rather than deterring them because of the photographs, the language used and generally the way it was covered".

Kıbrıs has a page titled "From the South" [29]. This page can be read as consider this "inside-out"ness of foreign news in the North Cyprus print media. Moral interviews with Michaelides, the Priest of Limasol Orthodox Church, who opened a shelter where sex workers can stay ("I have saved 300 women" [30]). Michaelides says that majority of the women who came to Cyprus have been cheated. They were told that they were going to dance and drink with male customers but never told that they would be forced to have sex with them. Once they entered the country it was too late for many of them. Michaelides also adds that sexual exploitation is not limited with sex, dancing for their customers and drinking with their customers should be regarded as a sexual exploitation. This reminds the reader that the shelter was not run by local authorities but it was left to a priest to initiate such a charity.

Here are some news articles taken from the Southern print media on the issue: "The south cannot prevent women trafficking" [31] explains that the number of trafficked women dropped compared to former years but it is because the number of police operations dropped. According to the news 34 police operations in 2008 have dropped to 8 in 2009.

The news titled "We will close the check points" [32] from Filelefteros explains new visa applications for *konsomatrises* in the south which put a certain condition of educational attainment for women to work in night clubs. Night club owners threatened the authorities to block one of the check points between the South and the North. Night club owners "occupied" and stopped car traffic in front of the presidential palace ("Night Club Owners spilled into the streets") [33]. As *Filelefteros* puts it, women trafficking works like clock-work in the South ("Greek side cannot prevent women trafficking"). A year and half later another news article taken from *Fileleftheros* mentions official preventive measures: The Minister of Internal Affairs, Neoklis Silikiotis, announced that, between February 2009 and January 2011, 39 night clubs in the South were closed. The number of

night clubs where women are working dropped from 1200 to 228 in February 2011 ("Women Trafficking is being prevented") [34].

There is a growing pressure by civil society in Cyprus. The Baraka Cultural Center and The Human Rights Foundation note two dimensions to the issue. Lack of awareness in public and lack of legal regulation at the state level go hand in hand. Their activities and calls are very well received by the public. Those activities are not limited to particular days such as International human rights day or women's day. Occasionally many events and protests are carried out and many reports are published by the Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies (MIGS), KISA (in South Cyprus), Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Foundation, Refugee Rights Association, Engelsiz (an initiative active on handicapped people's rights), Gender and Minority Institute, The Foundation for the Prevention of Social Risks (in the North). These are the organizations dealing with cases, and collaborating with authorities both in North and South Cyprus, and with many international organizations. In 2010, some NGOs and some leading women's organisations have initiated public protests to call for the closing of nightclubs where major women's human rights violations were taking place. Feminist Atelier (FEMA) with the collaboration of different NGOs recently have been coming up with the demand of closing night clubs by pointing out that night clubs are brothels ("They will march") [35]. NGOs are aware of the public perception that women working in these night clubs are working voluntarily, however, it is their aim to make the public aware that those women could be victims of human trafficking.

In terms of media representation, there is greater coverage of the issue in South Cyprus. There are more frequent meetings, seminars and gatherings for equal rights for migrant women, likely, as a result of EU membership. In the news article entitled "Not enough is being done to address migrant women's needs" (Dewhurst, 2009), The Minister of Labour says "Most migrants to Cyprus are women and face a double discrimination based on gender and ethnicity". The ministry revised the contracts and employment policies for cabaret performers and women employed in bars and homes to improve their conditions of employment. News coverage in the South shows that there is an attempt of *gender mainstreaming* in labour and migration policies. The news articles related to the issue cover both official announcements and NGO press releases in the South. However media coverage in the North is limited to the declarations of voluntary organizations and public protests not by official authorities.

Closing Notes and Suggestions

As it has been shown, the media depicts the issue of sex workers as scandal-news rather than commentary or news focusing on a burning social issue. This indirectly contributes to the perception that this domain exists outside of the normal rules

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28 "Foto Dünya"

29 "Güneyden"

30 "300 kadını kurtardım"

31 "Rum tarafı Kadın Ticaretini Önleyemiyor"

32 "Barikatları Kapatırız"

33 "Gece Klüpleri Sahipleri Sokağa Döküldü"

34 "Kadın Ticareti Önleniyor"

35 "Yürüyüş yapacaklar"

and regulations of society. This leaves an atmosphere with no legal regulations against human trafficking and any protective mechanisms and services or recourse for the victims. Racialized, sexualized, and even a hostile discourse in the media, keep the stories of sex workers and their "sexually suspect" behaviours out of sight, out of reach, and out of mind (Refworld 2011). In 2011, despite the pressure from civil society "Turkish Cypriot officials continued to fail to identify formally any trafficking victims, as no formal definition of 'victim' has been instituted" (Refworld 2012). This causes confusion between, prostitution trafficking and smuggling (Badarevski 2006, p. 232) [36] as there is no specialized training on how to identify, investigate, or prosecute trafficking (Refworld, 2012).

As Badarevski (2006) states in a study on analyzing the media discourse on the traffic of women, migrant men are described as "active, courageous, and adventurous spirits", while the coverage of migrant women portrays them as innocent, passive, incapable, irrational, immoral and victims of trafficking. But it should be reminded that migrant women either in sex industry or other sectors initiate an individual project of "escape from poverty" and deprivation in their home countries. (p.235). As Anthias and Lazaridis (2000) stated "women must be seen as active agents rather than passive victims" (p. 12) both by people and the media.

There are some pair studies in both sides of the island. However my analysis on news shows there is an urgent need for increasing awareness and raising consciousness about migrant women and sex workers in Cyprus. Media professionals should know that, as Göynüklü (2012) suggests, "The mix-up of the names and concepts of trafficking and prostitution is evident in the news stories and columns in the newspapers; these stories are usually handled by using the wrong images and the wrong language." Societal expectation from journalists and the media is not only limited with gathering news but also demands a fair hearing for all components of society. Journalistic practices in North Cyprus should engage with human rights, and human stories should be embraced by journalists. It would particularly be useful if the journalists shed off their insensitivity and lack of awareness to gender and human rights issues. Similarly, the media are abdicating an important part of their roles as public educators and peace makers by failing to bring this dimension to the public sphere, thereby perpetuating the idea that women are not victims but are prostitutes who pollute the local culture. The media should initiate a proactive role to be part of solution rather than maintaining the problem or magazinising and reducing it to public health issue.

36 Smuggling and trafficking are different concepts: Smuggling is illegal entry into a country, which is a crime against the state. However human trafficking is a crime against a person (see ICMPD for a detailed comparison). "Trafficking in persons" was first defined in the Palermo Protocols in 2000 during a conference. Official name of the protocol is the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings was opened in 2005 to non EU signatories (Göynüklü 2012).

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The Long "Spring" of the Egyptians: "Arab Spring" under West-centered Gaze

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Change is a saleable commodity like any other item

in a globalized version of "resistance"

Prakash Kona

The aim of this paper is about my ongoing experience with re-presentations of "Arab Spring" issued by the BBC, Newsweek, Al-Ahram Weekly and The Guardian. This work is no more than an indefinite theoretical attempt trying to give a description of the relations of the way in which four newspapers re-present the "Arab Spring" process in Egypt. What this paper says is that the meaning that BBC and Newsweek attribute to "Arab Spring" in Egypt is "revolutionary" in transcendental terms along with finite teleological undertones. Nevertheless, the same events and objects in Egypt carried the Al-Ahram Weekly and The Guardian to subscribe to the conviction that the "Arab Spring" is actually more of an unfinished struggle and delicate process rather than a transcendental revolution. In this vein, this paper is not aimed at scrutinizing the "Arab Spring" as an event in itself.

Difficulties in following the "Arab Spring"

Egypt is "the pivot of the Arab world". [1] But the ideology of communication analysis and the socio-ideological texture of Egypt are of critical concerns which cannot be singled out as ends in themselves. All the same, it is absolutely impossible for communication theory and research to avoid dealing with the problem of ideology (Hall, 1989). In addition to this aspect, the

[1] Milne, Seumas (2011, November 23). Egypt has halted the drive to derail the Arab revolution. Retrieved November 23, 2011 from the World Wide Web: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/23/egypt-arab-revolution

fact of a nebulous Islamic and Egyptian demography makes an analysis even more difficult. As Annabelle Sreberny says: "the Middle East is (…) a highly complex region, and any attempt to describe political change and democratization within it has to be mindful of the real historical and contingent differences and particular political economies that exists—no essentialist or culturalist models will suffice" (2007, p. 66). In this line of thought, one more point needs to be elucidated. In due course, facts just happen and they do not simply speak by themselves. In this regard "things do not mean: we construct meaning, using representational systems, concepts and signs (...) and the symbolic practices and processes through which representation, meaning and language operate" (Hall, 2003, p. 26). And what makes epistemological (to have knowledge about the truth) and ontological (the sense of reality) worlds look natural is the media frame. However, frames are not definitive or anchored for that matter.

Samples

Certainly we cannot take for granted that the world depicted is simply the world that exists as it is. At each moment the world is rife with events (Gitlin, 1980, p. 6). Roger Fowler, in a helpful comment on news and representation as interpretation of media audience says that discourses produced by the news, by definition, are "representation from a certain point of view" (1991, p. 209). Bearing this in mind, the samples I use for this pursuit are from BBC which remains the largest public service broadcaster in the world (Arsenault, 2011, p. 105) and the American weekly news magazine *Newsweek* which is 'the second-

largest news weekly magazine in the U.S" to try to point towards American and British mainstream media representations of "Arab Spring". During this argument I will provide the compact background to the reader regarding the way BBC and *Newsweek* construct Egypt and other Arab countries. The main reason why I chose both these institutions is that:

Mainstream financial media being considered are a select group of financial publications and business channels. These include the *Financial Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *International Herald Tribune*, *The Economist*, *Time*, *Newsweek* as well as the financial programs and reporting of BBC world, CNN (CNNI/CNNfn), CNBC, News Corporation and Bloomberg (…) these media are widely consumed in all of the overlapping elite networks. Their reporting and commentaries are taken very seriously by both financial and associated stakeholder elites (…) In theory, such communicative structures are also likely to generate and sustain a variety of discourses, cultures, narratives, and practices." (Davis, 2011, p. 247)

At the same time I have chosen the Egyptian *Al-Ahram* Weekly. Considered in this way, the first reason to select them is that Cairo is considered to be the publishing center in the Arab world and Africa. And secondly, *Al-Ahram* (The Pyramids) newspaper is one of the main sources of news with a 900,000 circulation and they are popular outside the state as well (Amin & Napoli, p. 180). The Guardian is also among the world's most respected newspapers (Fridriksson, p. 2004) with a reputation as a center/left newspaper which often expresses its opposition to US policies (Bantimaroudis & Ban, p. 182). *The Guardian* in paper form had a certified average daily circulation of 230,541 in October 2011, behind *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Times*, but ahead of *The Independent*. The newspaper's online offering is the second most popular British newspaper website behind the *Daily Mail*'s Mail Online. *The Guardian* had a certified average daily circulation of 358,844 copies in January 2009—a drop of 5.17% on January 2008, as compared to sales of 842,912 for *The Daily Telegraph*, 617,483 for *The Times*, and 215,504 for *The Independent*. [2]

Methods or Analytical tools

I will employ frame analysis method to scrutinize BBC, *Newsweek*, *Al-Ahram* Weekly and *The Guardian*'s representations concerning Arab Spring on the one hand and news covering of *Al Ahram Weekly* and *The Guardian* newspapers on the other hand. The time period of the BBC news is from 2 February 2011 to 6 December 2011 and the scale of the Newsweek is from 28 January 2011 to 7 March 2011. The time period of the *Al-Ahram Weekly* and *The Guardian* news is from 28 February 2011 to 4 April 2012. After scanning the headlines and news of 58 BBC news and 6 *Newsweek* stories, 60 *The Guardian* and 25 *Al-Ahram Weekly* news, three fundamental frame-groups were selected with reference to the "Arab Spring" discourse such as

immanence, negation and transcendence-immanent/transcendence frames of BBC and *Newsweek*. In the similar way 2 main and 12 sub-frame-groups selected from *Al-Ahram Weekly* and *The Guardian* together.

The analytical tools used here are inspired by, Gitlin, Goffman, Fairclough, Wodak, Entman, van Dijk and Moretti largely. As far as the "Arab Spring" framing issue is concerned, Erving Goffman, describes the basic nature of frame analysis as: "definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principals of organization which govern events (…) and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify" (Goffman 1974, p. 10). Emanating from Goffman, I exercise frame analysis in the light of "making sense out of events and to analyze the special vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are subject" (Goffman 1974, p. 10) while scrutinizing BBC and *Newsweek*'s re-presentations of the "Arab Spring" in their news headlines, subtitles and cover pages. In other words, some adaptable and indicative insights provided by four newspapers frames are appropriated here within the context of exemplary events as the particular object of evaluation. Furthermore, according to Entman, this method works effectively when we "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (1993, p. 52). This is because frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation about what exists, what happens, and what matters (Gitlin 1980, p. 6). At this point, it is important to direct the reader's attention to the text and context relation in Derrida. Distinctively, Derrida, famously posits that meaning (therefore frames) cannot be tightly held and therefore the text is not isolated from the particular and special context which influences a frame because of time and space factors. Taken in this sense, "there is nothing outside the text" turns out to be "there is nothing outside context" because *the* frame may change into *a* new and different frame every time it repeats especially when the contexts alter in scattered temporality and space. In analyzing frames my main argument and standpoint come from Derrida. With this iterability condition in mind Derrida (1982) explains how the signifiers can play in open-frame contexts:

Every sign, linguistic or non- linguistic spoken or written (in the usual sense of this opposition), as a small or large unity, can be cited, put between quotation marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and engender new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not suppose that the mark is valid outside its context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any centre of absolute anchoring. (Derrida, p. 320-21)

I have one more delicate matter that I want to draw attention here. As I frame the texts of BBC, *Newsweek*, *Al-Ahram Weekly* and *The Guardian*, there is the contingent nature of the analysis, facts and institutions to be kept in mind. Just like the play of

facts and language games before they enter into the frame, likewise frame analysis and news making are subjective human activity. Fairclough and Wodak stress on precisely this issue.

The Arab Spring movement as discourse

"implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institutions and social structure(s), which we frame it. The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shape them (…) discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of relationships between people and groups of people." (1997, p. 258)

The reason I concentrated on headlines and cover pages as well is because of their symbolic effect on the readership. Teun A. van Dijk emphasizes on his own terms (1998): "News headlines are first and on top and for that reason are markers that monitor attention, perception and the reading processes." (p.141) Furthermore, the words of Franco Moretti introduce an important nuance about the "mythical paradox" and symbolic power of the modern journalism language into the framework of van Dijk. Moretti (2005) contends:

Far from being enslaved to the 'cult of fact', the newspaper transforms every event into the support of a value system. It is not, nor can it be, interested in a news item's 'truth value', but only in its symbolic effectiveness. (p. 234)

The modern journalism's nature is Janus-faced and much of the effort in the news falls on headlines. One face of modern journalism today is set to proceed through striking symbolic shock effect on affections and it is pivotal to the newspaper in setting public opinion. But with regard to the other face of the Janus, the symbolic shock of headlines serves the vested interests of the structuration system. As Moretti says "The true aim of the daily newspaper does not consist in following history step by step in its unpredictability, but in slyly sauntering along in order to show that nothing that happens requires that our ideas truly change" (2005, p. 234).

Common Frames

Claude Lévi-Strauss' idea of oppositional pairs determining the structure of myths can consistently be applied to frames of value indicators in Arab Spring news. All the scope of Arab Spring coverage was constructed on the binary opposition between opposition forces such as good powers (protestors in Tahrir) and "bad persons" (old dictatorship) during course of events without taking possible nuances into consideration. The Arab Spring has been analyzed and constructed as mutual conflict between two parties no matter how remote we are from the vantage point to pass judgment about "winners" and "losers" of the struggle. As Khaled Diab makes clear "Arab awakening" has been portrayed as an epic battle pitting the enlightened forces of democracy and dignity against the dark powers of dictatorship

and despotism of the young and radical and towards more conservative opposition forces. [3]

Added to this the fact that what was pictured and framed as the source of conflict between "two" sides in all four newspapers seems to be a struggle for democracy and welfare state in the face counter-revolution (and status quo) and possible future uncertainty on the horizon. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Muslim Brotherhood in Arab Spring coverings are reconstructed through basic narratives as a system of oppositional values also.

The seasonal metaphors are example of stylistics in the presentations of an Arab Spring. By means of metaphors as such, columnists actually appear to be basing their arguments on binary opposition. The Middle East editor of *Guardian*, Ian Black, uses metaphors to portray a picture of Egypt after "post-revolutionary politics": " Seasonal metaphors —spring giving way to summer, then to autumn and winter —have also outlived their usefulness. Old assumptions are being re-examined". [4] The similar metaphor adoptions could be seen as the context to the binary opposition such as spring and winter. In the sense of the binary mind, framing helps positions and meanings to emerge if it is seen as contextual examples of the optimism and pessimism of grassroots in the "Spring" events. As an example to the metaphorical binary oppositions Black's remarks can be useful once again: "as spring and summer gave way to a bloody and inconclusive winter, the fate of the region's uprisings remained uncertain." [5] One can see that the spring is the common metaphor together with other seasons such as summer, autumn and winter.

In addition to metaphors, value-based references are taking place between the "Spring" and the "west". The external "West" is seen as US and Obama in opposition to "Arab Spring". Even though the language choice does not fully envelop violent wording and imaginations like that of colored trivial press, still expressions such as "fight", "shocking blow", "kill off" and "carnage" are used to a certain degree.

Journalists who covered Arab Spring with critical eye gave priority to their hopes and fears about the human dimension, that is to say, civilian lives in Egypt. The developments in the country were brought to public eye with colored and powerful photos as visual support. However, I did not search into editorials apart from those of Ian Black of The Guardian.

BBC and Newsweek Frame [6]

Main frame elements are taken from BBC and *Newsweek* are as I mentioned earlier through the *immanence*, *negation* and *tran-*

3 Diab, Khaled (2011, August 12). The Arab spring's bottom line. Retrieved November 23, 2011 from the World Wide Web: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/12/arab-spring-bottom-line

4 Black, Ian (2011, October 10). Carnage in Cairo: a shocking blow to both the Arab world and the west. Retrieved October 24, 2011 from the World Wide Web: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/10/egypt-carnage-cairo-shocking-blow

5 Black, Ian (2011, December 13). A year of uprisings and revolutions: uncertainty reigns in the Arab world. December 31, 2011 from the World Wide Web: http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2011/dec/13/arab-world-uprisings-2011-future

6 Dr. Nurten Kara (Personal Communication, November 19, 2011)

scendence-immanent/transcendence triad. The repeated frames of headlines and body of the stories of BBC and *Newsweek* were embedded within a Hegelian and Marxist line of thought. This relationship can be interpreted as a dialectical Hegelian triad of identity (being-in-itself), being-for-another (negation) and being-in-and-for-itself (negation of the negation) in the frames of BBC and *Newsweek* (Fuchs, 2011, p. 35). Christian Fuchs' work, as one of my theoretical foundations, is used wherever essential. To be able to support my argument, I will make use of *Foundations of Critical Media and Information Studies* by Christian Fuchs' to illustrate depictions of the political moves in Egypt under the western media eye.

Repeated frames in the "Arab Spring" discourse in BBC and Newsweek:

Immanence, Negation and Transcendence elements

This section explains the repeated words selected out of BBC and *Newsweek* in terms of framework analysis. Selected frames, this paper perceives, underpin theoretical figures too such as immanence, negation, transcendence of Hegelian and the Marxist dialectical mind. The news covered by BBC and *Newsweek* contain dialectical thinking patterns as to the course of actions in the "Arab Spring" in Egypt. Following the Marxist dialectical frame of mind, both newspapers hint that chains of course move towards transcendence-based revolution in society with the support of history and the immanent factors in society. In this light, a lot of this sense of transcendental thinking comes from what Aliboni says: "the Arab spring is seen in the West essentially as a series of domestic developments affecting different countries in different ways but generally meaning an end to authoritarian rule and the beginning of democratic regimes" (2011, p.7). Speaking through philosophical terms in critical theory, the dialectical relations contain two negating poles. If the contradiction between the two poles develops, then the negative relation of the two mutually negating poles is negated, which means that the contradiction results in a new result. Negation of the negation is 'the effected coincidence of each with its other' (…) The negation of the negation produces a new unity of two negating poles." (Fuchs, p. 64)

Immanence and Negation Frames

In their covering of "Arab Spring", as framed by BBC and *Newsweek*, the negation seems to be taking place through the encounter of its "other" or the opposite force in terms of this course of action. This happened when, as suggested by both newspapers, the angry Egyptians were disturbed by the status quo as a result of the immanent potential in the country. What I suggest by immanence in this work is the political and economic conditions. Class and capitalism as inherent (immanent) in Egyptian society is rendered as negation of the given regime. Journalists perceive the progression of transcendence as

something that previously bears its preconditions in Egyptian society. In this usage here, immanence frame refers to expressions in BBC and *Newsweek* such as "old order", "agony", "rage", "regime", "dictators", "Hosni Mubarak", and "system" to mean the immanent factors of the material world. Martin Assser, who wrote for BBC, falls into the scope of the immanence frame when he relates the breeding ground as corruption in the country to the maturing course of Egyptian people: "the main drivers of the unrest have been poverty, rising prices, social exclusion, anger over corruption and personal enrichment among the political elite, and a demographic bulge of young people unable to find work." [7] In Marxist thinking, simply speaking, immanent forces actualize potentials in material social conditions and this factor brings about the negation. Here, both the newspapers frame suitable portrayals which in the long run help emerge into a "negation". As Fuchs writes, "there are immanent possibilities to use". (2011, p. 108). Defined in this way, according to BBC and *Newsweek*, the potential immanence made the outrage of Egyptian grassroots possible after it ripened which eventually resulted in its negativity. This can be read in a binary opposition here as well. Interestingly, to point to the internal factors by which Egyptians walked against power, Hardy writes that "Western commentators are right to say the protests are about "them" rather than "us". [8]

As to the negation frames, on certain occasions, both newspapers seem to be leaning toward assuming correspondence with Hosni Mubarak and dominant power. The negation framework covers wording and language such as "uprising", "upheaval", "protest", "challenge", "clash", "unfinished business", "progress", and "revolt" in BBC and *Newsweek* stories. Typology of covering "facts" in this manner is highly noticeable in the *Newsweek* February 7, 2011 story which gives us the following title is a case in point: "Rage against the Regime" and after the title on page 22, the article written by Babak Dehghanpisheh, Christopher Dickey and Mike Giglio goes on to say: "From Tunisia to Egypt to Yemen, a youthful uprising is challenging the Arab world's rulers". The BBC follows similar pattern. For example, the news written by Middle East analyst Roger Hardy in BBC fits the negation frame in Egypt. With the headline of *Egypt protests: an Arab spring as old order crumbles?* and then first sentence of sub-headline of *The Arab order is crumbling*, Hardy is worth quoting here as an attempt to further retrace the highlights regarding the negation example in Egypt. He writes in a suggestive passage that

Arab *rulers*, from North Africa to the Gulf, *in rich countries and poor, find themselves in essentially the same boat*. Virtually without exception, they *preside over corrupt autocracies with little or no legitimacy* in the eyes of their people. All of them now watch *Egypt's "days of rage"* with

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[7] Asser, Martin (2011, February 11). Q&A: Egyptian protests against Hosni Mubarak. Retrieved October 20, 2011 from the World Wide Web: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12324664

[8] Roger Hardy writes that "The anger of the protesters is largely directed inwards—at a bankrupt Arab order—rather than outwards at Israel, the United States or the West." Hardy, Roger (2011, February 2). Egypt protests: an Arab spring as old order crumbles? Retrieved October 20, 2011 from the World Wide Web: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12339521

mounting trepidation. In the fate of the ailing Egyptian ruler, 82-year-old Hosni Mubarak, they see their own. (Italics mine) [9]

Rulers, corruption, autocratic rule, legitimacy problem and ailing Mubarak are situations could be referred to immanence frame all of which are "present" as contradictions and with deep negative forces in Marxist corpus. In conjunction with Entman's description above, the existing immanent factors as "days of rage" expression can be related to "aspects of a perceived reality". What is its significance? What happens with this claim made by Hardy? Having a "disillusioned movement" has found a breeding ground to poverty, corruption, autocratic rule, legitimacy problem and losing ground to Mubarak and his allies; it is based on the implicative premise that after a cumulative process the events came to the climax at the level of transcendental perception.

Transcendence Frame

Above all, transcendental factors are inherent in the existing social order. Transcendence emanates the inside of society and there are ways of interpreting Marxian critique as dialectic of immanence and transcendence (Fuchs, 2011, p. 26). Transcendence as Marx describes it is the negation of the negation. Revolutionary change could be seen as a transcendental possibility within this framework. Marx puts it thus: "Every revolution brings down the old ruling power; to that extent it is political" (Marx, p. 419-20). But, transcendental, in a general sense "refers to what remains outside of worldly entities. Speaking with the aid of Fuchs' terms, it is "immanent transcendence". Therefore, "It is also about exceeding (transcending beyond) the existing material conditions or red lines "to produce a transcendental outside that becomes a new whole" after negation of the negation in dialectic thinking (Fuchs, 2011, p. 22-302). To a large extent, BBC and *Newsweek*'s style of covering facts and events stand close to the basics of the transcendental philosophy. Departing from the ferments of the "Spring" as immanent framework, now the framework of transcendence (immanent transcendence) contains intensive recurring expressions such as "crumble", "next", "spring", "demise" "after", "freedom", "ecstasy" and "revolution" in BBC and *Newsweek* which seem to be written in a language embedded with mythical elements which is very much bound up to the associations of going beyond the here and the now. Both western news media institutions, as in the example of Fouad Ajami's title, seem to be treating the "revolution" with transcendental terms as evidence of pure and complete new page. The BBC portrays a picture of the collapsed old order in Egypt after a transcending "revolution". For example Asser's statement has considerable implications which reminds us of the "transcendental outside" of Fotini Vaki (Cited in Fuchs, 2011, p. 27): "[T]owns and cities across Egypt erupted in *joy* as Hosni Mubarak *slipped into history*". [10] (Italics are mine). Under

the headlines of *How the Arab League embraced revolution*, Bill Law from BBC News's eagerness carries Martin Asser's: "*As revolutions sweep the Middle East*". In terms of the spot of the headline, Law described the transcendental hallmarks of the Arab League in the following way:

Of all the startling changes that the *Arab Spring* has brought about, perhaps the most intriguing has been the *transformation* of the Arab League (...) It's as if a gentleman's club [the Arab League], very wealthy, very smug and sure of itself, had suddenly been forced to *drink deep from the revolutionary's cup* and found it rather intoxicating. The*n came the Arab spring* (...) *As dictators fell one by one*, the league *began to wake up*. (Italics are mine) [11]

What does seem to be the case is that the "spring" metaphor is political and mythical and it further refers to an overt transcendental constituent. The entire passage is crammed with excitement and the transcendental joy of revolution. Speaking within Marxist- Hegelian dialectic, the people of Egypt, then, who were pictured as "victorious" after bypassing such tension, (the rule of Mubarak) could be understood within the terms of a "new level" (which is yet to come). By relying on the claim to revolutionary language with terms such as "transformation", "revolutionary's cup", "spring" and "finally collapse of dictators one after another" and subsequent "wake up of people", the BBC is insisting on the manifestation of the final negation of negation that leads to a born-again or new level.

Apart from the Marxist-Hegelian dialectic, speaking within broader terms, media professionals can be seen transforming history to mythical time in their covering as if the "revolution" is a subtle epiphany because this is the occasion and connexion when one "reactualizes the archetypal cosmogonic act, and that is coincidence between the "mythical instant" and the "present moment" supposes both the abolition of profane time and the continual regeneration of the world" (Cited in Prakash Kona, Eliade, 1989, p. 79) [12] If we return to above passage again, consequently historical-linear time (that is to say startling changes from February 2011) seem to be whipped out through revolutionary eschatology (drinking deep from the revolutionary's cup as dictators fell one by one and found it rather intoxicating) and continual regeneration of the world happens finally (beginning to wake up). In Eliade, like the metaphor of "Spring", the world is reincarnated through

world-middle-east-12416154

11 Law, Bill (2011, December 2) How the Arab League embraced revolution . Retrieved February 2, 2012 from the world wide web: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15948031

12 Captivatingly, Mircea Eliade, in his book The Sacred and the Profane, shows how religion embedded in the eschatological Marxist idea of history and the discourse of salvation (dictatorship of the proletariat) are close to each other no matter how Marx subverts the ideal of progression in the Hegelian dialectic. With subtle irony in The Sacred and the Profane, Eliade says that, "Marx takes over and continues one of the great eschatological myths of the Asiatico-Mediterranean world—the redeeming role of the Just (the "chosen," the "anointed," the "innocent," the "messenger"; in our day, the proletariat), whose sufferings are destined to change the ontological status of the world" (206). Eliade further adds that: "It is even significant that Marx takes over for his own purposes the Judaeo-Christian eschatological hope of an absolute end to history; in this he differs from other historicist philosophers (Croce and Ortega y Gasset, for example), for whom the tensions of history are consubstantial with human condition and therefore can never be completely done away with." (Cited in Kona, 1987, p. 208).

9 Hardy, Roger (2011, February 2). Egypt protests: an Arab spring as old order crumbles? Retrieved October 20, 2011 from the world wide web: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12339521

10 BBC. Egypt's Mubarak: End of the great survivor. (2011, February 11) Retrieved February 22, 2011 from the world wide web: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/

repeating the creation cosmogony (Eliade, 1989, p. 79). Here Law's reference to the refreshing "Spring" after "drinking from revolutionary cup" suggests a transcendence frame in "post-revolutionary Egypt".

The Al-Ahram Weekly and The Guardian Framing

I gave the major importance to the general headlines of columns and parts of the internet stories written by journalists. I chose Al *Ahram Weekly* and *The Guardian* frames as example figures to the "chaos" frame dominating both newspapers in terms of their attitude to Egypt. What I try to show through the chaos frame is about generally political, social and economic conditions that emerge following series of events in the Arab Spring. Indeed, what is framed in the first place, especially in the headlines of two newspapers was the "tangled air" in the Egypt since the onset of the Arab Spring: lack of tranquility, peace, security and plurality in solidarity. In Simon Tisdall's headline, *The Guardian* reads "The Aftermath of the Arab spring". And it goes on to say:

"when it comes to Egypt, the beating heart of the Arab spring, post-revolutionary developments are worrisome (...) the political forces that ousted Hosni Mubarak are increasingly fragmented, the energy and ideals of Egypt's youth are being co-opted by an "incompetent" ruling armed forces council, and the country risks losing sight of the democratic prize for which it fought so hard." [13]

The second frame is one of ambiguity for the future of the country even though there is relative optimism and pessimism of the journalists about the ongoing dynamics with regard to the events in Egypt. The headline reads thus in the Middle East editor of *The Guardian*, Ian Black's words: "A year of uprisings and revolutions: uncertainty reigns in the Arab world". And he continues: "This has been a momentous year for the Arab world. But as spring and summer gave way to a bloody and inconclusive winter, the fate of the region's uprisings remained uncertain. Unpredictable, extraordinary events affecting millions have become the norm." [14] An expression like that of *The Guardian* is visible in the *Al-Ahram Weekly* as well. Abdel-Moneim Said, after he asks under the headline of whether "will Egypt follow Tunisia?" provides the following account of the political and social concerns of the country: "So far, the scene in Cairo is mixed... future of the Egyptian revolution remains uncertain. We don't know if the Muslim Brotherhood wants the country to move forward, or turn around...So we don't know yet if it is for a modern and democratic state, or for a hard-line Islamist kind of country." [15] The sub-frames in the coverage of "spring" come

under two main frames. As mentioned, there are some factors which make Egypt seem confusing and nebulous. As we see in coverage patterns, there are problematic areas in relation to the series of events of "Arab Spring". The recurring sub-frames in the second part are as follows:

Press Issues (lack of press freedom and impartial news coverage, "western media, highlights English-speaking Egyptians", limits for journalists)

Human rights violations (dysfunctional civil society, diminishing public sphere)

Economic problems (loans, class inequalities, mariginalized people, poverty, injustice, unemployment, healthcare)

Education (pedagogic problems, "improving the educational system")

Military (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces - SCAF, the tension between the SCAF and The Muslim Brotherhood)

Religious Concerns (Risk of Fundamentalism, Islamist groups, The Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis)

Political risks (Democratic mess, need for democracy free from SCAF and Islamic powers, "democratically-elected civilian government", new constitution)

Foreign Intervention and external factors (imposing from outside, West, US/Obama intervention, imperialism discourse and power struggles in the Middle East, Syria clashes, Iran, IMF, G8, Palestine)

Status Quo (the old order, old dictatorships, counter revolution)

Transition phase (interim, makeshift solutions)

Minority Fears (the fears of Christian Coptic community)

Women (violence on women, misygonist oppression)

Conclusion

Far from being the defence of any notion, in this paper I tried to show that BBC, *Newsweek*, *Al-Ahram* and *The Guardian* represent the "Arab Spring" in terms of their reconstructions. This work is written with the aim of putting forth the repeating patterns in BBC, *Newsweek*, *Al-Ahram Weekly* and *The Guardian* and their reconstructions on the subject of "Arab Spring". The aim of my essay was not about testing the validity of the re-presentations of the "Arab Spring" or the possibility of the revolution, but mere scrutiny to discern key frames in the BBC and CNN news. I argue that the BBC and *Newsweek* felt a need to put a heavy emphasis on the developments in Egypt with grand words and euphoric headlines referring to revolution as transcendental change. I worked by taking some of the ideas developed by BBC

13 Tisdall, Simon (2011, July 6). The Aftermath of the Arab Spring. Retrieved November 23, 2011 from the world wide web: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/06/arab-spring-aftermath

14 Black, Ian (2011, December 13). The aftermath of the Arab spring. Retrieved January 5, 2012 from the world wide web: http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2011/dec/13/arab-world-uprisings-2011-future

15 Said, Abdel-Moneim (2011, November 3-9). Will Egypt follow Tunisia? 1071. Retrieved January 5, 2012 from the world wide web: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1071/op2.htm

and *Newsweek* and presenting them as the basis of repeating patterns especially bearing elements of a Hegelian and Marxian dialectic. With respect to *Al-Ahram* and *The Guardian*, however, both seemed to be observing the facts with cautious optimism and by making references to "change" in the region.

We can take this analysis forward and support it by the reliability of the nature of the "Arab Spring" in future. The "Arab Spring" undoubtedly deserves more than a case study. Depicted events are not always like they are in the frames of four media institutions; treating them requires delicate ways. To put the same point in a different way, thoughtful analysis must include much more than what I attempted here to do. As Sreberny says, the researcher feels the need of a historical specificity for substantial description of internal process as well as analysis of external forces (2007, p. 64). As she further puts it, substantial analytic and theoretical work "would examine the conjunction and effects of global process within specific, localized settings, exploring the dynamics of external forces combined with the internal process. Deep theory would interrogate the adequacy of existing concepts (…) within new and different settings, being open to the challenge of the new "real" as well as offering novel frameworks for interpreting that reality; as usual, a dialog between theory and its objects is needed" (2007, p. 66). Owing to that reason, opening spaces to singularities with different latitudinarian qualities does not make them categories but leaves them as singularities: "a unity that maintains the disciplinary diversity." (Fuchs, 2011, p. 77)

There would seem to be a need for proceeding further in framing. This work deserves to be further investigated through the following parameter: what events or facts are not being covered is what needs to be subjected to criticism. This is because of the fact that the using of frame analysis may potentially preclude facts and events from expanding against insistence on mediated analysis. That is why the constituted media reality employs the language of institutional exclusion in politics and such necessity itself compels the audience to make do with what is already represented. After all these aspects, there are crucial questions: why is the "Spring" in media representations important? Why is that both the parties are covering and framing the "Spring" differently? What are they doing by proceeding with the above-mentioned claims? To what extent do we know the relation of BBC, *Newsweek*, *The Guardian* and *Al-Ahram*'s relations to the facts in Egypt? Why should we trust these newspapers? What are our criteria in following them?

Another weakness/limit of my attempt is the singling out of the other kinds of analysis about what is "really" happening by means of applying the orientalist discourse to foregrounding institutions such as *Newsweek* and BBC to "show" whether they have a hidden agenda and vested interests. It is noteworthy that such arguments are gaining ground in the international community and this deserves another flexible study to be developed in future to hear alternative voices and agencies, unwritten narratives, and minor media that are underplayed by mainstream media realm.

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War Journalists in Post-1970 Hollywood Movies

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When the Vietnam War was lost, the US news media faced accusations of blame for the defeat (Badsey, 2002; Roach, 1993; Tumber, 2005). It was said that the US news reporters lost the war because of the way they covered it. This blame game has found its way into propagandistic Hollywood movies such as John Wayne's *The Green Berets*. Since then, war reporters have been blamed on other occasions as well: They are sometimes accused of being partly responsible for the loss of civilian lives as in *The Killing Fields* or they are praised for contributing to the victory of revolutionaries as in *Under Fire*. Since Vietnam, Hollywood has questioned the role of frontline journalists in winning or losing battles.

Winning or losing a war requires taking sides. How does this fit in with professional journalistic norms such as objectivity and impartiality? How is the role of a journalist in conflict zones defined in movies? Do they remain detached or take sides and get involved? Where do journalists' allegiances lie? Through a textual analysis of selected movies, I explore these questions in order to describe how on-screen war correspondents in post-1970 American movies are constructed and used to problematize the role of news media and journalists in conflict situations.

I focus on movies that cast frontline reporters and photojournalists in leading roles reporting unfolding events in civil wars and conflict situations overseas in post-Vietnam movies. I exclude Vietnam movies from the analysis because as suggested by Badsey (2002), in these movies and other movies about American wars, the "reporter" is cast as a secondary or minor character in the narrative.

Why Movies?

It has become more difficult to ignore the part the media play in shaping our perceptions of the world especially when we are surrounded by and exposed to media artefacts constantly in almost every aspect of life. We depend on the prompts provided by the image-makers of the media about our world so that we can make sense of it. Our perceptions, therefore, are, to a certain extent, influenced, or rather, as Parenti (1992) has suggested, 'colored' as a result of our contact with the media. As Parenti has put it,

Our notion of what a politician, a detective, a corporate executive, a farmer, an African, or a Mexican-American is like; what rural or inner-city life should be; our anticipations about romantic experience and sexual attractiveness, crime and foreign enemies, dictators and revolutionaries, bureaucrats and protestors, police and prostitutes, workers and Communists, are all heavily colored by our exposure to the media. (p. 4)

Our perceptions of a war journalist could easily be added to this list. We have limited personal experience with war and war correspondents. For the most part, we draw upon movies for journalistic representations and ways of thinking about war zones and conflicting situations overseas. Movies are the major suppliers of information on how the news media and journalists operate because as noted by Zynda (1979): "Hollywood has a virtual monopoly on the public's image of the press" (p. 17). Our knowledge about journalists working on the frontlines and how they operate within a hostile and dangerous environment come mainly from movies since there is no other way for us

to reach this information unless we see journalists in action. Even journalists can get their ideas about war and war reporting from television or movies. As Chris Ayres has stated in his autobiographical book *War Reporting for Cowards* (2005),

War films were my only references, and gore-soaked scenes from *Saving Private Ryan*, *Three Kings* and *Apocalypse Now* flickered in my imagination like a private horror show. … And I remembered a line by Private Joker, the war correspondent in *Full Metal Jacket*: "A day without blood is like a day without sunshine". (p. 116)

Movies, therefore, appear to be useful tools for exploring the role of media and media professionals in reporting wars in distant parts of the world, especially when most of these movies are based on the actual experiences of foreign correspondents and 'real' wars. Just to mention a few,

- *The Killing Fields* (1984) tells a 'real' story of 'real'-life journalists: *New York Times* reporter Sydney Schanberg and his Cambodian assistant and colleague Dith Pran during Khmer Rouge's regime in Cambodia under the leadership of Pol Pot.

- *Salvador* (1986) is written collaboratively with the director Oliver Stone and the journalist Richard Boyle.

- *Welcome to Sarajevo* (1997) is based on the British journalist Michael Nicholson's book *Natasha's Story*, which is about his experiences during the Bosnian War.

- *A Mighty Heart* (2007) is based on a true story of Mariane Pearl's attempts to rescue her kidnapped husband, *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl, who was executed on camera.

- *The Bang Bang Club* (2010) is adapted from Greg Marinovich and Joao Silva's co-authored book *The Bang Bang Club: Snapshots from a Hidden War* (2000), which tells the actual accounts of four well-known photojournalists Kevin Carter, Ken Oosterbroek, and the writers of the book, working in South Africa between 1990 and 1994 during Apartheid. Greg Marinovich also worked as a consultant during the production of the film.

Despite the abundance of movies with war reporters either in leading or minor roles, research on frontline journalists is limited. An early account of on-screen foreign correspondents appears in Barris' *Stop the Presses* (1976). Barris, in a chapter, chronicles foreign correspondents in films until the release of *The Green Berets* in 1968. Good (1989) and Ghiglione (1990) also provide a brief account of war reporters in movies. More recent studies by Badsey (2002), which focuses on the image of war reporters from the Vietnam War to the recent past, and by Cozma and Hamilton (2009), which examine on-screen portrayals of foreign correspondents from the 1930s to the 1990s, provide a more systemic analysis of filmic depictions of foreign correspondents. Korte (2009) engages mainly with representations of British war reporters in memoirs, novels, films and television from the 19th century to the present but she also includes some examples of American movies featuring war correspondents.

The common point of these analyses is the change in the ways reporters are depicted on the screen before and after Vietnam, paralleling their changing image in the eyes of the public. Until Vietnam, the war correspondent appears as an adventurer and patriotic figure but their depiction changes after Vietnam because "disillusionment inevitably colors the fictional depiction of the U.S. correspondent" (Ghiglione, 1990, p. 144). It is the outcome of this change I intend to detail to cast a light on the role and function of war reporters and the news media in general.

Witnesses or Participants?

Professional mainstream journalism demands journalists to report events in an uncontaminated way by holding a neutral point of view, by employing facts and factual statements, and avoiding interpretation. Reporting objectively is believed to be possible when journalists position themselves as detached observers. Although the notion of objectivity in news is no longer accepted to be adequate among some journalists, the belief in the necessity of objectivity especially in war reporting still persists among a significant number of media professionals. Hollywood movies question and challenge this mainstream approach and show that being objective, especially in covering foreign issues, is problematic.

In movies featuring journalists as leading characters, whether depicted initially as indifferent, uncaring or over-ambitious, journalists are often seen losing their detachedness sooner or later and becoming participants rather than bystanders. This transformation shapes the way these journalists are represented on screen. One such journalist is Richard Boyle (James Woods) in Oliver Stone's *Salvador*. Wood's freelance photojournalist character is more interested in making money than reporting what's happening in Central America as a responsible journalist. Boyle's reason for going to El Salvador is to find a story that he can sell to news agencies for money: "If I can get some good combat shots for AP, I can make some money" is the rationale behind his journey to El Salvador. Yet, when he witnesses human suffering, death, torture and atrocities caused by the military-government of El Salvador backed up by the US government, his indifference disappears. He starts empathizing with the oppressed and becomes more involved in the revolution especially after visiting El Playon, a site where thousands of dead bodies are dumped to make a big pile of decaying bodies. Boyle is depicted to undergo transformation from being an indifferent witness who thinks war is about making money to being an active participant and a responsible journalist.

Depicted as detached early in the movie, both Russell (Nick Nolte) and Claire (Joanna Cassidy) in *Under Fire* later becomes participants in the revolution they are supposed to cover. Their story takes place in Nicaragua in 1979 during the Sandinista Revolution. At the beginning these characters do not display any concern for the Nicaraguan people or the violation of their rights. Russell's only wish is to be the first one to photograph the Sandinista leader Raphael. When asked by a priest whose side he is on, Russell clarifies his position as a neutral and detached journalist by saying "I don't take sides. I take pictures." When the Sandinistas ask Russell to make their dead leader Raphael

look alive on the photo, Russell refuses, explaining that he is a journalist. It is in a way Claire who manages to convince Russell to fake the photo of Raphael by telling him that he may have won prizes before but never "won a war."

This is not the only time Russell lets his feelings overcome his journalistic responsibility: Before the rebels' approach to Russell and Claire to make Raphael look alive, another incident occurs that affects Russell deeply. He feels sympathy for a young rebel who throws grenades with the skill of a baseball player and loses his temper when this young guy is shot down by the mercenary Oates (Ed Harris) surviving the grenade. As Claire reminds Russell, instead of taking pictures, he picks up the gun on the ground because he starts losing his detachedness. The parallel that the movie draws between American photojournalist, Russell and an American mercenary, Oates is striking and revealing. Ehrlich (2004) calls them "hired guns". Good and Dillon (2002) highlight the same parallelism when they say that Russell "shoots pictures" whereas Oates "shoots people." (p.66)

This movie also questions how far journalists should go in their support of a cause and what consequences such an action can have. The pictures Russell shoots help the Sandinistas win a war but they also cause bloodshed. The consequences of Russell's interference, therefore, are not all positive. The photos of the rebels he takes at Raphael's hideout place get into the hands of Somoza's National Guards who execute the people depicted in the photos. Moreover, the photograph, which shows Raphael alive, brings Russell's friend Alex (Gene Hackman) back to Nicaragua to interview Raphael but Alex ends up being executed in the street. Ironically, it is Russell again who captures the moment of his death on camera; the death of his friend who would not have to come to Nicaragua had Raphael been dead. And it is, in fact, not Raphael's photo but the death of an American journalist that really causes Carter's government to end its support to Somoza regime.

The impossibility of staying detached or maintaining neutrality is also evident in *Welcome to Sarajevo* (1997), which takes place during the 1992 siege of Sarajevo. We witness Michael Henderson's (Stephen Dillane) transformation from professionally detached journalist to an active participant in the conflict. He becomes involved in the story he is reporting not only by evacuating orphans from the country but also by adopting one of them.

At the beginning of the movie we learn that Michael believes in remaining detached and not getting involved as required in professional reporting. In the early scenes of the movie his journalistic principle is contrasted to that of another reporter, Flynn (Woody Harrelson). Flynn risks his life to help a priest trying to drag a wounded lady under sniper fire. Michael finds Flynn's attitude unprofessional and comments by saying, "We're not here to help. We're here to report." However, as the movie develops Michael cannot sustain his detachment and become personally and emotionally involved with his orphanage story. He believes that he can help these children by reporting their stories and making other people aware of their gruesome conditions.

However his insistence on reporting similar stories of children every night until they are rescued is met with resistance by his producer who says "That's not news. That's a campaign". From the role of observer, he turns into a participant when he realizes that reporting is not enough and contacts aid agencies and the UN to evacuate children from dangerous and poor conditions of the orphanage. Just as in *Under Fire*, *Welcome to Sarajevo* also questions how far a war reporter should go in intervening with the conflict. Henderson's attempts to use journalism as a campaigning tool for saving children works and some children are managed to be evacuated. However, while they are being transported, some are detained by the Serbs and no one knows what happens to them.

The movies selected for analysis here suggest that adherence to journalistic norms such as objectivity, professional detachment or neutrality could be impossible or wrong during times of war. Moreover, in such circumstances, staying detached or being a bystander might even mean sharing responsibility for the crimes committed against innocent civilians. Therefore, as Allan and Zelizer (2004) claim, reporting war "demands that notions of what constitutes good journalistic practice be realigned on the basis of different criteria than would typically seem appropriate, criteria thrown into sharp relief – at times violently so – by challenging circumstances" (p. 4). Thus while neutrality and impartiality might be desirable in times of peace, it might be detrimental in times of conflict and war.

US, the Third Party

In post-Vietnam movies, especially the ones produced in the 1980s, war reporter character is depicted to undergo transformation: They lose detachedness and start being responsible journalists searching for the truth. Finding the truth requires paying attention to *all* sides of a news story rather than concentrating on 'us-them' distinction because "There are always more than two parties to any conflict – some, whose involvement or interest is hidden, need to be put on the map. Others, presented as having a solid aggregate view, may contain important internal divisions, and need dis-aggregation" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p. xviii). Foreign correspondents covering distant wars lay bare the third party involved in creating and/or fuelling the conflict, which appears repeatedly to be the US government in the movies of the 1980s.

The analysis reveals that Hollywood movies tend to depict war journalists covering civil wars in distant lands – most of whom are American or British journalists – as taking sides with the victims, the oppressed or the rebels. Especially in the movies of the 1980s, the journalist character, while covering distant conflicts and atrocities, also critiques the US involvement in civil wars of other countries. In movies such as *The Killing Fields*, *Salvador*, and *Under Fire* journalists are not only shown as witnesses of war and violence but they are also depicted as truth-seekers even if this involves unravelling responsibilities of their own countries for civil wars, civilian casualties and even genocide. Just as they

cover civil wars between local governments and insurgents, they also make America's complicity in these wars as a third party transparent.

Schanberg (Sam Waterston) in *The Killing Fields* fearlessly follows the story of the American planes bombing a small Cambodian village, causing civilian casualties. Even though he is obstructed from going to that village by the military, with the help of Pran (Haing S. Ngor), he secretly gets on a Cambodian patrol boat to access the area. Schanberg wants to tell the world about the Khmer Rouge genocide and the US involvement in it with its wrong foreign politics. And he does. Schanberg reveals the responsibility of the US complicity in the Khmer Rouge massacre. The movie shows that in 1973 the fight in Cambodia was between Khmer Rouge guerrillas and the Cambodian government supported by the US. In its attempts of support, the Nixon government had bombed Cambodia, causing many civilian casualties. The movie implies that this has contributed to the increase in support the Khmer Rouge's take-over in 1975. Wrong US foreign policy in Cambodia led to Pol Pot's reign which turned against its own people and caused the death of millions of Cambodians.

Schanberg's journalistic ambition is so powerful that it almost costs his assistant's life. Pran stays in Cambodia instead of evacuating the country with his family so that Schanberg can access stories easily via his Cambodian assistant. When Schanberg and his other colleagues cannot succeed in faking a passport to take Pran out of the country with them, Pran is taken by the Khmer Rouge and spends four years in hell-like Cambodia. This event and his responsibility for Pran's hellish experience help Shanberg become a better journalist who learns to respect the value of human life. While he was interested in people only as casualties and sheer numbers at the beginning, accepting his part in Pran's hellish experience turns Schanberg into a person who condemns such thinking.

The journalist character is the agent unfolding and critiquing the US involvement in other wars. The complicity of the US in the perpetuation of the civil war in Central America is evident in *Under Fire*. The movie shows that the US government backs Somoza's dictatorial regime in Nicaragua. *Salvador* shows the complicity of the US government in preventing the overthrow of the Salvadoran government by revolutionaries and perpetuation of the civil war. Boyle in *Salvador* realizes that it is the US government to be blamed along with the oppressive regime of the El Salvador government and by pronouncing this complicity publicly in the movie, reveals the hidden third party.

In the movies of the 1980s, journalists, especially freelancers, are depicted as anti-heroes who cannot remain detached from the atrocities in distant lands and the complicity of their government in those crimes. This depiction of journalists can also be found in the movies of the 1990s and 2000s as well. Even though portrayals of combat or frontline journalists have not changed much in three decades, there have been some changes in the handling of certain issues such as news content, media-military

relationship and women's presence as war journalists.

News Media and War Reporting in the Movies of the 1990s and 2000s

The Media-Military Relationship

"This is a media war." This line from *Three Kings* (1999) indicates the change in war reporting and in the relationship between the military and the media starting with the 1990s. The media-military relationship appears to have moved to a new dimension where under the guise of cooperation the military controls and even manipulates the stories it wants transmitted. As the Colonel says to the embedded journalist's escort, "you're supposed to make her [the journalist] feel good about the stories we want."

Three Kings is set in 1991, in the last days of the Gulf War and tells the story of American soldiers searching for Saddam's hidden gold but ending up rescuing a group of Iraqi refugees from death by giving gold in exchange for their safety. They are followed by a TV reporter, Adriana Cruz (Nora Dunn), who is supposed to be escorted by Major Archie Gates (George Clooney) but instead whose attention is diverted somewhere else so that Gates and other soldiers can search for gold away from the radar of TV cameras. Adriana finds their trail and saves them from imprisonment by reporting on their humanitarian act of saving people.

In *Three Kings*, we see a minor woman reporter character, Cathy Daitch (Judy Greer), having sex with Major Archie Gates in exchange for information. This scene is symbolic of the relation between military and media: it shows media and military "in bed" for cooperation. This relationship involves cooperation between news organizations or agencies and the army, and requires "embedding" journalists with military units during war. This is problematic for journalists because as Tumber (2005) suggests embedding journalists with the military is a way of keeping an eye on the media so as not to have another Vietnam.

The movie suggests that this close relationship with the military might provide journalists with protection but at the same time it controls or manages journalists and their works. Clooney's character, for example, arranges to get Adriana off his back so that he can go and find gold bullions that Saddam stole from Kuwait and hide in his bunkers. Gates deceives Adriana by sending her in the wrong direction to meet him. However, when he needs to be rescued, he calls Adriana because he knows media coverage will be helpful. Adriana produces the story about Iraqi refugees crossing the Iranian border with the help of American soldiers and her report saves Clooney and his soldiers from being court-martialled; instead they are honourably discharged.

Media Content and Newsworthiness

The media's coverage of the Gulf War has always been condemned for turning the images of war into spectacle with 24

hour-a-day broadcasting to the world (Allan, 2010). This means bombarding TV screens with trivial news to fill time. This is one of the issues *Three Kings* brings up. In the early scenes of the movie, we see Adriana covering the soldiers' celebration of the ending of the war. Throughout the movie, there is not a single scene of violence or shooting that Adriana witnesses. In fact, the story Adriana covers in the end is not the story of a killing of an Iraqi mother in front of her daughter's eyes by Saddam's guards or children running in the mine field but the American soldier's humanitarian act of helping Iraqi refugees. The movie highlights the fact that media in collaboration with the military makes stories that will alter the way the war is perceived by audiences and will make the military look good.

The movies made after the Gulf War do raise the issue of changing news content and the priorities of news media. Michael in *Welcome to Sarajevo* realizes that his story and similar stories about the Bosnian War do not even become the lead stories in their stations. Such stories are considered less important compared to the stories of the divorce of the Duke and Duchess of York in Britain and Super Bowl in the US. Moreover, the way stories about the war are written and aired does not bode well for positive change. As Good (2008) has suggested "The power of the press has become yet another casualty of the war" (p. 155).

The change in priorities of news media and the meaning of newsworthiness is also conveyed in *Five Days of War* (2011). The movie received poor reviews on its release and deals with the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008. A freelance TV reporter Thomas Anders (Rupert Friend) and his cameraman friend Sebastian Ganz (Richard Coyle) want to alert the world to the Russian invasion of Georgia by trying to get footage of an execution to any network to air it. The whole story revolves around their attempts to get the story to the outside world. This is not an easy task because networks are covering the Olympic Games. Just like *Welcome to Sarajevo* depicts that the story of a royal divorce or football championship has more news value than the stories of war victims, *Five Days of War* shows that news media is more interested in the Olympics than an invasion threatening civilian lives.

Women and War Reporting

Not many women war reporters make it to the Hollywood screen even though the number of women war correspondents in actual life has increased significantly since the Vietnam War. It has been said that over 450 women reported from Vietnam during the war (Steiner, 2005, p. 47). According to Prentoulis, Tumber and Webster (2005), the number of women correspondents in war zones has increased even more since the 1990s (p. 375). Until recently it has been difficult for women to emerge as war reporters having had resistance from the public, the military and male colleagues; indeed, war reporting has been the monopoly of men both on screen and in social life.

In contrast, Claire Stryder (Joanna Cassidy) in *Under Fire*, Adriana Cruz (Nora Dunn) in *Three Kings*, Maddy Bowen (Jennifer Connelly) in *Blood Diamond,* and Jane (Kerry Fox) in *Welcome to Sarajevo* are strong women foreign correspondents working in conflict zones overseas. Yet despite the courage they display in the movies, these women reporter characters are secondary in importance either to male journalist(s) or protagonist(s) in these movies. A more recent movie *A Mighty Heart* (2007) does break this rule and features a woman correspondent in the leading role. However, the movie dwells on Mariane Pearl's (Angelina Jolie) attempts to rescue her husband Daniel Pearl rather than her depiction as a journalist. Her role as the wife of a kidnapped journalist dominates her role as a journalist.

Women war reporters are depicted similarly to their male counterparts: They are tough, hard-drinking and risk-takers. Yet the cinematic depiction of their dilemmas and journalistic responsibilities is underdeveloped. Woman journalist character Claire in *Under Fire* is a case in point. Even though Claire is always with Russell, experiencing and seeing everything with him, she is not granted the same amount of attention as the male character. Any allusion to Claire and her thoughts and feelings about the war she covers are hardly available to us. While the male photojournalist's dilemmas are brought to the fore, Claire's are overlooked even though she has an equal share in siding with the Sandinista revolutionaries against the dictatorial President Anastasio Somoza and his U.S supported Nicaraguan government. Claire has choices to make as well. On the one hand, she can be loyal to her audience by reporting the true story: death of the Sandinista leader. On the other hand, she can keep Raphael's death a secret and in that way help the revolution. This ethical dilemma; getting the biggest scoop of the war but refraining from reporting it, is left undeveloped or rather, left in the shadow of Russell's dilemma.

Concluding Remarks

It is no news that Hollywood film industry aims at making profit and maintaining ideological control by reaching mass audiences. In addition to these goals, which Parenti (1992) refers to as "capital accumulation" and "ideological legitimation", movies also take on different roles and perform different functions. The movies analysed here display a "watchdog" function by keeping an eye on journalistic practices. This is realized by unravelling ethical dilemmas of journalists in covering wars and questioning journalistic myths such as objectivity and impartiality. This is especially true for the movies of the 1980s. Films like *Under Fire*, *The Killing Fields* and *Salvador* question the principle of journalistic detachment in reporting distant conflicts and wars. In these movies, journalists undergo transformation from indifferent, uncaring and reckless hacks to war-critical reporters. These journalist characters also function as a device to articulate filmmakers' critique of foreign interventionism of US in the 1980s.

Even though ideological content of movies about war reporters made after the 1980s weakens, they still provide a critique of

news media either by pointing out their collaboration with the military or their choice of stories. While critiquing the news media, however, Hollywood film industry continues the same gendered bias as the media in general: They disregard women and their work as foreign correspondents.

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Conflicting Memories: Nostalgia in *Nostalghia* (1983)

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Introduction

When Andrei Tarkovsky was introducing his first film, *Ivan's Childhood*, which he made only in five months in 1961 after graduating, no one in Russia knew that they were watching a film from a promising film director in the new generation of Soviet filmmakers. After the screening at the Dom Kino, the Cinematographer Union's Club in Moscow, the audience thought that they saw something extraordinary: Nothing like this had appeared on their screen before (Volkov, 2008, p. 236). At this time Tarkovsky had not yet turned 30.

Ivan's Childhood was a milestone in the prolific film director's career. It used the themes that its director used throughout his film career. *Ivan's Childhood* was made in black-and-white, which subtly blurs the line between reality, dream and memory. He turned his camera on a 15th century Russian painter in his next film, *Andrei Rublev* (1969). Similarly, this film was also saturated with dream and memory, the memory of a nation's past in the case of one of its mystical icon and fresco painters.

He continued his film career swiftly. Then he decided to focus on a completely new story, new form, *Solaris* (1972), and science fiction. Tarkovksy adapted a well-known science fiction writer, Stanislaw Lem's novel and turned it into a completely new, very distinctive film story in which he criticized the rationality of modern science. His filmic style in this period was based on a mixture of black-and-white and colour images and was open to different readings which was strange to the audience of the time. Nevertheless, despite criticisms, he insisted on his style, and resisted it in every way he could.

Under the pressure of his personal memories he made another very controversial film in 1975, *Mirror*. He, as we will discuss below, continued from where he started in his first film *Ivan's Childhood* to focus on the individual sphere, the sphere of dreams and memories, though in a very complicated and personal way this time. He continued this style in *Nostalghia* (1983) following a half mystical parable and a half science fiction example, *Stalker* (1979). Memories and dreams of the past intensified in many ways in a different culture, a different climate. Moreover, if you add censorship and funding problems along with ideological ones and the seventeen years 'unemployment' in the film industry to this at that time in the Soviet Union the situation, as we may expect, became unbearable for him. Ironically, after being officially sent to Italy he made there the film *Nostalghia* and he refused to return to his home country (Volkov, 2008, p.238). Needless to say, as Volkov (2008) has pointed out, from then on his films were banned in the Soviet Union and his name disappeared from books on cinema (p. 239).

By the time he ended up in the West he had made films, as we will see below, under the influence of what Boym (2001) called "reflective nostalgia". However after that 'great refusal' he came to be affected more by what Boym (2001) terms the "restorative nostalgia" with nostalgic feelings for the home country.

In fact his film style tries to combine both of the types of nostalgia. This combination also indirectly shows us the contemporary social crisis. It confronts us with the modern fragmented humanity. But how do his films do this? How does he show this crisis in the particular case of the poet Gorchakov? The answers of these questions can only be given through

discussions of the concept of nostalgia.

The Concept and the Typology of Nostalgia

As the title of the film suggests, *Nostalghia* is a film full of nostalgic feelings, longing, and painful memories of a particular person, a spiritual soul's journey into meaning. However, one of the terms has become problematic at this point: Nostalgia. What is *nostalgia*? What does it mean to use it in a filmic context? Does the film director, Tarkovsky, use within the usual boundaries of the term, or take it, as he always does in his films by the way, in a completely new way and use it as a complementary part of his very distinctive film language? As a matter of fact these difficult questions can only be answered after reaching an understanding the term.

The term nostalgia is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as "a sentimental yearning for a period of the past, a regretful or wistful memory of an earlier time, severe homesickness". The word comes from the Greek words, *nóstos,* meaning *'return home',* and a Homeric word*, álgos,* meaning *"longing* or *"pain"*. Although the word originated in Greek, as a concept it gained its contemporary meaning in 19th century Europe (Boym, 2001, p.16).

However, it has experienced an interesting historical development before gaining its contemporary meaning. Although it sounds that it comes from Greek it was first used by a Swiss doctor Johannes Hofer in his dissertation thesis, "Dissertatio Medica de Nostalgia", in 1688. Interestingly the term was used only in medicine in the 17th century. For this reason it was treated as if it was a 'disease', a medical disease category. Hence some interesting methods were used in the treatment of this 'disease': Leeches, warm hypnotic emulsions, opium and a return to Alps (Boym, 2001, p. 27). [1]

Although these treatments were used to cure individuals who were stricken by this disease, nostalgic feelings could not be eased and this situation, on the other hand, caused an increase in the doubts about it. Supposedly it was believed that there were some symptoms provoking remembrance and they triggered some health complications in the patients (Boym, 2001, p. 4). Naturally the adventure of the term in the 17th and 18th centuries could be studied in the spirit of these centuries. After all, these centuries, the 18th century specifically, are the centuries in which the Enlightenment rose and all the concepts and symptoms were studied within the boundaries of positivist reason. The word, therefore, was examined within the boundaries of physics, physiology and positivistic conceptions. One has to wait until the emergence of the 19th century romanticism and mass culture to see the real interactions between collective and individual memories beyond medical explanations as Boym (2001) argued it (p.3, 16).

These two developments shaped the final meaning of the term nostalgia. Undoubtedly the impossibility of regaining the 'lost' with a withdrawal from the reality and shelter into the past is connected with the collapse of collective experiences and the social decay in modern times. In modern life individuals concentrate on some moments of the past to compensate what is lost in their real world. However the more modern collective experience decays the more difficult it becomes compensate for this decay with memories of the past. Types of the treatments for the collapse of the modern individual inner world are realized in different ways. At this point if we take the analysis of Boym (2001) we come across two types of nostalgia: [2] "Restorative Nostalgia" and "Reflective Nostalgia".

Restorative nostalgia focuses on the first part of the compound, *nostos.* It is connected with regaining the 'lost' in a wider scale. For this reason it aims to reconstruct the lost home, often in association with religious or nationalist revivals (Boym, 2001, p. 41). The lack coherent, integrated experience of the present and bitter images about present-day reality are intended to repair, to restore with an honorific journey into the past of national history. Naturally this kind of nostalgia appears acceptable to individuals in a society. So the conflict level is at the minimum in this type as we may expect. Collective identity seems complimentary to individual identity, thus no friction occurs between them. Hence this kind of nostalgia is rather experienced at moments of social crisis, it is a social emollient, an agency in adjustment to crisis which reinforces national identity when confidence is weakened and threatened, as Robert Hewison (1987, p.18) suggests in a different context.

However, reflective nostalgia dwells on the second part, *algia,* of the compound. "If restorative nostalgia ends up reconstructing emblems and rituals of home and homeland in an attempt to conquer and spatialize time, reflective nostalgia cherishes shattered fragments of memory and temporalizes space" (Boym, 2001, p. 49). Individual remembrance becomes important in reflective nostalgia. Past individual experiences and memories of them take place of the collective experiences. Therefore reflective nostalgia concerned with longing and the imperfect process of recalling as Boym (2001, p.4) points out. The 'imperfect process of recalling' leaves a memory full of intensive internal conflicts and complexities behind. Yet, this has a potentiality to arouse the most parts of the consciousness. For this reason human beings have a dual part in their memory which intersect and clash with each other from time to time.

In fact, either restorative or reflective nostalgia, as I explained in the introduction, deal with transformations in modern societies. Nostalgic feelings intensified and reached a peak in every field, from literature to cinema, music to painting, especially in the 1970s. For this reason the term must be examined within the contemporary crisis. Jameson (1991, 1998), and Harvey (1990) stressed that these kind of feelings, especially the ones that

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1 For an important discussion in addition to Hofer's thesis see the work of Strobinski (1966) which provides a broad historical perspective on the term.

2 Although we will use Boym analysis here, her main thesis on this issue, as Legg (2004) stressed (p. 100), utilized Fred Davis' 1978 seminal work on nostalgia: Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology of Nostalgia.

immerged in the field of art, are concerned with contemporary social experiences. According to them, the past within the late-modern society substantially has a conflict with the present for individuals who no longer perceive actual reality in its absolute coherence. What has caused this was the advanced fragmentation of the time-space compression in the modern, or late modern societies. This determines the interactions between the two types of nostalgia.

However when examining Andrei Tarkovsky what kind of nostalgia usage, specifically in his film *Nostalghia* (1983) can we identify? Furthermore shall we study it with the interactions between collective and individual memory experiences, or in the contemporary social rationality?

Nostalgia in *Nostalghia* (1983)

Nostalghia tells the story of a poet, Gorchakov, "who can only watch other people's lives from a distance, crushed by the recollections of his past, by the faces of those dear to him, which assail his memory together with the sounds and smells of home" (Tarkovsky, 1987, p. 203). Although the film contains both of the types of nostalgia, it uses the reflective type more often. Restorative nostalgia is experienced in Italy. The poet feels an alienation and observes the new Italian life from a distance with his Russian eyes. He is in despair and feels a sense of alienation. In this regard, longing for the Russian land, family and home is deeply felt thousands of thousands miles away. Self-imposed exile becomes an inexorable fate for the poet on the foreign land. His life, certainly, is the sum of the director's life after all. Thereby Gorchakov also signifies Tarkovsky's individual crisis. Both of them have to express under the dense longing feelings in the far distance. This obligation, intrinsically, causes a cultural conflict. The conflict in the film, as Mitchell (1984) points out, arises from the clash between an innocent view of the world and the real conditions of life for a man outside his own country (p. 8). These cultural differences can be seen throughout the film. The cultural differences and the difficulties of harmony unavoidably generate restorative nostalgic feelings. And these feeling which want to restore the 'lost' family home are rather Russian. Tarkovsky (1987), in his seminal work "Sculpting in Time" which includes much of his sincere observations and thoughts, explained that he wanted to express the Russian version of nostalgia in his film *Nostalghia*:

> "I wanted to make a film about Russian nostalgia— about the particular state of mind which assails Russians who are far from their native land. I wanted the film to be about the fatal attachment of Russians to their national roots, their past, their culture, their native places, their families and friends; an attachment which they carry with them all their lives, regardless of where destiny may fling them." (p. 202)

He did not make a nostalgic film exclusively, as he always did in his other films. He added the reflective ones to the restorative ones. While the film tells a story of a poet outside his own country

soon after we see the conflicting memories and splits inside him: The spaces mixed up with his memories and alienation to the new culture ornamented with the impossibility of escape.

What the poet consumes in the new spaces, in the middle of Europe are nostalgic feelings, either restorative or reflective. Tarkovsky uses these feelings as a mixture and clashes them against each other. He expressed that he wanted to represent despair and hopelessness that comes after restorative nostalgic feelings and the individual dilemmas immediately appear after reflective nostalgic ones in *Nostalghia*:

> "I wanted *Nostalgia* to be free of anything irrelevant or incidental that would stand in the way of my principal objective: the portrayal of someone in a state of profound alienation from the world and himself, unable to find a balance between reality and the harmony for which he longs, in a state of *nostalgia* provoked not only by his remoteness from home but also by a global yearning for the wholeness of existence." (Tarkovsky, 1987, p. 204)

Within this perspective Gorchakov constantly turns to his past experiences in the film. But what he finds there is only the crisis either for him or for humanity. He wants to overcome this problem certainly: The conflict between him and his environment is obvious. But soon after he realizes that neither him nor humanity has the "spiritual power" to overcome this. The director indicates as he also showed in his previous two films *Solaris* (1972) and *Stalker* (1979) that the poet's "Spiritual crisis" (Tarkovsky, 1987, p. 205) is not because of his Russian character, but whether to be a modern human being. Italy was intentionally selected for representing this crisis clearly. [3] Location, as King (2008) stressed, represents temporal and physical separation, the impossibility of return (p. 72). Then, as I partly explained above, *Nostalghia* mirrors what Tarkovsky feels in his inner world:

> "How could I have imagined as I was making *Nostalghia* that the stifling sense of longing that fills the screen space of that film was to become my lot for the rest of my life; that from now until the end of my days I would bear the painful malady within myself" (Tarkovsky, 1987, p. 202)

What spatial difference remains behind is a magnificent feelings of loneliness combined with an individual impossibility of escape, conflicting memories and disharmony. Although exile generated some patriotic feelings, these feelings are the signs of the searching of an individual, an exile, a search for home to refuge in beyond spatial boundaries. It is a self-imposed exile on earth. [4] Transcendence for an exile is the only home of the present for this poet. Past and present, collective and individual memory intertwined in the film. Under the influence of Marcel Proust, Tarkovsky (1987) writes: "[memory] makes us vulnerable,

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3 Tarkovsky reported to the Soviet authorities that he wanted to shoot Nostalgia in Italy. And after getting the official permission he officially went to Italy. But as soon as he made the film there, he declared that he would not return to the Soviet Union, it was going to be a self-imposed exile for him (Voklov, 2008, p. 253).

4 Maybe for this reason Volkov's (2008) phrase, "martyrology" (p. 238), could be accurate to define Tarkovsky''s last films.

subject to pain" (p. 58). *Nostalghia,* which is Tarkovsky's first journey into the universal, in fact, is like the second part of his earlier film, the *Mirror* in which he also made under the strong reflective nostalgic feelings in 1975.

In this autobiographical film, Tarkovsky starts a journey into his childhood, people whom he saw important. This journey "is the attempt through memory to regain what is lost" (King, 2008, p. 67). In this film where he forced the frontiers of creativity either narratively or visually, Tarkovsky uses reflective memories in their outmost boundaries. A director who writes "in a certain sense the past is far more real, or at any rate more stable, more resilient than the present" (Tarkovsky, 1987, p. 58) would not stop and wants to activate other parts of the consciousness with a heavy use of reflective feelings. He approaches his own past, his own sins within this point of view:

> "*Mirror* was not an attempt to talk about myself, not at all. It was about my feelings towards people dear to me; about my relationship with them; my perpetual pity for them and my own inadequacy— my feeling of duty left unfulfilled." (Tarkovsky, 1987, p. 134)

Memories in the film appear disconnected to each other as in a dream. Therefore different film critics from different places in the world labeled it as "the most difficult film by Tarkovsky". However, there is continuity between both films. Lost in memories with the free associations in order to explore inner spiritual power gives the chance to reconstruct what is lost. There, in the flow of memories, "'passed' means for a person when for each of us the past is the bearer of all that is constant in the reality of the present " (Tarkovsky, 1987, p. 58). So when an individual finds the core contents of his or her past he or she can make a big step to reach the meaning of life. Here the influence of Marcel Proust can clearly be seen. An individual, as Zelechow (2004) points out in his analysis of Proust, is not only recall in remembrance (p. 86), but combines the present with the past. This combination in modern societies transforms into an ontological step in order to overcome what Benjamin (1968) calls "shock" after the collapse of *Erfahrung* (coherent experience) (p. 194). It was not a coincidence for Tarkovsky to mix up personal memories and dreams with the historical news footage in the film.

He explained personal and collective memory dilemmas using a poetical film language. Meaning, in this kind of film style, is open-ended because they are poetical. Tarkovsky's filmmaking allows to use these kinds of images and that's because his films are like poems (Sandler, 2007, p. 648). Therefore he never focuses on either the form or the content in the first place. He rather concentrates on filmic rhythm. And this rhythm, according to Tarkovsky (1987), arises from the strength of poetic connections:

> "Through poetic connections feeling is heightened and the spectator is made more active. He becomes a participant in the process of discovering life, unsupported by ready-made deductions from the

plot or ineluctable pointers by the author. He has at his disposal only what helps to penetrate to the deeper meaning of the complex phenomena represented in front of him. " (p. 20)

There is a continuity between the final scene in the *Mirror* where the camera vanishes with a zoom-out in the forest and the final sequence of *Nostalghia* where the Russian house and Italian cathedral intertwine and disappear: Complete social experience, *Erfahrung,* will will never be regained after the collapse of modern individual interior. Hence the act of remembrance for modern individuals will be the same as what they experience in their fragmented personal life. What American cultural critic Jameson (1998, p. 5-10; 1991, p.18-23) calls the "crisis of the present" within this context is the outcome of modern experience and it is either cultural (collective) or local (personal). The problem of unique, complete social experience that occurs from mainly time-space compression as critic Jameson (1991, 1998) and Harvey (1990) suggests it after utilizing especially the main theses of Georg Lukacs and Walter Benjamin becomes significant in Tarkovsky's films, specifically in *Mirror* and *Nostalghia.*

As a universal artist who uses a universal language, Tarkovsky and his films reflect this situation. Although his films appear to be part of Soviet intellectual history, they are also the elements of modern history. Isn't Soviet history essentially part of modern history? [5]

Conclusion

A poet who has to survive in exile wants to return to his collective and personal feelings and memories after all. In fact his imperative is the consequence of the dilemmas of his consciousness, the dilemmas of his feeling and thoughts about his home country far from him. This new atmosphere was consciously selected to show the alienation of thr individual in modern societies by the director. Therefore, in this new geography on cultural habitus, we clearly see the level of alienation either in the spatial or the conscious level.

In fact, as I explained above, the story of poet Gorchakov tells the story of modern man. In spite of its open-ended structure, mystical Russian appearance it still tells the story. The consequences of the "incredible projects" that were developed in the 1920s Soviet Union for catching and passing the West was a social reality as in the rival West, which Buck-Morss (2000) and Stites (1989) analyze in detail were that socialism in the East produced a social life which was also highly fragmented and refracted as in the capitalist West. These refractions and fragmentations affected the inner life of the

5 Buck-Morss (2000) and Stites (1989), and with his analyses on the Russian cultural life Volkov (2008) reveal this fact. The continuity from Kuleshov, Meyerhold and Eisenstein to Tarkovsky and the new generation of Soviet filmmakers not only reflect the collective and reflecetive hope and crisis, but also the crisis and hope of modernism which spans a wider geography. There is only 8 years between the Nostalgia and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Volkov (2008) propounds with an accurate investigation that Tarkovsky's works can be read as "concluding chapters rather than the start of something new" (p. 243). These final chapters of the films signify some of the final sequences of social history.

people in the East and West. What we saw at the end in this context in Russia were only the Russian variants of the problems that have been experienced and discussed especially since the 1960s in the West. The soviet ideals and hopes ended with a big frustration: A frustrating final chapter from the intellectuals, such as Mayakosvky, Kuleshov and Meyerhold, who wanted to see machines and their sounds everywhere and who saw them as the power of motion in poetry and art, they consisted of an important portion of the revolutionary ideals by the way, to the new Soviet intellectuals such as Solzhenitsyn, Brodsky, Tarkovsky and Klimov.

This development collapsed the unique individual experience and incorporated it into the collective experience. This transformation can be seen in all of Tarkovsky's films, but especially in his *Nostalghia* and the *Mirror*. Both the 'heroes' of the films and Tarkovsky himself were Russian. They realized that the fundamental problem in the world is to live as an exile. Andrei Gorchakov in the filmic space, and Andrei Tarkovsky in real life.

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Dominant Peace/Conflict Frames of Opinion Articles in the Turkish Cypriot Press

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Introduction

The recent period of inter-communal conflicts in Cyprus began in the 1950s, when the Greek Cypriot community began its struggle with the British colonial administration for independence. In the nineteenth century, the declared aim of the Greek Cypriots had been "ENOSIS," or "union," a Greek term used to refer to the national aspiration and strategy of the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to unite Cyprus with mainland Greece; this strategy is known as the "Megali Idea" or "Great Idea." According to Niyazi Kızılyürek (2005), "[w]hen the Turkish Cypriots understood that the real aim was not to fight against colonialism for independence, but 'ENOSIS', unification of Cyprus with mainland Greece; they were persuaded by the UK to create the thesis of partition" (p. 36). The thesis of partition or "TAKSİM" in Turkish was a response to the perceived threat of annexation of Cyprus as a whole by Greece, and proposed the physical separation of the two communities on the island.

Raising issues such as who started the conflict, or who is right and who is not, is not productive in the context of this study, as from the perspective of peace journalism the question of who threw the first stone leads to conflict rather than solution: If one declares the party who threw the first stone is "guilty" and the counterpart has been "victimized," then any future faults of the victim will be legitimized. Thus in the Cyprus conflict, repeating the historical argument that the first stone was thrown by the Greek Cypriots trying to achieve ENOSIS and that following this the British provoked the Turkish Cypriots to argue for TAKSIM, does not serve any useful purpose; both theses

contributed to the expansion of the conflict between the two communities. According to Papadakis (2005), the termination of their convergence came about with the foundation of the Greek Cypriot EOKA organization in 1955, and two years later, in reaction, the establishment of the Turkish Cypriot resistance movement, TMT:

> "The era of rapprochement ended with the beginning of the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) struggle in 1955 for union with Greece: ENOSIS. Turkish Cypriots opposed this, asking for partition – TAKSİM– of Cyprus, and set up their own fighters' organization called TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization)" (p. 39).

During 1959-1963 there was heated conflict between EOKA and the TMT. According to Sözen (1999), "… [it] culminated in 1974 with the interventions of Greece and later Turkey that led to the island's current de facto division as the Greek Cypriot SOUTH and the Turkish Cypriot NORTH" (p. 1).

Historically, the Cyprus conflict dates back to long before the 1950s. In 1878, Britain leased the island from the weakening Ottoman Empire in order to protect its interests in the eastern Mediterranean. Initially, the Greek Cypriots were happy about the leasing of the island to Britain; many saw this as freedom from Ottoman sovereignty and believed it would facilitate ENOSIS, or the annexation of the island to Greece (the Megali Idea). However, this did not happen when the island came under British control:

"The British rule from 1878 to 1959 has harboured some deep-

rooted causes that eventually led to the Cyprus Conflict. Great Britain wanted to keep Cyprus as its colony at any cost and was merciless enough to enforce its "divide and rule" policy, which created hostilities among the two communities" (Kızılyürek, 2001, p. 32).

The British were not positive about the Greek Cypriot's demand for ENOSIS and accordingly took some measures against such a possibility occurring. Winning the support of Turkish Cypriots was one measure, and the British convinced them that they would lose their rights as Muslim Turks if British colonial rule in the island ceased to exist. Thus Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots began a conflict that would last for many decades. To realize their aspiration for ENOSIS, the Greek Cypriots formed the EOKA organization in 1955 under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, and on 1 April 1955, EOKA staged its first armed attack against British rule. "The British Administration took a set of measures against the acts of EOKA... The British Rule put into place its most powerful weapon: the 'DIVIDE and RULE' policy. It employed Turkish Cypriot police officers to counter EOKA activists and tried to create a divide between the two communities" (Kızılyürek, 2001, p. 51).

The EOKA attacks originally targeted the British administration in Cyprus; later on, following the intervention of Turkish Cypriots in the capacity of Auxiliary Police officers, these turned into violent ethnic clashes. The Turkish Cypriot community staged counter-offensives in revenge for the deaths of Turkish Cypriot police officers killed in the attacks, thus serving the interests of the British Administration. In 1958, when the clashes between the two communities reached a critical point, Turkish Cypriots formed the TMT resistance organization. The "TMT remained an underground organization from 1 August 1958 till 21 December 1963, during which it got organized, trained its members, possessed arms and prepared itself for any potential attack of Greek Cypriots" (Tansu, 2001, p. 15). As the situation developed in the direction desired by the British administration; and as Greek Cypriots started to perceive Turkish Cypriots – in addition to the British – as an obstacle to their aspiration for ENOSIS, Britain planned its next move.

As a result of the British policy of "divide and rule," the idea of TAKSİM (partition) was put forward as a response to ENOSIS. The British worked hard to force the Turkish Cypriots to adopt the idea of a divide, a partitioning, against the island's union with Greece. In this way, the protests and attacks started primarily for the independence of the island and against the colonial administration of the English could be diverted as the Cypriots fought among themselves over the future of the island. The status of the two military bases (Dekhelia and Akrotiri) obtained by Britain through the Treaty of 1960 were questioned by neither Turkish Cypriots nor Greek Cypriots, as the problem of independence became transformed into an ethnic conflict between the two communities that continued to escalate. The insistence of the British on TAKSİM was based on their

envisioned benefits from an unsolvable problem. According to Bailie and Azgın (2008), at the end of the 19th century "…the issue was between Greek Cypriots arguing for union of Cyprus with Greece and Turkish Cypriots claiming that Cyprus legally belonged to the Ottoman state and that, should Britain decide to vacate the island, it should be handed back to its legal owners" (pp. 86-87).

The demand to "return the Island to its legitimate owner" that was promoted by the Turkish Cypriots arose from their seeing the new Republic of Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Cypriots claimed the island had to be given back; however, the Menderes government which was in power in Turkey at that time adopted the position that "Turkey doesn't have a problem called Cyprus". Mehmet Fuad Köprülü was the Foreign Minister in the second and third Menderes governments. He had a strong effect on this stance of the Turkish Government. Mehmet Fuad Köprülü did not take part in the fourth Menderes government, and this policy changed. This stance came to an end in 1959, when Turkey participated in the Zurich and London Conferences organized at the invitation of England, and with the signing of the guarantorship treaties on Cyprus.

The future of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots was decided by the British, Turkish and Greek governments in February 1959, when the Turkish and Greek prime ministers signed the Zurich Agreement: "In 1959, Britain, Greece and Turkey developed the Zurich – London Accords and later in 1960, with Cypriot representatives, concluded the Treaties of Alliance, Establishment and Guarantees, which formed the basis for the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus" (Swan, 1998, p. 32). The two communities in Cyprus were brought in subsequently: "Later between the Turkish, Greek and British governments the London Agreement was prepared in London and the Turkish (Cypriot) and Greek (Cypriot) delegations were invited to London only to sign this agreement as representatives of the Cypriot communities" (Kizilyurek, 2001, p. 60).

The Republic of Cyprus was declared to the world on 16th August 1960. As indicated by İsmail Bozkurt (2001),

> "The Republic of Cyprus was a functional/federative republic with additional confederative qualifications... The ratios for parliament, government, police and gendarmery forces were calculated as 70 percent Greek Cypriots and 30 percent Turkish Cypriots and the ratios for the army were 60 percent Greek Cypriots and 40 percent Turkish Cypriots. A total veto right for foreign affairs, defense and security issues were given to the Vice President who was a Turk" (p. 14).

The independent Republic of Cyprus was short-lived. On 30 November 1963, the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, prepared 13 proposals for amendment of the Cyprus Constitution. These constitutional alterations were not approved by Turkish Cypriots, and the tension between the parties began

to grow.

> By 21 December, 1963, EOKA fighters began a campaign of violence against the Turkish Cypriots, and as Dodd (2001) notes, "From the end of 1963 until 1974 armed conflict continued. After the Greek Junta's coup in Cyprus, Britain refused Bülent Ecevit's request for joint action in Cyprus to restore the state of affairs as prescribed in the Treaty of Guarantees. Britain declined to become involved militarily, because she was not prepared to be involved in hostilities against Greece or Greek Cyprus" (cited in Gökçekuş, 2001, p. 336).

On 20 July, 1974 Turkey launched a military operation in Cyprus. The war of 1974 resulted in many people dying, children being orphaned, people leaving the island, and a large proportion of the population being displaced.

Afterwards, the "Treaty of Population Exchange" was signed in Vienna under the auspices of the United Nations in 1975. The treaty, which anticipated a bilateral exchange of populations, was signed by Glafcos Clerides for the Greek Cypriots and Rauf Raif Denktaş for the Turkish Cypriots. With this treaty, Turkish Cypriots who lived in the south of Cyprus migrated to the northern part of Cyprus and Greek Cypriots to the southern part; the small number who did not want to move continued their lives in their villages. As a result, a de facto situation was created where the south part of the island came to be inhabited by the majority of Greek Cypriots and the north by the majority of Turkish Cypriots. With this population exchange, the partition of the island was realized.

Eight years later, on November 15, 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared their own state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and "[w]hen independence was declared, Britain introduced UN Security Council Resolution 542 which deplored the 'purported secession' of part of the Republic of Cyprus and called upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus" (cited in Gökçekuş, 2001, p. 337).

Although it appears that the Cyprus conflict reached its decisive point with this UN Security Council resolution, there are still many problems to be solved between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and this is why the negotiations for a solution between the parties are still continuing. The divided interests, which were forcibly created between the two communities, have only resulted in deaths, casualties, missing people, orphans, poverty, misery and migration; and there are individuals who have profited unfairly from the division, especially in the northern part of Cyprus, as a result of unfair distribution of property.

The Press in Cyprus

The general and common peculiarity of the press in Cyprus is that it is a "press for struggle". The first newspapers of Cyprus press began their publication life on a nationalistic axis, and even today there does not seem to have been much progress beyond this line. Besides the occasionally different standpoints of some newspapers, the general trend in the print media is to publish around topics based on struggle and dispute. The press community in Cyprus is also struggling with its own identity; there are many different voices in the Cyprus press, and they are constantly in conflict with each other to try to gain legitimacy for their opinions. This should be seen not only from the perspective of ethnic conflict, but also as part of a democratic process for solving problems within the communities.

Ünlü (1981), explaining why the press of Cyprus is "a press for struggle" (p. 14), suggests that its main characteristic is that differences of opinion between the two communities are expressed through the print media in a "tough and hurtful" manner, so that they expand into an ethnic problem. This tradition and habit of the Cypriot press continues to this day; and as Bailie and Azgin (2008) emphasize:

> "Journalistic tendencies toward conflict reporting in Cyprus are deeply rooted in history. Conflict-centered journalism transcends the bi-communal disturbances of the 1950s and 1960s. During that time period, inter-communal fighting only exacerbated an already long standing journalistic tradition and helped to align both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers and journalists with "national struggles" (p. 58).

Andreas Cl. Sophocleous (2006) notes that the first Greek Cypriot newspapers were published as platforms for voicing demands and outlining a vision: "It was not fortuitous that from the start of their publication the first Cypriot Greek-language newspapers persistently and vigorously promoted the demand of the Greeks of Cyprus that the island should be ceded to Greece, thus achieving the vision of their national restoration with their incorporation into the metropolitan national body" (p. 113). This assessment once again demonstrates how the print media of Cyprus are embedded in the logic of ethnic conflict on the island.

The Structure of the Cyprus Press

The structure of the press in Cyprus is based on patronage and political party journalism. There are daily newspapers reflecting the political viewpoints of almost all the political parties; and on an island where the "Cyprus Problem" is at the top of the agenda, the statements of those in power and authority take priority.

The fact that political parties are so involved in the publication of newspapers needs to be questioned, as they use the media to propagate their political views and manipulate them as tools of propaganda. If one takes into account the organizational structure of today's press in Cyprus, it is clear that newspaper publication is problematic from the start: since the nature of the press stems from its historical mission as a "press for struggle"

in the context of the Cyprus conflict, its organizational structure has been affected accordingly. Özen Çatal's (2006) study on the Turkish Cypriot press argues that the problem is "more than the direct interventions of the proprietors of establishments [;] it is the employees' and their managers' protection of the proprietors' interests within the framework of self-control" (p. 9). In other words, the press applies "self-censorship" in order to protect the interests of its employers, and it is on this basis that the news is created and established.

The Cyprus press can also be affected by patronage for economic reasons: news items are typically assessed from the point of view of the proprietor's economic interests before they are published. As Eda Hançer (2006) pointed out in her study of the structure of proprietorship in the Turkish Cypriot press and its effects on the news, "… [in North Cyprus] the proprietor of the newspaper, in order to protect his/her economic interests, tries to establish control over the content of the news and applies pressure on journalists not to publish those that are contrary to his/her interests" (p. 7).

Patronage and political party journalism in these senses play a critical role in shaping the structures of today's Turkish Cypriot newspapers, which are the focus of this study. And for the Turkish Cypriot newspapers, the following general remarks can be made: *Kıbrıs* has the highest circulation in the North. It is highly influential and can be described as a right-wing newspaper. *Afrika* is an opposition paper which takes an active stance on the Cyprus conflict. *Yeni Düzen* is owned by the Republican Turkish Party, and it supports and promotes peace initiatives. The ultra-nationalist paper *Kıbrıs Volkan* supports division of the island and promotes a two-state solution. *Halkın Sesi* is the oldest Turkish-language newspaper on the island; it is privately owned and can be described as right-of-center. *Havadis,* is left-wing newspaper and supports peace initiatives. *Haberdar* can be described as a right-wing newspaper. *Star Kıbrıs* can be described as right-of-center.

Why "Cyprus Problem" Needs Peace Journalism?

The news values employed in the North Cyprus press are not the ones that can contribute to conflict resolution. As this study clearly indicates, columns relating to the Cyprus Problem, accidents, robbery, criminal offences, incriminating statements and libel are the ones that are mostly covered by the Turkish Cypriot press, when it comes to news reporting about the Other.

North Cypriot journalists, due to their accumulated experience in traditional journalism, try to look for some negative, intriguing and abnormal elements in the stories they cover. They also keep this attitude while writing reports, selecting stories and publishing about the Other. As the issue of newsworthiness becomes so problematic, journalists prefer to make their stories interesting and appealing to the reader, by covering negative stories about the Other. Such an approach leads journalists to do

conflict-based news reporting and prevents them from making any positive contribution to resolution.

These journalists put their stories into a certain ideological framework and by doing so they encourage the reader to confine their deliberations to the boundaries of that ideological framework. Hence, the importance of ideology and language used by journalists, as they cover stories about the "Other", becomes once again obvious.

The news agencies of both communities, which cover stories about one another every single day, can bring a positive contribution to conflict resolution if they decide to use the convincing power of media in a positive manner. At least, they can stop fanning the flames of a potential hatred and clash between the two communities. Given all these reasons and bearing in mind the existing problems in the Cypriot press, "peace journalism" [1] is an appropriate concept for the press in Cyprus.

Methodology

In this study, framing analysis was employed. Framing analysis was used, so that the way that the columnists represent the "other" side would be revealed by examples. Frame analysis is defined by Robert Entman (1993) as "selecting some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or recommendation" (p. 52). This theory suggests that the media use particular frames when covering issues. This study looks at whether the media in Cyprus use conflict frame or peace frame while producing news stories and opinion articles about the "other".

Sample of the Study

The "First and Second Green Tree" negotiations under the United Nations control in New York have been selected for analyzing. The Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot community leaders have met twice in New York for negotiation

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1 I asked Johan Galtung the rationale for using the term "peace journalism" by email in 2008. Johan Galtung answered this question by giving two major reasons: "[1] This was during the cold war, and I wanted to make my little contribution to the legitimacy of the word "peace". East used it a lot, so West, particularly USA-UK thought they had to be against it. Their approach was to see peace as suspect, even subversive, and they always added something, like peace with freedom, peace with justice; leaving peace undefined. Or by leaving the difficult word out, talking of conflict studies, international studies, etc. and they still do that - not saying that those studies are not good in themselves. But I wanted to give "peace" more meaning, more content, by linking it to other, less problematic, concepts. Hence "peace research"--and there were strong reactions against. The link "peace and conflict research" was actually invented by me January 1959 as the two are intrinsically connected, at least for negative peace: handle conflict without violence (but also for positive peace: handle cooperation at ever higher levels). I stuck to the word "peace" and added adjectives like negative, positive, and then used it as an adjective in peace research, peace journalism and now peace business. There is more to come, always keeping the word peace in it.

[2] Less semantic, philosophical, more pragmatic political: there is an implicit program in peace research, peace journalism, peace business. I found peace unexplored by academics as opposed to war studies focused on victory, journalism focused on violence and business on profit. Not good enough. During my years at Columbia University, New York, 1957-60 the US pragmatism in always asking "what can we do about it" impressed me. A strong feeling that there were jobs to be done, we put a marker on it and learn as we go."

in 30-31 of October, 2011 and 24-25 of January 2012. Turkish Cypriot newspapers columnists are the subjects of this study, as newspapers have an impact on building peace among the communities and decreasing the conflicts among them. In order to examine the Turkish Cypriot columnist's article coverage the framing analysis was used.

Eight Turkish Cypriot newspapers' opinion articles are the subjects or main independent variables of this study. The newspapers are *Afrika*, *Haberdar*, *Halkın Sesi*, *Havadis*, *Kıbrıs*, *Star Kıbrıs*, *Kıbrıs Volkan* and *Yenidüzen*. The samples for opinion articles were publications in October - November 2011 and January - February 2012.

This will help us to understand the role of opinion leaders in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers in creating a negative/positive effect on the First and Second Greentree Meeting of the society.

Instruments and Data Gathering Procedures

166 (101 from First meeting, and 65 from second one) columnists' articles among the Turkish Cypriot newspapers were selected for analysis. Almost 350-400 columnists are writing columns in the Turkish Cypriot daily newspapers. There are 13 daily Turkish language newspapers in the Turkish Cypriot press.

In order to examine the Turkish Cypriot columnist's article coverage of the First and Second Greentree Meeting and how they are covering the "other side" a 'Columnist Content Analysis Coding Schema' has been developed.

In this schema there are questions related to the article coverage: Quoted sources such as official or unofficial sources, ethnic, antagonistic and politic descriptions, and dominant frames in the article [Peace or conflict oriented frames].

Findings

The 'Columnist Content Analysis Coding Schema' results show the majority of the Turkish Cypriot columnists tend to use official government sources in their articles. The results indicate that Turkish Cypriot columnists do not use the "Other" side's official sources in their articles.

Table 1: Official (elite) and unofficial source usages of the Turkish Cypriot columnists for the First Greentree Meeting.

Table 2: Official (elite) and unofficial source usages of the Turkish Cypriot columnists for the Second Greentree Meeting.

Table 1 and 2 results show that the Turkish Cypriot columnists rarely use unofficial sources in their articles. Columnists do not give voice to the voiceless. From the perspective of peace journalism, it is even problematic to give too much voice to elites; Turkish Cypriot columnists do not give enough voice to the unofficial sources and the "other" side, ignoring a basic principle of peace journalism, giving voice to the voiceless.

Dominant Frames in the Articles

Turkish Cypriot columnists tend to use the *"Conflict Frame"* when they are writing about the "Other" side while they are covering the First and Second Greentree Meetings. As the results indicate, the percentage of *"Peace Frame"* usage is very low in the Turkish Cypriot press.

Table 3: Number of peace and conflict frames in the Turkish Cypriot columnists articles for the First Greentree Meeting.


Table 4: Number of peace and conflict frames in the Turkish Cypriot columnists' articles for the Second Greentree Meeting.

Table 3 and 4 indicate that the majority of Turkish Cypriot

columnists use conflict frames in their articles while they are writing on First and Second Greentree Meetings. *Kıbrıs* newspaper has the highest circulation in the North; It is highly influential and can be described as a right-wing newspaper. According to table 3 and 4 *Kıbrıs* newspaper holds the first position regarding usage of conflict frames among the columnists' articles (105 and 93).

Results show that *Kıbrıs Volkan*[2] writers use 92 conflict frames in its columnists' articles. The basic reason for this is that Kıbrıs Volkan newspaper is an ultranationalist newspaper in the Turkish Cypriot press. They support a "two separate states" solution on the Cyprus Problem and this is reflected in their columnists' articles.

Havadis is left-wing newspaper and supports peace initiatives. *Havadis* editorial policy supports peace initiatives on the island; however, results indicate that the columnists of this newspaper do not support peace initiatives. The columnists of Havadis, used 25 conflict frame in their articles for First Greentree Meeting and 82 for second one.

Star Kıbrıs holds the forth position regarding usage of conflict frame (23) for the First Greentree Meeting. The newspapers have used 53 conflict frames while they are covering the Second Greentree Meeting. *Star Kıbrıs* can be described as right-of-center and results show that columnists of this newspaper are on the center while they are covering the First Greentree Meeting. However, they have changed their position for the next meeting and used more conflict frames instead of peace frames.

Halkın Sesi newspaper follows *Star Kıbrıs* the usage of conflict frames in articles (10) for the First Greentree Meeting. *Halkın Sesi* is the oldest Turkish language newspaper on the island; it is privately owned and can be described as a rightwing newspaper.

The First Greentree Meeting results indicate *Haberdar* newspaper columnists are used 7 conflict frame. *Haberdar* can be described as a right-wing newspaper. *Yenidüzen* (2) and *Afrika* (1) newspapers are in the minority related with the conflict frame usage. Since they have a leftist- oriented stance, both newspapers' opinion columnists have used fewer conflict frames than other Turkish Cypriot newspapers. It can be said same evaluations for the results of Second Greentree Meeting. Table 3 and 4 show how rightwing newspapers use more conflict rather than peace frames.

Number of Conflict Frames in Detail

Table 5: Dominant conflict frames in the Turkish Cypriot columnists articles for the First Greentree Meeting.

Table 6: Dominant conflict frames in the Turkish Cypriot columnists articles for the Second Greentree Meeting.

Table 5 and 6 results indicate that the Turkish Cypriot columnists commenting on both First and Second Greentree Meetings tended to use the *Antipathy Frames* (116 and 105) as a conflict frame in their articles. The antipathy frames concentrate on the other as the threat, displaying distrust, prejudice, inferiority, and self and other sentiments.

The second popular conflict frame among the Turkish Cypriot columnists is the *Unbalance Frame* (85 and 98), which is sport oriented, accusing the other side's government, and blame oriented.

The percentage of the *Win-Lose Frame* is also significant (32 and 14); this is revenge oriented and who threw the first stone oriented in the articles. Emphasizing one side's pains and good and evil orientations are the Win-Lose Frame in the articles.

The *Status Quo Frames* (30 and 18) are other essential conflict frames for the Turkish Cypriot columnists. Once can identify the *Status Quo Frames* when the columnist emphasizes exclusive orientation, they are our enemy orientation, just war orientation, and hate speech orientation.

The percentage of the *Nationalist Frames* is not significant (2 and 3); this is revenge oriented and who threw the first stone oriented in the articles.

2 Kıbrıs Volkan and Halkın Sesi newspapers have closed their official web sites. This is why their Second Greentree Meeting articles have not been evaluated.

Number of Peace Frames in Detail

The writers of pacifist newspapers tend to use peace frames in their articles; nationalist newspapers use the peace frames less or not at all.


Table 7: Dominant peace frames in the Turkish Cypriot columnists' articles for the First Greeentree Meeting.


Table 8: Dominant peace frames in the Turkish Cypriot columnists' articles for the Second Greeentree Meeting.

Table 7 and 8 results indicate that the Turkish Cypriot columnists do not tend to use peace frames in their articles. Columnists prefer to use conflict frames instead of peace ones. The Turkish Cypriot columnists mostly use *Balance-Descriptive Frames* (23) in their First Greentree Meeting articles. Balance-Descriptive Frames could be describe as fair play orientation, criticize own government orientation, and applaud orientation. If one looks at the table 8 results, *Solution Frames* (31) are higher than the *Balance-Descriptive Frames* (23). One can identify the solution frame such as, inclusive orientation; we are friends orientation, common ground orientation, and friendly speech orientation.

Win-Win Frames (2 and 3) are the third accepted frames by the Turkish Cypriot columnists. The Win-Win Frames which has significant meaning for peace journalist are not accepted by the Turkish Cypriot columnists. According to peace journalism, the journalist should emphasize both sides' pains, he or she should frame the issue in good/good or bad/bad orientation rather than "Good and Evil Oriented". When the journalist looks from the good and evil oriented perspective, it legitimizes any violence done to the "evil" side. However, the journalist should show both good and bad aspects of all sides.

The number of the *Empathy Frames* (1 and 2) and the *Anti-nationalist Frames* (1 and 2) are very low. Understanding the other orientation, trust orientation, unprejudiced orientation, accept other as it is orientation, other in the self orientation are the Empathy Frames in the articles. The Anti-nationalist Frames are forgiveness oriented and history – culture oriented in the articles.

Discussion and Conclusion

Columnists are the opinion leaders of societies, and should give opinions/ideas and enlighten their readers through their articles. One should be critical and not accept every piece of information as it is. From a peace journalism perspective, opinion leaders or columnists are valuable because they can provide multiple perspectives for their readers through comments in their columns. Because of these features, they can create an effect on the audience and help them to think in different ways. As a columnist, even if one does not like the publishing policy of the newspaper one still has a chance to work with them. In other words, the columnist can have a different ideology from that of his/her newspaper; this is why this study included columnists' articles in the research.

According to the results, most Turkish Cypriot columnists did not pass the peace journalism test: there are many unacceptable mistakes in their articles. The long list below shows how the majority of Turkish Cypriot columnists are not aware of peace journalism as a concept:

- Turkish Cypriot columnists tended to use official government sources in their articles.

- Turkish Cypriot columnists tended not to give voice to the unofficial sources and "Other" side.

- Turkish Cypriot columnists tended to use the "conflict frame" when they wrote about the First and Second Greentree Meetings.

- The writers of pacifist newspapers *Yenidüzen* and *Afrika* tended to use peace frames in their articles; right-wing and nationalist newspapers *Kıbrıs*, *Kıbrıs Volkan* used the peace frames less.

- Turkish Cypriot columnists did not have any hope from the First and Second Greentree Meetings.

This study has provided definitive evidence that columnists' articles in Cyprus are far from contributing to peace building. In light of the renewed negotiations in Cyprus for reunification, the Cypriot press should engage in responsible reporting. It is of utmost importance that peace journalism is introduced and supported in Cyprus now.

WRITING STYLE OF ARTICLE: Most columnists in the Turkish Cypriot press use information given by the official sources of the community they live in for their articles. The first problem from the point of view of peace journalism is that instead of implementing the rule "focus on people peace-makers", advocated by peace journalism, the focus is only on "elite peace-makers". In this way, the solution is an object coming from only one segment of the population. The second problem is the denial of the right to speak to the opposite side.

It is evident that the proposal by Galtung (1998) "Giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding" is not being implemented by most authors. When the opposite side does not have the right to speak, its views are not understood. In addition, the feelings of the empathized opposite side are not given any importance by most columnists.

DOMINANT FRAME OF THE ARTICLE: In articles on issues concerning the First and Second Greentree Meetings, Turkish Cypriot columnists generally made use of the "conflict frame." Authors' use of the conflict frame more than the peace frame means not seeing the problem as one which is soluble. It means finding who threw the first stone, thus finding the culprit, and looking for victims and murderers in the conflict. By dehumanizing "them", they are made to be seen as not human. This is to focus only on the apparent effects of the conflict. The conflict frames used by many Turkish Cypriot columnists in their articles can be summarized in this way. The number of the above conflict frames can be increased; such frames are far from discussing problems; the aftermath of conflict it holds within it the "winner" and the "loser." Instead of understanding the opposite side through the use of empathy, a form of phraseology is used to apportion blame and responsibility to the opposite side in order to show oneself to be righteous and good. Focusing on the sufferings of the community one lives in and belittling the sufferings of the opposite side will divide the sides into us and them, making it problematic from the point of view of peace journalism. However, frames similar to the conflict frames have been observed in many articles. It is unfortunate that the use of "peace frames" by Turkish Cypriot columnists has been very limited in numbers. And this summarizes the existing problems in the press.

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Sosyal Paylaşım Ağlarının Dünya Barışına Katkı Amacıyla Yürüttükleri Faaliyetler: "Facebook'ta Barış" Örneği

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Giriş

Toplumu değiştiren önemli buluşlara dair yaşam evreleri; yazının bulunmasına kadar geçen oral çağ, matbaanın bulunmasıyla başlayan görsel çağ, elektronik basının devreye girmesiyle oral, işitsel ve görsel çağ (Onat Alikılıç 2008, s. 1115) olarak sınıflandırılmış, 2000'li yıllarda ise dijital ortamı ile internet ve Web.2.0'ın gelişiyle dijital çağ başlamış sosyal medya, interaktif iletişimin odak noktasında yerini almıştır. Marshall Mc Luhan'ın 1960'larda, ileri sürdüğü, elektronik medyanın ileri teknolojiye geçmesiyle ülkeler ve toplumlararası sınırların kalkacağı ve dünyanın bir global köye dönüşeceği tezi gerçekleşmiştir. İnternetin yaygınlaşması çağdaş, kültürel, toplumsal, ekonomik ve politik karşılıklı etkileşimlere neden olmuş, ülkeler arası sınırlarla birlikte kültürler arası sınırlar da kalkmıştır.

Birçok bilgisayar sisteminin birbirine bağlı olduğu, dünya çapında yaygın olan ve sürekli büyüyen bir iletişim ağı olan internet, insanların her geçen gün artan, "üretilen bilgiyi saklama, paylaşma ve ona kolayca ulaşma" istekleri sonrasında ortaya çıkmış bir teknolojidir. İnternet aracılığı ile pek çok alandaki bilgilere kolay, ucuz ve güvenli bir şekilde erişilebilmektedir (Tutar, 2009, s. 260). Temel olarak merkezi olmayan, yani ne bir ulusun ne de bir grubun kontrolünda olan internet, her ne kadar multimedya ortamda sohbet, video konferans gibi yenilikleri getirmişse de çoğunluk mesajlarını, bilgisayarı daktilo gibi kullanarak iletmektedir. Dolayısıyla kişilerin internette iletişim kurarken yüz ifadeleri ve vücut dili kullanmaları mümkün olmamakta (Kaypakoğlu, 2004, s. 81) fakat buna karşın kullanıcıdan anlık tepkiler alabilme olanağı ile, toplumlar arası yakınlaşma ve ortak

ilgi alanları sağlayan, internete özgü bir iletişim süreci olan "many to many" ile PC başında olan herkes katılımcı ve yayımcı olmaktadır. Bireylerin kendilerini rahatça ifade edebilecekleri önemli bir kitle iletişim aracı haline gelen internetin bugün dünyada bir milyara yakın kullanıcısı bulunmakta ve her geçen gün bu sayı hızla artmaktadır. Kullanıcıların %25'ine yakınının ise internet bağımlısı haline gelerek sosyal yaşamdan soyutlanmaları, internet kullanımının en önemli sakıncalarını oluşturmaktadır.

İnternetin diğer kitle iletişim araçlarından bir diğer farkı da, bu yolla aktarılan düşüncelerin çok geniş bir kitleye çok büyük bir süratle yayılması ve bu özelliğinin bireylere kamusal tartışmalara katılmaları ve siyasi muhaliflerin görüşlerini tüm dünyaya ulaştırabilmeleri imkanını sağlamasıdır. Örneğin Meksika'da Zapatist isyancılar seslerini tüm dünyaya bir dizüstü bilgisayar aracılığı ile duyurmuşlardır. Ülkelerin ırkçı söylemlerin basın-yayın yoluyla yayılması halinde etkin bir koruma sağladığı halde, internette yayılmaları halinde yetersiz kalmaları, ırkçı internet sitelerinin hızla artmasına neden olmuş, Alman aşırı sağı için internet, en etkin propaganda aracı haline gelmiştir (Çankaya ve Yamaner, 2006, s. 246). Zaman, mekan ve bütçe problemi olmaksızın milyonlarca kişinin eşzamanlı olarak iletişime geçebildiği internet, toplumsal örgütlenmenin en önemli mecrası olmuş, son dönemlerde İngiltere Tottenham'daki, Mısır ve Tunus'taki olayları planlamak için sosyal ağ olarak Twitter ve Facebook kullanılarak dünyada" Twitter devrimleri" ve "Facebook devrimleri" yaşanmaya ve gün geçtikçe sosyal medya yüzlerce insanın bir mesajla anında toplanacağı, örgütleneceği bir güç haline gelmeye başlamıştır. [1]

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1 Kuzey Afrika'da, özellikle de Tunus ve Mısır'da ortaya çıkan muhalif toplumsal hareketlerde sosyal medya platformlarının önemli bir payı vardır. Tunus ve Mısır'da

Araştırmanın İçeriği ve Yöntemi

En büyük sosyal paylaşım ağı olan Facebook'da barış hareketlerine yönelik olarak düzenlenmiş olan "Facebook'da Barış" sayfası ve bağlantıları ile katılımcı sayıları yüksek ve barış teması içeren sayfaların metin analizleri araştırmanın kapsamını oluşturmaktadır.

"Facebookta Barış" sayfası ve bağlantıları "Friends Without Borders"; "One Million Voices Against FARC"; "Invisible Children"; ile diğer barış temalı STOP THE WAR "Kürt ve Türk Gençleri Artık Ölmesin!"; "Savaşa BÜYÜK bir HAYIR"; "Peace, Peace On Earth" başlığı ile açılmış olan Facebook hesaplarının ana sayfaları metin analizi yöntemiyle incelenmiştir.

Araştırma, "Facebookta Barış" sayfası ve bağlantıları "Friends Without Borders"; "One Million Voices Against FARC"; "Invisible Children"; ile diğer barış temalı STOP THE WAR "Kürt ve Türk Gençleri Artık Ölmesin!"; "Savaşa BÜYÜK bir HAYIR"; "Peace, Peace On Earth" başlığı ile başlıkları altında açılan Facebook hesaplarının ana sayfalarının incelenmesi ile sınırlıdır.

Online İletişim ve Sosyal Medya

İnternetin kullanıcı içerikli boyuta transferiyle ortaya çıkan Web.2.0 teknolojisi ile yapılanmış büyük bir güç olan sosyal medya, 2005 yılında web yayıncılığının ve genel anlamda halkın kullanabileceği, erişimi kolay ve ücretsiz sosyal mecra içeriklerinin üretiminin artışıyla ortaya çıkmıştır. Sosyal medya ve onun bir parçası olan bloglar, anında bilgi akışının sağlanması, dedikodu ve söylentilerin tespit edilmesi, aynı anda gereken benzer tepkilerin verilmesi, farklı görüşlerin ve bilgilerin anında yakalanması gibi olanaklar sunmaları nedeniyle büyük bir güç haline gelmiştir. Bu çağın odak noktasında yer alan sosyal medya ise "one to many"'den "many to many" iletişime geçişin temsilcisi olarak yerini almıştır.

1960'ların sonunda Internet'in buluşu yeni online teknolojilerin ve dolayısıyla yeni dijital platformların oluşmasına neden olmuştur. Web.2.0 dönüşümüyle kullanıcı sayısı artmış ve kullanıcıların mesajları oluşturduğu ve paylaştığı büyük bir güç oluşmuştur. Bunun önemini çabuk kavrayan firmalar önce arama motorlarını; Google'ı, Yahoo'yu daha sonra MSN'i, Hotmail'ı, Blogları, Youtube'u ve son olarak da facebook twitter gibi sosyal

ağ sitelerini keşfetmişlerdir (Onat ve Alikılıç 2008, s. 1115). Hedef kitle artık, aldıkları mesajları seçerek, hatta içeriklerini üreterek istedikleri kişilere ileten, farklı ilgi alanları olan ve farklı kültürlere sahip olan heterojen gruplar olmuştur. İnternet, basın bültenleri açısından da devrim yaratacak yeniliklere yol açmış, kuruluşlar geleneksel medyadaki eşik bekçileri olmaksızın, düzenli olarak online basın bültenleri yayınlayarak hedef kitleleri ile sürekli iletişim kurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Sosyal medya ve onun bir parçası olan bloglar dedikodu ve söylentilerin tespit edilmesi, aynı anda gereken tepkilerin verilmesi, farklı görüşlerin ve bilgilerin anında paylaşılması gibi olanaklar sunması nedeniyle halkla ilişkiler alanında yeni bir mecra olmuştur.

Yeni medya, anaakım medya ve politikadan dışlanmış grup ve bireylere, politik tartışmaların kapsamında yer almayan fikirleri yayarak, kamunun erişimine açık bilgi ve fikirleri zenginleştirerek daha fazla bilgiyle donanmış bir seçmen kitlesinin oluşumuna yardım etmesi, bireylere kamusal alana katılım olanağı sağlaması (Kellner, 2004, s. 711) nedeniyle toplumsal ve siyasal örgütlenmenin en önemli mecralarından biri olmuştur. ABD'deki seçimlere bakıldığında ilk adı Eisenhover radyoyu kullanarak, John Kennedy televizyonu kullanarak, Barack Obama ise dijital teknolojilerin araçları olan sosyal ağları kullanarak kamuoyunu etkilemeyi başarmış ve başkanlık seçimlerini kazanmışlardır. Dijital çağı yaşadığımız son dönemde ise, sosyal medyayı ilk kullanan ABD başkanı olan Barack Obama, seçmenlerini harekete geçirmede sosyal medya platformlarında paylaşım ve iletişim kurmanın gücünü farkederek, başkanlık seçimlerinde sosyal medyayı devreye sokmuş ve milyonlarca katılımcıya ulaşarak başarısını sosyal medya sayesinde elde etmiştir. Türkiye'de ise son seçimlerde Ak Parti'nin başarısında rol oynayan faktörlerden biri ise medya görünürlüğüne önem verilerek, internetin ve özellikle sosyal medyanın kullanımı ile mecralar arası entegre iletişim ortamı yaratılmasıdır.

Sosyal Paylaşım Ağları ve Facebook Kullanıcıları

Enformasyon toplumunun yeni alternatif kamusal alanı olan internette, haber gruplarıyla başlayan sanal topluluk ilişkileri, giderek büyüyerek sosyal ağları oluşturmuşlardır (Sayımer, 2008, s. 260). Sosyal ağlar, bireylerin internet üzerinde toplum yaşamı içinde kendilerini tanımlayarak, aynı kültürel düzeyde rahatlıkla anlaşabilecekleri insanlarla internet iletişim metotları ile iletişime geçmelerini sağlayan ve aynı zamanda normal sosyal yaşamda yapılan çeşitli mimik ve jestleri simgeleyen sembolik hareketleri göstererek, insanların yarattığı sanal ortamdaki sosyal iletişimi kurmaya yarayan ağlardır (Sosyoloji). Bugün ise Ağustos 2011 verilerine göre dünya genelinde 200'ün üzerinde sosyal ağ sitesi bulunmaktadır (200 adetsosyalağ-sitesi). 2002-2004 yılları arasında kullanıma açılan üç sosyal ağ sitesi olan Friendster MySpace ve Bebo dünya genelinde yaygınlaşan popüler siteler olarak tarihe geçmişlerdir. 2005 yılında istatistiklere göre MySpace, Google'dan çok daha fazla ziyaret edilen bir site olmuştur. 2004'de Myspace'in en büyük rakibi olarak (Sosyal

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hükümetler basını kontrol etseler bile sosyal medyayı kontrol edebilmeleri mümkün olmamıştır. Mısırlılar komşu ülkelerdeki, özellikle de Tunus'taki gelişmelerden sosyal medya kullanımı sayesinde haberdar olmuşlardır. " 'Saat 4'te Gösteri, Şehir Merkezinde Buluşalım' gibi bildiriler Facebook sayfaları üzerindeki sosyal aktivizmin ortak özelliklerinden olmuştur. Böylece Yeni Medya halka başka iletişim yolları ile ulaşamayan on binlerce protestocu arasındaki bilgi dolaşımı ile etkinliğini ve hızını kanıtlamış oldu'(Tunus: Sosyal Medya Bir Alternatif Devrim Aracı mı?). Tüm bu devrimci hareketlerin başlangıcı olarak kabul edilen Tunus'ta Mohamed Bouazizi'nin kendini yakarak öldürmesi üzerine de http://www.facebook.com/pages/Mohamed-Bouazizi adresiyle bir Facebook grubu açıldı ve bu adresle beraber sosyal medya dalgası yayılmaya başladı (Türkden).Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika'nın ardından İngiltere'nin başkenti Londra'nın Tottenham semtinde başlayan daha sonra da diğer kentlere yayılan ayaklanma ve yağmalama olayları yine halkın sosyal medya aracılığıyla örgütlenmesi sonucu olmuştur (Sosyal medyanın Halk Ayaklanmaları Üzerindeki Olumlu Etkisi).

Ağ siteleri). Facebook Harward Üniversitesi öğrencilerinin kullanımıyla ortaya çıkmış ve çok hızlı büyümeye başlamıştır (Durmuş vd, 2010, s. 25). 2006 yılında ABD'deki üniversitelerin dışındaki kitlelerin kullanımına açılan Facebook, herkesin eklenti uygulama geliştirerek katkı verdiği bir altyapı sunarak, bunun da ötesinde, sadece kişilerin değil sosyal ağların da birbiriyle bağlantı kurup yeni sosyal ağlar oluşturduğu, en yaygın ve en hızlı büyüyen sosyal ağ sitesi haline gelmiştir.

Facebook Türkiye'de 2007 yılında yaygınlaşmaya başlamıştır. Türkiye, her geçen gün artan kullanıcı sayısı ile dünya sıralamasında dördüncü ülke konumundadır. Kullanıcıların %64'ünü erkek, %36'sını kadınlar oluşturmaktadır. Kullanıcılar arasında en büyük grubu ise, %33 pay ile 18-24 yaş grubundaki gençler oluşturmaktadır. Türkiye'deki kullanıcılar günde ortalama 60 dakikalarını Facebook'ta geçirmektedir. (*Facebook Türkiye İkonografisi* Temmuz 2011).

Bugün dünyada bir milyara yakın aktif kullanıcısı olan Facebook'un, dünya nüfusunun %90'ını oluşturan altı milyar kişiye henüz ulaşamadığına dair bazı varsayımlar bulunmaktadır. Dünya Sağlık Örgütü tarafından açıklanan rakamlar, dünya üzerinde üç milyar kişinin fakirlik sınırı altında yaşadığını göstermektedir. Temel ihtiyaçların yanı sıra internet erişimine de sahip olmayan ya da sınırlı şekilde sahip olan bu nüfus, Facebook'u aktif olarak kullanmayan altı milyar insan içerisinde büyük bir orana sahiptir. Bazı ülkelerde Facebook'a erişim siyasi iktidar tarafından yasaklanmış olup, 1,3 milyar nüfuslu Çin, bu ülkeler arasında nicelik olarak başı çekmektedir. 78 milyonluk İran, 23 milyonluk Kuzey Kore, 11 milyonluk Küba ve 54 milyon nüfusa sahip olan Myanmar Facebook'un yasak olduğu diğer kalabalık ülkeler arasında yer almaktadır. 147 milyon nüfuslu Rusya ve 127 milyonluk Japonya için ise durum biraz farklılık göstermektedir (Kim bu Facebook üyesi olmayan 6 milyar kişi?). Sahip oldukları yerel sosyal ağlardan ötürü Facebook bir türlü bu iki ülkede istediği talep ile karşılaşamamaktadır. 310 milyon nüfusa sahip olan ABD'de, nüfusun üçte birinin Facebook üyeliği bulunmamaktadır. 113 milyon kişinin Facebook kullanmadığı ülkede fakirlik sınırının altında yaşayan 47 milyon kişi bulunmaktadır. Bu da nüfusun büyük bir oranının sosyal ağın aktif kullanıcıları arasında yer almadığını göstermektedir. 2010 yılında 300 milyon, 2011 yılında 200 milyon yeni üyeye sahip olan Facebook'un 2012 yılının sonunda 1 milyar kullanıcıya ulaşması beklenmektedir (Kim Bu Facebook üyesi olmayan 6 milyar kişi?) Facebook'da en çok üyeye sahip şehirleri olarak birinci sırada 18 milyona yakın bir kullanıcı sayısıyla Endonezya'nın başkenti Jakarta, ikinci sırada ise 9,6 milyon kayıtlı kullanıcıyla İstanbul yer almaktadır. Tabii ki bu duruma, Facebook'un Türkiye'de yoğun bir şekilde kullanılması ve İstanbul'un en kalabalık nüfusa sahip olan şehir olması da etken olmaktadır (http://knownmedia.net). Facebook tarafından yapılan bir araştırmaya göre, Türkiye'de toplam nüfusun %38.5'i Facebook kullanmaktadır. Daha da ilginç bir istatistik ise, Türkiye'nin online nüfusu, toplam nüfusunun %85'ini oluşturmaktadır. Bu istatistik Türkiye'nin, dünyanın en büyük sosyal medya marketlerinden biri olduğunu göstermektedir. Türkiye nüfusunun neredeyse yarısı 29 yaş

altıdır. Bu yaş grubu da en yaygın olarak Facebook kullanıcılarını oluşturmaktadır. Bu yaş grubunun yarıdan fazlası da çok genç olduğundan, Facebook için sabit bir büyüme olarak kabul edilmesi mümkündür (http://analytics.socialbakers.com)

Ortadoğu ve Latin Amerika'da anlık mesajlaşma servislerinde harcanan süre ortalama bir internet kullanıcısının online olduğu zamanın üçte birini oluştururken, Türkiye'nin de içinde bulunduğu Avrupa'da internette harcanan zamanın en büyük kısmı sosyal paylaşım sitelerinde geçmektedir. Son üç yılda kullanıcıların internette harcadığı zamandan en çok pay alan siteler ise Facebook ve Twitter'dır. Facebook, global olarak kullanıcıların internette harcadığı zamanın %7'sini geçirdikleri site durumundadır. Twitter kullanıcı sayısında hızlı bir artış olsa da kullanıcıların internette harcadıkları zaman, global olarak, %0,1 gibi düşük bir orandadır. Facebook penetrasyon oranlarına baktığımızda ise ilk sıraları Endonezya ile Latin Amerika ülkeleri Şili ve Kolombiya'nın aldığı görülmektedir. Türkiye ise, %84,1 penetrasyon oranı ile listede 4. sıradadır. Ancak, Türkiye'nin internet nüfusu sayıca ilk üç sırayı paylaşan ülkelerden fazla olduğu için kullanıcı sayısı bakımından Facebook'da Amerika ve İngiltere'den sonra 3. büyük ülke konumundadır ("Türkiye Avrupa'da Interenet kullanıcı Sayısında 6.").

Sosyal Paylaşım Ağları ve Toplumsal Hareketler

Kullanım maliyetinin düşüklüğü, yer ve zaman sınırlandırılmasının olmayışı, milyonlarca kişinin eş zamanlı iletişime geçmesi, sosyal paylaşım ağlarını toplumsal ve siyasal örgütlenmenin en önemli mecrası konumuna getirerek, farklı amaçlar ve hedefler doğrultusunda biraraya gelen gruplar ve örgütlenmeler yaygınlaşmaya başlamıştır.

İnternet ya insanları önceden hazırlanmış anlamlara boğar ya da diğer metinler ve fikirler üzerinde eleştirel düşünerek ve karşılığında kendi düşüncemizi oluşturarak yazınsal doğamızı daha özgür kılmamızı sağlar (Agger, 2011, s. 225). 19. Yüzyıldaki işçi hareketleri ve 1960'lı yılların kimlik temelli toplumsal hareketlerinin unsurlarını da barındıran bu yeni toplumsal hareketler, üçüncü kuşak hareketler olarak adlandırılmaktadır. En belirgin özellikleri ise tabanını işçi sınıfı yerine orta sınıf üyelerinin oluşturmasıdır. Dolayısıyla toplumsal ve siyasal mücadelesini sınıf yerine kimlik temeli üzerinden yürütmesidir. Uğruna mücadele verdikleri görüşler ise evrenseldir. Savaş karşıtlığı, kadın hakları, insan hakları, küresel ısınma, nükleer silahsızlanma (Toprak v.d, 2009, s. 196) bunlardan bazılarıdır. İnternet, bu toplumsal hareketlerin mücadelelerinde üç temel amaca hizmet etmektedir: haberleşme, örgütlenme ve eylem. Dava, amaç ve hedefleri tüm dünyaya duyurabilmek için internet siteleri kurulmakta, kendi aralarında etkin bir şekilde haberleşebilmek ve yeni üyeler toplayabilmek için e-posta grupları oluşturulmakta ve sokak eylemlerine çağrıda bulunulmaktadır. İnternet sayesinde toplumsal hereketler küreselleşmekte, dünya üzerindeki toplumsal hareketler birbiriyle temasa geçmekte ve birbirine bağlanmaktadır. Böylece uluslararası eylemler örgütlenebilmekte,

çeşitli gruplararası dayanışma gerçekleşmektedir (Toprak v.d, 2009, s. 200). Sanal topluluklar farklı amaçlara sahip olsalar da sanal dünyanın bazı temel ortak noktaları bulunmaktadır (Çakır, 2011, s. 276);

- *Paylaşılan Alan*: Birçok kullanıcı eşzamanlı olarak bu dünyaya dahil olur.

- *Bir Grafik Arayüzü*: İki boyutlu (2D) yada 3 boyutlu (3D) grafik arayüz nitelikleri içerir.

- *Aracısızlık*: Gerçek zamanlı olarak etkileşimin gerçekleşmesini sağlar.

- *Süreklilik*: Sanal dünya kullanıcı dahil olsa da olmasa da varlığını devam ettirmektedir.

- *Sosyalizasyon ve Topluluk*: Sanal dünya, sosyal grup biçimlendirmesine izin vermekte ve bunu teşvik etmektedir.

Genel olarak dünyanın hemen her yerinde günden güne gerek kimlik temelli, gerek cinsiyet temelli, gerekse sınıf temelli olsun, bir derdi olan herkes ve her grup internette kendisine bir yer bulmaktadır. Dünya üzerinde sayısı milyonları bulan bu örgütlenmeler, 2000'li yıllara gelindiğinde Türkiye'de de internet kullanımının yaygınlaşması ile birlikte farklı düşünce ve hedeflere, politikalara sahip pek çok grubun internette örgütlendiği görülmektedir. BAK (Küresel Adalet ve Barış Koalisyonu), DurDe (Irkçılığa ve Milliyetçiliğe Dur De) gibi barış yanlısı grupların yanısıra "(Ermenilerden) Özür dilemiyoruz" (özürdilemiyoruz.biz), Türkçü Toplumcu Budun Derneği (http://toplumcubudundernegi.blogspot.com) gibi etnik temelli örgütler, Bergama'da siyanürlü altın arama çalışmalarına karşı çıkan Ege Çevre ve Kültür Platformu (http://www.egecep.org.tr) gibi çevreci gruplar, Kadın Kurultayı E-Grubu gibi feminist gruplar (Toprak v.d., 2004, s. 199) bunlardan bazılarıdır. Toplumsal hareketler, yeni aktivistler kazanmak ve kamuoyuna eylemlerini duyurmak için Facebook ve Myspace gibi çeşitli sosyal paylaşım ağlarını kullanmaktadır. Facebook ortamında çeşitli amaçlar doğrultusunda oluşturulmuş gruplar pek çok sanal protestolar gerçekleştirmekte, hatta bu çevrimiçi eylemleri çevrimdışına da taşımaktadır. Bu açıdan baktığımız zaman Facebook bir çeşit sanal demokrasi platformudur (Toprak v.d., 2004, s. 202-203).

18.07.2011 tarihinde "Ortadoğu'da Düşmanlar Arasında Sanal Bir Köprü" başlıklı yazısında Ethan Bronner, Facebookta barış teması içeren bir sayfa ile ilgili yaptığı yorumda; İsraillilerle Filistinlilerin birbirinden ayrıldığı bir ortamda, engeller olmaksızın etkileşimde bulunmanın çok önemli olduğunu, İsrail ve Filistin liderlerinin son iki yıldır barış müzakerelerini askıya aldıklarını, fakat son dönemde Facebook sayfalarının yarattığı heyecanla katılımcıların yoğun olduğunu, ve Facebook'un Tunus ile Mısır'da devrimlerin oluşumunda etkisinin büyük olduğunu belirtmiştir. Facebook bir arada yaşama çabalarına rehberlik etmektedir. Eski bir İsrailli diplomat tarafından kurulan «Facebook.com/yalaYL» sitesi ilk ay içinde 91 bin kez ziyaret edilmiş olup, 22 bin 500 aktif kullanıcısının yüzde 60'ını ise Araplar oluşturmaktadır. Büyük çoğunluğu Filistinli olsa da Mısırlılar, Ürdünlüler, Tunuslular,

Faslılar, Lübnanlılar ve Suudiler de bu siteyi takip etmektedir. Siteyi takip eden Araplar ve İsrailliler birbirleriyle ilgili daha fazla şey öğrenme arzularını açıkça dile getirmektedir(http://www.sabah.com.tr/NewYorkTimes). ise sosyal ağlar üzerinden yürütülen bu iletişim biçimini "kitlesel kişilerarası ikna (mass interpersonal persuasion) olarak tanımlamaktadır. Bu kavram kişilerarası iknanın gücü ile sosyal medyanın geniş erişim gücünü bir araya getirmiştir. Sosyal ağların temelinde yatan kitlesel kişisel ikna, insanların düşüncelerini ve davranışlarını değiştirmek üzere odaklanmaktadır. Dünyada en geniş katılımcıya sahip olan Facebook sosyal ağ sitesi de kullanıcı davranışlarını etkileme yönünde, sosyal kabul, övme, teşekkür, beğenme, ayrıcalık kazanma, tanınma ve düşüncelerin onaylanması gibi sosyal etkileme stratejilerini kullanmaktadır (Çakır 2004, s. 273).

Facebook'ta Barış Teması İçeren Sayfalar

Her gün Facebook kullanıcılarına kendi dillerinde sormakta ve bu bilgileri de bir grafikte paylaşmaktadır. Stanford Üniversitesi tarafından kurulan "Peace Innovation" dünya barışını sağlamak amacıyla kurulduğu tarih olan 2009'dan bugüne kadar çok ciddi adımlar atarak, barışın sağlanması amacıyla dünyada olup biten "güzel" gelişmelerin duyurulduğu ve bu konuda nelerin yapılması gerektiği ile ilgili fikirlerin dile getirildiği büyük bir platform kuran "Peace Dot", organizasyonları bu ağa davet edip çözüm arayışlarına devam etmektedir. İnternetin gücünü arkasına alarak etkisini artırmayı amaçlayan "Peace Dot", organizasyonları "Peace Dot" sayfası kurmuş ve bu konudaki tecrübelerin tüm dünyayla paylaşılmasını sağlamıştır.

Bu organizasyon doğrultusunda hareket eden ve *https://peace.facebook.com* adresi üzerinden *Facebook'ta Barış* sayfasını kuran Facebook, sahip olduğu teknolojiyi dünya barışının sağlanması için kullanmak amacıyla farklı çevrelerden insanları bir araya getirip bu konuda fikir alışverişinde bulunarak çözüme katkı sağlamaya çalışmıştır. *Facebook'ta Barış* sayfasında farklı bölgelerden, dinlerden ve siyasi görüşlerden insanların kurduğu arkadaşlıklara ilişkin grafikler bulunmaktadır. Son 24 saat içerisindeki bağlantıları güncel bir şekilde bildiren Facebook, "Dünya Barışı Mümkün Mü?" sorusunu sormaktadır.

Görsel-1

Farklı bölgelerden, dinlerden ve siyasi görüşlerden insanların kurduğu arkadaşlıklar grafikler ile belirtilerek, Arnavutluk ve Sırbıstan (Kosova dahil), Hindistan-Pakistan, İsrail-Filistin ve

Türkiye-Yunanistan arasında kurulan günlük arkadaşlık sayıları gösterilmektedir. Her gün, Facebook'taki binlerce insana kendi dillerinde; *50 yıl içinde dünya barışını sağlayabileceğimizi düşünüyor musunuz?* sorusu yöneltilmektedir (Facebook'ta Barış).

Görsel-1-1

Aralarında sorunlar yaşayan Hindistan-Pakistan, Sırbistan-Kosova, İsrail-Filistin ve Türkiye-Yunanistan arasında, küresel barışın inşa edilmesi amacıyla, sayılan sekiz ülkeden barış temsilcileri seçilmiştir. Bu temsilciler dostluk çifti olarak bu ülkeler arasında eşleştirilmiştir. Bu proje ile, bu sekiz ülkede yaşayan 14-25 yaş aralığındaki gençlerin sosyal ve kültürel olarak birbirleri ile iletişim kurması, paylaşımlarda bulunması amaçlanmıştır. Dostluk çiftleri, kendi dostluk hikayelerini anlatarak, videolarını paylaşarak, barış kampanyası elçileri olarak hareket etmektedir. (Friends without Borders) 19.01.2012 tarihli arama sonucu beğenen sayısı 40.642'dir.

Görsel-1-2

Kolombiya'da silahlı eylemler yapan FARC'e karşı, "FARC'e karşı bir milyon ses" başlıklı sayfa 2008'de açılmış, FARC'a karşı küresel seferberlik kararlaştırılmıştır. Vatandaşların organize olup yaptıkları bu gösteriler Kolombiya tarihinin en büyük gösterisi olmuştur. Dünya çapında 200 şehirde 12'den fazla şehir ve 40 ülke katılımıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir. Yasadışı silahlı gruplar tarafından işlenen eylemlere karşı toplumsal farkındalık yaratılması ve

Kolombiya'da terörizmin önlenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. (One Million Voices). 19.01.2012 tarihli arama sonucu beğenen sayısı 630.960'dır.

Görsel-1-3

"Invisible Children" sayfası, kuzey Uganda'daki çocuk askerlerin trajedisini konu alan belgesel film olan "Invisible Children"ın ABD'de milyonlarca insan tarafından izlenmesinden sonra, bu durumda olan çocukların hayatlarını değiştirebilmek ve tepki vermek amacıyla oluşturulmuştur (Invisible Children). 19.01.2012 tarihli arama sonucu beğenen sayısı 434.390'dır.

Görsel-2

Son dönemde yaşanan olaylar üzerine artık ölümlerin olmasını istemeyen bir grup tarafından Facebook'ta açılan "Kürt ve Türk gençleri artık ölmesin! Savaşa BÜYÜK bir HAYIR!" sayfası, barış savunucularını bir araya getirmektedir.

> "Savaşa BÜYÜK bir HAYIR!. diyen cesur Kürtler ve cesur Türkler toplanıyoruz, çoğalıyoruz!";
> "Barış, kardeşlik ve eşitlik için atan o kocaman yüreklerinize bin selam olsun canlar! Var olun!";
> "Bijî Aşitî!"; "Yaşasın barış!"; "Biz insanız, savaş karşıtıyız!"; " Em mirov in, em dijî şer in!" söylemleri ile barış, kardeşlik mesajları içeren örneklerden bir kaçıdır.

(Savaşa Hayır Diyoruz) 19.01.2012 tarihli arama sonucu beğenen sayısı 28.237'dir.

Görsel-3

Bu sayfa, dünyada tüm insanların, inançları ne olursa olsun barış için bir araya gelmesi ve paylaşması amacıyla açılmıştır. 19.01.2012 tarihli arama sonucu beğenen sayısı 1.418.738'dir.

(http://www.facebook.com/#!/FanofPeace?sk=info E.T.19.01.2012)

Görsel-4

Küresel barışın sağlanması amacı ile 1997'de açılmıştır. 19.01.2012 tarihli arama sonucu beğenen sayısı 135.143'dür (Peace On Earth)

Değerlendirme ve Sonuç

İnternet erişim olanağı çok kolay olan ve sınırlandırılması pek mümkün olmayan bir medya olması bakımından geleneksel medyalar karşısında kullanıcılar açısından büyük olanaklara sahiptir. Yeni medya yaşamın her alanında yer almakta, siyasal ve toplumsal hareketlerin süratle yayılmasında ve etkinliğinde rol oynamaktadır. Sosyal medya aracılığı ile sosyal ağlar üzerinden yürütülen iletişim biçimini "kitlesel kişilerarası ikna (mass interpersonal persuasion)" olarak tanımlayan Fogg'a göre, bu kavram kişilerarası iknanın gücü ile sosyal medyanın geniş erişim gücünü bir araya getirmiştir. Sosyal ağların temelinde yatan kitlesel kişisel ikna, insanların düşüncelerini ve davranışlarını değiştirmek üzere odaklanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bir kullanıcının sanal ortamda dijital kodlar aracılığıyla gönderdiği ikna edici mesajı tekrar tekrar kullanıcılar arasında dolaşmakta ve çok kısa sürede çok sayıda kullanıcıya eş zamanlı olarak ulaşmaktadır. Dünyanın en büyük sosyal ağı olan Facebook, kullanıcılar üzerinde sosyal kabul, övme, teşekkür, beğenme, ayrıcalık kazanma, tanınma, düşüncelerin onaylanması gibi sosyal etkileme stratejilerini kullanmakta, yüzlerce insanın bir mesajla anında toplanacağı, örgütleneceği bir güç haline gelmektedir.

İngiltere, Mısır ve Tunus'ta olayları planlamak için sosyal ağ olarak Twitter ve Facebook kullanılmış ve artık dünyada "Twitter Devrimleri" ve "Facebook Devrimleri"yaşanmaya başlamıştır. Yüzbinlerce kişiyi aynı anda etkileyip örgütleyebilen sosyal ağların, dünya barışı için çaba sarfetmeleri en güzel sosyal sorumluluk örneklerinden biridir.

Ayrıca Facebook'ta Barış ile ilgili etkili söylemler de yer almaktadır. Bunlardan bazıları; "Savaşın dili ve yöntemleri 30 yıldır bu coğrafyada uygulanıyor."Sonuç: Acı, gözyaşı, kahır, nefret, kin, düşmanlık, eşitsizlik, ölüm, yıkım ..."Artık denenmesi gereken tek çıkar yol barış'ın yoludur. Unutmayın, barış'tan umudun kesildiği anda daha da bir çıkmaza girilir". "İlle de savaş, kan ve gözyaşı diyenlere inat biz de barış'ı haykıralım."

Facebook'ta Barış sayfalarında farklı bölgelerden, dinlerden ve siyasi görüşlerden insanların kurduğu arkadaşlıklara ilişkin grafikler bulunmaktadır. Bugün Facebook'ta barış teması içeren birçok oluşum bulunmakta ve çok sayıda kullanıcı tarafından büyük ilgi görmektedir. Milenyumun en etkin mecralarından olan Facebook bu yönleriyle, barış teması içeren ve barış söylemlerinin hakim olduğu, küresel barışın sağlanmasına katkısı olabilecek önemli mecralar arasındadır.

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Tiksindirici Olanı Yok Etmek, Kendimizi Temizlemek: Detan ve Domestos Reklamları Örneğinde Bir Güç Savaşı

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Giriş

Pazarlama iletişiminin bir kolu olan reklam, hem reklamveren olarak bir mal, hizmet veya fikri pazara sunan kurum/kuruluş için, hem de bu ürünün potansiyel alıcısı için önemli bir iletişim aracıdır. Reklamın hedeflenen kişi, grup ve kurumlara ulaşabilmesi, özünde insanın istek, ihtiyaç ve beklentilerine odaklanılmasıyla mümkündür. Sadece ulusal değil uluslararası boyutta rekabetin kıyasıya yaşandığı ve farklı olanın, yeniyi üretebilenin satışlarını yükseltebildiği günümüz pazarlarında işletmeler bedeni ve ruhuyla insana odaklanırken, algı yönetimi, duyular ve marka ilişkisi gibi daha geniş perspektiflere yönelmişlerdir. Tüketicinin bir markaya bağlanmasını sağlamak için nasıl sevgi, beğeni, hoşlanma gibi duygular su yüzüne çıkarılmaya çalışılıyorsa; bu duyguların tam tersi yani sevmeme, tiksinme, korkma, kaygı duyma gibi duygular da, markanın inşası için iletişim çabalarında ve reklamda yer bulabilmektedir.

Tiksinme Duygusu

Tiksinme duygusu; insanların hayvansal gıdaları almayı arttırmaları, bir arada yaşayan insan sayısının artması ve Darwin'in evrim teorisi (insan-hayvan sınırının bulanıklaşması) ile Pasteur, Koch gibi bilim adamlarının belirli mikroorganizmalarla hastalıklar arasında bilimsel bir bağ olduğunu kanıtlamalarıyla mikrop teorisinin yükselişi gibi bilimsel gelişmelerle gündeme gelmiştir (Rozin, Haidt & McCauley, 2008: 763-764; Tomes, 2000, s. 192). Tiksinmeyle ilgili Darwin, Angyal, Renner, Plutchik, Curtis ve Freud gibi düşünürlerin tanımlamaları (Rozin ve diğerleri, 2008: s.757-758; Miller, 1997, s.5-6) bulunmakla beraber Rozin, Haidt

ve McCauley (2008) tiksinme duygusunu fizyolojik, psikolojik ve sosyal boyutlarıyla ele alarak kendilerinden önceki araştırmaları değerlendirmişler ve bu duygunun sebeplerini beş kategori altında incelemişlerdir (s. 759-762).

Ağız yoluyla temas konusunda; ağız yoluyla alınan fakat kötü tada sahip yiyeceklere verilen tepki tiksinmenin kökenini oluşturur.

Zarar görme konusunda; Angyal'ın ifade ettiği üzere, bedenin (insan veya hayvana ait) çıktıları (dışkı, kusmuk, idrar, kan – özellikle adet dönemine ait kan) antropolojik olarak kirlenmeyle ilişkilidir ve tiksinme duygusunun merkezinde yer alır (Angyal'dan aktaran Rozin ve diğerleri, 2008, s. 760). Ayrıca bazı hayvanlar tiksindiricidir çünkü sümük, balgam gibi insan vücudunun çıktılarına benzer özelliklere sahiptirler (örn; sümüklü böcek). Kimi hayvanlar da çürüyen hayvan eti, dışkı, diğer insan vücudu çıktılarıyla temas halinde (sinekler, hamam böcekleri, fareler, akbabalar ve diğer çöp toplayanlar) olmaları dolayısıyla tiksindiricidirler. Ayrıca, korku ve tiksinmenin birlikte oluştuğu bir grup "anormal" hayvan kategorisi söz konusudur (örn; örümcekler ve yılanlar). Davey ve diğerlerine göre bu hayvanlara yönelik nefret korkudan çok tiksinmeye dayanır (Davey ve diğerlerinden aktaran Rozin ve diğerleri, 2008, s. 760).

Hastalık Bulaş(tır)ma konusunda; S.B. Miller'a göre (S.B. Miller'dan aktaran Rozin ve diğerleri, 2008, p.: 761), ağız, burun, deri ve gözler; vücuda açılan kapılar, potansiyel biyolojik hastalık, enfeksiyon bulaşma kaynağıdır. Tiksinme, ağız dışında vücudun diğer bölgelerini bulaşıcı hastalıktan veya enfeksiyondan korumaya, insan vücudunun hayvan vücudundan farksız olduğuna ilişkin kanıtlara karşı çıkma amacına yönelir (örn; cinsellik, cildin bozulması/tahribi, ölüm). Kendimizi hayvanlardan ayırma isteğimiz, hayvanlarla benzer olan ölümlülüğümüzden korkumuzdan kaynaklanabilir. Becker'a göre (Becker'dan aktaran Rozin ve diğerleri, 2008, s. 761) ölümün reddedilmesi tiksinmeyle ifade bulur. Ölüyle temas, çürümenin kokusu, potansiyel

tiksinme sebebidir. İnsan böylece ölümlülüğünü hatırlatan düşünceler ve deneyimleri bastırır.

Kişilerarası Tiksinme konusunda; Darwin ve Angyal'ın (Darwin'den ve Angyal'dan aktaran Rozin ve diğerleri, 2008, s 762) ifade ettikleri üzere, diğer insanlar da tiksinme sebebi olabilmektedir. Rozin, Haidt ve McCauley'e (2008, s. 762) göre kişilerarası tiksinme; yabancıdan tiksinme, hasta insandan tiksinme, kaza geçirmiş insandan tiksinme veya ahlaki bozulmadan tiksinme olarak karşımıza çıkabilir. Kişilerarası tiksinme, kişinin samimi olmadığı diğer insanlarla temasını önler. Dolayısıyla enfeksiyon riskini azaltır, sosyal mesafeyi ve sosyal hiyerarşiyi vurgular.

Ahlaki Tiksinme konusunda; insanların tiksindikleri durumlar arasında, ahlaki saldırılar, seks veya diğer sebeplerle insan vücudunun yanlış kullanımı, istismarı, ihanet, iki yüzlülük, ırkçılık da yer almaktadır.

Görüldüğü üzere tiksinme duygusu fizyolojik ve psikolojik açıdan insan için önemli boyutlara sahiptir. Yediğimiz, dokunduğumuz nesnelerden tiksinme, bir adım ileriye geçerek kişilerarası iletişimi ve (ahlaki açıdan) sosyal etkileşimi etkileyen bir duygu olarak karşımıza çıkabilmektedir. Tiksinmenin ne olduğunu, sebeplerini, sonuçlarını değerlendirmek bir anlamda, tiksinmenin yöneldiği nesneyi (ki bu insanın kendi kendisi de olabilir) tanımlamak, özne (tiksinen) ile nesne (tiksinilen) arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya koymayı gerektirir. Çünkü W.I. Miller (1997)'ın ifadesiyle tiksinme bir şey hakkında, bir şeye cevaben gelişen bir duygudur, bağımsız bir duygu değildir (s. 7-8).

Ben/Biz – Öteki, Tiksinen - Tiksinilen

Tiksinme, "ben" ile "öteki" arasında bir ayrım oluşturur. Tiksinen ve tiksinilen arasında sınırlar çizer ve dolayısıyla da hiyerarşik yapılar inşa eder. W.I. Miller'a göre (1997), seçkinliğe ait iddiaları ortaya koyar ve kişinin sosyal düzendeki konumunu belirtir (s. 8-9). Tiksinme, dokunduğu şeye (negatif) değer biçer. Tiksinti objesinin aşağılığını ve ikincilliğini ifade eder. W.I. Miller (1997) tiksinmenin şu ikili karşıtlıklar arasında gerçekleştiğini belirtmiştir (s. 37-39): İnorganik– organik; bitki–hayvan; insan–hayvan; biz–onlar; ben–sen; benim dışım–benim için; kuru–ıslak, yaşayan–ölü veya çürümüş; sağlık–hastalık; güzellik–çirkinlik; tek–pek çok *(Bir Hamam Böceği–On Milyon Hamam Böceği karşıtlığında olduğu gibi).*

Tiksinme duygusu bağlamında insan zihninde bu karşıtlıkların inşası ve modernite birbirini besleyen olgular olarak ifade edilebilir. Zira modern bilim ve siyaset geleneği, hayvan - insan, organizma - makine, fiziksel - fiziksel olmayan ayrımları üzerinde yükselir. Sınırlara ihtiyaç duyar ve kendini inşa etmek için çizginin öte yanındakini Öteki'leştirir. "Benlik"i, Öteki'nin yansımalarından durmadan yeniden üretir (Ergün ve Akal, 2006, s. 17). İşte bu ayrım sayesinde netleşen kimliğe ilişkin Nuri Bilgin; bireysel, sosyal ve kolektif olmak üzere üç boyuttan bahseder.

Bireysel boyutta, *kişisel/bireysel kimlik* yani benlik yer alır. Kişisel kimliğin yani benliğin bireyin bedeni ile göz ardı edilemeyecek bir ilişkisi söz konusudur. Nuri Bilgin'in (2007) tanımladığı üzere, beden imajı, kimliğin önemli bir bileşenidir (s. 101). Bunun temel nedeni de, pek çok insan açısından kimlik göstergelerinin daha

ziyade vücutta toplanmasıdır.

Bu bağlamda, tiksinme konusunda önemli bir tartışma düzlemi de bireyin bedenidir. Kişisel kimlik yani benlik, beden ve tiksinme duygusu arasındaki ilişki; Rozin, Haidt ve McCauley'in ifade ettiği tiksinme duygusunun çekirdeğinin yani ağız yoluya temas, zarar görme ve hastalık bulaş(tır)manın; bireyin bedeniyle doğrudan ilişkisi olduğu bu anlamda öne sürülebilir. Tiksinme duygusu sadece bedenle, bireysel kimlikle ilgili değil; tiksinmenin kişilerarası tiksinme ve ahlaki tiksinme gibi boyutlarını da dâhil edersek, bireyin sosyal yaşamıyla, kolektif kimliğiyle de bağlantılıdır. Bilgin'e göre (2007), belirli bir kültür etrafında birleşen grup veya toplum açısından *kolektif kimlik*'ten bahsedilebilir. Etnik, dini, ulusal kimlikler kolektif kimliğin türleridir (s. 12-14).

Bireysel boyutta kirden ve kimi hayvanlardan, insan olmayandan tiksinme, sosyal boyutta bireyle aynı normlara, sosyal sınıfa, ırka, cinsiyete vb. ait olmayandan tiksinmeye doğru genişlemekte hatta bu bireysel ve sosyal boyut zaman zaman iç içe geçmektedir. Masquelier (2005) kolonyal düşüncede Amerikalı ve Avrupalı aileler için sabunun kitlesel üretimi ve şebeke suyuyla, temizlenmenin sadece fiziksel değil, ahlaki bir görev; kirin de Afrikalı, Amerikan yerlisi veya göçmenlerin vücutlarında taşıdıkları bir şey olarak görülmeye başlandığını belirtmiştir (s.6-7, 10-11): Temiz olma kampanyaları, sağlıksız, fakir, etnik veya dini açıdan öteki olanı diğerlerinden ayırmak ve izole etmek için uygundur. Temizin gözünde kir, insan vücudunun üzerindeki bir damgadır.

Kendimizi Douglas'ın (2007) belirttiği çerçeve içinde, kirli veya temiz, hayvana veya insana benzer, hasta veya sağlıklı kategorilerinden birine yerleştirmemiz; sosyal anlamda kendimizi "biz"in içine yerleştirerek "öteki" olmaktan kaçınmamızı da sağlar (s. 60). Kişilerarası tiksinme konusunda ele alınan, "bir yabancıdan tiksinme" ile bu konu bağlantılı olarak düşünülebilir. Ki bu yabancı bizden farklı bir dinden, dilden olabilir, farklı bir cinsel tercihe sahip olabilir. Etnik açıdan farklı olana ilişkin önyargılar, stereotipleştirmeler ve damgalamalar bu noktada milliyetçi ideolojiler içinde aşırı uçlar olarak kendilerine uygun bir zemin bulabilmektedirler.

Postmodern dönemde kimlik krizleri beraberinde "Biz kimiz?" sorusunu da getirmiştir. Milliyetçilik söylemi, modernliğin sıkıntılarına yanıt bulmaya çalışan ideolojik duruşlar arasında yer alarak, kimlik krizlerine karşı bir tür panzehir olarak kodlanır. Milliyetçi ideoloji(ler) kimlikler ve anlam sistemleri inşa eder. Milli Kimlik de popüler kültürel formlar aracılığıyla gündelik hayat içinde sürekli bir biçimde inşa edilir (Işık, 2006, s. 228-229). Etnik olarak "biz"i vurgulamak, aynı zamanda "öteki"ni de tanımlamayı gerektirmektedir. Modernite kendisini modern öncesine (ötekine) göre tanımlar, konumlandırır. Modern dinamizm modern öncesi düzenden, dinamik Batı statik, sabit Doğu'dan farklılaşır, ayrışır. Dünya aydınlanmış ve aydınlanmamış arasında bölünmüştür (Robins, 2003, s. 62, 64-66).

Türk insanı bir yandan Batı'yla Doğu arasında kendi kimliğini

bulma ve ifade etme çabası içindeyken diğer yandan da kendi içinde, çoğunluktan ayrılarak bir azınlık oluşturan ve kimi zaman sosyal anlamda bir tür tiksinme olarak nitelendirebileceğimiz, ırkçılıkla birlikte su yüzüne çıkan bir tür "nefret söylemi"nin hedefi grupların varlığıyla da yüzleşmektedir. Binark nefret söylemini; bir bireye veya topluluğa dair, ırkı, etnik veya cinsel kimliği, dini, mezhebi, siyasal görüşü, fiziksel özellikleri, sağlık durumu veya engel(ler)i dolayısıyla "ayırt edici, "ötekileştirici" ve "dışlayıcı" duygular hissetmek ve bu duyguları sistematize bir biçimde (sözlü veya sözsüz) dile dökmek olarak tanımlar (Binark 2011). Nefret söylemi konusunda medya etkin bir kültürel iletken olarak kabul edilir ("Nefret Söylemi Nedir"). Kaba, küçümseyici, hakaret içeren, öfkeli, saldırgan ve küfürlü sözcüklerin kullanılması, yazı biçimde büyük harflerin ve "!", "…" gibi noktalama işaretlerinin seçilmesi, hedef gösteren görsel malzemelerin kullanması gibi dilsel pratikler nefret söylemini medyada somutlaştıran unsurlardır (Binark 2011).

Kısaca, ötekini dışlamak suretiyle "biz"i inşa etme sadece beden üzerinden gerçekleşen bir olgu değil, sosyal anlamda da toplumda öteki olarak kabul edilen kişi, grup veya kurumları da dışlama anlamına gelebilmektedir. Bu noktada önem taşıyan ve nefret söylemi konusunda da ön plana çıkmış olan, medyanın konuya bakışı ve oynadığı roldür.

Bilimsel Bilgi, İktidar ve Medya

Medyanın yaşadığımız dünyayı nasıl sunduğu konusunda O'Shaughnessy ve Stadler (2008); pek çok medya ürününün gerçek dünyayı göstermediğini, gerçekliği yeniden inşa ettiğini savunmaktadırlar (s. 34-36). Burada sunulanın ne olacağına medya sahipleri, yöneticiler, yaratıcı personel ve teknikerler karar verir. Bu kişiler medyayı kontrol ederler ve yaratırlar. Ott ve Mack'a göre (2010) medya metinleri dünya ve toplum hakkında belirli perspektifleri sunarken aynı zamanda diğerlerini dışlarlar: (s. 124). Medyada sunulan bakış açısı sosyal olarak güçlü ve ayrıcalıklı gruplara aittir ki bu gruplar toplumda iktidarı elinde tutanlar olarak adlandırılabilir.

Konuya tiksinme duygusu açısından bakarsak; birey, bedenine (ve dolayısıyla kişisel kimliğine) zarar verecek nesnelerden, durumlardan kaçınmak için tiksinme duygusuna başvurur fakat bireyin bedeninin "nasıl olması gerektiğini" ve "tiksinme duygusunun boyutlarını" belirlemek bireyin de ötesinde, medyanın ardındaki, toplumda ekonomik, siyasi, kültürel ve sosyal anlamda iktidara (kişilere, gruplara, kurum ve kuruluşlara) kalmaktadır. Foucault'ya göre gerçeğin inşası, iktidar ile bilginin kesişiminde yatar (Rose, 2003, s.138). Her bilgi iktidar üretici, her iktidar bilgi kurucudur (Canpolat, 2005, s.80-101). İktidar ve uygulaması günlük eylemi ve davranışı etkiler (Smith, 2007, s. 174) .

Foucault iktidar kavramının modern toplumlardaki yansıması olarak biyo-iktidar kavramını ortaya atar. *Biyo-iktidar*, bedenler üzerinde eğitim, nüfus, cinsellik açısından iktidarın sağlanmasıdır (Yılmaz, 2007, s. 2) ki sağlığı da bu kapsamda değerlendirebiliriz.

Biyo-iktidar ile normalleşme ve sapkınlık tanımlanmakta, bireyler ve nüfuslar gözetleme ve denetlemeye maruz bırakılmaktadır ki böylece bireyleri norma uymaya zorlayan, onları normalleştiren bir toplum oluşturulmaktadır (Smith, 2007, s. 174; Canpolat, 2005, s. 103-104). Bedenlerin denetimli bir biçimde üretim ağına sokulması ve nüfus olaylarının ekonomik süreçlere göre ayarlanmasıyla biyoiktidar; kapitalizmin gelişiminin vazgeçilmez bir öğesidir (Foucault, 2010, s. 103-104). Biyo-iktidarın doğuşuyla birlikte biyolojik türden ırkçılık ve dolayısıyla ölüme meşruluk kazandırılması da devlet mekanizmasına girmiştir. Irkçılık, yaşamak istiyorsan öldürebilmelisin ilkesini işleme koyar. Aşağı türler yok oldukça, anormal bireyler ortadan kalkacaktır. Tür içinde yozlaşmış insanların azalması, türün uzun yaşamasını, güçlü, sağlıklı olmasını sağlar (Canpolat, 2005, s. 104-105).

Bilgiyi üreten, medyada sunumunda ve dolayısıyla bir anlamda biyoiktidarın kurulmasında rol oynayan bilim adamının sahip olduğu bilgiyle halktan bir kişinin sahip olduğu bilgi arasında bugün, uzmanlık anlamında büyük bir fark oluşmaktadır. Bilimin halka ulaşmasını kolaylaştıracak olan bilimin popülerleşmesidir (Dursun, 2010, s. 1). Zaman zaman manipüle edilerek sunulan bilimsel bilginin toplumda paniğe sebep olması durumuysa bizi Cohen'in "ahlaki panik" kavramından (Smith, 2007) doğan "mikrop paniği" kavramıyla karşı karşıya getirir (s.130-132).

Tomes (2000), bir hastalıkla (örn AIDS) ilgili kaygıların problemden bağımsız olarak üretilmesini "mikrop panikleri" (germ panics) olarak adlandırmıştır (s. 191-192). Antibiyotiklerin yanlış/fazla kullanımıyla tüberküloz gibi kimi hastalıkların ilaca dirençlerinin artması; su ve gıda güvenliğindeki açıkların salgın hastalıkların önünü açması; salgın hastalıklar hakkındaki popüler kaygıların artması; hükümetin otoritesi hakkında şüpheler; kamu sağlığı uzmanlarının "öldürücü mikrop" peşindeki "tıbbi dedektifler" olarak medyada ilgi çekmeleri; uzman görüşüne duyulan şüphe gibi sebepler günümüzde mikrop paniklerinin yansımalarıdır.

Korku ve Hijyen

Mikrop paniklerinin temelinde tiksinme duygusunun da iç içe geçtiği duygular olarak korku ve kaygı yer almaktadır. Rozin, Haidt ve McCauley (2008) tiksindirici nesneye (örn; hayvanlara ve hayvansal çıktılara) karşı bir korkunun sözkonusu olduğunu ifade ederler (s.760). Tomes'a göre de (2000: 192) toz ve böcekler, yiyecek ve giyecekleri hastalığa sebep olan mikroorganizmalarla bozdukları sebebiyle korkulan ajanlardır. Arrindell vd. (aktaran Öhman, 2008) temelde dört tür korku tanımlamışlardır: *Kişilerarası olaylar ve durumlar hakkında korkular*; *evcil, küçük - zararsız veya örümcek, sümüklü böcek gibi yavaş hareket eden, sürünen* olmak üzere *hayvanlardan korkmak*; *ölüm, yaralanma, hastalık, kan ve ameliyattan korkmak* ve *Agorafobik korkular*. Bu korkuların sebeplerinin tiksinme duygusunun sebepleriyle iç içe geçtiğini söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır: (s.711).

Bireysel anlamda korkunun korku kültürüne dönüşmesinde medyanın önemli bir rol oynadığı söylenebilir. Füredi'ye göre

(2007) popüler kültür sürekli olarak kamuya, (insan ürünü ve doğal) felaketler hakkında korku dolu programlar sunmaktadır (s. vii – xviii). Bunlar, doğrudan karşı karşıya olmadığımız fakat pasif bir biçimde korktuğumuz tehlikelerle ilgilidir. Çünkü Giddens'ın da belirttiği üzere (2010) bir risk kültürü olan modernite; bir yandan hayat tarzlarımızın genel anlamda riskliliğini azaltırken geçmişte var olmamış büyüklükte ve belirsizlikte yeni risklerin oluşmasına da sebep olur (s.11-13, 14-15). Bilim adamları; milenyum bakterisi, tehlikeli grip salgınları, yeni süper böcekler (çoğu antibiyotiğe karşı dayanıklı genlere sahip mikroorganizmalar) ve biyo-çeşitliliğin bozulması gibi konularda insanları uyarmaktadırlar (Füredi, 2007, s. vii - xviii). Riskler ve korkularımız arasındaki bu ilişkinin aslında, bir ideoloji olarak çizilen hijyen ideolojisinin de temelini oluşturduğu söylenebilir.

O' Shaughnessy ve Stadler'e göre (2008) ideolojiler; insanların kolektif olarak içinde yaşadıkları dünyayı anlamlandırmalarını, ortak, doğallaştırılmış, garanti altına alınmış bir dünya görüşü inşa etmelerini sağlayan sosyal değerler, fikirler, inançlar, duygular ve sunumlar bütünüdür (s.33). Althusser iktidarın gündelik hayatın içine sızdığını, göstergeler yoluyla ürettiği anlam evreninde de ideoloji olarak var olduğunu savunur (Althusser'den aktaran O'Shaughnessy ve Stadler, 2008, s. 33).

Hijyen ideolojisi, hijyenik olmanın modern Batı toplumunda gündelik yaşamda doğal karşılanması gerekliliğini sunar. Bu doğrultuda konuya yaklaşıldığında, kimilerine göre az ya da orta derece hijyen ile beraber gelen korkuların en rahatsız edici yanı, farkında olmadan bireyin de hijyenin olmayışı sebebiyle kendini suçlu hissetmesidir. Hiçbir zaman yeteri kadar temiz olduğunu düşünmesine izin verilmez. Hijyen konusunda getirilen standartlarla doğal ve insani olan dışlanmaktadır şöyle ki erkeklere yönelik reklamlar, sabun ve parfümler olmaksızın işyerinde terfi edemeyeceklerini, kadınlara yönelik reklamlar da vücutları kusursuzca temiz olmadığı sürece hiçbir erkeğin onlarla birlikte olmayacağını vurgular (Geliyorum Josephine, yıkanma!).

Tiksindirici Öğeler ve Reklam

Tiksinme duygusunun, tiksinen ben – tiksinilen öteki ayrımının, "bilimsel" bilginin, korku ve hijyenin vurgulandığı medya ürünleri arasında reklamlar da yer almaktadır. Mikroorganizmaların sebep oldukları hastalıkların medyada ve dolayısıyla reklamlarda temsili konusunda; Tomes'a göre (2000) eğer bir hastalık, haber değeri taşıyorsa medya buna yer verip önemini arttırırken; bir hastalık, ürün veya hizmet satmak için ticari potansiyele sahipse, reklamlar hastalığı önleme etkisini büyütmeye çalışırlar (s. 193). Mikropların etkilerine odaklanan reklam kampanyaları, önemli bir eğitici güç haline gelmekte, bilimsel otoriteyi canlı tutmaktadır. Johnson tarafından 1998'de ABD'de yapılan *"Television movies help children picture germs"* (Çocuklara böcek resmi yaptırmada yardımcı olan TV filmleri) isimli bir araştırma, okula giden çocukların bakteriler ve virüsler hakkında bilgiyi diş macunu ve ev temizlik maddeleri reklamlarından öğrendiklerini ortaya çıkarmıştır (Aiello ve Larson, 2001, s.385-386).

Hayvanlar açısından konuya bakıldığında; Lerner ve Kalof (1999), TV reklamlarında hayvanların kimi zaman rahatsızlık verici kişi - şey olarak temsil edildiğini ifade ederler (s. 565). Van Riper'e göre (2002) *böcekler* popüler kültürde genel olarak; hoşlanılmayan, ilgilenilmeyen, dokunulamayan, vurulup ezilmeleri gereken baş belalarıdır (s. 142–144). Rahatlıkla ve rutin bir biçimde imhaları popüler kültür tarafından desteklenen nadir hayvan türlerindendir. Van Riper (2002); imha edicilerin ve böcek ilaçlarının reklamlarının bu duyguları işlediğini söyler (s. 142–144). Örneğin; ABD'de ulusal bir imha edici zinciri olan Orkin, ev içindeki "zararlı" böcekleri yüksek çözünürlüklü fotoğraflarla başka dünyalara ait canavarlar olarak göstermiştir. Böcek ilacı markası Raid, reklamlarında pasaklı, derbeder görünüşlü böcekleri karikatürize ederek sunar. Bununla beraber, böcekler, sıçanlar vb., reklamlarda asla gerçek halleriyle ölü olarak görülmezler (The Animal Studies Group, 2006, s. 6). Bu durumun da reklamlarda izleyicinin "dozunda" (ne eksik ne de fazla) bir tiksinme duygusu hissetmesine yardım ettiği söylenebilir.

Holbrook ve Batra'ya göre tiksinme reklamcılıkla ilişkili bir duygudur. Richins de tiksinmeyi tüketim deneyimleriyle bağlantılı bir duygu olarak kabul eder (Shimp ve Stuart, 2004, s. 43-44). Holbrook ve Batra'nın da ifade ettiği üzere (1987), reklamda duygulara hitap eden uyaranlar, tüketicinin reklama tepki vermesi sağlar (s. 404-420). Dens, De Pelsmacker ve Janssens (2008), tiksindirici olana yönelik tepkiyi Mandler'in uygunsuzluk şeması teorisiyle açıklarlar (s. 250-251). Tüketiciler uyaranı mevcut şemalar (tüketicilerin markalar, ürünler ve reklamlar hakkındaki bilgi ve beklentilerini temsil eden bilişsel bir yapı) temelinde değerlendirirler ve mevcut bir şemaya uyumsuz bir uyaran, uyumlu bir uyarandan daha fazla dikkat çeker, daha iyi hatırlanır. Dens ve diğerleri (2008) ayrıca, tiksindirici öğelerin reklamda tiksindirici olmayan öğelerle karşılaştırıldığında markanın hatırlanmasında daha başarılı olduğu hipotezini test etmek için; bir tur operatörü için iki reklam versiyonu geliştirmişlerdir (s. 255-256). İlk versiyonda, bir adam kumsalda, başı dizlerine dayalı şekilde çıplak oturmakta, ikinci versiyonda ise aynı adam, derisinin üzerinde kan ve vücut çıktılarıyla (reklamın başlığındaki yeniden doğuşa ithafen) fetüs pozisyonunda durmaktadır. Gerçekleştirilen internet anketinde ikinci versiyon daha tiksindirici bulunmuştur.

Detan ve Domestos Reklamlarının Söylem Analizi ile İncelenmesi

Tiksinme duygusundan beden, bireysel ve kolektif kimlik, medya aracılığıyla elde edilen bilgi ve riskler üzerinden oluşturulan korku kültürü ve hijyen ideolojisine uzanan "insan" – "insan olmayan" ayrımı; modern toplumda bu ayrımın diğer deyişle taraflar arasında yaratılan savaşın devamlılığı; mikroorganizmalar ve kimi hayvanların medyada ve özellikle reklamlarda düşman öteki olarak sunumuyla gözler önüne serilmektedir. *Temiz ben – Kirli, zararlı öteki* ayrımı ve ötekine karşı duyulan korkular üzerine inşa edilen iktidar, bu iktidarın içine kolayca yerleştiği

hijyen ideolojisiyle; günümüz insanının satın alma davranışını şekillendiren bir unsur olarak reklamda, kültürel, ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasal yan anlamlarla karşımıza çıkabilmektedir.

"İnsan" ve "insan olmayan" (mikroorganizma, böcek) olmak üzere tarafların, taraflar arasındaki ilişkinin açıkça ortaya konduğu, böcek ilacı ve çamaşırda leke çıkarıcı olmak üzere kimya sektöründen iki farklı ürünün tanıtım çabaları genel olarak değerlendirilerek bu çalışmada Türk televizyonlarında yayınlanmış "Domestos Hijyenik Leke Çıkarıcı" reklamı ve "Detan Maxi Mikro Kapsüllü Böcek İlacı" reklamı örnek olarak seçilmiş ve söylem analizi yönteminden yararlanılarak incelenmiştir. Analizde önem kazanması dolayısıyla reklamın metni, görselleri, akustik öğelerinin yanısıra reklam veren, reklam ajansının felsefesi, işletmenin diğer pazarlama iletişimi çabaları (halkla ilişkiler, marka yönetimi vb.) gibi yan unsurlar da değerlendirmeye dahil edilmiştir.

Reklamda Söylem Analizi

Söylem analizi neyin söylenebilir (doğal, normal, sorgulanmayan) ve belirli bağlam içinde nasıl söylenebilir olduğunu sorgular ("Discourse Anaysis"). Temel kabulü; dilin dünyayı tarafsız bir biçimde yansıtmayıp bilgi(leri)mizi, kimliklerimizi ve sosyal ilişkilerimizi aktif bir biçimde yarattığı, kurduğu, dönüştürdüğüdür ("Discourse Anaysis"). Foucault'ya göre söylem analizi, geleneksel düşünme ve yazma pratiklerinin kültürel yapı içinde politik ve ideolojik amaçlara nasıl hizmet ettiğini ortaya koyar. İnsanların düşünme biçimlerinin ve sosyal bir varlık olarak eylemlerinin nasıl sınırlandırıldığına, kısıtlandığına yönelik açıklamalar getirmeyi amaçlar (Çelik ve Ekşi, 2008, s. 100, 105-106).

Reklamda söylem analizi dili (metni) ve bağlamı bütüncül bir biçimde görür. Müzik ve resimler (anlamı belirginleştirmek veya değiştirmek için dille bütünleşen {Cook, 2001, s. 3}); nesnelerin ve insanların içinde bulundukları durum; katılımcılar (mesajı gönderici ve alıcılar; bu kişilerin amaçları, bilgileri, inançları, tutum ve davranışları) ve fonksiyon (metnin gönderici tarafından gönderilme, alıcı tarafından alınma amacı); bağlam kapsamında yer alır. Söylem, metin ve bağlamın birlikte, katılımcılar (ki bağlamın hem bir parçası hem de gözlemcisidirler) tarafından anlamlı bir bütün olarak görülebilmesi için etkileşimi sağlar (Cook, 2001, s. 4). Söylem analizinde amaç; az sayıda bireyden elde edilen geniş kapsamlı dilsel malzeme ürününü anlamlandırma veya yorumlamadır (Çelik ve Ekşi, 2008, s. 109-110).

Bu çalışmada Cook'un görsel-sözel ve işitsel öğeleri bir bütün olarak dikkate alıp gerçekleştirdiği söylem analizi yöntemi (2006) kullanılırken eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla bu öğelerin ardında, reklamın kültürel yapı içinde hizmet ettiği politik ve ideolojik amaçlara da odaklanılmıştır (s. 42-50).

## "Domestos Hijyenik Leke Çıkarıcı" Reklamı ve Analizi

Domestos'un mikropları animasyon karakterler olarak sunan

reklam kampanyası; LOWE Londra ajansı tarafından hazırlanan ve LOWE İstanbul tarafından Türkiye'ye uyarlanan "Kötüyüm ben Kötüyüm" cıngıllı Domestos 5 Kat reklam filmiyle 2006-2007 sezonunda başlamış ve animasyon karakterlerin yer aldığı diğer reklamlarla devam etmiştir (Tuvalet temizliğinde devrim: "Domestos 5 Kat" ile Milyonlarca Mikrop Ölecek...)

"Domestos Hijyenik Leke Çıkarıcı" Reklamı şu şekilde gelişmektedir: Genç bir erkek soyunma odasına gelir t-shirt'ünü çıkarır, çantasına koyar. Bir kadın banyoda çantayı açar ve t-shirt'e bakar. *Dış Ses: "Bakteriler lekelerde hızla çoğalır."* T-shirtteki lekede yaşayan mikroplar konuşur. *Mikrop 1: "Onlar bizim sadece mutfakta, banyoda yaşadığımızı sanıyor. Ha ha. Çamaşırları unuttular." Mikrop 2: "Çamaşırlarda ürediğimizi bilmeyen mi var? 70 milyonun bildiği sır değildir usta!" Mikrop 1: "Hadi çoğalalım. Şimdi başlasak iki günde büyük bir ordu oluruz." Mikrop 2: "E peki bu gelen ne o zaman?"* Lekeye Domestos dökülür. *Mikrop 1: "Domestos! Hem lekeleri temizleyecek hem de bizi."* Mikroplar kaçar. *Dış Ses: "Şimdi artık beyazlarda ve açık renklerde de Domestos hijyenik leke çıkarıcı. Lekelere de bakterilere de hijyenik darbe."* Kadın temizlenmiş t-shirte bakar, Domestos şişeleri görülür.

Reklamı, çalışmanın literatür kısmında ortaya konulan başlıklar üzerinden değerlendirirsek; *Tiksinme Duygusu*'nun görsel ifadesi olarak (Resim 1) gencin terli yüzü, koltuk altındaki leke, bilgisayar animasyonu mikropların vücutlarının yeşil, mor renklerde, biçimsiz ve ciltlerinin parlak, kaygan oluşu verilebilir. Vücutlarının bu biçimsiz ve ıslak yapısı, Dens ve diğerlerinin (2008) araştırmasında olduğu gibi, tiksindirici öğeler olarak kabul edilebilir (s. 255-256). Reklamda insanların bulunduğu düz, aydınlık ortamların aksine yükseltilerin, girinti-çıkıntıların olduğu, karanlık bir ortamdır. Animasyon mikropların yeraldığı diğer Domestos reklamları ve tanıtım çabalarında da benzer formlar, yapılar, karşıtlıklar kullanılmıştır.

Resim 1 : Domestos Reklamı Görselleri 1

Resim 2: Domestos Reklamı Görselleri 2

Kimlik, öteki ve milliyetçilik konusuna bakıldığında; Kurtlar Vadisi dizisi metninde yer alan *"İki kişinin bildiği sır değildir."* cümlesi, dizide Laz Ziya karakterini canlandıran İstemi Betil tarafından *"Çamaşırlarda üretdiğimizi bilmeyen mi var? 70 milyonun bildiği sır değildir usta!"* şeklinde söylenmektedir. Bu sözler, Laz Ziya karakteri, *"Domestos! Hem lekeleri temizleyecek hem de bizi!"* ifadesi ve genel olarak dizinin atmosferi reklamı izleyenlere delikanlılık, iyi-kötü ilişkisi, Türk milliyetçiliği, şiddeti bir araç olarak kullanma vb. fikirlerinin sunumunda rol oynar (Resim 2).

Burada tiksinen – tiksinilen kimliklerinin karşıtlığı şu şekilde ortaya konabilir:

Tiksinen: İnsan, biz, izleyici, iyi, medeni (Avrupalı/Amerikalı), acımayan, kadın, seçkin, modern, tek, kuru, güzel.

Tiksinilen: Mikrop, öteki, Kurtlar Vadisi'nden kurmaca bir karakter, kötü, medeni olmayan (üçüncü dünyadan olabilir), acınılan, erkek, aşağı sınıf, modern öncesi, pek çok, ıslak, çirkin.


Reklamda, çokuluslu kimi yapılanmalara ve politik - ekonomik anlamda dünya üzerinde önemli bir güç olan ABD'nin, Ortadoğu'daki politikalarına karşı bir söylemi olan Kurtlar Vadisi dizisine gönderme yapılmaktadır. Reklamın ardındaki kurumun sermaye yapısına bakıldığında; uluslararası ilişkilerde önemli bir güç ve ekonomik, politik açıdan ABD ile yakın ilişkileri olan İngiltere'den kaynaklı olduğu görülür. Bu anlamda bir çelişki gibi gözükse de reklam, uluslararası bir işletmenin kendisini yerel olarak kabul ettirmesi için stratejik olarak yerel kültürde popülerleşmiş bir metin ile bağlantı kurmaya yönelmektedir. Çünkü bir reklamveren olarak Unilever; ürün portföyündeki çeşitliliğinin *"yerel pazarlarda güçlü kökler ve yerel kültür hakkında birinci el bilgi"* kaynaklandığını, faaliyette bulunduğu ülkelerin manevi ve kültürel değerlerine saygılı olduğunu ve kendini *"çok-yerel çok-uluslu"* bir şirket olarak tanımladığını belirtmektedir ("Unilever'i Tanıyalım"). Örnek olarak incelediğimiz reklamda Türkiye'de popüler olmuş Kurtlar Vadisi temasının kullanılması da yerel pazarlarda güçlü kökler için doğru bir seçim olarak nitelenebilir.

Domestos'un arkasında bulunan işletme olarak Unilever'in bu küresel-yerel birlikteliği anlayışı, Domestos markasının da ardındaki reklam ajansı DLKW Lowe'un, tüketiciye ve reklama bakış açıları değerlendirildiğinde anlam kazanır. DLKW Lowe, yaptıkları işi; birkaç kişi için değil, birçok kişi için yapılan, hakkında konuşulan, paylaşılan, popüler kültürün bir parçası olan iş olarak tanımlamakta; önce değiştirmek istedikleri davranışı tanımladıklarını, ardından da bu davranışa (hangi kanaldan olursa olsun) popülist yaratıcılığı uyguladıklarını belirtmektedir (About DLKW Lowe). Bu reklam özelinde animasyon mikropların yeraldığı kampanya ile tüketiciyi; rakip ürünlere karşı daha yoğun içerikli bir temizlik maddesi kullanmaya yöneltmek için, hijyen kavramını yeniden tanımladıkları ve halk tarafından sempati

duyulacak ve sevilen ünlüler tarafından seslendirilen animasyon karakterler ile kültürel ürünlere atıfları kısaca popülist yaratıcılığı kullandıkları söylenebilir.

Unilever'in ve birlikte çalıştığı ajansın yerel ve küreseli aynı potada eritme çabası eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla değerlendirildiğinde; Batı'ya ait değerlerin üçüncü dünya ülkelerine kültürel unsurlarla zenginleştirilerek sunulmasıyla satış potansiyelinin de artması olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu bağlamda da 35 ülkede pazarlanan (Brands in Action) Domestos'un, reklamlarıyla Türk pazarına beraberinde getirdiği "küresel" temizlik algısının bir anlamda Batı Avrupa kültüründen kaynağını alan bir temizlik kültürü, temizlik algısı olduğunu söylemek mümkündür.

Reklamda *Bilimsel Bilginin Sunumu*'na baktığımızda; mikropların hızla çoğalabildikleri "bilimsel" bilgisi, (iktidarı temsilen, kendinden emin, sert bir erkek sesiyle) dış ses ve (ince ve alaycı bir ses tonuyla, mizahi bir dille) animasyon mikroplar tarafından ifade edilmektedir. Ayrıca, reklamda mikropların sadece laboratuvar ortamında görülebileceği de görsel olarak yansıtılır (Resim 3). Bu da bir reklam stratejisi olarak, izleyiciyi kati bir problem ile karşı karşıya bırakmakta, çözüm için ürünü sunmaktadır.


Resim 3 : Domestos Reklamı Görselleri 3

Reklamda mikropların Domestos'un t-shirt'e dökülüşünü dev bir monitörden izlemeleri teknolojiyi iyi kullandıklarının da bir göstergesidir ki Beck (2011) günümüzde bilimin, risklerin sebeplerinden, *tanımlama araçlarından* ve *çözüm kaynaklarından* biri niteliğini kazandığını; analiz etmesi ve üstesinden gelmesi gereken bir gerçekliğin ve sorunların ürünü ve üreticisi olduğunu ifade eder (s. 232-236).

Bir yandan mikroplar insanın biyoiktidarına karşı gelerek hızla çoğalırken; *Biyoiktidarın* insanları norma uymaya, normalleşmeye zorladığını düşündüğümüzdeyse, bu temizlik maddesini kullanarak "zararlı" mikroorganizmalardan kurtulmak ve temiz, beyaz, sağlıklı bir ortama/giysilere kavuşmak normal olmayı sağlar. Temizliğin normallik sınırlarını çizen reklam ajansı, reklamveren, genel olarak temizlik ürünleri - sağlık sektörü ve devlet; burada iktidarı elinde tutan taraf olarak nitelenebilir. Unilever'in hijyeni ve sağlık standartlarını dünya çapında arttırmak iddiasıyla, Kızıl Haç gibi bilimsel kurumlar ve diğer büyük organizasyonlarla birlikte çalışması ve Dünya Sağlık Forumu'na ev hijyeni alanında katılım da bu iddiayı destekler

niteliktedir (Brands in Action).

Reklamda *Korku*, mikropların gözle görülemeyen fakat yok edilmesi gereken bir kitle olduğu fikriyle karşımıza çıkar. Canetti'ye göre (1998) geçmiş çağlarda korkulan cinler, iblisler bugün bakteriler olarak karşımıza çıkmakta, insan vücuduna saldırmakta ve tehlikeli olabilmektedirler (s. 46-47). Korku yaratma konusunda animasyon mikrop reklam serisine olumsuz tepkiler de gelmiştir. Domestos Beyazlatıcılı Temizleme Spreyine ait reklam İngiltere'de 18 aylık - 5 yaş arası çocuk sahibi 19 ebeveyn tarafından çocukları korkuttuğu gerekçesiyle İngiliz Reklam Yayın Kontrol Merkezi'ne şikâyet edilmiştir (Pearlman, 2012). Domestos Reklamında *Hijyen*'i vurgulamak üzere ürünün içeriğinin (mavi renkli ve koyu kıvamlı sıvı) ön plana çıkartıldığı, temizlenmiş t-shirt'ün kamera önünde kanıt olarak gösterildiği görülmektedir (Resim 4). Hijyen kelimesi reklamda iki kere kullanılmakta (*hijyenik leke çıkarıcı, hijyenik darbe*), darbe kelimesiyle bir tür yıkım tarif edilmektedir.

Resim 4: Domestos Reklamı Görselleri 4

"Detan Maxi Mikro Kapsüllü Böcek İlacı" Reklamı ve Analizi

Eczacıbaşı Girişim Pazarlama A.Ş. için RPM/Radar reklam ajansı tarafından hazırlanan "Mikrokapsüllü böcek ilacı Detan Maxi"nin 2005 tarihli reklam filminde; çekimler için gerçek bir mağara kullanılmış, böcek karakterlerini canlandıran oyuncular özel olarak seçilmiş, kostümlerin gerçeğine benzemesi için yaklaşık üç haftalık ön hazırlık süreci yaşanmıştır (http://www.marketingturkiye.com/yeni/Kampanyalar/DetailedView.aspx?detailedid=615 27.12.2011).

"Detan Maxi Mikro Kapsüllü Böcek İlacı" Reklamı şu şekilde gelişmektedir: Reklam, *"Bu reklam filminde hiçbir insan zarar görmemiştir"* uyarısıyla açılır. *Dış Ses: "Detan Maxi. Böcekleri sıradan spreyler gibi teker teker değil, tümünü yuvalarında topluca imha eder."* Böcek kostümlü adamın üzerine mikrokapsüllü Detan Maxi püskürtülür. Böcek evde bir deliğe girerek diğer böceklere de ilacı bulaştırır. Böceğin üzerindeki bomba patlar ve tüm böcekler ölür. *Dış Ses: "Detan Maxi. Türkiye'nin ilk ve tek mikrokapsüllü böcek ilacı. 6 ay etkili."*

Reklamı, çalışmanın literatür kısmında ortaya konulan başlıklar üzerinden değerlendirirsek; *Tiksinme Duygusunun Sunumu* konusunda, reklamda böceklerin içinde bulundukları karanlık ortam - ki mağara olarak tasarlanmıştır - ve böcek ilacının etkisini göstermesiyle patlayan dinamitle etrafa dağılan vücut parçaları tiksinme duygusunu ön plana çıkarabilecek öğelerdir. Genel olarak baktığımızda bir böceği öldürmek kanlı bir eylemdir ve öldürdükten sonra ortadan kaldırılması gereken bir bedenle karşı karşıya kalırız ki bu tiksinti verici bir durumdur, ölü bedeni kendimizden, yaşadığımız mekândan uzaklaştırmak isteriz.

Marvin (2006), insan yaşamıyla iç içe geçmiş hayvanların, böceklerin öldürülmesini evcil öldürme (domestic killing) olarak tanımlar (s. 15, 17). Bu canlılar sınırları aşar, insana ait alanlara izinsiz girer, insanın barındığı yapıları ele geçirir, yerel kültürel düzeni bozarlar. Kızgınlık, nefret, tiksinti uyandırırlar. İnsanlar için, yıkıcı (evcil hayvanlara, ekinlere zarar vermelerinde dolayı) ve (bulunmamaları gereken yerlerde bulunduklarında) kirleticidirler. Zararlı hayvanları ve haşeratı öldürmek; yıkım, ortadan kaldırma, imha, yok etme, temizleme gibi kavramlarla ifade edilir. Bununla birlikte, hayvan ölüsünün görsel olarak sunumu bir tabudur ve potansiyel bir toplumsal tiksinti yaratır (The Animal Studies Group, 2006, s. 4).

Kimlik, öteki ve milliyetçilik üzerine; bu reklamda hiçbir insanın zarar görmediği şeklinde bir ifadeyle ürünün insanlara zarar vermek değil hayvanları öldürmek amacıyla kullanıldığı ironik bir biçimde anlatılmaktadır. İnsan ve hayvan ayrımının kesin biçimde sözlü ifadesinin yanı sıra; görsel olarak, yukarıdan bakan, iktidar sahibi insan ve aşağıdaki hayvan, temiz açık alandaki insan ve kirli, kapalı alandaki hayvan ayrımına gidildiği de görülmektedir (Resim 5).

Resim 5: Detan Reklamı Görselleri 1

İnsan - Hayvan ayrımının yanı sıra reklamda görsel olarak böceği temsil eden insanların sarışın, mavi gözlü değil de özellikle karakaşlı, kara gözlü bıyıklı, sakallı olması, nefret edilenin etnik kökenini de ima edecek görsel portresinin çizilmesi; bir yandan Orta Doğu coğrafyasından insanların böcek olarak temsili fikrini geri planda sunarken diğer yandan reklamda böceklerin yaşadıkları mağara, ortada bir savaş durumunun olması, saatli

bombanın vurgulanması ve böceklerin yuvalarında topluca imha edileceği bilgisinin verilmesi biraz daha derine inersek izlerkitleyi Türk-Kürt ayrımı ve etnik savaş gibi Türkiye realitelerine doğru genişleyen bir perspektife götürebilir (Resim 6).

Tiksinme burada kişilerarası tiksinmeye dönüşmektedir ki bu da sosyal mesafeyi ve hiyerarşiyi arttırmaktadır. Böceklerin de insanlaştırıldığından yola çıktığımızda, ayırt etme, ötekileştirme; "Yuvalarında topluca imha" gibi II. Dünya Savaşı'nda yaşanan toplu imhayı çağrıştıracak öfkeli, saldırgan sözcüklerle, saatli bomba kelimesinin sonunda ünlem işaretiyle nefret söylemi somutlaşmaktadır.

Resim 6 : Detan Reklamı Görselleri 2

Bilimsel Bilginin Sunumu konusunda, reklamda mikrokapsülün böceğin bedenine yapışması ve gittiği her yerde ölümü engellenemez kılması (Resim 7), bilimsel bilginin kati oluşu üzerine bir yorum olarak eklenebilir.


Resim 7: Detan Reklamı Görselleri 3

Bilimsel ve endüstriyel süreçler dâhilinde insanlar hayvanları öldürmektedirler ki bu da insanın hayvan üzerindeki gücünü/ iktidarını yansıtır (The Animal Studies Group, 2006, s. 4). Zira Hobart (1996) iktidarın zor ve şiddet gibi dışavurumları aracılığıyla kavranabileceğini belirtmiştir (s. 54). Somersan'a göre de (1996) şiddet iktidarın yapışık ikizi, gücün koruyucusudur (s. 49). Reklamda "zararlı" türler üzerinde iktidarı sağlamak için şiddete başvurulduğu, temizleme/imha hareketinin tıpkı etnik temizlik amaçlı bir askeri harekât gibi gerçekleştirildiği ve *"kökünü kurutur"; "yuvalarında topluca imha eder"; "saatli bomba"; "insana zarar gelmemiştir"* gibi sözcük öbeklerinde dilin, şiddeti besleyen bir söylem yaratmak üzere kullanıldığı görülür. Bomba görseli ve ölü böcek bedenleri bunun bir kanıtıdır (Resim 8).

Böceklerin çok hızlı üreyebildikleri "bilimsel" bilgisinden yola çıkarak ürünü ortaya koyan reklamda bu üremeyi durdurmak ve dolayısıyla "zararlı" türlerin oluşturduğu kitleler üzerinde *Biyoiktidar* kurmak gerekliliğine de gönderme yapılır.

Resim 8: Detan Reklamı Görselleri 5

Korku'nun temsili için böcek ilacından korkan ve çığlıklar atarak kaçan böcekler görsel olarak kullanılmıştır (Resim 9). Gerçek hayatta böceklerin insanlardan değil çoğu insanın böceklerden korktuğu gerçeği karşımıza çıkar. Bir kriz anını ifade eden insan – böcek karşılaşmasını dramatize etmek üzere reklamda, korku filmlerinde tehlike anında kullanılan arka fon müziklerine benzer bir müziğe yer verilmiştir.

Resim 9: Detan Reklamı Görselleri 4

Hijyen ve Temizliğin Sunumu dikkate alındığında, hijyenik, aydınlık, beyaz mutfak/ev ile kirli ve karanlık olan, böceklerin yaşadığı yuva/mağara karşıtlığı verilebilir. Rollins (Rollins'ten aktaran Şentürk) hijyenin, nüfusu "normalleştirmek" ve "tekil bir yaşam tarzı aracılığıyla ulusal bir kimlik yaratmanın" temeli olduğunu söyler. Beyaz mutfak hijyen ideolojisi ve cinsiyetçi bakış açısını açığa çıkartmaktadır.

Sonuç

Tiksindirici olanı yok etmek, kendimizi temizlemek üzerine gerçekleştirilen bir reklam söylem analizi çalışması üzerinden yükselen bu çalışmada; ulusal bir işletme olan Eczacıbaşı'na ait Detan ve uluslararası bir işletme olarak Unilever'in Türkiye kolunun temsil ettiği Domestos markalarına ait iki reklam, söylem analizi yöntemiyle analiz edilmiştir.

Genel olarak değerlendirdiğimizde yaşanan; insan, tiksinen "biz" ile mikroorganizma/böcek, tiksinilen "öteki" arasında iktidarı sağlamaya yönelik bir savaştır ki "yaşamak istiyorsan öldürmelisin" ilkesi doğrultusunda biyoiktidarın sahibi aynı zamanda temiz olmanın sınırlarını da çizendir. İktidarın sağlanmasına giden yolda bilimsel bilginin doğruluğu ve gerçekliği gereklidir, reklamda da kesin bir dille ifade edilir. Bilim ve teknolojinin ürünü olan sanayi toplumunun üstünlüğünün izlerine rastlamak mümkündür. Ayrıca mikroplar ve böcekler özelinde sınırları çizilen, modern öncesi düzende, sabit Doğu'da yaşayan *Öteki*; bir anlamda insan olarak "biz"in ve modern dinamizm içinde aydınlanmış olarak yaşayan Türk-Müslüman olarak *Biz*in inşasına yardım eder.

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UTV, The Network Relationship and Reporting the 'Troubles'

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Introduction

Sendall claims that it was not long after the creation of the British Broadcasting Company (hereafter BBC) in 1922 that there were concerns over its monopoly both among members of parliament and the general public asserting 'the very idea of a single public corporation, enjoying unchallenged monopoly control over a channel for the communication of information and ideas, seemed wrong to many thinking people' (Sendall, 1982, Vol. 1, p. 4). Over 30 years later after a very 'long and stormy passage' the Television Act reached the Statute book on the 30 July 1954 and the creation of Independent Television (hereafter ITV) had officially begun. It went on air to a London audience on the 22nd September 1955.

In 1958 one of the areas in the UK still to be served with an ITV service was Northern Ireland. Sendall notes that it was a popular and 'desirable' choice for an independent programme company as 'Here if anywhere was a population with distinctive regional character…' (Sendall, Vol.2, p. 22). Invitations for the contract eventually went out in the autumn of 1958. Sendall states that even in the early stages of the process which resulted in the creation of Ulster Television it was noted by the *Belfast Evening Telegraph* that the Stormont government would presumably 'want to have its say in the appointment' because 'the political implications are considerable'. This unsettled the Director General of the Independent Television Authority [1] (hereafter ITA), Robert Fraser, who was 'deeply conscious'

of the 'great importance in a Northern Ireland context of the Act's requirement of due impartiality' particularly relevant in Northern Ireland due to it's contested position within the UK between the Catholic and Protestant populations (Sendall, Vol.2, p. 23). The new company adopted the name of Ulster Television (hereafter UTV) and went to air on Hallowe'en night 1959. From the outset indications of challenges which the company would encounter were apparent. Between 1956 and 1962 the IRA [2] and allied organisations had launched a campaign of violence. Anderson in a publication for the company's 50th anniversary in 2009 notes: 'The directors of Ulster Television would have known that setting up a commercial television station was not like setting up any other type of business. Television was special and it could make enemies as well as friends' (p. 32). It did not take long for this ability of television to become the biggest challenge for UTV and its staff.

The Civil Rights Movement: Background

Social and Political changes introduced by the British government after WW2 disrupted the convention of Catholic conformity in Northern Ireland, essentially the foundation on which Northern Ireland had been based. In 1948 the construction of the welfare state had direct political implications on the local power structure within the region and on Northern Ireland as a

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1 The ITA had been created by the Television Act in 1954 to oversee the creation of Independent Television.

2 The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was the main Republican paramilitary group which was involved in the Northern Ireland conflict. The central aim of the IRA was to end British control of Northern Ireland and to achieve the reunification of the island of Ireland (http://www.cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/organ/iorgan.htm#ira).

state itself. This new welfare state created employment in middle class occupations such as teaching where it was accustomed that professionals in Northern Ireland served their own religious community. While the Catholic middle class was grew and developed it still remained small and segregated from the large Protestant middle class. Acutely aware of injustices occurring within their community Catholics also gradually became disillusioned with the static politics of the Nationalist Party and from the mid 1960s onwards a group of moderates in alliance with a small number of Protestants in the Liberal and Labour parties were extremely active in a Derry University and housing campaign [3]. By the time 1968 had come around the group had the political and organisational knowledge necessary, along with its newly acquired contacts to launch a civil rights campaign in the city (Bardon 1992, McCann 1993, O'Dochartaigh 1997, Purdie 1990).

The Rise of 'Paisleyism'

The first indications that UTV are becoming concerned with rising tensions in the region are apparent in August of 1964, as the Regional Officer for Northern Ireland in his monthly reports to the ITA [4] discusses the emergence of Loyalist leader Ian Paisley and the possibility of sectarian strife once again materialising in Northern Ireland [5]. These concerns were also clearly evident within UTV's news output at the time. In an early report to camera on the 21st of June in 1966 Bill McGookin claims that the Prime Minister, Terence O' Neill, in a recent speech 'nailed Paisleyism for the evil thing he believes it to be' informing the audience that he declared the Paisley faction as 'mindless individuals who used unspeakable language in the streets'. McGookin also continues to quote the Prime Minister who branded Paisley as a 'demagogue' whose followers are not a political party but use the 'the sordid techniques of gangsterism' which has its 'parallel with the rise of Nazis to power'. Throughout this piece to camera which lasted two minutes UTV, while not overtly, allow the views of the Prime Minister Terence O' Neill to be aired without opposition. The piece, entirely dedicated to quoting the Prime Minister, discusses only one sentence of his resistance to extreme Republicanism, with the rest of the time committed to his condemnation of Paisleyism. It is then again in a report covering June 1966 that the Regional Officer informs the ITA that Paisley's popularity is on the increase and that this puts pressure on the Authority to ensure that he is given adequate coverage within their programming:

...It is not difficult to foresee a situation arising, possibly in the near future where the authority may be faced with the necessity of providing platform for Paisley in any programme which tends to be critical of him…I have told the company that so far as Independent Television is concerned, we must live strictly according to the letter in the Television Act. If we interpret any 'liberal' interpretation of it we shall be in serious trouble [6].

Aware that UTV's best achievements in programming have been in community relations the Regional Officer also raises concerns in June 1968 that the BBC in Northern Ireland (hereafter BBCNI) appear to be striding for a more community relations approach arguing that for broadcasters it is most difficult to build bridges between the two points of view and that UTV's performance 'had been courageous for the most part…It has not only reflected but it had ameliorated' adding that any competition with the sphere of community relations 'will provide a very serious challenge to UTV' [7]. UTV have throughout the past 50 years continued with their enduring and heavy community relations approach which while instilled from its inception in 1959 was particularly anchored as tensions in Northern Ireland evolved throughout the 1960s. Essentially it became a coping mechanism for the company who would position themselves firmly at the heart of the community focusing on the effects of the political situation on the population of Northern Ireland, particularly in areas which were to become affected by division which erupted in October 1968.

The Derry Riots

When the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association [8] (hereafter NICRA) announced a civil rights march for the 5th of October in 1968 not even they could have predicted the lasting consequences that events of the day would have on the history of Northern Ireland. While many Catholics had been reluctant to support it initially when the Stormont government banned the march even moderates showed up to participate in the protest. As images of the RUC launching a baton charge against the crowd were captured and screened worldwide the event generated massive local and international media coverage. The incident presented substantial problems for UTV in relation to 'balance'. The Regional Officer in a report covering the month of October 1968 argues that initial UTV reporting was heavily weighted on the side of civil rights protestors and interviews

3   The Derry Housing Association (DHA) was set up in October 1965. The association provided flats for young couples who could, after two years, obtain a return of half the rent they had paid to put down a deposit on the purchase of a house. The association also undertook the building of new houses. Some of the housing plans of the DHA fell foul of the Unionist controlled Londonderry Corporation who refused planning permission. It was claimed that planning permission was denied because of the likely effect on the religious and political balance of certain key wards in the city (http://www.cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/organ/dorgan.htm#dhac).

4   Regional Officer for Northern Ireland Monthly Reports, August 1964, ITA/IBA/Cable Authority archive, Bournemouth University, 29/IA 2462-2464.

5   Northern Ireland Regional Officers Monthly Reports, May 1966, ITA/IBA/Cable Authority archive, Bournemouth University, 29/IA 2462-2464.

6   Regional Officer for Northern Ireland Monthly Reports, June 1966, ITA/IBA/Cable Authority archive, Bournemouth University, 29/IA 2462-2464.

7   Regional Officer for Northern Ireland Monthly Reports, June 1968, ITA/IBA/Cable Authority archive, Bournemouth University, 29/IA 2462-2464. See also Cathcart 1984, Curtis 1998 and McLoone (1996).

8   The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was officially set up on the 9th of April 1967. The objectives of the association were:

1. To defend the basic freedoms of all citizens.

2. To protect the rights of the individual.

3. To highlight all possible abuses of power.

4. To demand guarantees for freedom of speech, assembly and association

5. To inform the public of their lawful rights (Purdie, 1990, p.133).

'all presented a local indictment of the Minister for Home Affairs'[9]. Politicians who took part in the march all castigated the RUC for their brutality, arguing that their actions were unwarranted. Interviewed after the riots, Minister for Parliament (hereafter MP) Gerry Fitt (at the time Republican Labour, later Social Democratic and Labour Party) argues that there was no provocation for the baton charges by the RUC and there was no justification for the force which they used against the protestors 'I do not believe that the police should have used brutality the way they did this afternoon. It is obvious that in this city of Derry which is so symbolic of all the inherent injustices which are contained within unionism that they could not afford to let the people of Derry to take a stand'. Fitt was filmed after the riot with the blood still running from his head onto his white shirt from where he had been hit by a baton. This image conjures up for the audience associations with cruelty, persecution and injustice. These associations would become apparent not only in Northern Ireland and Britain but across the world as it sat up and took notice of a campaign which was beginning to be heard. Minister for Home Affairs, William Craig, was forced to continuously defend the actions of the RUC which he did by arguing that if they had not taken the measures which they had done then a more serious riot situation would have developed. An interview with two IRA leaders aired on UTV a couple of weeks previous to the march had also 'provided him with the means whereby he could smear the civil rights movement'[10] after they had stated that they were instructing their members to participate in various kinds of organisations in Northern Ireland in the hop of achieving their aim of a socialist Republic[11]. In the days following the riots it also became necessary for UTV to avoid swinging into imbalance in the other direction as they tried to establish an 'overall' balance within their coverage surrounding events in Derry. The 5th of October proved a crucial moment in the representation of Northern Ireland in mainstream media as sectarian tension and violence became the primary focus of reporting and would remain so for the next three decades.

Battle of the Bogside

On the 12th of August riots broke our after an Apprentice Boys[12] parade in Derry. After initial restraint the RUC launched a baton

charge against a group of Catholic youths who had gathered to protest at the parade. This charge by the RUC changed even the minds of many moderate Catholics who now essentially gave up on their efforts of preventing violence. Days of rioting ensued with resistance by now extensive in the Catholic community. Due to the unrest UTV made a number of policy decisions and went over to an entirely hard news situation, also agreeing to interrupt programmes to go to news bulletins and have news flashes at programme breaks. With the growing conflict it also became apparent that UTV were going to have to deal with increasing problems in relation to networked news and current affairs programming which while perhaps considered information in 'mainland' Britain, could be interpreted as incitement in Northern Ireland. As the regional broadcaster in Northern Ireland UTV made it clear to the ITA that due to their experience and understanding of life in the community they must have the opportunity to make editorial decisions on all content to be screened in the region. The pressures and strains which UTV staff were under did not go unrecognised by the ITA but UTV often felt that the network did not completely understand the company's difficulties and that they often put further strain on the company and its resources. This is highlighted in a letter from UTV's Managing Director in September 1969 to the Director General of the ITA:

> …this situation will require a rethink. Apart from problems of heavy local coverage, we had to cope with 'visiting firemen' from such as ITN, Thames and Granada. There had been the usual constant endeavour to maintain balance…the task is hard. Consultation with Ulster Television has mainly been god but in some cases disgracefully bad…[13]

Towards the end of 1970 these familiar difficulties and dilemmas were still occurring in UTV. The Regional Officer also argues that within UTV itself, notably among executive members, there was a 'reluctance to tackle difficult issues', particularly within the current affairs field[14]. Central to this judgement as mentioned before, was the eagerness within UTV to have community relations at the heart of the news and current affairs policy and agenda.

Omagh Bombing:Background

The Omagh Bombing occurred on the 15th of August 1998. The bomb, which exploded in the Market Street area of the town, killed 28 and injured over 200 members of not only communities in Counties Tyrone and Donegal, but also Spain. Victims were primarily women and children who had been shopping on a Saturday afternoon during the summer break. The bombing is widely believed to be the worst atrocity which

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9   Regional Officer for Northern Ireland Monthly Reports, October 1968, ITA/IBA/ Cable Authority archive, Bournemouth University, 29/IA 2462-2464.

10   Regional Officer for Northern Ireland Monthly Reports, September 1968, ITA/ IBA/Cable Authority archive, Bournemouth University, 29/IA 2462-2464.

11   This interview was an item in UTV's current series *It's All Happening* aired on the 17th September 1968.

12   One of the smaller 'Loyal Order' organisations; the others being the 'Orange Order' and the 'Royal Black Institution'. The Apprentice Boys is a Protestant / Loyalist organisation set up in memory of the group of apprentice boys who shut the gates of Derry (Londonderry) on the approaching army of King James II on 7 December 1688. This is the event which led to the siege of Derry (which lasted 105 days until 28 July 1689) and which is commemorated annually by the Apprentice Boys of Derry. The main march organised by the Apprentice Boys takes place in Derry each year on a date close to 12 August. There is an additional parade in Derry each December (the 'Lundy Parade') to commemorate the closing of the gates (http://www.cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/organ/aorgan.htm).

13   Managing Director, UTV letter to Director General ITA, London, 7th September 1969. ITA/IBA/ Cable Authority archive, Bournemouth University, 5005/16, IBA 01089.

14   Regional Officer for Northern Ireland Monthly Reports, November 1970, ITA/IBA/Cable Authority archive, Bournemouth University, 111/IA 2462-2464.

Northern Ireland has seen in the history of its 'Troubles'. It was highly condemned by all sections of the community as it came at a time of relative peace and political acceptance in the months following the Good Friday Agreement [15]. The 'real IRA' or Óglaigh na hÉireann accepted responsibility for the explosion.

'Terrorism as Cause'

UTV themselves were to be the first, outside of the paramilitary group, to be informed that a planned explosion was underway. The perpetrators of the bomb had rang UTV's newsroom twice that afternoon informing staff that a bomb had been left at the courthouse in Omagh's main street [16]. Having passed the information on the RUC then evacuated the area round the courthouse but upon the information provided, ended up directing the public into Market Street where the bomb exploded. In a special news report that evening UTV do not hesitate in laying all accountability with, as they state 'so-called real IRA' as reporter Ivan Little declares the mindset behind the explosion as 'savage and senseless' and that the culprits set out to murder innocent civilians arguing:

Already it's patently clear that this appalling massacre caused by the terrorists giving the wrong location for their massive and deadly bomb...a phone caller rang Ulster Television's newsroom twice around half past two saying he was speaking for Óglaigh na hÉireann, the so-called real IRA, and after giving a code word added that a 500 pound bomb had been left at the courthouse in Omagh's main street. The RUC swiftly moved in to clear the area round the courthouse. They sheparded hundreds of shoppers to what they believed was towards the sanctuary of Market Street well away from where the terrorists left their bomb.

There is some implicit cogent imagery that can be decoded here which is that of the victims of the bombing being led to their death like a flock of sheep trusting that they had been protected. This imagery is then further strengthened as Little asserts 'scores of people stood behind white tapes strung across market street where they believed they were safe from danger'. It is highly evident from their initial reports on the day that UTV have adopted a 'terrorism as cause' paradigm. Essentially the 'who, what, where and when' is reported, but the context, the 'why', is not'. The rational basis of the ideas and actions of the terrorists have not been acknowledged (Butler, 1995).

This paradigm is manifest throughout the rest of UTV's reports in the week following the explosion. The audience's attention is drawn to the fact that this event has caused absolute carnage and destruction and these 'terrorists' remain a threat to the very

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15 On Friday the 10th of April all parties in Northern Ireland who had taken part in peace negotiations sign an agreement. This agreement was later approved by voters in two referendums both in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on the 22nd May 1998. The Democratic Unionist Party however opposed the Agreement.

16 It was common during the period of the 'Troubles' for newsrooms in Northern Ireland to take a code word from a paramilitary group should they receive a phonecall that dealt with this sort of information. The code word was then passed on to the RUC would determine it's authenticity.

fabric and foundation of society, the family. This is perhaps most evident in the opening address by Mike Nesbitt in *UTV Live at Six* on the evening of the 17th where he reports from the scene in Omagh as he firmly declares a stance against terrorism.

During the course of this programme you will inevitably hear us talk about politics, security initiatives, about early release of prisoners and decommissioning the so-called 'big picture'. But for the people of Omagh the 'big picture' is behind the landrovers. Terrorists came here on Saturday and they decommissioned, they decommissioned 28 lives permanently. They decommissioned 220 others many of whom have injuries which are both serious and permanent and they have left hundreds more traumatised with a recurring nightmare which will not go away. And lets knock on the head immediately the notion that this was some sort of mistake, that the bomber could not get to the intended location because even if that were true the bomber still had an option, the option to get out of the car and shout a warning to people. The bomber didn't take that option, the bomber ran away saving their own life, knowing fully it was at the cost, loss of many others, and why? These people say because they have a vision of a better and fairer future than is available through the Good Friday Agreement but they don't tell us why they deny a future to an 18 month old baby, why a grandfather had lost his wife, a daughter and a granddaughter. Why a father and son are dead and why a Spanish teacher and student lay dead, 28 dead. So for those who believe these people are paramilitaries, can we finally agree they are not-they are terrorists!, they terrorise, they kill, they killed 28 people.

Nesbitt employs a number of linguistic constructs such as colloquialisms, incomplete sentences, variations of emphasis and rhetoric to mimic a speaking voice, a person talking informally but with passionate indignation. Through the use of rhetoric in particular Nesbitt has created a space for viewers to occupy which allows them to respond accordingly but accurately. For example, a viewer whether consciously or subconsciously will respond to the address claiming 'definitely, they have absolutely no right to deny a young 18th month old baby a future'. Finally, there are a number of modal expressions throughout this statement which not only signify judgement (for example, terrorists decommissioned 28 lives permanently) but also suggests 'an individual subjectivity' encoded within the text which underscores that the individual (Nesbitt) has the authority and knowledge required to pass judgment (Fowler, 1991). The language used by journalists, in particular Mike Nesbitt, is highly personalised and clearly designed through a number of linguistic techniques to evoke an emotive response within the viewer. As evident within many local broadcast institutions the distinctions between a political and terrorist event and human interest story are blurred (Franklin and Murphy, 1998) with much of the discourse surrounding the event being de-politicised in favour of more culturally familiar narratives. UTV's reporting of Omagh fits seamlessly into Schlesinger's assessment of television news and terrorism as he argues:

Television news, because it deals with immediate events, presents the 'who, what, where and when' of the latest incidence in its reporting of terrorism. Because it cannot be present at every violent event, it often makes use of pictures of the aftermath, and this directs the audience's attention to the connection between terrorism and its horrible consequences. In particular, television like the press tends to focus on those victims who are most vulnerable and innocent: women, children and animals. Where the victims are members of security forces or the police, attention is drawn to their lovable human qualities (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p.42).

As well as this UTV's community relations approach, which became embedded within the company's news policy and agenda in the late 1960s is also evident in its reporting of Omagh and is most manifest when dealing with the victims of the atrocity and the destruction of family life, the very fabric and foundation and society.

Conclusion

From it inception in October 1959 UTV became acutely aware of the special position it would hold as a regional broadcaster in Northern Ireland. The ability of television to 'make enemies as well as friends' became the biggest challenge for the company and its staff. As early as August 1964, four years before the period which was to become know as the 'Troubles' began major concerns were raised within the company and by the Regional Officer for Northern Ireland regarding the emergence of Loyalist leader Ian Paisley as they feared that sectarian strife would once again materialise in Northern Ireland. This fear was reflected within UTV's news output at the time as they became aware of their necessity of providing Paisley with a platform in relation to the 1964 Television Act. While the company's community relations approach had been instilled from its inception it became particularly anchored throughout this period as tensions in the region evolved throughout the 1960s. Essentially it became a coping mechanism for the company who would position themselves firmly at the heart of the community focusing on the effects of the political situation on the local population.

As images of the RUC launching a baton charge against a group of civil rights protestors in Derry on the 5th of October 1968 were screened worldwide the event generated massive local and international coverage. Events of the days provided UTV with substantial problems in relation to the Television Act which required due impartiality. Initial UTV reporting was 'heavily weighted on the side of the civil rights protestors and interviews presented 'a local indictment of the Minister of Home Affairs' and the RUC. It did however also became necessary for UTV in the days following the riots to avoid swinging into imbalance in the other direction as they tried to establish an 'overall' balance within their coverage surrounding events in Derry. The 5th of October proved a crucial moment in the representation of Northern Ireland in mainstream media as sectarian tension and

violence became the primary focus of reporting and would remain so for the next three decades. As days of rioting ensued following an Apprentice Boys parade in Derry on the 12th of August in 1969 resistance of the RUC and local Government became extensive within the Catholic community. Following this development UTV adopted a hard news policy and due to increasing issues concerning networked news and current affairs productions on the Irish question also requested licence to make editorial decisions on all content to be screened in the region. While pressures on the company did not go unrecognised by the ITA, UTV often felt that they did not have a substantial understanding of life in Northern Ireland and often added to their difficulties putting further strain on the company and its resources. These difficulties were still occurring towards the end of the 1970s and the hard news policy which they adopted was short lived as community relations returned to the heart of its news and current affairs policy and agenda.

On the 15th of August 1998 UTV were the first outside of the 'real IRA' to be informed that a planned explosion was underway in Omagh town centre as its newsroom received two telephone calls from the paramilitary group. The information provided to the company was false and the explosion resulted in the deaths of 28 people, primarily women and children. UTV however do not hesitate in laying all accountability with the 'so-called real IRA' and adopt a 'terrorism as cause' paradigm within their news broadcasts following the explosion. While the 'who, what, where and when' is reported, the context, the 'why' is not. All background causes and basis for the actions of the 'terrorists' are excluded in favour of more culturally familiar narratives. Distinctions between a political and terrorist event and human interest story are blurred as UTV's community relations approach is once against manifest.

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Mourn for Today: Melancholy and (Be)Longing in Cypriot Documentaries

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After 30 years of the seperation of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots since 1974, the border, called the green line or the buffer zone, were opened on April 23, 2003. Until that time, the people from both communities never had the chance to visit their old-houses, old-friends, old-homeland or to meet other community members across the partitioning border. The people who were middle aged in 1974, were not young any more and the people who weren't born in 1974, were nearly at their middle-age. A Turkish Cypriot (in *Which Cyprus,* 2003) during her visit to her old-home says: "I ran away from this village at the age of 11. My children have only seen their village now. Right now I feel born again."

After the doors across "the green line" were opened, the people from both communities started to make films in various forms but mostly as documentaries. The people started to deal with the past not only in the film format, but also in all kinds of formats like books, interviews in newspapers, tv programmes, etc. The filmmakers tried, and are still trying to dig their or their parents/communities' past, roots of the migrant parents or grandparents, missing people, atrocities, etc.

For most of the Turkish Cypriots, the date of rupture in the history is late 1950s when the Greek Cypriots intensified their attacks towards Turkish Cypriots whereas for almost all Greek Cypriots it is 1974, for it has caused more deaths, missings and displacement for them. Although there is a difference between the two communities' perceptions of the past/history according to their own suffering, 1974 is quite important historically for both peoples of Cyprus for its division of the island with a border into two, as north and south, and radically as past and present. From that moment, the past has always referred to the time before 1974. Therefore, this split always had a strong effect on Cypriots' memories and the way they tell the stories of the past as well. The border, the Green Line, blocked our minds to see the past as a part of present-and-future, so it has created a rupture from our pasts—and from our homes/identities. The other side, the past, and the previous homes, were like "forbidden lands" before the green line was opened; like a closed box that has been kept locked for almost 30 years.

The border created such a sharp split in minds; it was almost impossible for the people to tell different/or similar stories in any other format. There was only the official story that was heard through those years that the Greeks killed us and that we were the only victims of this story (This is the Turkish Cypriot version). And the other side had the same approach in the official story with the opposite identities of the persecutors and victims. The past, or the history of the past, as a result of that border was like a photograph, like a still image for the members of both communities; an image which was frozen, and the memory that that image provoked seemed unchangeable. What has been experienced in the past, during the war, was irreversible like a photograph, which freezes the moment. Therefore, I call this period from 1974 to 2003 as the "photographic period/or/still time" for a number of reasons; first of all, for both communities, the main symbol of their victimization has always been the photographs of the ones who had been killed by the other/enemy; and secondly, the forbidden other half of the island's being for all those years could only be imagined through photographs, even if they were in the memories, in the minds.

Then, I can say that the past was frozen in terms of history and image; so was the future.

Because it has shaken the past into 'movement' and made the dreams for the future possible, I will call the period which starts with 2003 as the "moving period/or/moving time". In this new 'time', re-membering the past in different forms became the new paradigm, and the production of video documentary tended to increase in recent years in the island. This tendency, which is formed in documentary towards filming especially the past traumas and losses in Cyprus, raised some questions in my mind:

In which moments of the films do tears well up in our eyes? And is it possible to analyse these moments of the films very similar to the photographs' effect? Is it possible to call these moments, as 'paused' film pieces that are identical with the photographic image, which drives us into a silenced cry and an endless sorrow? Has the repressed in the photographic period become surplus through this documentary film form? My purpose in this paper is to read those "paused moments" of the documentaries about Cyprus. (These moments are from the films titled *Our Wall*, *Voice of Blood*, and *Which Cyprus*.)

The films whose moments I have chosen to analyse have an interesting chronology of their production years. One of them, *Our Wall*, was made in 1993, ten years before the Green Line was opened and most of the interviews was made at the Greek side with the Greeks in majority. *Voice of Blood* and *Which Cyprus* were made in 2003, when there was an opportunity to cross the border and reach the other side. *Voice of Blood* is a film that has been made by a Greek Cypriot, about the mass slaughters committed by Greek Cypriots towards Turkish Cypriots. And the last one, *Which Cyprus* was made by a Turkish journalist from Turkey after the doors were opened, and is based on interviews. If I had to categorize these documentaries, I would say that they share more or less the same concern towards the partition and how people see their past-and-future. All of them have the same characteristics in their style: voice-over narration, archival footage, interviews, music, etc.

Silencing moments: **What cannot be told?**

I will focus on the moments in these films that silence us in despair and sadness: Which moments of the films locks us to the screen and fills the gap between the screen and the audience and eliminates the distance we have with what has been shown on the screen?

Roland Barthes (1982), in his book *Camera Lucida*, makes a distinction between two different experiences of perceiving a photograph. One of them, which he calls the *studium*, defines the level of the coded meaning; the meaning which the photographer intended to code by framing the object in a particular way; it can be effective or even devastating, but it is mostly definable and familiar in one way or another. The impression we get from a photograph evokes possible comments on it; and we can speak

for the photograph like "very beatiful", "touching", "very sad", etc. On the other hand, *punctum* is defined by Barthes as the one that has something in it which is not definable, which is beyond the coded meaning; every time that you try to fix the meaning it flees from your view/mind. One may find oneself looking at a photograph without finding the exact words to define his/her feelings towards the object of that photograph; that kind of photograph silences the one who is looking at it rather than calling him/her to speak about it. The photograph's *punctum* is that the photograph makes us turn back to our inside, our very subjectivity, our silenced memory, our feelings of lost happiness, or our melancholy. And I see a link with this definition of photograph's punctum effect with Zizek's explanation of the melancholy. Zizek (2000) goes back to Freud's distinction between mourning and melancholy: "Freud opposed normal mourning (the successful acceptance of a loss) to pathological melancholy (the subject persists in his or her narcissistic identification with the lost object).... In the process of the loss, there is always a remainder that cannot be integrated through the work of mourning, and the ultimate fidelity is the fidelity to this remainder. Mourning is a kind of betrayal, the second killing of the (lost) object, while the melancholic subject remains faithful to the lost object, refusing to renounce his or her attachment to it" (p. 658). The thing in a still or moving image that cannot be told or defined is the remainder of what has been lost.

1. Filling the gap

I would like to start with one scene which seems to me very touching: In *Which Cyprus* the very first day of the opening of the "Green Line", the people have been shown at the check points waiting in the queue and then running to cross the border when allowed. I am taking this scene as the fundamental scene with the question it raises: Why and where were they running? Is there any reasonable answer to that question? I doubt it! I don't think that there is such an answer which could add a rationale to the people's act of running with such an urgency, like they are running from something (like they are fleeing from prison).

One may not specify where they were running to. Apparently, there is no possibility for all those people to have an urgency all together unless they were running from a threat. If you share the same culture, you too cross the frame, leave your audience position and become one of them as sharing that feeling of urgency. Or at least it would strike the one with curiosity, if there is nothing in common. I believe that that moment of crossing the border in that scene fills the gap between the viewer—I am refering to myself at least—and the frame, and has a punctum value by cutting off all the possible reasonable explanations and keeps you locked to the screen. It is the thing which could be very subjective in a certain way that goes beyond the coded meaning. Keeping Cypriots behind the border for all those years brought suppression with it. While this running is towards the other side, it is also a form of running from the half-uncompleted/supressed self. In the same film, a Greek Cypriot journalist says

"They stole our 30 years. Now we have to fill the gap." This is melancholic, because you can't go back to the past; so the Greek journalist is talking about an 'act of the impossible'. In "Which Cyprus", one of the interviewees,—he is also a friend of mine—goes to visit his old-village and says: " I will stroll around here by myself. I will stay on the hills as much as I want, go to our fields, fly kites as long as I want. I will walk around the village as much as I want." Here we see a similar emphasis on 'as much as I want', as if it can fill the gap, but we also know that it is just a visit to his '(old-)homeland'.

2. Empty Chairs from *Which Cyprus*

A Greek Cypriot man talks about his college experience that took place in 1974. In his class there were 9 Turkish Cypriots and he tells that when he went back to school in September, after the military operation, following the summer holiday, there were nine empty chairs in his class. Then he tells how he felt when he first crossed the border in 2003 when it was opened (He is talking about the buffer zone):

"Strange experience, you've got the Greek Cypriot check point on one side, and this strange, one hundred meters, and there is the Turkish Cypriot check point on the other side and this hundred meters are so quiet, so strange, it is like complete silence.. all around there is conflict, there is pain… I hear voices, I looked up, and I saw my friends. Adnan, Ali, Mehmet…" He tells the names of his friends who had to leave the school like Ali Faik, a Turkish Cypriot telling the names of the ones he lost in 1974: My father, Hasan Süleyman was 54 years old; my mother was 55 years old, Ayşe Hasan; my sisters, one 20 and the other one 15 years old, Kıymet Hasan ve Narin Hasan; my wife, Mualla Ali Faik, 30-31 years old; my three children, 3 years old, 2.5 years old and 16 days old… The elder one Güldem, the second Özdem, and the 16 days old -Selden." When he tells the names of the family members he lost, he stops from time to time and sighs silently—recalling the names is a strong part of remembering.

3. A child witness *who never cried* after what he saw…

And now Şafak Nihat's story from *Voice of Blood II: Searching for Selden* (Selden is the name of a little 16 days old baby-girl who had been executed by the Greek Cypriots in the village called Muratağa).

Şafak Nihat in *Voice of Blood* is talking about what happened at their village in 1974 at the time of the military operations. He tells how he found the corpses in the field: 18 days after the operation he was running in the fields of his village and goes near the hole where he used to find old batteries and collected them to play. He sees something weird in that garbage dump. He says that the garbage was like two pyramids that he had never seen before. And that there was a pungent smell when he went closer. And he sees an arm of a child wearing a pyjama and he understands that the villagers they were searching for for a while now were lying there all together, dead. He cannot continue, clears his throat, pauses for a while, he breaths deeply, sniffs and closes his eyes.. Then he keeps describing what he saw in detail. And he says that after that day—he was 14 years old—and after what he saw, he has never been able to cry again… At the very moment he tells this, he closes his eyes again, clears his throat over and over, changes his sitting position, looks somewhere up, closes his mouth, then he tries to continue his story and tell why he couldn't cry while he was trying to cut that cry. He says "Because I don't think that I could live through anything worse than that, and that I could not see anything worse than that.."

Conclusion: *Could a human being do it?*

In these documentaries, interviewees who side themselves with peace, and with the discourse that the Greeks and the Turks could live together again, keep saying that *they* were humans as well. This insistent remark on 'the other's being human too' needs to be taken into focus. In *Voice of Blood*, a Turkish Cypriot man, one of the interviewees, who saw the corpses after the mass murder in his village when he was a child, asks this question: "how on earth could a human being do this to another human being?" In *Our Wall*, the old Turkish Cypriot woman tells a story of how she explained to a little Greek Cypriot girl that they both are humans and there was no need for the little girl to be scared of her. In that story she asks her to see the similarities of their bodies: they both have two eyes, they both have two legs, etc. So, here again, being human seems to supply sufficient explanation for peace. In *My Cyprus*, a Greek Cypriot young woman, Maria Sakallı says: "We used to not like Turkish Cypriots and we used to say that the Turks are Barbarian and they took our homes and they killed our relatives. And even in the school—we always learned that Turkey was the enemy. When I met Turkish Cypriot people I realised that **they're all humans** like us and that we have nothing to seperate us." She says that she has realised that Turkish Cypriots "are all humans" as they are. This common discourse on the other's being human too could be found in many texts, in people's daily talks, in tv programs, repeatedly used as an explanation but whichnever an explains.

Here, I am going to finish with Ann Kaplan's (2005) argument that telling and re-telling the stories, or capturing the reality in the retelling is a way of comprehending the incomprehensible! How could a human being do this to another human being? We know that it is not the right question, because, throughout history, it has always been the humans who killed the others. But on the other hand, despite all the academic works that explain how those kinds of conflicts might have occurred in history, there is always a question which insistently remains: "How on earth could a human being do this to the other(s)…" This is melancholic.

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How to Establish Enduring Peace: Lessons from the Rwandan and Irish Peace Processes

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The complex conflict in Darfur, one of the most violent and enduring disputes of the last decade, often labeled as identity-based and which has led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the displacement of millions more, is approaching its end. Scholars, the international community and the country's leaders should start envisioning an efficient peace process, capable of ensuring social stability and reconciliation and of preventing future violence from reoccurring. One of the best manners to attain this goal is by drawing lessons from peace processes implemented by countries considered to have already experienced identity-based conflicts, such as Northern Ireland, which in 1998 ended an enduring conflict between Catholics and Protestants, and Rwanda, that in 1994 came out of a highly destructive genocide. Even though their identity-based disputes had different causes and durations, Ireland and Rwanda adopted similar peace processes that were politically constructed and focused more on putting the past behind than reconciling the formerly disputing groups. Both peace processes failed to ensure enduring peace, as they neither reflected the populations' needs and expectations about peace and the future of their countries nor addressed the post-conflict social tensions and hatred.

I will commence my argument by giving a brief historic account of the causes that led to identity frictions in Ireland and Rwanda. Secondly, I will engage with existing literature on conflict causes, focusing particularly on greed and grievance theories, and challenge the notion of "identity-related conflict." For the purposes of this essay, "identity-based conflicts" shall refer to conflicts labeled by numerous scholars and politicians as generated primarily by ethnic and/or racial, religious, gender and class tensions. Afterwards, I will highlight the similarities between the two peace processes, while analyzing the key problems they faced. I will conclude not by proposing a universally successful reconciliation model, but by underscoring some central elements that, if implemented, could increase the likelihood of a peace process' efficiency.

Historic Contextualizatıon Of The Rwandan And Irish Conflicts:

Behind the Irish and Rwandan genocides lie similarly complex, but different historical socio-economic and political realities that, combined, gradually led to a build-up of tensions and eventually to conflict. Many scholars and politicians have reduced the causes behind the Rwandan genocide to ethnic motivations and Hutu power ideology, centered around affirming Hutu superiority and expressing outrage at Hutus' past oppression under the Tutsi minority's power control during the Belgian colonial rule (Gourevitch. 2009; Lindner. 2001). The Irish conflict was similarly oversimplified and explained to be caused by the region's division according to religious and political lines, with the western part being largely Catholic and supporting the reunification of Ireland and unification under a Dublin government, and the Eastern side being largely Protestant wanting it to remain part of the United Kingdom. (Curran & Sebenius, 2003; Cairns & Darby, 1998).

However, intertwined with these issues that undoubtedly played a key role in causing the conflicts, other factors equally contributed to building up inter-group tensions and sparked

violence. Thus, Tracy Kidder (2010) emphasizes that, in Rwanda, colonial legacies regarding Tutsi superiority and racial divisions, environmental degradation as well as international aid allocated unevenly between the two groups ultimately led to the genocide. Additionally, the economic and political crises that Rwanda had faced in the 1980s and early 1990s and the fragile regional and class base of a political faction determined to hold on to state power at any cost also contributed to rising tensions between the two groups (Hintjens. 1999).

In Northern Ireland, historical legacies and socio-economic inequalities play important roles in explaining the conflict (Cairns & Darby, 1998). While the Irish people had been in sporadic conflicts with the English due to England's control of their resources since the 12th century, the conflict was intensified in the 17th century by the arrival of large numbers of Scottish Protestants attracted by exploitative opportunities (Tonge. 1998). By the 18th century, the Protestant colonizers became the majority population owning 95% of the land in the northern part of Ireland. (ibid. 1998) After years of colonist oppression and native rebellion, in 1921, the island was partitioned into two provinces, the future Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Since then, several periods of increased violence have swept Ireland, with the latest one, known as The Troubles (1968-1998), commencing with a Catholic civil rights campaign deploring "Protestant discrimination against Catholics in the areas of jobs, education, housing, and local elections" (Cairns & Darby 1998, p. 755).

Challenging Greed And Grievances Conflict Theories And Identity-Based Conflicts

The factors generating the Irish and Rwandan conflicts provide important insight for the literary dispute regarding 'grievance versus greed' as the determining causes for conflicts' onset. According to some scholars, conflicts reflect elite competition over valuable resources, concealed behind appeals to collective grievance, which become mechanisms to mobilize the masses for private gain (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004). Other scholars have argued that conflict stems from grievance, resulting from perceived group differences, in particular in terms of access to opportunities and benefit distribution, based on historical conditions (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2007). These latter authors further argue that the creation of enduring and differentiated identity groups is essential for mobilizing groups in taking violent actions against these inequalities (Tilly. 1978; Gurr. 2000).

Critiquing the separation between these two theoretical approaches, certain experts have suggested greed and grievance may be complementary explanations for conflict, as greed may lead to grievances and vice versa (Murshed &Tadjoeddin, 2007). They also emphasize that, while greed and/or grievance may be necessary causes for civil war's outbreak, they are not sufficient, as there are many countries which, despite having conditions pre-disposing them to civil war, do not descend into war.

Nevertheless, the Irish and Rwandan conflicts suggest that conflict can be sparked and maintained by a mixture of greed and grievance, as greed is an embedded component of grievance. In direct response to the greed theory, it must be emphasized that, in the case of elite-driven conflicts, which not all of them are, it is difficult for a researcher ever to determine what motivates the elites to instigate the general public to violence in the first place and to understand how their motivations might vary over time. Even if accepting the greed hypothesis that greed-driven elites might prompt people to enter conflict so as to gain personal profits, people could hardly be mobilized into starting and perpetuating conflict, without their sense of collective identity and grievance against the other group being powerful and enduring.

As for greed itself, it is not characteristic only of the elites, but of the general public as well. In entering a conflict, a group does not simply wish to gain equality with another group, but demonstrate its superiority and replace the other group from power, take control over the resources and access rights, benefits and economic opportunities. In turn, the group in power deems itself entitled to the benefits it possesses and enters conflict so as to maintain them. In both Rwanda and Northern Ireland, group identity and "othering" the opposing group was powerful and an ideology of group superiority over the "other" was coupled with a sense of entitlement to control resources and political power (Lewis. 2006). As already mentioned, in Rwanda, emphasizing Hutu superiority as well as calling out Tutsi oppression and their long-established control over power and resources played vital roles in fuelling the genocide. Similarly, in Northern Ireland, the Catholics' sense of discrimination in front of the majoritarian and wealthier "other," the Protestants, manifested itself primarily in their desire to gain access to socio-economic opportunities, motivated their actions.

In turn, the Protestants as well as the Tutsis retaliated out of a desire to reaffirm their dominant position and maintain their control over resources. Indeed, convinced of a zero-sum framework, the Protestants feared that any concessions made will negatively impact their benefits and rights, while raising the Catholics' status (Hughes et al., 2007). The intertwining of grievance and greed that motivated both the Irish and Rwandan conflicts also challenge the currently accepted idea that conflicts can simply be identity-based. While strong identities may play a role in sparking conflict, they are not the *sole* cause of conflict, as often portrayed to be, but are usually coupled with other equally important factors, particularly grievance and greed, which will be further analyzed in the rest of the essay.

Key Differences Between The Two Conflicts

Despite their equally intricate causes, the two conflicts were motivated by different goals. Thus, while in Rwanda the central objectives were ethnic and political, due to some parts of the Hutu population, particularly Hutu extremists, desire to dominate the Tutsis and take over power, in Ireland, they

were national, as the Catholics and Protestants envisioned their country's future in a divergent manner, as mentioned previously.

The two conflicts also significantly differ in terms of violence's actual duration, its intensity and the manner in which it was inflicted. Thus, the Rwandan genocide lasted only one hundred days, but led to the death of more than one million Tutsis and Hutu moderates and Hutu Tutsi sympathizers (Gourevitch. 2009). The violence was well-organized at all political levels, as not only the government, but also lower local authorities provided information and weapons to parts of the Hutu population, willing to participate in the killings. The genocide-committing Hutus became involved, either because they personally resented the Tutsis or because they had been instigated by the extremist media and governmental propaganda. The latter mixed its appeals to mythical images of Hutu heroism with hateful portrayals of Tutsis as Hutu oppressors (Ranck. 2000). Their key target was the Tutsi ethnic minority, who, for the most part, lacked access to armament and was, therefore, defenseless in the face of their aggressors.

From an official governmental position and over a decade of scholarly research, the Rwandan genocide has been portrayed as divided between the Hutu genocidaire and the Rwandan victims. More recent scholarship has started to underscore the fact that, in the Rwandan genocide, Hutu and Tutsi played the roles of "both attackers and victims, and systematically used mass killing to settle political, economic and personal scores" (Davenport & Stam 2009). While Hutu moderates were targeted by governmental forces, numerous Hutus were also killed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was leading an insurgency campaign in an effort to seize power from the Hutu government. The RPF committed not only spontaneous retribution killings against Hutus, but, also large-scale Hutu killings, especially whilst fighting to acquire more territory from the FAR and seize gain power and control (ibid. 2009).While the violence burst and consumed itself rapidly, the genocide was nevertheless the consequence of a continuum of tensions between the two ethnic groups building since the mid-1980s, as emphasized previously.

On the other hand, the Irish conflict was a long-lasting 30 year conflict, characterized by periodic local terrorist activities, planned and carried out by political armed organizations. Thus, while the main nationalist party with terrorist involvement was the Catholic Irish Republican Army (IRA), on the unionist side, there are several powerful paramilitary groups, such as the Ulster Defense Association and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (Mitchell. 2001). As in Rwanda, killings were equally inflicted, as the armed groups from both sides committed violent attacks against the other group. In contrast, despite its longer duration, the Irish conflict generated a smaller death toll than the Rwandan genocide, because the violence was conducted primarily through attacks that took place infrequently. Also, if in Rwanda, the aggressors, who ranged from police and administrative officers and militias to ordinary men and women, had varying levels of

political involvement and interests, in Northern Ireland, they were more keenly politically involved, as most of them were members and/or supporters of the armed political parties.

Similarities Between The Irish And Rwandan Peace Processes ; Politicized, top down approaches

Despite the mentioned contrasts between the two disputes, the post-conflict peace processes initiated in both nations were alike, in that they were politically determined without taking into account the needs and priorities of each country's citizens. In Rwanda, the reconciliation process was constructed by the country's president, Paul Kagame, alongside his political party, The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), in the form of community-based trials known as the *gacaca* system (Burnet. 2010). The courts primarily served a social purpose, as they aimed to ensure "rudimentary justice and punishments" for the Hutu *genocidares* and permit emotional catharsis for the local communities where crimes had been committed (Gourevitch. 2009, p. 39).

The decision to create the *gacaca* was taken solely by political forces, which, ironically, requested and listened to the opinions of "international donors, human rights lawyers and human rights organizations," but did not consult the population on the matter (ibid. 2009, p. 38). The government justified the official adoption of the *gacaca* courts to punish lesser crimes, by claiming that they represented a traditional, pre-colonial, justice mechanism, which undoubtedly reflected Rwandan values and customs and would not only establish the truth about what the genocide and end the case backlog, but consolidate the national unity. While, in reality, the gacaca represented more a combination of traditional with modern justice mechanisms, such the Rwandan Penal Code, the government's decision to adopt it in 2002 was motivated by the overall inefficiency of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and by a penury of experienced Rwandan judges, most of whom had fled or been killed and by a desire to gain credibility in front of the international community, by demonstrating that the Rwandan Government was taking responsibility and was committed to ensuring durable peace respectful of and reinforcing the country's traditions (Waugh. 2004; Moleenar. 2005).

Because of the government's top-down approach in establishing them, for many Rwandans, the trials remained a political instrument, a program of the state, not a unification tool. According to Molenaar (2005), the term "gacaca" was elusively used and remained largely undefined, therefore rendering it difficult to understand what the official government's vision and strategy entailed. Thus, Tutsis perceived them as a façade, through which the killers asked forgiveness from the government and the Rwandan people, but never from their victims, while the Hutus emphasized that they were a political mechanism for state control, as the RPF placed its own people in charge of these courts and ensured that they punished only (Gourevitch. 2009; **International** Refugee Rights Initiative [IRRI]. 2010).

The Hutus remain discontent about the fact that, after the atrocities, Hutu has become almost synonymous with murderer and that many innocent Hutus have been imprisoned for years because of their identity (Temple-Raston. 2005). Additionally, Hutus mention that the *gacaca* trials are intrinsically biased and discriminatory and politicize justice, because they exclusively target Hutu *genocidaires*, whilst completely overlooking the crimes RPF members committed against Hutus during the stopping of the genocide and thereafter (Moleenar. 2005). The Hutu complaints are supported by field data collected by scholars, which indicates that, of the around one million individuals believed to have died during the genocide, around half were Hutu killed mainly by RPF forces (Davenport & Slam 2009). Others data-collecting experts place the Hutu deaths at lower numbers than the Tutsi ones, but acknowledge nevertheless that the total was significant (Bhavnani & Backer 2000).

In Ireland, the peace process was even more politicized than in Rwanda. Thus, peace was considered to be attained by settling the political differences and reaching an agreement between Irish unionist and separatist political parties through negotiations. These talks were chaired by a U.S. diplomat, George Mitchell. After two years and a half of deliberations, the parties signed the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which, among other prerogatives, stipulated a two year period for paramilitary decommissioning, the release of mutual prisoners and the creation of a new North-South institution, Northern Ireland Assembly (Mitchell. 2001). Thus, the agreement exclusively dealt with political or public security issues and did not contain provisions addressing any social needs.

Just as in Rwanda, although the decisions ultimately had an impact on the citizens' lives, the population was not invited to engage in the process of discussing, creating and determining the most adequate solution for their country's future. Instead, the people of the Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland were asked, through a referendum, to vote in favor or against the decisions contained in the agreement. Although Mitchell, certain British politicians, including the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, as well as some scholars may consider the fact that the overwhelming majority of the population voted for it as an indication of the solution's success, this popular support may reveal the level of despair that the public had reached during the thirty years of war and its desire to accept anything resembling peace, but not necessarily an approval of the solution as appropriate.

The absence of public consultations is a fundamental problem that the peace processes adopted in both Ireland and Rwanda faced, because it highlights the gap between the political and public spheres and the fact that the citizens' needs and expectations were not directly taken into account when creating these reconciliation process. Neither Kagame nor the Northern Ireland politicians seemed to prioritize the need to understand how the people that they were striving to bring peace to envisioned peace, even though, as Uvin (2009) stresses,

different cultures conceptualize peace differently. Uvin (2009) himself conducted an interesting experiment in post-conflict Burundi to determine people's perception of development, peace, governance and their future. He conducted over 388 unstructured, open-ended interviews throughout the country, in rural as well as urban areas, with people coming from diverse backgrounds.

His research led him to conclude that many Burundians view peace as social harmony, helping members of the other ethnicity and having basic needs fulfilled; while, in the Western sense, peace is intrinsically linked to good governance and justice, Uvin's (2009) research concluded that many Burundians do not believe that peace can be achieved politically. Therefore, it is important to ask the people to express their opinions on both their conception of peace, as well as on their needs and expectations of the future development of their country, through public consultations, because this will lead to the envisioning of not just one, but several alternative reconciliation processes, from which the people can select, through voting, the one that they consider would best realize their goals. Even if, in an extreme case, the majority of the citizens' response would be killing the members of the opposing group, while the government would not implement this as a solution, it would nevertheless understand the level of polarization and hostility that the society is experiencing and the initial steps that need to be taken to engage people in a constructive dialogue.

Putting the Past Behind

Apart from being politically constructed, another common component of both peace processes was their focus on putting behind the past, so enable progress and construct the future. Kagame wanted the Rwandan population not just to forget the crimes committed during the genocide, but also to gradually abandon their ethnic identities. Thus, his ultimate vision for his country is that of a unified nationality and identity, where citizens will regard him not as a Tutsi president, but as the Rwandan president. Kagame's ideas reflect a broader strategy attempting to create a united "national" identity common to many anti-colonial and post-colonial contexts. (Mamdani. 1996, 1998) Kagame believes that surpassing identity is the only way in which the country can progress. This same idea has been expressed regarding Northern Ireland, as it has been assumed that the adoption of the Good Friday Agreement means the commencement of a new era in Irish politics, where the past hatred is put aside, simply because the population is sick of war, and the country can focus on constructing the future (Mitchell. 2001).

Continued Tensions, Violence and Segregation

The approaches adopted in Rwanda and Northern Ireland disregard both the persisting post-conflict social tensions and violence between the different identity groups and the importance of preserving personal identity. To begin with,

both conflicts left profound scars on both individual and collective psyches. Regarding Northern Ireland, Mitchell (2001) emphasizes that as a result of the long-standing infliction of reciprocal physical and psychological hurt, numerous Irish Protestants and Catholics have become mutually hateful and fearful. Nevertheless, Mitchell as many other scholars often disregard the perceptions and experiences of Irish citizens who refuse to identify through religious markers at all, and who instead highlight political commitments over and beyond religiously framed ones.

In terms of acts of violence, although the IRA promised to cease its terrorist activities after the Good Friday Agreement, since 2009, some of its factions have recommenced hostilities, claiming they want Northern Ireland's independence. Thus, in March 2009, the Real IRA faction murdered two British soldiers, while, in April 2010, the Real IRA organized a car bomb attack on the Military Intelligence headquarters in Belfast (McDonald. 2010; Gardham. 2010). There are other groups perpetrating similar acts, such as the Oglaigh na hEireann and Saoirse na hEireann, thus indicating that tensions have not been, in fact, overcome, but they still linger on. Moreover, as a means to prevent violent inter-group interaction, approximately 35–40 per cent of the population lives in completely segregated neighbourhoods (Hewstone et al., 2004). Residential segregation is often coupled with other types of segregation, such as access to jobs, shops and leisure facilities (Shirlow. 1999). In a study conducted in two selected segregated communities, comprising over 30 semi-structured interviews, Hughes et al. (2007) determined that both the Catholic and Protestant segregation resulted primarily from individual and collective anxiety, fear, suspicion and a sense of threat of the "other." The authors simultaneously point out that the two groups' fear and suspicion are different in content, as the Protestants fear losing their socio-economic advantages and the Catholics' status rise, while the latter attribute their ongoing anxiety to their perception of Protestant bigotry and intolerance (ibid., 2007).

Similarly, in Rwanda, although Hutus and Tutsis sometimes live in the same community, to many of them the possibility of creating a viable relationship between the two groups remains bleak (Gourevitch. 2009). Indeed, in Rwanda, some of the Tutsis emphasized that they find it difficult to live in the presence of Hutu *genocidares* who "hunted them like quarry, looted and burned their homes, or killed their family members." (Burnet, 2010, p. 105) Simultaneously, other Tutsis believe that the Hutu culprits trailed by the *gacaca* often provide only partial accounts of or outright lying about their killings, feel almost no regret for their acts and no desire to request forgiveness (Molenaar. 2005) Instead of reducing the Tutsi's anger against the Hutus, the latter's proximity in the community and confessions in the trails which are either blatantly insincere or are perceived as such only augment it (ibid.).

Meanwhile, the Hutus are discontent about the fact that, after the atrocities, Hutu has become almost synonymous with

murderer, while the deaths of Hutu victims at the hands of the RPF remain entirely neglected in the public sphere and in the gacaca trials (Temple-Raston. 2005). Focusing exclusively on condemning the Hutu, while neglecting to punish the RPF murderers represents a governmental strategy to silence Hutu deaths and keep them out of national and international public debate. According to Moleenar (2005), this situation "can easily be turned into a myth that is far more dangerous than being open about the reality that happened." (p. 89) The focus on Hutu genocidaires has, in fact, politicized justice, by transforming it from popular justice into the victory's justice (Straus. 2011).

Irked by the inefficiency of the *gacaca* to bring justice to their causes, numerous Rwandans, Tutsi and Hutu alike, have taken matters into their own hands and have sought revenge on those whom they considered responsible for their suffering, be it particular individuals or entire groups (Burnet. 2010). Fearing the Tutsi vengeance and believing the *gacaca* to be a Tutsi political tool to imprison them, many Hutus living in neighboring countries refuse to return.

The situation in both Northern Ireland and Rwanda suggests a post-conflict model of inter-group segregation. As opposed to Massey and Denton's (1988) claims regarding the positive effects of inter-ethnic exposure as a strategy to enhance interaction and communication, although the two groups technically share the same space, this proximity only fosters distrust, anxiety and fear toward the other group and a preference to avoiding inter-ethnic interaction to the utmost degree. Therefore, just placing former enemies in the same community is not equivalent with establishing positive contact and communication between them. While many scholars and practitioners emphasize the need to prevent post-conflict segregation, few of them take into adequate consideration and suggest solutions for the individual motivations through which people justify this segregation and for the psychological barriers that often determine people to avoid contact with members of the other group (Lewis. 2006; McGlynn et. al., 2004).

On a slightly different note, the idea, proposed mainly by Kagame, that, in order to progress, ethnic identities have to be left behind is untenable at several levels. To begin with, overcoming an identity dispute by striving to eliminate the different identities is not a viable solution, but rather a means to avoid creating a solution. Secondly, these different identities have been passed on for centuries and carry customs, knowledge and ideals that should be regarded as valuable and enriching not just to Rwanda's culture, but to world heritage as well. Thirdly, asking someone to forget their ethnic or religious identity ultimately is equivalent to soliciting them to deny themselves as individuals, which is an unfair demand and one that is hard to achieve. Finally, deciding to forget is a personal decision: it cannot be imposed politically and does not have true value unless heartfelt. What the goal of a peace process should be to learn how to overcome past fear of the "other's" difference, to discover and appreciate the value of the other ethnicity(ies) and of inter-group socio-economic, political and cultural equality.

Dependence on one political figure

Finally, in both Rwanda and Ireland, the peace process was, to a large extent, dependent upon the efforts of a political leader. Thus, Kagame not only managed to create the *gacaca* trials, but also convinced the majority of his people to accept them as a solution to the conflict. Similarly, although peace attempts had been carried out for years in Northern Ireland without yielding significant results, the redoubtable negotiations skills of U.S. representative Mitchell, resulting from his low-key, consensus-oriented, patient, but endlessly persistent style, as well as his efforts to maintain impartiality between the various sides ensured the success of this round of discussions (Curran et al., 2004; Curran & Sebenius, 2003).

While both politicians played an essential role in achieving peace, the degree to which the effectiveness of these reconciliation processes depends on their continuous political involvement is very different. Thus, the Rwandan *gacaca* is almost entirely dependent on Kagame's presidency. The probability that it would be abandoned and tensions would start up more violently is highly possible, not only because many Rwandans have emphasized that they only supported the *gacacas* exclusively out of respect for Kagame, but also because as stressed previously, the trials have not resolved the tensions and the violence, that, in fact, continue to mount (Gourevitch 2009). In fact, according to some Rwandans, the *gacaca* trails have only managed to ensure more security, not peace and, if the government were to break down, it would mean the end of all the has been achieved (Straus 2011).

Mitchell, on the other hand, remained an outsider in Ireland, a U.S. politician whose involvement was partly motivated by the pursuit of the Democratic Party's foreign policy and domestic interests. The U.S. key foreign policy objective was to prevent any resurgence in international isolationism after the Cold War. This goal was chased through several strategic interventions, not just in Northern Ireland, but Haiti and the Balkans as well (Briand. 2002). In terms of domestic interests, President Clinton's decision to intervene in Northern Ireland was motivated by both an interest in securing increased support from the Irish-American community, which represents an important electorate in the primaries and a fundraising-platform, as well as the influence of American-Irish senior figures on Capitol Hill, such as Teddy Kennedy, and of intense Irish-American political lobbying (Briand. 2002; Guelke. 1996; Reynolds. 1999/2000).

As a result of the national interests that he was pursuing, which were, to some extent, obvious to most of the Irish politicians, Mitchell was initially received with skepticism, particularly by the Unionist parties, who accused him as being imposed by the U.S., Irish and British governments (Curran et al., 2004). In order to gain credibility and acceptance, Mitchell agreed to "negotiate his role, the rules, the agenda, and the procedures of the talks" and eventually to remain a mediator in a debate where others had the power and the voice (ibid., 2004, p. 522). As Mitchel (2010) himself emphasizes, the success of the peace process he initiated *only* depends on the Irish politicians' commitment to implement it and the Irish population's will to respect it.

Despite their repeatedly outspoken commitment to peace and reconciliation, few politicians in Northern Ireland have openly addressed the need to forgive their former enemies, which is arguably reconciliation's forerunner (McLernon. 2004). This is mainly due to a fear of alienating their electorate by advocating for forgiveness. Instead, most of them prefer to use a broader approach, by encouraging the population to put behind their past, without implying, however, how this process may be successfully carried out, as was seen in the Rwandan and Irish examples. Local politicians are also avoiding tackling some of the specific post-conflict problems facing their communities. For instance, in Belfast, instead of addressing the issue of enduring ethno-sectarian segregation, largely resulting from fear and prejudice towards the "other", policy makers aim to put forth a non-controversial representation of the city and present it as a post-conflict success (Shirlow. 1999). They marginalize issues such as segregation, without first striving to understand its important underlying causes and assess the potential consequences that leaving it unaddressed may have.

Positive Outcomes Of The Rwandan And Irish Conflicts

Despite the multiple problems highlighted above, the Irish and Rwandan peace processes have nevertheless ensured a certain level of stability in the two countries. Until the 2008 global economic crisis, Rwanda and Northern Ireland experienced rapid development. According to Gourevich (2009), Rwanda's economic growth has over the past few years been continuous, while the living standards for its citizens are also improving on a yearly basis (Gourevitch. 2009). In Northern Ireland, since the Good Friday Agreement was adopted, one of the most important signs of economic recovery in Northern Ireland has been the formidable drop in unemployment rate, as the region went from "having the highest rate in the UK to nearly the lowest" (Simpson. 2008).

Nevertheless, the global economic crisis seems to reverse these positive achievements in both countries. Thus, in 2009, the crisis led to a reduction in Rwanda's financial inflows, particularly foreign demand for Rwandan goods, foreign direct investments and remittances, reducing the country's economic growth from an 11.2% increase in 2008 to only 3.5-4% in 2009 (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]. 2009). In Northern Ireland, in 2011, the unemployment rate hit 8.0, making the province fall behind the rest of the UK. This is also the highest unemployment rate since the Good Friday Agreement. While thus far there has not been a renewal of violence, it will be interesting to observer whether a faltering economy will increase the number of inter-group violent attacks in the two countries.

Conclusion:

All in all, the 'peace' which the two peace processes achieved was artificial and fragile, because they did not address inter-group tensions, while forcing the population to accept top-down political decisions imposed on them, without being able to voice their needs and expectations about peace and their country's future. Nevertheless, countries or regions that are approaching the conflict's resolution stage of their "identity-based" disputes , such as Darfur, have valuable lessons to draw out of the Rwandan and Irish examples about their own future reconciliation processes.

The first lesson that Sudanese politicians, the international community and scholars should draw from Rwanda and Northern Ireland is that conflicts labeled as identity-driven, which was the case in Darfur, are in fact caused by complex and intertwining elements of grievance and greed. The Darfur conflict has often been depicted as resulting from ethnic hatred between the Arab and African population. While this identification along opposing group lines corresponds with the grievance theory, there were other important factors pertaining to both grievance and greed that led to the Darfur conflict. In 1987, the Arabs published a manifesto of racial superiority, and clashes broke out between Arabs and the African population and were continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Mentan. 2010). The Arab-led Khartoum government sided with the Darfuri Arabs, providing them weapons and support, thus reinforcing an underlying assumption, characteristic of the northern Arab societies for centuries, regarding Arab superiority, and discriminating at the socio-economic and political levels against the African population (Burr & Collins, 2010). This discrimination has deep historical roots, as it commenced in the 16th-17th century, when Arab migrants first arrived in the Nile valley (ibid., 2010).

The African population's grievance therefore surrounded challenging these claims of superiority and defeating the discrimination experienced faced in front of the "other" and the Khartoum government's neglect, while the Arabs strived to defend their privileges. Grievance contained an important greed component, as the Africans are predominantly farmers, while the Arabs pastoralists, and they both wished to control both political power and precious natural resources, in particular pasture, agriculture land and water. The urgency to gain control over natural resources was further exacerbated by the environmental challenges Darfur increasingly faces, in particular severe droughts that have affected it periodically since the 1980s (Burr & Collins 2010).

In order for an effective peace process to be implemented in Darfur, these varied, but all crucial conflict causes should be adequately redressed in the post-conflict situation, in an attempt to prevent a resurgence of violence and to ensure peace. Simultaneously, in Darfur as well as other post-conflict societies, the conflicting groups must not be divided into victims and aggressors, but it must be acknowledged from the beginning that both parties simultaneously acted as oppressors and oppressed, however disproportionately this may have been. This is particularly important in ensuring that justice is delivered to all those who deserve it, regardless of their group, and it does not transform itself into a victor's justice.

Moreover, the problems encountered by Rwanda and Northern Ireland suggest that a successful reconciliation system should start at the citizens' level, not the political one, by determining the popular conception of peace, as well as the population's needs and wants. At the same time, political decisions must be a reflection of the people's interests, not of the international community's preferences. Furthermore, simply deciding to forget the past should not be an option. Instead, future peace processes, including the one for Darfur, should create a platform on which the divided groups could reconcile their differences by understanding and accepting each other's identities, stop fearing the other and accept them as equals, rather than rivals.

A peace process should be a collective and social effort, not the result of a single politician or government's efforts. Important post-conflict issues, such as segregation, which have been often construed as negative conflict results, must be understood and evaluated at the community level, in order to determine appropriate measures. Finally, while post-conflict gender-related issues have not been discussed in this paper, in Darfur and other reconciliation processes, the specific problems facing certain groups of women, children and men must considered and appropriately dealt with. Following these steps can contribute to ensuring a reconciliation process, in Darfur and elsewhere, that is truly effective people and justice-centered and that can establish durable peace.

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Framing Peace Journalism:
How Do The Turkish Journalist-Columnists
See and Evaluate The Concept?

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Introduction

Peace journalism, which emerged at the intersection of peace studies and journalism, has become a popular concept by the late 1990s. Peace journalism is a socially responsible form of journalism that aims to contribute to peaceful possibilities of conflicts. Based on the analysis that media coverage of conflicts often escalates violence, peace journalism aims to contribute to peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes, by "changing the attitudes of media professionals and audiences towards war and peace" (Shinar, 2007, p. 2).

Peace journalism as a new concept has many advocates as well as critics. This research aims at investigating the views of Turkish journalist-columnists on the issue. The reason of choosing journalist-columnists is that they are seen by their colleagues as opinion leaders of the profession.

To find out how Turkish columnists frame peace journalism, first we conducted an online keyword search in newspaper websites, and accessed 21 articles on peace journalism written by 16 different columnists. Then we contacted 107 columnists from 20 daily newspapers published in Turkey via e-mail, and asked for their opinions on peace journalism. Only 12 of them replied. This research is based on the frame analysis of the answers of this rather small group of columnists and the 21 articles published in various newspapers.

Peace journalism

The core work in peace journalism is based mainly on Johan Galtung's peace/war journalism model. Galtung in his early work with Rouge back in 1965 analysed the structure of foreign news in Norwegian newspapers. His aim was to find an answer to the question of "how do events become news" (1965). Later he adopted the principles of conflict resolution to news reporting.

Galtung presented peace journalism as an ethical challenge to conventional journalism (2006). In his binary model, he defines peace journalism as a transformative approach to conflict reporting, by raising the legitimacy of peace initiatives, empowering the voiceless, representing diversity of perspectives, avoiding zero-sum conflict frames and humanising all sides of the conflict can help transform images of the "enemy" and open space for peace initiatives. "War journalism", on the other hand, often escalates conflicts. Main features of war journalism makes a long list: it polarises conflicts between "good guys" and "bad guys" without giving space to diversity of perspectives, which often belong to neither category; it demonises the "enemy" and patronises the "victim"; it relies mainly on official sources without questioning their reliability; it defines peace in terms of victory or ceasefire creating winners and losers; it concentrates on short-term visible effects of war, often ignoring its long-term psychological, structural and cultural damage; and finally it does not give adequate space for peace initiatives, especially on grass-roots levels. Galtung advises journalists to view the conflict within its complete map with its historical and cultural roots, and to approach all sides with empathy reflecting the suffering of all parties.

Peace journalism redefines the journalist's role vis-à-vis the

subjects of her/his news story as one of a participant-observer, rather than a neutral outsider. The argument has been that the journalist is a participant-observer because the parties act differently in the presence of journalists, and because journalists' presence may affect the course of events. Therefore s/he cannot claim to be a neutral outsider. What follows from this argument is that the journalist has a responsibility to intervene in the course of events, and this intervention should be done in a way to contribute to peaceful transformation of conflicts. In this respect, peace journalism is a normative theory in that it brings obligations to journalists about "what to do, how to do and why to do" (İrvan, 2006). The nuances in peace journalism approaches lie in the questions "of where, when and how far this intervention should be" (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005, p. 15).

The roots of peace journalism

Although peace journalism is a relatively new concept, the idea that press has a responsibility to society goes back to the social responsibility theory outlined by Peterson (1963) in 1960s. For Peterson, press had a normative function in that it was "obliged to be responsible to society for carrying out certain essential functions of mass communication" (p. 74).

Also, two important UNESCO documents, the Mass Media Declaration of 1978 and the International Principles of Professional Ethics in Journalism of 1983 support the idea that the mass media have responsibility in contributing to peace and international understanding. Article 3 of the Mass Media Declaration, adopted by the 20th session of the General Conference in Paris in 1978 is as follows:

> 1. The mass media have an important contribution to make to the strengthening of peace and international understanding and in countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war.

> 2. In countering aggressive war, racialism, apartheid and other violations of human rights which are *inter-alia* spawned by prejudice and ignorance, the mass media, by disseminating information on the aims, aspiration, cultures and needs of all peoples, contribute to eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between peoples, to make nationals of a country sensitive to the needs and desires of others, to ensure the respect of the rights and dignity of all nations, all peoples and all individuals without distinction of race, sex, language, religion or nationality and to draw attention to the great evils which afflict humanity, such as poverty, malnutrition and diseases, thereby promoting the formulation by States of the policies best able to promote the reduction of international tension and the peaceful and equitable settlement of international disputes (UNESCO, 1978, 28 November).

In this document, the media are given a role to contribute to peace and human rights by breaking down the "us versus them" dichotomies and creating an environment of mutual understanding among people.

Likewise, the International Principles of Professional Ethics in Journalism, adopted in the 4th consultative meeting of international and regional journalists in Paris in 1983 under the auspices of UNESCO, support that journalists have responsibility in intervening for peace and justice. The eighth principle in the document, entitled "Respect for Universal Values and Diversity of Cultures" states that "a true journalist stands for the universal values of humanism, above all peace, democracy, human rights, social progress and national liberation. The journalist participates actively in the social transformation towards democratic betterment of society and contributes through dialogue to a climate of confidence in international relations conducive to peace and justice everywhere"[1]. The ninth principle, "Elimination of War and Other Great Evils Confronting Humanity", also calls for an ethical commitment to peace:

> The ethical commitment to the universal values of humanism calls for the journalist to abstain from any justification for, or incitement to, wars of aggression. . .and all other forms of violence, hatred or discrimination, especially racialism and apartheid. . .By so doing, the journalist can help reduce ignorance and misunderstanding among peoples, make nationals of a country sensitive to the needs and desires of others[2].

Methodology

The best definition of framing comes from Robert Entman, who says that to frame is "to select some aspects of a perceived reality to make them more salient, thus promoting a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (1993, p. 52). For Gamson and Modigliani (1989), a frame is "a certain organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to a strip of events…The frame suggests what the controversy is about, and the essence of the issue.". Semetko and Valkenburg underline the importance of media frames: "How people think about an issue, especially a political issue that is inherently ambiguous, is dependent on how the issue is framed by the media (2000, p. 94).

In order to find out how the Turkish journalist-columnists respondents framed peace journalism, we applied frame analysis to open-ended survey answers and to excerpts from newspaper columns.

Analysis

We sent e-mails to 107 journalist-columnists writing regularly in the Turkish newspapers. In the e-mails, we briefly explained our

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1 International principles of professional ethics in journalism (1983). Retrieved April 7, 2012 from http://ethicnet.uta.fi/international/international_principles_of_professional_ethics_in_journalism

2 Ibid.

aim and asked them to answer four open-ended questions. The questions were:

1. How would you define peace journalism?

2. In your opinion, what are the differences between peace journalism and conventional journalism?

3. Do you think peace journalism approach can be put into practice?

4. If your answer to the above question is negative, what, do you think, are the obstacles that hinder peace journalism from being applied into practice?

After several attempts, only 12 journalists responded to our mail. Applying frame analysis to their answers, we have detected five major frames, which we think, represent the general attitudes of the studied Turkish journalists toward peace journalism.

"Journalism is journalism" frame

Some journalists oppose the idea of peace journalism. Erdal Şafak from Sabah newspaper responded to us saying that it was the first time he heard of such a concept in his 40 years of journalism career. He states, "journalism is journalism, no matter if it is for peace or for war. Unless of course, you are not a serious journalist, or not working for a serious newspaper, but an ideologue or a spokesperson for an institution."

Bekir Coşkun from Cumhuriyet newspaper replied in a similar way:

> A newspaper has to report everything that is happening. It can't hide some events. Peace journalism as a concept would only serve to hide cruelty, occupation, blood and tears. This, in my opinion, is not right. For example, as you have seen, a concept such as 'tolerance' has come to mean flattering the government and the congregation.

Semih Idiz from Milliyet also shares similar views:

> The concept of 'peace journalism' evokes the idea that journalism has a different aim other than its primary aims. However, the aim of journalism is apparent: to inform the public in a timely, accurate and objective way."

"Balanced reporting is peace journalism" frame

One journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand from Posta, defines peace journalism as reflecting opposite views in a balanced way. He says:

> There are two types of journalists: One that advocates the ideology, nationality, or the group or

institution it supports. The other one is the journalist who, no matter what she or he thinks, reflects the opposite views in a balanced way. I call him or her, who listens to what the opposite side says and present it fairly, a peace journalist. The foundation of journalism is to present the opinions of all sides in an equal and balanced way.

This understanding equates peace journalism with balanced and objective reporting.

"Good and ethical journalism is peace journalism" frame

Some journalists see peace journalism as good and ethical journalism. Doğan Tılıç from Birgün newspaper is the forerunner of this view. Tılıç argues against "the peace journalism-war journalism divide" and thinks that this is an academic categorization, which does not match up to reality. He states that peace journalism refers to "how journalism *should* be", whereas war journalism stands for 'how journalism *is* practiced".

Ümit Alan from Birgün newspaper also views peace journalism as how journalism should be. He says that peace journalism is "the reverting of journalism to its origins."

Meliha Okur from Sabah newspaper associates peace journalism with consensus culture and respect. Okur says that peace journalism "is about respecting the reader and the audience, and giving them true information."

Fatih Polat from Evrensel newspaper equates peace journalism to ethical journalism. He thinks that peace journalism is "an accentuation that calls (journalists) to act on the premise of journalism's ethical principles. That is to say, staying outside of the hate discourse, and taking peoples' and societies' realities, feelings and aspirations into consideration." He argues that this forms the essence of what we call peace journalism.

Ayşe Batumlu from Ozgur Gundem newspaper defines peace journalism as "the objective and true journalism that is able to present events without detaching them from their historical reality and completeness." This form of journalism seeks to avoid conflict situations without making an 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy." Her approach is clearly consistent with the academic definitions of peace journalism. She further explains how peace journalism can be practiced:

> A journalist should not be an instrument of violence, tyranny and war mongering; he or she must abstain from publications provoking hatred and enmity... Peace journalism seeks honourable solutions to problems... Especially in conflictual processes, it is very important to develop a language and interpretation that would contribute positively to the solution. In this respect, good knowledge of conflict history, the ability to make conflicts transparent, disclosing secrecies and giving equal space to parties

are also quite important. Peace journalism does not focus only on one side's fears and grief. Because this would imply that the way to the solution goes through punishing or even exterminating the other side. Giving voice to only one side in a news story is against peace journalism. This method would divert (the reader) from the completeness of meaning.

"Brave journalism is peace journalism" frame

Şeyhmus Diken from Birgun newspaper thinks that peace journalism is a missionary journalism which can be practiced in a limited period. According to him, when the problem is solved, peace journalism completes its function. He says that peace journalists must be brave enough to oppose war and human rights violations.

"Solution oriented journalism is peace journalism" frame

Among the answers, the closest one to the academic understanding of peace journalism came from Alper Görmüş from Taraf newspaper. He defines peace journalists as "the ones who do not like tension and conflict; who refuse violence as a means to the solutions of problems; who believe in the power of discourse; who believe that all tensions and conflicts can be solved discursively; and who never say that 'we are at the end of words."

Şeref Oğuz from Sabah newspaper also defines peace journalism within a solution-oriented frame. Oğuz explains what he understands from peace journalism with the following words:

> Dispersing information and not propaganda, trying to understand instead of judging, placing commentaries in columns and not in news, and while doing this, conciliating individuals instead of decomposing the society and developing a style that would not feed the problem but help to solve it. This is what I understand from peace journalism in a nutshell.

Analyzing columns

We have made an online keyword search in newspaper websites to select the columns that referred to peace journalism. We have reached 21 articles by 16 different columnists. They all advocate peace journalism with different frames, and call journalists to practice peace journalism. One major argument in these writings is that "it is the time to practice peace journalism". Faruk Bildirici, the readers' representative of Hurriyet newspaper wrote on peace journalism three times. In his first article (Bildirici, 2010, August 2), referring to the coverage of the Kurdish issue, he called the reporters to practice peace journalism:

> The media have a critical task at this point. First of all, we need to put aside the attitude of turning a blind eye to a conflict, and to start naming the parties

and write about the causes of the fight. Of course, the language we use is very important. We need to communicate what is going on without provoking violence, without fuelling nationalisms of both sides, without becoming a party to the conflict and without identifying ourselves with either parties. We need to bring out examples that would serve to the reestablishment of peace and friendship. Because now it is the time, for peace journalism. As Professor . Dr. Johan Galtung, who coined the term, said, we need to pursue that kind of journalism which focuses on peace, truth, people, and most importantly, on solutions. Galtung's formula is simple: "A journalist should always question whom and what the story is about, and whether the language s/he uses would contribute to peace.

In the second article, Bildirici (2011, October 24) called on the media to use peace discourse:

> In 1990's, when a blood bath was taking place in the South East, the great majority of newspapers took side in the war. A dirty war discourse, which didn't suit journalism, was dominant in the media. Peace discourse was not used. What was happening was not boldly questioned either… In this new era, a "peace discourse" has appeared in the news. But, a provocative language has infiltrated news pages from time to time. The mistakes in human memory are not cleansed easily; you cannot wipe out the dirt of the past like you whitewash your house."

In the third article, Bildirici (2011, May 16) was asking whether the media can be a part of the solution:

> According to journalistic responsibility, one should not publish about violence in an exaggerated and sensational manner, not to disseminate the horror in a society, and instead protect human life and peace in all circumstance. But more importantly, journalistic responsibility entails abstaining from evoking feelings of hatred and from ethnic discrimination, and pursuing peace journalism rather than war-mongering. Only in this way, can the media be a part of the solution.

Ümit Alan, from Birgün newspaper wrote two articles on peace journalism. In the first article, Alan (2011, May 11) was criticizing the mainstream newspapers for not practicing peace journalism:

> But when the subject is "peace journalism", Hurriyet and Sabah, Ahmet Hakan and Erdal Şafak, all fall into the same category. They really resist practicing 'peace journalism'. In a country which lost tens of thousands of its children to this war, as far as one's conscience is concerned, one is obliged to think twice and research thoroughly, when writing a news story on such a subject. But they are not doing this. As always they fuel the fire. Hürriyet and Sabah, Ahmet Hakan and Erdal Şafak are brothers in this respect. I hope one day they will learn what 'peace journalism' is and write for the Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood.

In the second article, Alan (2011, August 24) was giving suggestions to practice peace journalism. He was arguing that although the mainstream media insisted on using the war journalism, there was such a thing as 'peace journalism'. Referring to Johan Galtung, Annabel McGoldrick and Jake Lynch, he explained how peace journalism could be applied in practice in the following way:

> Are there only two sides?

> McGoldrick and Lynch suggest that peace journalists should refrain from showing the dispute as if it consists of two sides. Are the state and Kandil only sides in the war, which has been going on for 30 years? Certainly, there are different groups on both sides, which have more reasonable demands, which work for peace, and which call for "no more bloodshed". Therefore, a peace journalist's foremost aim should be to bring forth these groups.

> Who are we?

> McGoldrick and Lynch suggest that peace journalist should refrain from using an "us versus them" dichotomy. It is certain, that this kind of discrimination is used to legitimize violence. Therefore, a peace journalist should take side with truth, and not with us or them.

> Searching for the invisible

> McGoldrick and Lynch believe that a journalism which seeks peace can only be possible by giving space to the sufferings of both sides. In my opinion they are right. Consequently, neither side is fighting with robots. All of those who die are our children and peace journalism can only be pursued by showing the sufferings of both sides equally; likewise by reporting the invisible effects and the traumas that is taking place.

> Using the words properly

> By the desire to create rating and scandals, the mainstream media use certain words very easily. For example, "massacre" means slaughtering of defenceless civilians, but this word is even used for clashes between two armed groups. Likewise, malign labels such as terrorist, fundamentalist, fanatic or head of terrorists close the road to negotiating with the other. For peace journalism, one should rethink these definitions, and perhaps not use them so easily.

> Towards the horizon…

> Peace journalism is certainly not an easy endeavour under these circumstances. To realize this, the alternative media that appeal to the Kurdish side must make as much efforts as the mainstream media in Turkey. Perhaps, at the moment, it seems naïve to some people, but everyone who says "Enough is enough. No more killings!" will certainly come to this point one day.

Doğan Tılıç (2011, October 22), in the article entitled, "Now, it is time for peace journalism!" continued equating peace journalism with good journalism. "For me, war journalism/ peace journalism is a just an academic distinction. Those who do war-mongering cannot be considered as journalists." Nevertheless, he contrasted war journalism with peace journalism:

> War journalism focuses on violence and conflict. It prefers propaganda. For war journalism, the news value stands in the words of elites, military commanders and those in power. It runs after victory. Peace journalism, on the other hand, looks through the lens of peace-among contradictions and their causes. It pursues truth. Rather than focusing on elites and on people of high rank; it focuses on ordinary people and their sufferings. It seeks not victory but-seeks solutions.

Meral Tamer (2007, April 20), from Milliyet newspaper, writing on peace journalism in an earlier time, was asking "who needs peace journalism". She wrote: "In an environment where a great majority of our media are racing with each other on a warrior type of journalism, the importance of bringing forth peace journalism is obvious. In my opinion, peace journalism must be explained firstly to the famous professoanls of the media rather than the young ones."

Ferai Tınç from Hurriyet newspaper also wrote two articles on peace journalism. In the first article, Tınç (2008, May 11) defined peace journalism in this vein: "We may not be as influential as a drop of rain on marble at the moment; but if we place compromise and mutual understanding in the foreground, if we not only reflect the voice of the powerful for the sake of neutrality, we may practice peace journalism." In the second article, writing about a workshop, Tınç (2010, May 9) continued, "When we perform the kind of journalism that helps people in society to understand each other, which enables people to realize their anxieties, we will get closer to the peace journalism principles."

Kadri Gürsel (2010, May 10), from Milliyet newspaper, wrote also an article referring to a workshop on journalism conducted in Diyarbakır.

> The media being an empathy bridge means to be a mediator for the Turks to understand the Kurds. But first the media should develop its ability to empathize with the Kurdish state of being. Only if this is realized, peace journalism, as Prof. Süleyman İrvan has stated in the workshop, namely 'a new approach to journalism, which makes non-violent solutions to contemporary conflicts possible, and which is truth oriented, not propaganda oriented' can peace journalis be put into practice.

Haluk Şahin (2010, May 9), also referring to the same workshop on journalism, said that it is not easy to practice peace journalism:

> Communication experts who attended the workshop emphasized that the time for 'peace journalism' has come. Peace journalism, which a Norwegian

communication theorist has suggested for all conflict regions, is 'a journalism approach that supports peace initiatives, focuses on the visible and invisible effects of violence and values conflict preventing initiatives more'. But although it seems appealing, it is not easy to realize it. 'Conflict' is among the most popular 'news values' (the other one being sex!), which means it brings ratings and it sells. Friendship and compromise are considered boring. They are not 'hot news' or 'breaking news', they are like calm winds or sprinkles of rain, which they make less noise.

Melih Altınok (2011, November 4), from Taraf newspaper, referring to the coverage of Kurdish problem, associated peace journalism with courageous journalism: "Certainly, I distinguish the courage and journey of those valuable people who perform peace journalism without any doubts today as they also did in those dark days."

Koray Çalışkan (2011, October 4), from Radikal newspaper, criticized his newspaper for not abiding the principles of peace journalism.

> Our newspaper is one of the few papers, which must be well-prepared for these days. We started with the slogan of radical revolution in media. We filled up Diyarbakır with Radikal blue; we said that we were going to do peace journalism, our journalists even ran seminars on 'how to do peace journalism'. When war-mongering became excessive, we said, 'Let's be calm, let's control our words, let's protect democracy' ... (This headline) serves war and not peace; not tranquillity but violence, rage and disappointment. It doesn't inform. It agitates and manipulates. Plus, it puts Ezgi Başaran, who, I think, is the best young journalist in Turkey, on the spot in the middle of Batman. It hurts all of us, the readers and the writers. It invites resentment but not peace. As BDP returns to the parliament in spite of everything, what we must do is to make a call to sanity to all those who have lost their marbles. While Erdoğan says "let's go to BDP", or Bahçeli says 'good they are here", what is expected from us is not these kinds of headlines.

Yıldırım Türker, from Radikal newspaper also wrote two articles on peace journalism. Writing the first article on October 28, 2007, Turker made a call to practice peace journalism.

> Defending peace, as a political act, has been regarded as the most dangerous form of opposition to the system. Because those who embrace peace do not only assume the spokesperson role for friendship and solidarity on earth, they also question the mechanism of the whole system and the power machine it is built on... Galtung says, "People-oriented Peace Journalism approach is to focus on all sufferings; to give voice to women, elderly, children and to all whose voices are not heard; to name all the wrong-doers and to focus on grassroots level peace initiatives; whereas elite-oriented war journalism is to focus only on 'our' sufferings; to focus on the powerful elite men; to be

their trumpeter; to name 'their' wrong-doers; and to focus on elite level peace initiatives...Those who are in charge of the media, who agitate people sharing the same country against each other, who talk about giving a lesson to the world and the Kurds, must review the principles of journalism once more. And without losing time. We know and we note down: what they do is not as innocent as the entrepreneurship of the flag sellers who fill the streets as soon as they hear news of deaths from the South East. Those who anticipate peace do not procure people's lives to war.

In the second article, Yıldırım Türker (2010, June 29), was criticizing the opinion leaders for their call to take side with their war-mongering efforts:

> Certainly, in these days, the press needs to be very careful and very sensitive. But the wish of opinion leaders is not to give up war-mongering. What they want is not peace journalism at all. They call the press to take side with war. Reminding what kind of responsibilities they must take on 'under these conditions', they are trying to establish the wartime press officially. Although they insist on saying that the peace initiative will continue, they constantly do war-mongering.

Necmiye Alpay (2011, January 2), from Radikal newspaper, was writing on the difficulty to practice peace journalism:

> Suppose, you are an editor and you receive a text, in which the words "baby killer" was used 27 times to refer to Abdullah Öcalan. Leave aside the hatred dosage; this is not acceptable according to reporting techniques. You remove those elements from the text and publish it, and you find yourself fired. Suppose you are a reporter... Suppose you are a TV journalist and you are reporting the news live, you constantly hear your manager's voice from the little microphone pressuring you to say the word 'terrorist'. You can't make news without using them. This is exactly what is referred to as 'conflict language' or 'hatred discourse' in the literature… In this respect, some members of the media are worse than the General Staff.

Derya Sazak (2007, October 19), the readers' representative of Milliyet newspaper, wrote on how to practice peace journalism: "When looking for ways to 'incorporate peace into the media', Johan Galtung mentions four orientations: 'conducting peace, truth, people, and solution oriented journalism." He also mentioned McGoldrick and Jake Lynch's suggestions in detail.

Ragıp Duran (2010, October 24), from Birgün newspaper, argued that peace cannot be realized with the war media. He wrote, "Peace journalism, developed in the West in the last 20-25 years, may not be able to produce solution itself, it is a method to be practiced to bring peaceful solution to Kurdish problem." He also argued that in order to bring peace, creating peace media is needed.

Mustafa Kuleli (2011, September 26), from Evrensel newspaper,

called the media to practice peace journalism. "It is time to leave the old habits, and to practice peace journalism. It is vital to act responsibly, and to choose the right words. Until today, there was blood under all words. It is time to stop the blood."

Hilal Kaplan (2011, December 4), from Yenişafak newspaper, wrote an article on Irish peace process and the role of the media, argued that peace journalism is to focus on positive aspects of the process and to use an objective language.

Birgün newspaper is the only one which publicly declared to practice peace journalism. In the editorial published in 2008, it was argued that doing journalism in war times is not easy: "The best sentence that describes the difficulty of doing journalism in conflict or war times, informing the public of the reality of the conflict as accurate as possible is probably the following: The first victim of the war is the truth." In the editorial, peace journalism is defined as practicing ethical journalism; multi-perspectival news coverage; and using conventional and non-conventional news sources.

Conclusion

We draw two major conclusions from the answers of the commentaries by the respondent in this study. First, those who are familiar and empathize with peace journalism, mostly reduce it to good and ethical journalism. Although their understanding of peace journalism is influenced by Galtung's peace journalism model, they imply that conventional journalism, if practiced ethically, can be considered as peace journalism. As a starting point, this can be seen as a positive step forward. If the term gains recognition in journalism circles, then it becomes possible to highlight aspects of peace journalism.

The second conclusion is that peace journalism is highly associated with the Kurdish problem in Turkey. This has positive and negative ramifications. The positive ramification is that the call for peace journalism while covering the Kurdish problem makes journalists more aware of the problems associated with conventional journalism's propaganda oriented coverage. The negative ramification is that it is only reduced to the Kurdish problem. It is as if when the Kurdish problem is solved, there will be no more need for peace journalism. In addition to that, peace journalism can easily be associated with having sympathy for Kurdish nationalism, which can make the mainstream journalists stay away from being labelled as advocates of peace journalism.

Is there hope, that one day peace journalism will become prevalent in journalism circles? We are not very optimistic on that point considering the ownership structure and the profit oriented media mentality. "If it bleeds, it leads" is the slogan of conventional journalism. This slogan needs to be turned upside down: "It shall lead before it bleeds".

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Hospitality and Hostility of Turkish Cypriot Identity and Citizenship in North Cyprus

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Introduction

> "Hospitality precedes property."
>
> (Derrida, 1999, p. 45)

This paper deals with the hospitality and hostility of Turkish Cypriot identity in North Cyprus in its various configurations, while highlighting its identification in terms of citizenship. It argues that we become who we are through a relationship of hospitality, by extending hospitality to others, different and differing representations of who we are, like a body, a language, a name, a passport, a citizenship, a birth certificate, a land, a home, a folklore, a tradition, gender, ethnicity, those who make up our community, etc., all the while unable to reduce this differential relationship to a self-identical and self-sufficient ipseity. It maintains that a continually negotiated differential relationship and articulation is the origin of identity and not a singularly self-identical and self-sufficient subjectivity mistakenly thought to be given in and of itself, and inherited from a past history and culture. It argues that using the alibi of an inheritance cannot hide our complicity in the production of that very history and culture anew in the present. Hence, it calls for responsibility in the production and becoming of the identity in whose production we are complicit. This shift in perspective opens "Turkish Cypriot identity" to its future becoming, hopefully to a future becoming beyond the trinity of ethnocentrism-nationalism-xenophobia, towards a form of solidarity different from the border politics of a paternal and phallocentric hospitality like that of nation-states.

My observations and analyses are self-reflexive and recognize my implication in what I observe. I also recognize my spatio-temporal and theoretical location in the postmodern condition, and claim the poststructuralist, postcolonial perspective (always-already) in deconstruction that also characterizes it, taking care not to close them to their becoming (different).

What I mean by the postmodern condition is not a self-contained period succeeding a similarly conceived modern one, in a successive serialization of periods over a unilinearly conceived time-line, as is commonly portrayed. As Jean-François Lyotard(1992) points out, that would have been a "perfectly modern" conception of postmodernity (p. 76). Rather, I use it to refer to the difference-within the modern, that is, within the present, that makes it at once the same and different from itself, decentering its eurocentrism and phallocentrism. It is thus a condition which necessitates that we take into account and negotiate the "complex figures of difference and identity, past and present, inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 1).

It also means that we need to come to terms with our own difference, with our own alterity and otherness-within. Even as individuals, we identify ourselves with a name and a language, both of which are "foreign" to us. "Our" name was given to us by others, and we had to learn "our" language as a foreign language. That we call our language our "mother-tongue" is a give-away. It is not ours, but our mother's, an "other" to us. We can never entirely assimilate the language that is our "own," which means we are both its host and hostage. In the Turkish Cypriot case, where the "standard" Turkish claimed by, and attributed to, Turkey is different than the Turkish spoken here, it

is even farther removed as a "step-mothertongue," as Mehmet Yashin (2000) puts it.

The crucial point not to be missed here is that, whether we are dealing with individual or collective identities, there can be no self-present, self-identical, or self-sufficient ipseity without this supplemental relationship with an "other." To think that one exists as an individual self first, and then enters into a relationship of difference with others is to commit the logical fallacy of metalepsis, that is to say, to put the proverbial cart of my selfhood before the horse of the self-other differential relationship.

My individual self-identity, for example, does not precede my relationship with others and otherness, but is, rather, the result of it.[1] When someone asks me who I am, I answer by telling my name, Tuğrul, even though I was not asked what my name was. But this Tuğrul that I am, is the result of a performative speech act whereby I was named Tuğrul. No referent Tuğrul preceded the performed Tuğrul. On the one hand, I am not my name. It is one more signifier of who I am. Yet, I can only become who I am through a relationship of hospitality, by extending hospitality to others, different and differing representations of who I am, like a body, a language, a name, a passport, a citizenship, a birth certificate, a land, a folklore, a tradition, gender, ethnicity, etc., all the while unable to reduce this differential relationship to a non-different, self-identical ipseity. Tuğrul cannot be Tuğrul without the name Tuğrul, even while these three Tuğruls are not identical to each other. In a fundamental sense, I cannot not be hospitable. Hence, the "absolute precedence of the welcome" (Derrida, 1999, p. 43), and this is why I picked the metaphor of "hospitality" as the running thread of my paper.

Such a coming to terms with our own difference-within will enable us to begin to think "beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences." (Bhabha, 1994, p. 1)

A continually negotiated differential relationship and articulation is the origin of identity and not a singularly self-identical and self-sufficient subjectivity given in and of itself. Difference is radical, it is the root of identity. And yet difference cannot be an origin in the conventional sense; we cannot point to difference as one thing; it is more than one, relational and in-between. Indeed, rather than "root," a displacing metaphor itself, a more apt metaphor could be rhizome, which recalls plants that have multiple roots, as suggested by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987, pp. 3-25).

Our individual and collective identities are thus formed "'in-between,' or in excess of, the sum of the 'parts' of difference" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 2). And that is why, collective identities conceptualized as indivisibly unified and self-same, like the

"nation" of nationalism, feel threatened by the "excesses" of identities that do not add up to make one whole and complete self without remainder, but which continue to differ.

Cyprus history, and "the Cyprus problem" that has been plaguing it for more than half a century now, is nothing but the history of such articulations—not that it has been commonly read like that. More commonly, it has been written as the story of the civilizational and political advancement of a singularly and miraculously self-sufficient and ethnocentric identity facing the threat of a similarly conceived hostile other. But, it *could* and *should* be re-read as the history of the contending and negotiated articulations of cultural difference, and that is what I set out to do here. I believe that such a shift in perspective will help us to better deal with the "Cyprus problem."

Identity Question

It has been noted that the identity question is a nodal point of condensation in North Cyprus "which knots together and hides, under its singularity, a multitude of different political, ontological, international, and ethical questions" (İlter & Alankuş, 2010, p. 263). Therefore, it is not surprising that identity is a persistent theme of public discussions of the "Cyprus Problem." However, there is also a tendency to belittle discussions of the "Cyprus Problem," and the problems of North Cyprus, as a problem concerning identity, seeing this as a reduction of something assumed to be more substantially significant and important to something that is superficial and marginal or trivial. That is why I want to emphasize, at the outset, the significance of identity. Far from being insignificant, identity denotes the signified, that is to say the very being, the reality, the meaning of the multiple and substitutable signifiers of "(Turkish) Cypriot"—including the very designation "(Turkish) Cypriot." Identity thus has ontological significance—its significance concerns our very existence as who we are.

We can see this clearly in the discourse of the ongoing public protest rallies in North Cyprus. A prominent slogan in these rallies continues to declare "We exist!" [as Turkish Cypriots] (See Figure 1). The recent rallies are nowadays referred to as "Existence and Survival Rallies" ("Varoluş Mitingleri"), replacing the earlier designation of "This is Our Homeland!" ("Bu Memleket Bizim"), which has a similar connotation also. Another prominent slogan declares, "No to the Elimination of Turkish Cypriots' Identity and Existence," which clearly links identity with existence and highlights its ontological significance.

There are a number of reasons for these persistent declarations of existence. It seems like the Turkish Cypriots are surrounded by denials of their distinct and independent existence. Historically, the anti-colonial struggle against Britain's colonial rule on the island was instigated by the Greek Cypriots, and relied on the ideology of Greek nationalism. Defining the proper self of the island as Greek (Hellenic), this Greek nationalism called for "Union" (*Enosis*) with Greece. Such a self-identification could

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1   In his chapter on "ethics," Jonathan Roffe writes: "self is nothing without an other, or others, to which it has a fundamental and fundamentally constituting relationship" (2004, p. 38)

only recognize the Turkish Cypriots "through assimilation if not as an other who does not belong" (İlter & Alankuş, 2010, p. 263). Turkish Cypriots represented the difference that did not add up to make one Hellenic nation.

Figure 1 "We Existed, We do, and We Will" (Tuğrul İlter)

Although the Republic of Cyprus, which replaced the British colonial state, was founded in 1960 as a bi-communal Greek and Turkish Cypriot state, Greek nationalism not only continued but picked up steam as the dominant means of self-identification. When the Greek Cypriot President attempted to tamper with the bi-communal constitution, the Turkish Cypriot representatives left the parliament in protest. All this led to the on and off flaring of inter-ethnic clashes and a precarious life in "enclaves"[2] for the Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, Makarios Drousiotis (2008) refers to this as "the first partition," also the title of his book.

This was all before the military coup against President Makarios of the Republic in 15 July 1974, led by the Greek Cypriot Nikos Sampson but which was engineered by the junta then in power in Greece, and the subsequent intervention by Turkey, as

one of the guarantors[3] of the Republic of Cyprus, in 20 July 1974, which led to the *de facto* partitioning of the island into the Greek Cypriot South and the Turkish Cypriot North, although the Republic of Cyprus, now governed by the Greek Cypriots exclusively, has *de jure* claim to the whole island. However, by supporting the founding of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, Turkey undermined the justification of its intervention as a guarantor of the Republic of Cyprus.

Because of this *de jure* claim, the official discourse of the Republic of Cyprus refers to all the social institutions and people with institutional titles in the North—from its self-declared state recognized only by Turkey to municipal governments to schools and universities, as well as the administrators, mayors, professors managing and working in these institutions—with the prefix "pseudo." For the Turkish Cypriots, the implications of this designation are not only limited to particular legal considerations, but have ontological significance and is read as yet another denial of their existence as Turkish Cypriots. That the Greek Cypriots voted overwhelmingly (76%) against the Annan Plan in the simultaneous referenda of 2004, the plan that would have reunified the island and bring the Greek and Turkish Cypriots together again, while the Turkish Cypriots voted for it (65%), has only served to reinforce this impression of denial.

The Turkish nationalism that was cultivated in reaction to Greek nationalism on the island brought denials of its own. In a mirror image polarization of difference vis-a-vis the Greek Nationalism asking for union with Greece, Turkish nationalists in North Cyprus declared that there are no Turkish Cypriots but only Turks who belong to the Turkish nation. The long-standing, but now deceased, Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş, who was the first president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, established in 1983 in the aftermath of the partition of the island in 1974, for example, stated that there are no distinct Cypriot-Turks apart from motherland Turks, that there is no TRNC nation, that the Motherland is "our" nation, and that "we" are a part of that nation, a part that has established a state in Cyprus (see *Avrupa* and other newspapers dated 20 April 2001).

For a period following Turkey's intervention in 1974, these Turkish Cypriot nationalists encouraged and facilitated migration from Turkey to bolster the weak minority position of the Turkish Cypriots vis-a-vis the majority Greek Cypriots on the island. From 1975 to 1979 immigrants who benefited from this policy received Greek Cypriot properties that were left behind following Turkey's intervention, as well as "citizenship in the Turkish Cypriot state almost upon arrival" (Hatay, 2007, pp. 2-3). These are the immigrants who were the beneficiaries of a deliberate demographic and settling policy.

And yet, as Mete Hatay (2007) points out, "while politicians in the North have, in the past, denied the 'demographic engineering' that took place in North Cyprus between 1975

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2 "Ghetto" is perhaps a more familiar term for readers who are not familiar with the local term "enclave."

3 To ensure the survival of the bi-communal constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey were assigned as guarantors of the Republic at its foundation (Macris, 2003).

and 1979, the government of the Republic [of Cyprus] has generalized all migration movement from Turkey to Cyprus as one of 'colonization' and lumped all immigrants and visitors into the single category of 'settlers'" (p. ix).

The continuing emigration of Turkish Cypriots to Britain, Australia, and other countries, fleeing the conflict and the uncertainties of the long-standing Cyprus-problem-without-end, the influx of immigrant-settlers in the aftermath of the 1974 intervention, and the ongoing influx of immigrants from Turkey, has made an impact on the demographic structure of the Turkish Cypriot society in the North, fueling the fears of the established Turkish Cypriots that their prospect of becoming "masters in their own home," even after establishing their own state, is under threat, once again. It is commonly assumed that, the one who hosts a guest is at home, feels at home, is the master of his/her own house. The subtext of hospitality thus asks the guest that the host's status as master of the house be recognized. As Mireille Rosello (2001), who is quoting from Abdelmalek Sayed's *L'immigration, ou, Les paradoxes de l'alterite*, puts it, "if one cannot offer hospitality, one has an address, not a home" (p. 18). Ironically, in North Cyprus we don't even have an address of our own. Because the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is internationally unrecognized except by Turkey, all international mail is routed through Turkey, hence the last line of our address in North Cyprus reads: "via Mersin 10, Turkey."

The Turkish Cypriots who rebelled against, and left their impotent and endangered minority status in the Republic of Cyprus behind, now face the real or imagined threat of becoming a minority in their own "home." The increasingly dependent and colonizing relation with Turkey, facilitated by North Cyprus' non-recognition internationally, and its consequent over-dependence on Turkey, the only one to recognize it, also threatens the Turkish Cypriots' master status while they nominally govern themselves in their own "state." This increased feeling and experience of powerlessness has created a favorable sentimental and intellectual climate for xenophobia, creating discord between sections of the established Turkish Cypriots [4] and immigrants from Turkey, with or without proper papers. As Jacques Derrida points out, "one can become virtually xenophobic in order to protect one's own hospitality, the own home that makes possible one's own hospitality…I want to be master at home…head of house…to be able to receive whomever I like there" (2000, p. 53). (Figure 2 "We want to be master of our own house")

Hospitality and Hostility

The subtext of this understanding of hospitality thus asks that the host's status as the proper master of the house be recognized. Yet Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida question this way of understanding hospitality. Levinas (1969) writes that, "to dwell…is a *recollection*, a coming to oneself, a

retreat home with oneself as in a *land of asylum or refuge*, which answers to a *hospitality*, an expectancy, a *human welcome*" (p. 155). In his oration at Levinas' funeral, Derrida (1999) concludes that, "if the at home with oneself of the dwelling is an 'at home with oneself as in a land of asylum or refuge,' this would mean that the inhabitant also dwells there as a refugee or an exile, a guest and not a proprietor" (p. 37). The host who welcomes is, thus, first welcomed in his/her own home. "Hospitality thus precedes property" (p. 45) This "originary dispossession" (p. 42) therefore undermines the property claims of the host, who turns out to be a guest as well. "The familiarity of the home does not bring separation to an end, no more than proximity in general does, and no more than love or eros implies fusion" (p. 37).

Figure 2 "We want to be master of our own house" (*Yenidüzen,* 6 September 2012)

The home is, thus, not a place of property or possession. It too is an uncanny other, a supplemental substitute that we use for identification. Hospitality of the other precedes property and possession of the self. The other, in a self-other relationship, which is the ethical relation itself, therefore, constitutes the very condition of hospitality. The very possibility of hospitality comes from the guest, for one could not be hospitable without the guest. Hence, the possibility of the host is derived from the guest.

Furthermore, the above mentioned model of hospitality, which references the "master" of the house, is "a conjugal model, paternal and phallogocentric," according to Derrida (2000, p. 149). There, "it's the familial despot, the father, the spouse, and the boss, the master of the house who lays down the laws of hospitality" (p. 149).

Instead, Derrida distinguishes between infinite or unconditional hospitality (an ethics of hospitality), beyond any human law, and finite or conditional hospitality (a politics of hospitality) which involves calculations and management of finite resources, people, national borders, state sovereignty, and which places conditional limits to hospitality. In making this distinction, Derrida is not proposing a choice between ethics and politics because ethics and politics are "irreducibly intricated," such that "the unconditional is, as unconditional, subject to political transaction: and this political transaction of the unconditional is not an accident, a denegation, or a last resort; it is prescribed by ethical duty itself… One should not have to negotiate between

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[4] This also seems to be the case among some established immigrants. In an interview published in *Yenidüzen* newspaper, a Bulgarian-Turkish immigrant says, "My feelings for Cyprus have grown cold, it has received too many immigrants" (*Yenidüzen*, 2 September 2009).

two negotiables. One must negotiate the nonnegotiable… negotiation is always the negotiation of the nonnegotiable" (2002, p. 305). As Mireille Rosello points out, the tension between the "apparently incompatible pair…is what hospitality is precisely about" (2001, p. 11).

The laws, discourses and practices of hospitality form a significant part of national identities. And yet, "a nation's hospitality can hardly be quantified, because it is made up of the untotalizable sum of individual or collective social practices, as well as of the layer of statements that comment on or judge the practices in question" (Rosello, 2001, p. 6). It is, therefore, important to note that hospitality does not only exist as "normative and prescriptive discourses [such as a state's immigration policies] that seek to be obeyed as laws of hospitality" but also "through constantly reinvented practices of everyday life that individuals borrow from a variety of traditions… practices that are sometimes similar to, sometimes different from, a supposedly shared norm" (p. 7).

Welcoming (only) the welcomable guest does not live up to the promise of hospitality, because, in this case, not a welcome, but a hostility, [5] is extended to the unknown Other; my welcome is reserved for the known, the "at home." As Derrida puts it, "the other becomes a hostile subject, and I risk becoming their hostage" (2000, p. 55). If I am sure that the newcomer is perfectly harmless and beneficial to me, I am not being hospitable to the unknown Other, but xenophobic. This would be like forgiving the forgivable, a programmed robotic action with no opening to the Other. The guest of hospitality is not necessarily a threat, conversely the host may or may not turn out to be a threat to the guest, but what welcoming the Other means is that such hospitality does contain incalculable and unknown futures. But as such, it is also the very condition and possibility of "good" hospitality, when all we have around us seems to be the "bad" kind.

Difference Outside

The nationalist variant of ethnocentrism and a xenophobic sentiment against strangers or strange others, which references it, is widespread in North Cyprus, and Cyprus in general. [6] Ethnocentrism is judging different others by one's own standards. The result of such a judgment for different others is their inevitable failure. Simply for being different in some way, the other comes up short. If the "self" sees herself as "civilized," perhaps by dint of speaking the "proper" language properly, the different other necessarily becomes "uncivilized," not able to even speak, a babbling barbarian. [7] The nature of

their difference is completely irrelevant in the determination of the different other's failure. The ethnocentric subject does not need to know about the details of their difference. Their being different in some way, so that they can be distinguished from "us," is enough to judge them deficient and dangerous for our self-presence as "us." Ethnocentrism, thus, is a perfect vehicle for creating scapegoats and is a seemingly "rational" justification for ethnic-cleanseing to uphold the supposed self-presence of the self against outside threats.

In identifying the self-other relationship, ethnocentrism relies on a binary-oppositional logic where self and other are polar opposites, as we see above. Difference, which would otherwise trouble the self-sameness of each in their opposition, is portrayed as being located outside the self: the other is different, not the self. In other words, in order to claim self-identicalness and self-sufficiency for the self, the self's own alterity and difference is projected outside, and excommunicated, by means of a binary oppositional representation. I have already pointed out, and will continue to demonstrate, that the supplemental relationship between the two exposes and undermines their projected "externality," and points to a difference-within and a contradictory hybridity, rather than a self-identical self-presence.

Depending on how the ethnos—that is to say the people—of ethnocentrism is defined, ethnocentrism takes different forms. If the people of central importance is defined in sexual terms, it becomes sexism or heterosexism. If it is defined in racial terms, then ethnocentrism becomes racism. If ethnocentrism is defined by fixing the centrality of a place for the identification of the self, for instance of the place identified as the West and the Western perspective, it becomes orientalism. If the people are defined in nationalist terms, we get nationalism. Similarly we get, ageism, speciesism, carnism, and so on, based on still further definitions of the ethnos of ethnocentrism.

That nationalism is the dominant ideology in Cyprus, and that competing nationalisms of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been the driving force of the "Cyprus problem," has been widely noted (Bryant, 2004; İlter & Alankuş, 2010; Kızılyürek, 2002). As İlter and Alankuş (2010) argue, "unless weakened and supplanted by a radically pluralist democracy, nationalism imagines one's identity as an indivisible unity" (p. 261) and feels threatened by cultural differences that do not add up to make one whole and total self without remainder. Let us note that this idea of a total without remainder is the bedrock of all totalitarian political orientations. I find it significant, in this regard, that, from the Republic of the French Revolution to the Fascist state, the symbol of the nation has been the *fasces*—signifying undivided and indivisible unity—from which the designation fascism is derived.

Turkey's increasingly domineering neo-colonial relation with North Cyprus has facilitated what may be described as a xenophobic, nationalist reaction in some sections of the

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5 This intrication of hostility with hospitality has led Derrida to coin the new term *hostpitality* (2000, p. 45).

6 *European Network Against Racism's Shadow Report 2011-2012*, covering both the South and the North, refers to "the mainstreaming of a most negative, xenophobic and many times outright racist narrative around migrants and refugees" (Savvides, Osum, & Pasha, 2013, p. 5). *Yenidüzen* had reported earlier that in a Europe-wide poll conducted in 2008 in the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots had come out as the most xenophobic in Europe (10 November 2009).

7 The word "barbarian," a word traceable to Greek, was used by Ancient Greeks pejoratively as an antonym of "citizen" (belonging to a civilized city-state), and referred

to those whose languages were incomprehensible to them, or those who spoke Greek badly. See also (Sardar, Nandy, & Davies, 1993).

established Turkish Cypriots. Considering the intellectual hegemony of the nationalist imaginary in modern Cyprus, this is perhaps not surprising. However, because Cyprus has suffered so much from this nationalist imaginary, one would also expect that we should have problematized it more. Resting on a binary oppositional logic, this reaction sees immigrants from Turkey, with or without proper papers, as representing the other of Turkish Cypriot—even those who have gained citizenship or those who were born here. For the established Turkish Cypriots, who are unable to be "masters of their home" in this neo-colonial relationship with Turkey, the immigrants, especially those from Turkey, are seen as encroaching on their "at home," on their sovereignty as host, and, thus, on their power as the host of hospitality. The other thus "becomes a hostile subject, and [the Turkish Cypriots] risk becoming their hostage" (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 55). It is this fear, the fear of taking such a risk, that is feeding the xenophobia. And yet, without taking this risk, there can be no hospitality. "Pure, unconditional or infinite hospitality cannot and must not be anything else but an acceptance of risk" (Derrida, 1999, p. 137). If hospitality were entirely risk-free, and hosted only the hospitable according to some tradition, authority, orthodoxy, rule or doctrine, it would betray the very idea of hospitality.

Difference Within

> "At the best of times, the host is the master (the owner of the house) and the servant of the guest. At the worst of times, the guest is the servant of the master, who is also the guest in his own house" (Mireille Rosello, 2001, p. 18)

The sense of Turkish Cypriot selfhood that the above-mentioned xenophobia relies on accepts no difference inside, and any different-others inside are targeted for removal. As Arif Hasan Tahsin—once a member of the nationalist Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) who later became a well-known opposition figure—put it shortly before his death, speaking to Radyo Mayıs (Radio May), "Don't let them think that we Cypriots have lost this cause. Cypriots will remove those who have entered amongst them, and will claim their homeland" (Reported by Ali Kişmir in his column "Bağımsız Köşe" in *Afrika*, December 14, 2012). While Arif Hasan Tahsin upholds a Cypriot identity, rather than a Turkish Cypriot one, putting a different emphasis on Cypriots who speak Greek and Cypriots who speak Turkish, and differs from most in that regard, he was celebrated, following his funeral, by the opposition forces pretty much across the board as speaking in their spirit. And his statement above is noteworthy as it highlights a number of issues related to hospitality that we have been discussing so far: the prospective host, who suffers from displacement and diaspora, thus lacking in sovereignty, wishes to lay claim to the home(land)—"I want to be master at home to be able to receive whomever I like there" (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 53), which, in turn, will necessitate another displacement of the undesirables inside, "those who have entered amongst us,"

welcomed by another Turkish Cypriot hospitality. A previously or concurrently welcomed "entrance" is now portrayed as more like an undesirable intrusion.

Arif Hasan Tahsin is best known, perhaps, for an expletive he uttered at a television program in Turkey a few years back. When a Turkish settler, Erhan Arıklı—who at one time served as the tourism representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in Kyrgyztan, and who is also one of the murder suspects of a Greek Cypriot protester at a border incident in the buffer zone in Cyprus in 1996—claimed on the TV program that he was as much a Cypriot as Arif Hasan Tahsin, the latter responded with "Fuck off!" Since then, "what the mentor [Arif Hasan Tahsin] has uttered" has become a commonly used expression to vent out anger against the domineering colonial impositions of Turkey on North Cyprus, such as its structural adjustment packets.

Another characteristic of this sense of ipseity is that it is considered to be an already accomplished, finished being. In fact, it is commonly represented as an intact inheritance from the past. It is thus represented in terms of an identification with a particular traditional cuisine, folklore, and memory of bygone days which predate the arrival of newcomers. A cartoon character seen in a number of newspapers and who represents the quintessential (Turkish) Cypriot [8] is Ömer Dayı (Uncle Omar), a wise old(er) man who is always pictured in a traditional dress from the past that no one wears anymore, and with the distant silhouette of the Five-Fingers Mountain located in North Cyprus in the background, used as constant identification markers. The Ömer Dayı character allows the cartoonist Serhan Gazioğlu to comment on ongoing events from the (Turkish) Cypriot perspective. In Figure 3 Ömer Dayı goes through a long list of people, food and cultural markers, and says "how can I call someone who doesn't know and like these, a Cypriot?" In Figure 4, Ömer Dayı and his companion are watching the ugly and messy goings on in Cyprus. His companion asks "Did you not say that this homeland was beautiful?" and Ömer Dayı replies, "I said when it was ours, and when it was just us." Of course, the history of conflict, (first) partition, displacement and discord in Cyprus before the Turkish intervention, mentioned earlier, belies this portrayal of an idyllic past, so we are dealing with a genealogical projection from the present which rests on a normative rather than a factual, historical description here.

Stuart Hall (1997) discusses how this sense of cultural identity defined "in terms of one shared culture, a collective 'one true self,'…which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common" has "played a critical role in all the post-colonial struggles" mentioning the poets of *Negritude* like Aaimee Cesaire and Leopold Senghor, and the "Pan-African political project" (p. 51). But he goes on to question whether this "discovery" of self-identity supposedly "recovered" from the past is "only a matter of unearthing that which the colonial experience buried and overlaid" or is it "a quite different practice [which] entailed…

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8   In one cartoon, Ömer Dayı says, "Cypriot is both my essence and adjective."

not the rediscovery but the production of identity" (p. 52)?

As Hall goes on to argue, this is an "imaginative rediscovery" [9] imposing an "imaginative coherence" and continuity "on the experience of dispersal and fragmentation" (p. 52), an illusion of coherence and continuity being the products of a representational production that takes place at the time of that production, and not something that is inherited full and complete in its self-presence from the past. As Jacques Derrida points out in another context, "inheritance is never a given, it is always a task" (Derrida, 1994, p. 54).

Figure 3 "How can I call someone who doesn't know and like these a Cypriot?" (*Afrika,* 26 August 2009)

Inheritance is not a given, because it is always becoming, in process, always yet-to-come. Every being is becoming, never full and complete, or in full presence, which means both that it is becoming what it is or who s/he is, the same as before, *and* that it is becoming different than what it is or who s/he is at any one moment. Difference thus persists throughout continuity and sameness. As Derrida puts it, "the same, precisely, is *differance*" (1982, p. 17). Our relationship with difference, with others and otherness, including the otherness of our own self, our alterity, is, therefore, irreducible to a simple given. Using the alibi of an inheritance from history/culture/tradition cannot hide any longer our complicity in the production of that very history/culture/tradition anew in the present. We thus need to take responsibility in the production and becoming of the identity in whose production we are complicit. And "there is

9   This is why Benedict Anderson refers to the "nation" as an "imagined community" (1983) and why Salman Rushdie writes of "imaginary homelands, Indias of the mind," in his book of essays titled *Imaginary Homelands* (1991, p. 10).

no responsibility without a dissident and inventive rupture with respect to tradition, authority, orthodoxy, rule or doctrine" (Derrida, 1996, p. 27).

Citizenship as Home of Identity

"Immigration policies reflect and impose official laws of hospitality… the laws of hospitality form a significant part of any national identity"
Mireille Rosello (2001, p. 6)

Citizenship has become both a power base for identification as well as the fiercely contested ground of disputes over identity in North Cyprus. This is not only because citizenship is such an important signifier of identity in general, but here, in North Cyprus, the unresolved "Cyprus problem" has made citizenship an even more complicated and contentious issue. Despite its claims of indivisible unity, the textile fabric of citizenship is obviously and unconcealably intertextual and palimpsestic in North Cyprus. Citizenship as identity, based on the nationalist imagination, believes itself to be self-same, self-identical, home unto itself, a simple given, an undivided and indivisible unity where difference is excluded through a binary polarization. Yet, in North Cyprus, it stands revealed as unabashedly divided, more than one, shifting and sliding from one to the other depending on the exigencies of the circumstance.

Turkish Cypriots typically hold a number of citizenships— Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Turkey, Republic of Cyprus, and other—and play their citizenship cards, often against each other, trying to maintain their ontologically independent existence against threats like non-recognition, lack of international stature, minority status, labels like "pseudo," colonial belittlement, etc. For example, their self-declared state, TRNC, is not internationally recognized except for Turkey. Thus, their TRNC passports are useless for international travel except in Turkey. Yet, holding either or both Republic of Cyprus and Turkish passports, they, individually, gain international recognition. Being able to get both or more of these passports, gives them leverage against the impositions of any one state, although their increased dependence on Turkey in face of the lack of international recognition cannot be stressed enough.

Figure 4 "When it was ours, and when it was just us" (*Yenidüzen,* 25 September 2009)

It needs to be stressed that these citizenship identities are not

identical. There are areas of overlap, as well as of divergence and mismatch, especially in the context of the "Cyprus problem" and the divisions fostered by it. Each could serve as a sign of both hospitality and hostility, affinity and enmity against the other.

The Turkish Cypriots are not the only ones playing the citizenship card. The nation-states, the citizenship granting authorities, also, and even more stridently, play the citizenship card as part of their internal and international power play. The Republic of Cyprus—even though the Republic was founded as a bi-communal state but is now a *de facto* Greek Cypriot state—selectively grants citizenship to Turkish Cypriots who live in North Cyprus to bolster its *de jure* claim to the whole island. The National Union Party (UBP), formerly governing the Turkish Cypriot state in the North until a recent no-confidence vote in parliament, for its part, continued until the end of its rule to grant citizenship to mostly Turkish immigrants by government decree, to extend its traditional patronage and clientelism power base, [10] to promote its Turkish nationalism, [11] and to appease the long and heavy shadow of its neo-colonial custodian, Turkey, across the sea. [12]

It is especially these citizenships granted by the UBP that is fueling the xenophobia among some of the established Turkish Cypriots, leading to complaints and protests. *Yenidüzen* reports, for example, that doctors organized in the Physicians Union and working at the State Hospital in Nicosia have stopped seeing any applicants for citizenship in protest, whose application requires a health check, complaining that the sheer number of applicants is preventing them from attending to patients who need help, that about a third of the patients they see are citizenship applicants, and that such a ratio cannot be seen in any other country (*Yenidüzen*, 8 January 2013).

In a conference recorded on DVD on "the structure of the population in North Cyprus" organized by the New Cyprus Party, Alpay Durduran, the Party's Secretary of Foreign Relations, had this to say: "I am coming from the street, I look around. Do I not see what the situation is? If I used to exchange greetings with 4-5 people on the way, none is left now. Thus, for me there is no question about the population. … Our concern

is to conserve the national, ethnic character…of the Turkish Cypriots" (YKP, 2008). Similarly, Mahmut Anayasa, the author of the book *İsyanım İşgale* (*My Rebellion is Against the Occupation*) says, in an interview about his book: "We are being suffocated in the lands where we were born. I believe that there are at least seven hundred thousand people in this country. Why should I pay attention to the delirious statements of the State Planning Organization? Whether it is *de jure* or *de facto* does not concern me. What concerns me is the street. Because the street does not lie. … Am I in the minority? Yes!" (Soyalan & Anayasa, 2013, p. 33).

Using such impressionistic indicators as to the number of people who are given citizenship, the fear that Turkish Cypriots are becoming a minority in their own home keeps growing. As one cartoon, drawn as a "writing on our wall," puts it, "when a Cypriot dies, the population does not diminish" (*Afrika*, 11 September 2009). (Figure 5)

In the days following the Physicians' Union protest action, we learned that the union had signed a protocol with the Ministry of Health, and that one of the items in the protocol mandated that people diagnosed with a disability during the health check would not be granted citizenship. This eugenicist agreement was criticized as a human rights violation by a number of civil rights and activist organizations. Mehmet Erdoğan from the *Engelsiz İnisiyatifi* (Disabled Initiative), Ömür Yılmaz from the *Gender and Minorities Institute*, Chair of the *Turkish Cypriot Orthopedic Organization* Orkun Bozkurt, and *Temiz Toplum Derneği*, a nascent political movement, all characterized this protocol as an example of discrimination, and as a violation of "United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities" (*Yenidüzen* 10, 13, 15 January 2013). Ironically, as Mehmet Erdoğan points out, the said UN Convention had been ratified in the North Cyprus parliament in 2010.

Figure 5 "When a Cypriot dies, the population does not diminish" (*Afrika*, 11 September 2009.)

A parliamentary inquiry into the North Cyprus leg of the Turkish Gladio ("Ergenekon") earlier had revealed that the Citizenship Law of 1992 did not require that citizenships

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10 *Yenidüzen* reports how a couple of migrants who were granted citizenship on 29 November 2012 were employed at Akçiçek Hospital in Kyrenia, beginning on 2 January 2013, as an example of such patronage and clientelism. UBP has a well-deserved reputation in this regard, and many unions and NGOs have often complained about this.

11 That "Cyprus is a national cause" is the oft-repeated mantra of Turkish nationalists. *Yenidüzen* reports, for example, how Derviş Eroğlu, the President of the TRNC, who had to resign as chair of the UBP to become President, stated in his talk at a Turkish University that he has always emphasized in the past, and will continue to do so in the future that "Cyprus issue is our national cause" (25 February 2013). Consequently we are appalled but not surprized to read in another news that when the Greek Cypriot documentary film maker, Tony Angastiniodis, who resided in North Cyprus at the time, wanted to speak at a rally in Karpaz, protesting the killing of feral donkeys by the farmers there, the police did not let him, on the grounds that he was a "foreigner." *Afrika* newspaper gave the news by commenting: "while the population carried over from Turkey is given the citizen treatment, Greek Cypriots who reside in North Cyprus are given the 'foreigner' treatment!" (21 April 2008). This incident demonstrated, once again, how nationalism does not accept any difference-inside, unless their difference is reduced to a licenced-difference, the result of assimilation.

12 Because these granting of citizenships serve self-serving goals, they too betray unconditional hospitality.

granted or revoked be published in the Official Gazette, and that the parliament's will at the time was against the publication of such information. In his reply, the Secretary of the Cabinet has concluded, "Therefore, there are other examples of citizenships granted by governmental decree which are not published" (*Yenidüzen*, 3 January 2011). Such lack of transparency, and its attendant lack of accountability, has helped the formation of a climate of distrust towards any official statistics and declarations concerning migration and citizenship. Even independent and scholarly studies, such as the PRIO Report, *Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking?,* which I quoted earlier, published after the 2006 Turkish Cypriot census, basing its conclusions on its results, was met with much distrust. In such a climate of fear and distrust, more or less exaggerated impressions and impressionistic accounts are gaining more credibility than any existing data. As Mireille Rosello (2001) puts it, "what is the power of statistics against fear or mutual distrust?" (p. vii).

The xenophobia, which feeds from the fear and uncertainty of this climate of distrust, rests on an ethnocentric, binary oppositional "othering" of the other, which reduces the unknown other to a known and familiar "other," and is conducive to the stereotyping of immigrants as "criminals" or as "settlers" with undue privileges. And yet, immigrants in North Cyprus are irreducibly heterogeneous. Many who study and work here are here on a temporary basis, and quite a few of them lead a very precarious life during their residence here.

Among these immigrants we have students and academics who come to study and teach at universities in North Cyprus, which are the "substitute industries" in an unrecognized country which cannot trade internationally, and which, consequently, cannot sustain the familiar kinds of industries. These universities were instituted mainly to service students from Turkey and hence the majority of their students are from Turkey. Then, there are the women sex workers who work in so called "night clubs" and who are part of the international "traffic in women." According to a study by Fatma Güven-Lisaniler (2008), the largest group (50.7%) of migrant women with work permits in 2003 was from Eastern European or former Soviet Union countries, and 86% of those were employed in night clubs as sex workers. The second largest group (46%) was from Turkey who worked at casinos, or in low-paid, low skilled jobs such as manufacturing, or as sewing machine operators.

Getting back to male immigrants, a considerable portion of them are construction workers working in the construction industry, which boomed following the collapse of UN's Annan Plan for the reunification of Cyprus, when Greek Cypriots voted against it, despite a Turkish Cypriot "yes" vote. As Ceren Göynüklü, a lawyer working for the Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Foundation, stated in an interview, "the pull factor in the use of immigrant labor [in North Cyprus], is the demand for a cheap labor force that is open to exploitation" (*Yenidüzen* 3 January 2011). As many of these examples show, the risk of hospitality is not only a risk incurred by the "host" but by the

"guest" who is hosted as well.

In sum, I think it is imperative for us to recognize, first, that immigration is irreducibly heterogeneous, second, that both immigration as well as emigration are internal to the becoming of (Turkish) Cypriot identity, even after we reform and improve our migration policy, as we should, and, third, that we need to learn to negotiate through and across our differences, rather than becoming fixated on unchangeably given and fixed notions of identity, which have no room for alterity or differences inside, and consequently, have no need for negotiation.

When everything is in place and everyone is at home, what is there to negotiate? If everyone were self-identical, self-present, at home with oneself, that is to say, if our identities did not differ from and defer who we are, then there would be no need for negotiating our differences—everything would be in place without any threatening becoming (different). But if we are negotiating (cf. Cyprus peace negotiations), can we still pretend that our identities are at home, non-diasporic, and not-displaced, not-migrant? As Derrida (2002) has argued, negotiation is linked to "the impossibility of establishing oneself anywhere" (p. 12), referring to the impossibility of claiming an unquestionable high-ground and a self-sufficient basis for judgement.

Any Turkish Cypriot identity would identify with this place called Cyprus or North Cyprus as its home. But if identification with a place is what gives one one's identity, if it is the home that makes her/him the host, consider the case of a young woman, interviewed by the reporter Çağıl Günalp, who says "I am from here" (*Yenidüzen* 25 September 2009). She is an immigrant, born to immigrant parents from Turkey who migrated to North Cyprus when she was four years old. And yet she has no other place to identify as home but Cyprus. A different example of the difference-within!

In sum, citizenship has also proven to be fragile as yet another, and just as insecure and uncanny home of one's identity as the others.

Conclusion

Whether we start at the level of a collective identity like that of a Cypriot, or at the level of an individual identity, all identities are rift by difference and involve an articulation of difference such that we cannot not be hospitable to a different other. We have a fundamental and fundamentally constituting relationship with others, otherness, and alterity. Most obviously, the Cypriot identity is divided into Greek and Turkish Cypriots, or, if you like, between Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking Cypriots. Furthermore, the so-called "bi-communal" image of Cyprus in general, and the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, does not add-up either, and is doing injustice to additional differences within Cyprus including Arabs, Maronites, Gypsies, Armenians, Latin Catholics, Britons, as well as many migrants with or without, or more or less, proper "papers."

"Turkish Cypriot" is a diasporic identity, having experienced displacements due to the "Cyprus problem," and not quite at home in her home state either, feeling excommunicated from the world community of nations and threatened by intruding strangers. Longing for but unable to finally return home where s/he could be at home with herself in undivided unity, s/he feels insecure and hostile towards strangers, whether outside or inside, whom s/he holds responsible for this failure to finally be at home with herself.

But "Turkish Cypriot" is also divided and different from her/himself, and it is so from the outset, that identity being the result of an articulation of difference. Difference and alterity are not latecomers, immigrants who arrived after the fact of identity. Identity is a migrant who is always on the move, never finished and completely settled, but always yet-to-come.

It is true that alterity problematizes any dream of a final return home where one could be with oneself in indivisible unity. But it also enables a shift in perspective enabling us to see beyond the nationalist imaginary. Rather than an obstacle that needs to be removed, it is the difference and alterity of the "Turkish Cypriot" identity that opens it to its future becoming beyond what it is now. Hopefully, to a future becoming outside the trinity of ethnocentrism-nationalism-xenophobia, towards a form of solidarity different from the border politics of a paternal *hostpitality* or that of nation states—even while residing in families and nation-states, like migrants.

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